Un impensé de la sémiotique : la variation (diachronique, sociale, expérientielle)

Semiotica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (234) ◽  
pp. 25-44
Author(s):  
Jean-Marie Klinkenberg

AbstractThe paper starts from the premise that the epistemological requirements of the semiotic discipline have led it to overlook the variation (geographical, chronological, social) of the subjects it deals with. After reviewing the historical and methodological reasons for this setting aside, this paper outlines a general theory of semiotic variation. For this, it distinguishes two families of variation – the variation of practices and the variation of attitudes – and three axes of variation: the spatial axis, the time axis and the social axis. It also highlights the two types of forces that govern the variation: centripetal forces and centrifugal forces. The paper concludes with the epistemological impact that the concern about variation may have on semiotics and disciplines that, such as sociology and anthropology, have made variation their subject.

Author(s):  
Christopher Cambron ◽  
Richard F. Catalano ◽  
J. David Hawkins

This chapter presents an overview of the social development model (SDM)—a general theory of human behavior that integrates research on risk and protective factors into a coherent model. The goal of this synthesis is to provide more explanatory power than its component theories. This chapter first specifies the model constructs and their hypothesized relationships to prosocial and antisocial behaviors. It then provides a synthesis of what has been learned from empirical tests of social development hypotheses for predicting pro- and antisocial behaviors. This chapter also highlights interventions derived from the SDM and summarizes their impact on pro- and antisocial behaviors. Finally, the chapter concludes by presenting future directions for SDM-based research.


Author(s):  
Mabel Berezin

This article extends the concept of events to bring cultural analysis to bear on political explanation and privileges “thick description” and narrative as methodological tools. Drawing on the views of Emile Durkheim, it argues that events constitute “social facts”—phenomena with sufficient identity and coherence that the social collectivity recognizes them as discrete and important. The article first considers the tension between the political and the cultural using a metaphor from sports and biology that unites agency and nature. It then discusses the intersection of events and experience as an analytic category that incorporates the “counterfactual” turn in historical analysis by drawing on William Sewell’s sociological theory of events. It also argues for the existence of “political facts” and concludes by proposing an analytic typology of political facts based on the classification of events along a temporal or spatial axis.


2019 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 575-643 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stef Proost ◽  
Jacques-François Thisse

Spatial economics aims to explain why there are peaks and troughs in the spatial distribution of wealth and people, from the international and regional to the urban and local. The main task is to identify the microeconomic underpinnings of centripetal forces, which lead to the concentration of economic activities, and centrifugal forces, which bring about the dispersion of economic activities at the regional and urban levels. Transportation matters at both scales, but in a different way. The emphasis is on the interregional flows of goods and passenger trips at the regional level and on individual commuting at the urban level. ( JEL F12, L13, R12, R23, R30, R40)


Author(s):  
Joseph Pitt ◽  
Steven Mischler

The modern search for an adequate general theory of explanation is an outgrowth of the logical positivist’s agenda: to lay the groundwork for a general unified theory of science. Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim’s “Studies in the Logic of Explanation” (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948, cited under the Deductive-Nomological Model of Explanation) was the first major attempt to put forth an account that met the positivist’s criteria. It initiated a lively debate that has continued up to the present. But as the attention of the philosophers of science became increasingly focused on the individual sciences, it quickly became clear that one general theory of explanation would not do since the particulars of the various sciences called for different accounts of what constituted an adequate explanation in physics and biology as well as chemistry, etc. This article attempts to capture the flavor of the debates and the nature of the shifting targets over the years. It does not profess to be complete, being largely restricted to work published in English, but it is a start. While the modern debates surrounding explanation can be said to begin with Hempel and Oppenheim, the history of philosophical accounts of explanation can be traced at least to Aristotle, whose metaphysics set the logical framework for explanations until Galileo urged that appeals to metaphysical categories be replaced by mathematics and measurement. For the most part, Galileo was not interested in appealing to causes or occult forces. The account of how things behaved was to be expressed in the language of mathematics. Descartes tried to capitalize on that insight with his resurrection of medieval discussions of causation relying on Aristotle’s framework framed in a mathematical physics, only to be countered by Newton, who introduced non-Aristotelian causal explanation grounded in mathematical physics. Finally John Stuart Mill begins the long march to contemporary accounts of causal explanation in both the physical and the social sciences, again relying on certain key assumptions about human nature. So the history of explanation is long and intertwined with a variety of metaphysical frameworks. The Positivists of the 20th century unsuccessfully eschewed metaphysics and sought to create an account of causal explanation that somehow aimed to stick strictly to the dictates of science, only to be thwarted by the metaphysical assumptions in the sciences themselves.


2010 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 317-343 ◽  
Author(s):  
ELINOR OSTROM ◽  
XAVIER BASURTO

Abstract:Most powerful analytical tools used in the social sciences are well suited for studying static situations. Static and mechanistic analysis, however, is not adequate to understand the changing world in which we live. In order to adequately address the most pressing social and environmental challenges looming ahead, we need to develop analytical tools for analyzing dynamic situations – particularly institutional change. In this paper, we develop an analytical tool to study institutional change, more specifically, the evolution of rules and norms. We believe that in order for such an analytical tool to be useful to develop a general theory of institutional change, it needs to enable the analyst to concisely record the processes of change in multiple specific settings so that lessons from such settings can eventually be integrated into a more general predictive theory of change.


2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (8) ◽  
pp. 652-662 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Flinders ◽  
David S. Moon

While clear lines of accountability are normally considered a sine qua non of any modern democracy, this article argues that too much accountability can be as problematic as too little. Through the application of a number of analytical ‘hooks’ drawn from the accountability studies literature, it argues that if the coalition government’s rhetorical commitment to a shift from a ‘Big State’ to a ‘Big Society’ is implemented, it may well flounder due to its inability to reconcile the centrifugal forces of devolution and localism with the centripetal forces of political accountability and public expectation. Indeed, without a more aggressive, sophisticated and indeed honest approach to accountability, the ‘Big Society’ is unwittingly likely to forge an even ‘Bigger State’.


2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (11) ◽  
pp. 0-0
Author(s):  
Дмитрий Богданов ◽  
Dmitriy Bogdanov ◽  
Евгений Богданов ◽  
Evgeniy Bogdanov ◽  
Елена Богданова ◽  
...  

The present work reveals the content of the principle of solidarity in civil relations. The principle of solidarity reflects interests of society and an individual as a single social system that allows one to form relationships between the members of society based on solidarity and not on individualism, when pursuing profit making and own interests the interests of both society and the contract partners are ignored. In case there are individualism and selfishness in society centrifugal forces operate, what pulls apart society into some (atomic) unit. But if there are the interests of solidarity then centripetal forces operate, that unites society, integrates the interests of the members of society and of the entire society. It allows reaching not only the balance of interests between the partners in the agreement, but also equilibrium and stability in society. Therefore, the principle of solidarity is of particular importance for the formation process of civil society.


2021 ◽  
Vol 70 (4/2020) ◽  
pp. 151-170
Author(s):  
Milorad Djuric ◽  
Djordje Stojanovic

Niklas Luhmann articulates the basic elements of his authentic theoretical position as criticism of, as he calls them, classical sociology or classical organisation theory. While within these orientations, (social) systems are mainly interpreted as centralised entities whose structures are stabilised by purpose determined at the top, Luhmann, in his general theory of social systems privileges internal differentiation in which subsystems autonomously define their purposes, making society more flexible and capable of responding to environmental challenges. In that sense, the main intention of this paper is the creation of cognitive interest for the notions of complexity and flexibility, i.e. for the issue of subsystem autonomy, as the important elements of Luhmann’s general theory of social systems. Our premise is that the establishment of subsystem autonomy is not a matter of mere, a priori, theoretical and/or practical arbitrariness, nor does it mean an introduction into deconstruction of the system, but it represents a necessary step in the creation of successful responses of the social system to problems arising from the immense and dynamic complexity of its own environment. In other words, through the process of internal differentiation, by establishing subsystem autonomy, the social system increases its own complexity, i.e. ability to adjust to the environment. Thus, challenges arising from the environment are not transferred to the whole, but localised and processed in the appropriate, autonomous parts of the system. By so increasing its internal complexity, the system undeniably acquires the necessary flexibility, or capability for a faster and more efficient creation of alternative.


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