scholarly journals North Korea’s Evolving Cyber Strategies: Continuity and Change

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Michael Raska

AbstractPyongyang sees the Korean Peninsula as entrenched in a geopolitical deadlock among great powers, with the United States continuing to employ what the North Korean regime sees as a “hostile policy” detrimental to its survival, its ability to shape relevant events, and the country’s political and economic development. While the core security concerns of South Korea and the United States are North Korea’s growing nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities, the alliance must increasingly also prioritize the continuous development of North Korea’s cyber capabilities, both offensive and defensive. North Korea aims to gain strategic advantage by pursuing cost-effective, asymmetric military capabilities, including cyber strategies, to gather intelligence, coerce its rivals, financially extort others, and otherwise exert influence in ways that are resistant to traditional deterrence and defense countermeasures. Seoul and Washington need a full-spectrum military readiness posture against the full range of potential North Korean provocations, while European democracies need to strengthen their cyber readiness posture to effectively track and counter North Korea’s evolving global cyber operations.

Author(s):  
Geir Lundestad

There are no laws in history. Realists, liberals, and others are both right and wrong. Although no one can be certain that military incidents may not happen, for the foreseeable future China and the United States are unlikely to favor major war. They have cooperated well for almost four decades now. China is likely to continue to focus on its economic modernization. It has far to go to measure up to the West. The American-Chinese economies are still complementary. A conflict with the United States or even with China’s neighbors would have damaging repercussions for China’s economic goals. The United States is so strong that it would make little sense for China to take it on militarily. There are also other deterrents against war, from nuclear weapons to emerging norms about international relations. It is anybody’s guess what will happen after the next few decades. History indicates anything is possible.


Author(s):  
Joseph Cirincione

The American poet Robert Frost famously mused on whether the world will end in fire or in ice. Nuclear weapons can deliver both. The fire is obvious: modern hydrogen bombs duplicate on the surface of the earth the enormous thermonuclear energies of the Sun, with catastrophic consequences. But it might be a nuclear cold that kills the planet. A nuclear war with as few as 100 hundred weapons exploded in urban cores could blanket the Earth in smoke, ushering in a years-long nuclear winter, with global droughts and massive crop failures. The nuclear age is now entering its seventh decade. For most of these years, citizens and officials lived with the constant fear that long-range bombers and ballistic missiles would bring instant, total destruction to the United States, the Soviet Union, many other nations, and, perhaps, the entire planet. Fifty years ago, Nevil Shute’s best-selling novel, On the Beach, portrayed the terror of survivors as they awaited the radioactive clouds drifting to Australia from a northern hemisphere nuclear war. There were then some 7000 nuclear weapons in the world, with the United States outnumbering the Soviet Union 10 to 1. By the 1980s, the nuclear danger had grown to grotesque proportions. When Jonathan Schell’s chilling book, The Fate of the Earth, was published in 1982, there were then almost 60,000 nuclear weapons stockpiled with a destructive force equal to roughly 20,000 megatons (20 billion tons) of TNT, or over 1 million times the power of the Hiroshima bomb. President Ronald Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ anti-missile system was supposed to defeat a first-wave attack of some 5000 Soviet SS-18 and SS-19 missile warheads streaking over the North Pole. ‘These bombs’, Schell wrote, ‘were built as “weapons” for “war”, but their significance greatly transcends war and all its causes and outcomes. They grew out of history, yet they threaten to end history. They were made by men, yet they threaten to annihilate man’.


2019 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 88-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eliza Gheorghe

The evolution of the nuclear market explains why there are only nine members of the nuclear club, not twenty-five or more, as some analysts predicted. In the absence of a supplier cartel that can regulate nuclear transfers, the more suppliers there are, the more intense their competition will be, as they vie for market share. This commercial rivalry makes it easier for nuclear technology to spread, because buyers can play suppliers off against each other. The ensuing transfers help countries either acquire nuclear weapons or become hedgers. The great powers (China, Russia, and the United States) seek to thwart proliferation by limiting transfers and putting safeguards on potentially dangerous nuclear technologies. Their success depends on two structural factors: the global distribution of power and the intensity of the security rivalry among them. Thwarters are most likely to stem proliferation when the system is unipolar and least likely when it is multipolar. In bipolarity, their prospects fall somewhere in between. In addition, the more intense the rivalry among the great powers in bipolarity and multipolarity, the less effective they will be at curbing proliferation. Given the potential for intense security rivalry among today's great powers, the shift from unipolarity to multipolarity does not portend well for checking proliferation.


10.1068/a3469 ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 33 (10) ◽  
pp. 1807-1827 ◽  
Author(s):  
Becky Mansfield

Debates about the relationship between globalization and state power have often relied on a static view of spatial scales as discrete stages for social interaction. Focusing instead on the ‘production of scale’, several researchers have argued that globalization leads to rescaling of the state, as regulatory powers are realigned both upwards to supranational regimes and downwards to regional, local, and urban governance structures. Although this perspective quite usefully treats scale as relational, this ‘glocalization’ argument remains somewhat schematic and does not allow for a full range of possible scalar configurations. Highlighting instead heterogeneity of scalar relations, in this paper I analyze the ways that United States' fishery development in the North Pacific produced both national power and transnational economic activity. After extending political jurisdiction over waters up to 200 nautical miles from shore, the United States implemented fishery development policies that emphasized the ‘Americanization’ of the Alaska pollock fishery at the expense of an international, particularly Japanese, fishery. The outcomes of these policies, however, have been international partnerships, foreign direct investment, and increased international trade, all of which have made the pollock industry simultaneously national and transnational. Efforts to assert and implement control over ocean territory produced both the national state and globalization, which were mutually reinforcing rather than antagonistic. Treating national states and the global economy as complex, contingent scalar configurations facilitates analysis of the causes of variability in state – economy relations.


Author(s):  
Patrick McEachern

After a year of trading colorful barbs with the American president and significant achievements in North Korea’s decades-long nuclear and missile development programs, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un declared mission accomplished in November 2017. Though Kim's pronouncement appears premature, North Korea is on the verge of being able to strike the United States with nuclear weapons. South Korea has long been in the North Korean crosshairs but worries whether the United States would defend it if North Korea holds the American homeland at risk. The largely ceremonial summit between US president Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un, and the unpredictability of both parties, has not quelled these concerns and leaves more questions than answers for the two sides' negotiators to work out. The Korean Peninsula’s security situation is an intractable conflict, raising the question, “How did we get here?” In this book, former North Korea lead foreign service officer at the US embassy in Seoul Patrick McEachern unpacks the contentious and tangled relationship between the Koreas in an approachable question-and-answer format. While North Korea is famous for its militarism and nuclear program, South Korea is best known for its economic miracle, familiar to consumers as the producer of Samsung smartphones, Hyundai cars, and even K-pop music and K-beauty. Why have the two Koreas developed politically and economically in such radically different ways? What are the origins of a divided Korean Peninsula? Who rules the two Koreas? How have three generations of the authoritarian Kim dictatorship shaped North Korea? What is the history of North-South relations? Why does the North Korean government develop nuclear weapons? How do powers such as Japan, China, and Russia fit into the mix? What is it like to live in North and South Korea? This book tackles these broad topics and many more to explain what everyone needs to know about South and North Korea.


2010 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 7-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael S. Gerson

The release of the Barack Obama administration's much-anticipated Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) concluded an intense, yearlong effort to revamp U.S. nuclear weapons policy to better address modern threats. Despite general agreement that the United States' nuclear policy and posture was in need of overhaul, there were strong disagreements over what kinds of changes should be made. At the core of these debates was the issue of U.S. declaratory policy—the stated role and purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons. Whereas some members of the administration advocated that the United States retain all of the flexibility and options afforded by the policy of calculated ambiguity, others contended that to fulfill President Obama's commitment to “put an end to Cold War thinking” and “reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy,” the United States should adopt a more restrictive nuclear policy such as no first use (NFU), perhaps in the form of a declaration that the “sole purpose” of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack. By not adopting NFU, the NPR missed an important opportunity to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy. The traditional case for NFU hinges on the argument that the threat of nuclear first use is unnecessary for deterrence. Yet the continued U.S. option to use nuclear weapons first is not only unnecessary but dangerous. Given the size and accuracy of the current U.S. nuclear arsenal, and given the variation in the nuclear capabilities of current and potential adversaries, the first-use option risks creating instabilities in a severe crisis that increase the chances of accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate nuclear use. In a future crisis with a nuclear-armed state, the fear—whether real or imagined—that the United States might attempt a disarming nuclear first-strike increases the possibility of nuclear escalation.


1969 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 711-746 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edwin Brown Firmage

On March 13, 1969, the United States Senate by a vote of 83 to 15 consented to the ratification of a treaty described as “the most important international agreement brought before the U. S. Senate since the North Atlantic Pact” and “the most important international agreement limiting nuclear arms since the nuclear age began.” Assuming a timely entry into force, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons may delay incarnation of the specter which “haunted” John F. Kennedy:I see the possibility in the 1970's of the President of the United States having to face a world in which 15 or 20 or 25 nations may have these [nuclear] weapons. I regard that as the greatest possible danger and hazard.


2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-81
Author(s):  
TAKU TAMAKI

AbstractA series of Six-Party Talks involving the United States, China, Japan, South and North Korea, and Russia resulted in the emergence of a narrative of a ‘nuclear-free Korean Peninsula’. Given the prevalence of nuclear weapons amidst Sino-American rivalry, the area is hardly ‘nuclear-free’. Instead, the phrase has evolved into a common signifier for the US and China, suggesting that, despite their rivalries, the North Korean nuclear issue can be detrimental for both – a rare convergence of interests in an often sensitive bilateral relationship. This article provides a Constructivist perspective to this particular aspect of Sino-American balance of power by taking the language of ‘nuclear-free’ seriously, recasting the phrase as borne of both mutual scepticism, as well as convergent interests, over the Korean Peninsula.


1984 ◽  
Vol 17 (01) ◽  
pp. 24-32
Author(s):  
Michael Mandelbaum

Of all modern machines, indeed of all the artifacts of modern culture, the bomb is the most frightening. It is the most dangerous of all human inventions. The American, European, and Soviet people have always known how dangerous it is. They have, nevertheless, left nuclear weapons in the hands of the nuclear priesthood. (In the Soviet Union this has not been a matter of choice.) In the 1980s some in the West resolved to take control of the bomb. They began to demand that disarmament replace deterrence as the principal nuclear business of the Atlantic alliance.Probably from 1945 onward the average American or European would, if asked, have said that he wanted to do away with all nuclear arsenals rather than refine or increase them. But the average Westerner was not asked, and did not say so, at least not in any way that influenced public policy. In the 1980s citizens of the West did begin to say so, publicly, loudly, and in growing numbers. For the first time, a mass movement dedicated to shaping the nuclear future appeared on both sides of the Atlantic.In this, as in other things, the North American and the European wings of NATO differ. Opposition to the alliance's nuclear weapons policies made itself known earlier in Europe than in the United States. Both European and American anti-nuclear weapons activists aimed ultimately to lift the nuclear siege that the world must endure as long as these weapons exist. But each rallied around a more immediate issue, and the issues were different. The Europeans opposed the stationing of 572 intermediate-range missiles on the continent, which the NATO governments deemed necessary to offset comparable Soviet weapons. In the United States a proposal to freeze the deployment, testing, and manufacture of all weapons by both superpowers attracted wide support.


2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weiqi Zhang ◽  
Ginger L. Denton

North Korea has repeatedly defied the international community with regards to its nuclear weapons programme. Many look to China for leverage to change North Korea’s behaviour. This study reviews the development of the China–North Korean relationship and conducts a statistical analysis on the impact of China’s influence on North Korea. Our analysis finds China’s leverage on North Korea to be nuanced. We maintain that North Korea has been wary of China’s influence. Complete isolation or pressure from China under certain conditions will render North Korea more resistant to China’s influence. We also suggest that the key to the North Korean issue is still in the hands of the United States and the entire international community through the use of an engagement strategy.


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