scholarly journals Participation of the Turkish Military in the Economy of the State: Case of Indirect Praetorionism

Politologija ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 99 (3) ◽  
pp. 8-40
Author(s):  
Valerij Špak

Based on the example of the Turkish military’s involvement in the country’s economy, this article seeks to complement the concept of praetorionism and to highlight the mechanisms of indirect praetorionism. The Turkish army plays an important role in the country’s economy, while the military pension fund OYAK is considered one of the country’s business giants. It provides an opportunity to maintain disproportionate institutional autonomy and weakens civilian control mechanisms. This provides the military with additional instruments of political influence and encourages the emergence of hidden mechanisms of praetorianism. The article seeks to understand new phenomena and trends in the interaction between the society and the military, as the involvement of the Turkish army in the country’s economy changes the concept of praetorianism and provides new, indirect ways of intervening in public policy. Because of how the Turkish military controls business companies using a privileged position in the country’s economy, corruption mechanisms that influence the mechanisms of the redistribution of economic resources and the pursuit of rents have an indirect impact on the political system of the state. In this way, military entrepreneurship has transformed the conceptual structure of praetorians and complemented interventions with indirect forms of influence, such as corruption, economic dominance, and the distortion of economic reforms.

Author(s):  
Kristina Mani

The Honduran military has a long history of established roles oriented toward both external defense and internal security and civic action. Since the end of military rule in 1982, the military has remained a key political, economic, and social actor. Politically, the military retains a constitutional mandate as guarantor of the political system and enforcer of electoral rules. Economically, its officers direct state enterprises and manage a massive pension fund obscured from public audit. Socially, the military takes on numerous civic action tasks—building infrastructure, conserving forests, providing healthcare, and policing crime—that make the state appear to be useful to its people and bring the military into direct contact with the public almost daily. As a result, the military has ranked high in public trust in comparison with other institutions of the state. Most significantly, the military has retained the role of arbiter in the Honduran political system. This became brutally clear in the coup of 2009 that removed the elected president, Manuel Zelaya. Although new rules enhancing civilian control of the military had been instituted during the 1990s, the military’s authority in politics was restored through the coup that ousted Zelaya. As no civilian politician can succeed without support for and from the military, the missions of the armed forces have expanded substantially so that the military is an “all-purpose” institution within a remarkably weak and increasingly corrupt state.


Author(s):  
Oren Barak

Since Lebanon’s independence in the mid-1940s, its military—the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)—has played a pivotal role in the country’s politics. The political role of the LAF in Lebanon might seem surprising since the Lebanese state did not militarize, and its political leaders have continuously managed to keep their military relatively weak and small. Indeed, in this respect Lebanon has been markedly different from its close neighbors (Syria and Israel), but also from several other Middle Eastern states (especially Egypt and Iraq), where the military, which was large and powerful, was continuously involved in politics. Additionally, both Lebanon and the LAF have persistently striven to distance themselves from regional conflicts since 1949, particularly in relation to the Palestinian issue, albeit not always successfully. Still, and despite these ostensibly unfavorable factors for the military’s involvement in politics in Lebanon, the LAF has played an important political role in the state since its independence. This role, which has been marked by elements of continuity and change over the years, included mediation and arbitration between rival political factions (in 1945–1958, 2008, 2011, and 2019); attempts to dominate the political system (in 1958–1970 and 1988–1990); intervention in the Lebanese civil war (in 1975–1976 and 1982–1984); attempts to regain its balancing role in politics (in 1979–1982 and 1984–1988); and facilitating the state’s postwar reconstruction (since 1991). The political role of the military in Lebanon can be explained by several factors. First, the weakness of Lebanon’s political system and its inability to resolve crises between its members. Second, Lebanon’s divided society and its members’ general distrust towards its civilian politicians. Third, the basic characteristics of Lebanon’s military, which, in most periods, enjoyed broad public support that cuts across the lines of community, region, and family, and found appeal among domestic and external audiences, which, in their turn, acquiesced to its political role in the state.


2009 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 72-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oren Yiftachel

Focusing primarily on Israeli voter attitudes with respect to the Zionist-Palestinian conflict, this paper argues that the results of the 2009 elections highlight the structural entanglement of Israeli politics within a colonialist process of ““creeping apartheid”” not only in the West Bank but in Israel proper. The elections also demonstrated the continuing relevance of identity and class politics among Israeli voters and the trend among culturally and economically marginalized groups to support the colonialist agendas set mainly by the settlers, the military, and parts of the globalizing economic elites. In parallel, election results among Palestinians in Israel reflect their growing alienation from a political system that structurally excludes them from political influence.


Author(s):  
Liudmyla Herasina

Problem of setting. Public government – it political practice of power which is carried out within the limits of the constitutionally political system and has a direct influence on all industries of life of socium is important. An effective public management in Ukraine must provide the state of stability, implementation of social obligations the states, deserving a condition for realization of congratulatory, financial, spiritual and social necessities of citizens; but him high-quality indexes far imperfect and characterized the plural of problems. Recent research and publications analysis. The questions of modernization and reforms of the system of state administration, constructions of the legal, social state, social and political processes are actively probed in the scientific mind of Ukraine, by the necessity of achievement of balance between the vital necessities of societies and interests of the state. Quite a bit Ukrainian scientists were engaged in researches of these questions - V. Kostytsky, І. Kostytska, O. Koban, A. Kovalenko, O. Batanov, I. Reznik, G. Chapala, M. Pukhtinskiy et al. Paper objective – ground of position, that a public management in Ukraine, which is carried out by public organs, local self-government, political parties and groups of political influence, must correlate with public resonance, to support the legitimity and answer to the innovative tendencies. Paper main body. A management in the public sphere of the state is very difficult professional activity, and foresees state and legal responsibility and account of public interests and expectations. However, disfunctions and destructions of public management can draw social and political instability, cutback of economic activity or regress, even weakening of sovereignty of the state. The criteria of political modernization matter very much for modern Ukraine: capacity of the political system for perception of innovations and mobilization of resources of power, structural and functional perfection of institutes of policy, powerful «social elevators» for equal access of people to imperious positions, effectiveness of principle of «equality all before a law». To Ukraine, as to the young state which passed by democratic transit, naturally peculiar strategy of reforms. Reformation is a not workaday situation for a country, it generates calls and problems. Among them most difficult is destructive of political power, what democratic development of country and becoming of civil institutes is braked through. Sociological researches rotined that a population considered: «The state must take more responsibility in providing of life of citizens» (68,6%). Stably negative is attitude of people toward a department judicial, which loses a «social capital» through inability to the just legal proceeding and mercenary political interests. In the end, unique reform 2014, that purchased positive social resonance is the process of decentralization the public power and strengthening of local self-government, which is mainly approved by citizens. Conclusions of the research. Problems of public management and collision of reforms are the sign of modern democracies which are modernized. The political system and public management can be effectively modernized at the maintainance of their integrity, institutional memory and, at the same time, harmonious relationships with a social environment.


Author(s):  
Philippe Droz-Vincent

Why did the Syrian army play such a crucial role in the country? How did it change over the years after independence? At first glance, one would look at the post-independence history of coups d’état for an explanation. Such path dependence helps us to understand how the army positioned itself close to politics and how the surge of the military in the state (cor)related with huge changes in Syrian society. The political role of the Syrian military, however, is much more complex to decipher. The officer corps that acted behind many different regimes became a crucible for political scripts in Syria. The military or politicized cliques within it came to control (civilian) politics in Syria. Yet, quite differently from other Arab countries where coups took place, such as in Egypt, the Syrian army was much more subjected to broad social trends active in the modernizing of Syrian society, in particular the role of ethnicity and confessionalism. Closeness to politics had blowback effects on the (civilian) political system and even on the army institution itself, as it literally imploded in politics. Syrian politics was later “de-militarized” in a very specific sense, that is, politics was rebuilt on different grounds larger than just military politics, namely authoritarianism. The coup in November 1970 by Hafez al-Assad was a real break and not just another coup in a long series. A new political system was rebuilt by Hafez, himself an officer, with the army as a crucial pillar of his regime, much more focused on internal security functions than on waging wars with Israel. At the same time, however, Hafez pushed the officer corps away from direct politics and relied on other pillars, especially networks of power in the security services and the state bureaucracy. The Syrian military was transformed and adapted to this new enduring regime, quite a novelty in Syria when compared with the 1950s–1960s. The military was part of the enduring status quo of the Assad regime for 40 years and benefited from it—at least the high officers did. No wonder that in March 2011 and at times of Arab uprisings spreading from Tunisia to Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Bahrain, and Syria, the army was pulled by the regime into repression. The role of the Syrian military became all the more crucial as Syria treaded the path toward full-scale civil war after 2012, or after the latter took the form of a proxy war around Syria with huge regional and international interventions. After a substantial number of individual defections, the military was rebuilt during the conflict with Russian and Iranian support, and this support will be a key component of regime reformation in Syria.


Author(s):  
Smruti S. Pattanaik

In any nascent democracy, the military as an organized force is a dominant factor in politics. The nature of the relationship between different institutions, especially in fledgling democracies, decides the position of the military in the state. Compared to the political parties, the military is a cohesive force with a command structure that ensures orders are dutifully implemented. Often the military becomes part of contested politics and remains a dominant factor in countries that were previously under military rule. This could be for two reasons. First, their regime remains a reference point and is often compared to democratic regimes thereby creating a legitimacy factor. Second, the military is seen as savior and often portrayed as a fall-back option if a civilian system of governance is not able to deliver. Though many argue that military regimes are a thing of the past and their role is in fact in decline, this may not be true. Military institutions have adapted to change and the nature of their interactions with civilian groups has undergone a shift. However, use of coercion by military authority does not explain military dominance. Much is determined by the structural factors within which both the civil and military agents operate. In some cases, the military’s preserve is not only ensuring state “sovereignty” and its territorial integrity but also preventing a political catastrophe from happening during political transition. They are often referred to as guardians of the state. Study of civil–military relations in South Asia tends to follow a narrative that synthesizes and combines the structural and agency-related issues. Agency, however, is a dominant factor that waits for structurally enabling factors to contemplate a military takeover. In South Asia, and particularly in Bangladesh, any study of civil–military relations within the theoretical framework of a structure-agency divide is inadequate. Challenges in studying the structure-agency divide can be attributed to the larger-than-life image of the military agency. Military agents as actors, their political motives appear to be more important than the societal structure that influences decision. Social class, macroeconomic situations, the society-governing class interface, and lopsided institutional developments also shape the role of agencies (civil and military) and determine the balance of power. Absence of coup does not imply “civilian control,” but rather the civilian government’s ability to decide on posting, promoting, and shaping the vision of the military regarding threat perception determines the extent of civilian control over the military. Political culture, agreement within the society on political structure, institutional checks and balances, and political socialization are important aspects of state structure that acts a constraint on Agency’s action.


1984 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 502-515 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert F. Byrnes

The Soviet Union confronts grave needs for reform because it achieved impressive progress upon old foundations, struggles with a systemic economic slowdown, faces fundamental social and spiritual infrastructured problems, wrestles with a costly overextended empire, and must adapt to the age of knowledge that challenges its centralized control. Soviet leaders recognize the need to restructure the economic and political system, but they consider innovation an ideologically unacceptable hazard to its values, and its control. Change would threaten the primacy of the military share of economic resources, the high priority foreign policy receives to provide legitimacy, and control of Eastern Europe. Only corrections and minor repairs in the economy are likely in a system that lacks a reform mechanism.


Author(s):  
Ozan O. Varol

Following most democratic coups, the military manages to secure exit benefits, which, depending on their degree, may foster various dysfunctions in the political system and undermine long-term democratic development. The dose determines the toxicity. A democratic regime can mature even with prerogatives for the military, as long as those prerogatives don’t interfere with democratic notions of civilian control of the armed forces. Although these prerogatives are often undesirable from civilians’ perspective, any attempts by civilians to immediately march the military back to the barracks empty-handed can prompt a backlash from the military leaders. They may dig in, rather than give in, and derail the transition process. And from civilians’ perspective, the military’s exit with benefits is often better than no exit at all.


2019 ◽  
pp. 12-45
Author(s):  
Amy Austin Holmes

Because the revolution in Egypt was directed at the state, it is important to properly conceptualize the state apparatus and the regime that ruled it. Thus, chapter 2 provides an overview of the literature on authoritarian regimes and explains why it is important to distinguish between states and regimes. Hosni Mubarak’s powerful presidency did not preclude the development of a diverse and unruly civil society, including tens of thousands of nongovernmental organizations. A new framework is employed in order to understand which parts of the state apparatus are most crucial during a period of revolutionary upheaval. It is important to distinguish between tools of the regime and pillars of support for the regime; the latter have the ability to either prop up or potentially withdraw their support. Mubarak relied on four pillars of regime support: the military, the business elite, the United States, and the acquiescence of the people. The chapter then turns to an overview of the literature on revolutions and military coups, which have usually been studied separately, as well as the literature on how establishing civilian control over the military constitutes the neuralgic point of democratic consolidation.


Author(s):  
L.F. BOLTENKOVA

The author, analyzing the article by V. Surkov Putins Lasting State, expresses either agreement with a part of his theses, substantiating it, doubting or denying and also briefly justifying them. Agreement with the theses: illusion of choice, realism of predestination, logic of the historical process, state of a new type, uniqueness and viability of Russia, model of the state, ideology of Putinism, people, the military and police functions are the most important and decisive. Doubts, denial: impossible, unnatural, counterhistorical disintegration of Russia, growing Russia, survival of the Russian nation, the absence of mention of the First President of the Russian Federation, which laid the foundation of the new Russia a significant export potential of the Russian political system, supreme ruler, understating the value of political institutions and the promotion of one person against this background, multilevel political institutions outlet clothing,trust in one person.


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