scholarly journals The crisis of the classical concept of liberal democracy in the context of modern challenges

2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 48-55
Author(s):  
Kateryna Fedoryshyna

The main aim of this paper is to examine the problem of the crisis of liberal democracy in the modern world, referring to the phenomenon of a loss of balance between social and personal good in a pluralistic society. There are several concepts of democracy in political science, including the classic liberal concept, which sees its core priorities collide with recent global challenges. Thus, the relevance of this problem refers to the recent disappointment in the idea of liberal democracy, which shows disillusionment in democracy as such. In response to this trend, some hybrid regimes offer an alternative in the form of so-called democracies with illiberal approaches. From the other side, the liberal democratic platforms are used by populist political forces, which results in dividing democratic societies about the questions hard to finally solve. The Brexit problem – the process of British exit from the European Union – shows recent examples of long-lasting social effects derived from the crisis of liberal democratic concept. The author of the article has come to the conclusion that when it comes to modern democratic processes, classic liberal approach brings the populism threat back to the table. When there is no balance between the totally free civil society with its direct democratic influences and the state structure with formal procedures aimed at total good of beneficial functioning, the liberal instruments would be used by populists. Populism can create severe divisions within liberal democratic societies providing dilemmas, such as Brexit, which are difficult to solve with the same liberal democratic procedures. This means that liberal democratic approach undermines itself with the very fact of the existing tendency to lose balance between the ideal personal freedom (that includes satisfying every citizen’s choice) and public good.

2015 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 9-23
Author(s):  
Adéla Gjuričová

The Czechoslovak federal parliament was designed in 1968 to replace the National Assembly of a unitary state and thus formally express equality between Czechs and Slovaks in the newly established federation. After the crash of the Prague Spring reforms, the socialist parliament lost most of its sovereignty, while preserving its federal character and formal procedures, thus providing a sort of “backup” legislature. The Velvet Revolution of 1989, with its proclaimed respect to peace and legality, logically found the ancient régime’s parliament in the centre of new politics. In the revolutionary parliament of 1989-1990, the concept of socialist parliamentarianism began to clash with new motives, such as the national unity, a break with the Communist past, liberal democracy, or subsidiarity. Various blends of socialist, revolutionary and liberal democratic views of the parliament consequently came to life, while each of these concepts as well as every practical policy was perceived and accepted in conflicting manners by the Czech and Slovak publics as well as political representations. Some of these differences turned out to be irreconcilable and the federal parliament eventually played a key role in administering the break-up of Czechoslovak federation in 1992.


Federalism-E ◽  
1969 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-21
Author(s):  
Eric Servais

The European Union (EU), a contested “European” political construct, is contemporarily positioned at a critical juncture that presents three options that may determine its status as a supranational actor: stagnation, dissolution, or deeper and wider integration. The myriad pressures antagonizing the European Union and its structural foundations parallel those that the project sought to address following World War II. The unprecedented level of devastation caused by advanced military technologies and totalitarian ideologies in the war provided the impetus for increased cooperation amongst independent nation-states. Institutional cooperation encourages the deconstruction of destructive socio-political forces including racism, nationalism, and primordial cultural identities. These essentialist forces emerge in the absence of effective governance and encourage internal and external hostilities. The EU is intended to provide a structural framework for liberal-democratic countries to make collective decisions to increase economic prosperity, freedom, security, and justice [...]


2014 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-58 ◽  

This study concentrates on the changing nature of the prison officer profession in Poland as the country developed from a Stalinist satellite to a liberal democracy and member of the European Union. Drawing on a range of archival materials, the study also aims to demonstrate how a social institution is shaped by political forces. The analysis supports two theses. Firstly, because for two generations the prison system was deployed ‘against the people’, it is unsurprising that Polish citizens view prison officers in a negative light. Secondly, if prison staff wants to be recognised as professionals devoted to a decent and worthy task, they are likely need to deploy imaginative public relations.


1997 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 561-592 ◽  
Author(s):  
Russell Arben Fox

As East Asian societies struggle with the implications of modenity, the degree to which their Confucian heritage can support institutions of liberal democracy has been much debated. Recently, several authors have argued that the nations of Confucian Asia are indeed modernizing, but in the direction of “illiberal democracy”, which they see as an approach to democratic practice that takes communitarian concerns like social solidarity and political virtue into greater account than other, more liberal democratic societies do. In line with that argument, this article makes an introductory comparison of classical Confucian and contemporary communitarian thought, criticizes the view of Confucianism as necessarily authoritarian and suggests that Confucian theory and practice provides a strong and in many ways unique communitarian response to liberalism, without fundamentally invalidating those humanistic principles basic to democratic reform.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
ULRICH WAGRANDL

Abstract:Ordinarily, militant democracy is about restricting the rights of those who threaten to overthrow the very democracy that guarantees these rights. Hence, militant democracy permits the defence of democracy by disarming its opponents. Turkey’s recent constitutional reform, which arguably is a move away from liberal democracy, forces militant democracy to face up to its transnational application. Can we use militant democracy’s tools to defend not our own, but another democracy? Maybe we can and even should. This article examines the two transnational manifestations of militant democracy. The first is ‘transnational democracy gone militant’, epitomised by the European Union (EU)’s power to enforce liberal democratic standards in its Member States. The second is ‘militant democracy gone transnational’. This manifestation permits treating people rallying in the EU to attack democracy abroad in the same manner in which we are permitted to treat opponents of ‘our own’ democracy. As long as we are dealing with members of the Council of Europe (CoE), the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) gives us the instruments we need. Generally, militant democracy is a militant liberal democracy, which is not neutral towards itself, but is also an opponent of every system that is antithetical to it.


Public Choice ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 187 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 217-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miklós Rosta ◽  
László Tóth

AbstractIn the European Union right-wing and left-wing populist parties are increasingly becoming stronger. Meanwhile in Central and Eastern Europe autocracies are emerging and becoming stabilized. Italy and Hungary are two notable examples of these processes. Italy is the only country in Western Europe where a coalition of purely populist parties won an election, while Hungary has the most mature autocracy in the European Union. By using survey methodology, we examined the preferences of Hungarian and Italian students regarding the values of liberal democracy. We seek answers to the questions whether there are any significant differences between the proportion of Hungarian students and Italian students who identify themselves with the values of liberal democracy and which of these values of liberal democracy they consider to be protected values. Based on our results, we claim that students from both countries are more likely to support liberal democratic values than to support either right-wing or left-wing populist values, even if the distributions of the two groups differ significantly. We found that Italian students adhere more strongly to liberal democratic values, while Hungarians are more open to left-wing and right-wing populism. Our results confirm that in Hungary, because of the values that many people hold, conditions are conducive for establishing a sustainable autocracy, while in Italy, the demand for such a system is much weaker.


Author(s):  
Richard A. Falkenrath

This chapter examines strategy and deterrence and traces the shift from deterrence by ‘punishment’ to deterrence by ‘denial’ in Washington’s conduct of the Global War on Terror. The former rested on an assumption that the consequences of an action would serve as deterrents. The latter may carry messages of possible consequences, but these are delivered by taking action that removes the capabilities available to opponents – in the given context, the Islamist terrorists challenging the US. Both approaches rest on credibility, but are more complex in the realm of counter-terrorism, where the US authorities have no obvious ‘return to sender’ address and threats to punish have questionable credibility. In this context, denial offers a more realistic way of preventing terrorist attacks. Yet, the advanced means available to the US are deeply ethically problematic in liberal democratic societies. However, there would likely be even bigger questions if governments failed to act.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
William E. Scheuerman

I spent a few unseasonably hot summer days in 1996 digging around in the German Federal Archives in Koblenz for what later became a lengthy essay on Ernst Fraenkel (1898–1975), the neglected German socialist political and legal thinker. I still recall struggling to justify my efforts not simply as an historian of ideas but also as a political theorist who, at least in principle, was expected to make systematic contributions to contemporary debates. The problem was that Fraenkel had focused his acumen on investigating liberal democratic instability and German fascism, matters that did not seem directly pertinent to a political and intellectual constellation in which political scientists were celebrating democracy's “third wave.” With Tony Blair and Bill Clinton touting Third Way politics, and many former dictatorships seemingly on a secure path to liberal democracy, Fraenkel's preoccupations seemed dated. Even though Judith Shklar had noted, as late as 1989, that “anyone who thinks that fascism in one guise or another is dead and gone ought to think again,” political pundits and scholars in the mid-1990s typically assumed that capitalist liberal democracy's future was secure. When I returned to the US and described my research to colleagues, they responded, unsurprisingly, politely but without much enthusiasm.


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