scholarly journals The post-2010 ‘Democratic Rule of Law’ practice of the Hungarian Constitutional Court under a rule by law governance

Author(s):  
Nóra Chronowski

AbstractThe paper focuses on the democratic rule of law principle as it appeared in the practice of the Hungarian Constitutional Court under the 1989 Constitution and the 2012 Fundamental Law. The rule of law doctrine had a paramount role in the argumentation of the Court in the 1990s as a normative fact and a programme of the Hungarian state. Under the Fundamental Law introduced in 2012, however, it has been somewhat relegated to the background in case law. The study first recalls the main achievements and characteristics of the democratic rule of law state interpretations of the Constitutional Court and then focuses on developments since the introduction of the Fundamental Law. On the one hand, it outlines the constitutional and institutional capacity of the court regarding the protection of the rule of law principle. On the other hand, it reveals the characteristics of the post-FL interpretation through case studies in the field of legal certainty and judicial independence, both of which were representative elements of the pre-2010 constitutional practice from the point of view of the democratic rule of law state doctrine.

TEME ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1419
Author(s):  
Bálint Pásztor

The author of the article analyzes the specificities of the normative control of the law, i.e. the procedure of assessing the constitutionality and legality of the law in the Republic of Serbia, with the aim of detecting historical and legal preconditions of the effective functioning of the rule of law. The historical perspective of the development of the constitutional judiciary in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, as well as the analysis of the experiences of various systems of control of constitutionality and legality, open the contextual, scientific-historical and pragmatic dimensions of understanding. The specificity of the system of normative control is reflected in its triplicity, meaning that three institutes are known that characterize different procedural possibilities (to initiate the process of assessing the constitutionality and legality of general acts). The paper is written in order to point out the dichotomy of the proposal and initiative of the procedure of the assessment of constitutionality and legality, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of the ex officio procedure. Furthermore, the author wanted to point out the essential and procedural differences between the proposal, the initiative and the constitutional complaint, especially analyzing the purpose of retaining the institute of the initiative in the light of the existence of the constitutional complaint and the fact that the initiative does not imply the automation of the initiation of proceedings. The dilemma that the article opens concerns the possibility that in the case of abolishing the initiative as an institution accessible to all, is it possible to preserve the democratic culture and the participation of citizens, furthermore is it possible to abolish the fundamental institutional values and freedoms of a legal state and the rule of law? The paper opens other issues of importance for the establishment of an effective constitutional architecture that concern: the width of the circle of authorized proposers of normative control before the Constitutional Court; the dual role of the constitutional judiciary: on the one hand protection of the Constitution, constitutionality and legality, on the other hand effective protection of human and minority rights and freedoms.


2018 ◽  
pp. 75-83
Author(s):  
OLGA-ANDREEA URDA

The present article aims at presenting the Austrian fundamental law with the highlighting of some essential aspects regarding the exercise of the legislative, executive and judicial powers, the institutional particularities and, last but not least, the evolution of the regulation that was generated generated by the state's accession to the European Union. Constitutional control is another aspect that we have focused into the study, considering the important role of the Constitutional Court in the rule of law. The conducted analysis has significant valences, especially in the context in which it can signify a point of reference in the comparative study of constitutional regulations


Obiter ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Themba Maseko

The Hyundai-inspired interpretation obliges the courts to interpret, where possible, legislation in conformity with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. This process involves taking into account the objects and purports of an Act and interpreting its provisions in the manner that complies with the constitutional values. Essentially, it ensures that courts give preference to an interpretation of legislation that is within the parameters of the provisions of the Constitution over the one that is not. However, courts do not apply the Hyundai-inspired interpretation if it cannot be ascribed to the provision of the legislation in question or if it is not reasonably possible for them to do so. Such situations include the Hyundai-inspired interpretation that unduly strains the text, or that obliges the court to read-in too many qualifications. In these situations, the courts have to declare the legislative provision in question unconstitutional and resort to the remedy of reading- in or notional severance. The Hyundai-inspired interpretation is evidenced in quite a number of cases. However, this case note critically dissects the manner in which the Constitutional Court applied it in the case of Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly ((CCT86/15) [2016] ZACC 8).It concludes that the manner in which the Constitutional Court applied it, in this case, is inconsistent with the manner in which the Constitutional Court applied it in the case of Abahlali Basemjondolo six years earlier. When interpreting the word “disturbance” which section 1 of the Powers Privileges and Immunities of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures Act (4 of 2004) defined as “any act which interferes with or disrupts or which is likely to interfere with or disrupt the proceedings of Parliament or a House or Committee” and which the High Court had found to be too broad that it had the effect of finding a robust and controversial debate unconstitutional, the Constitutional Court unexpectedly read in too many qualifications to the word “disturbance” in conformity with the Constitution. The reason being, the Constitutional Court, six years earlier, found the approach of reading- in too many qualifications in conformity with the Constitution to be straining the text and to be contrary to the rule of law and the principle of separation of powers in the case of Abahlali Basemjondolo.


2021 ◽  
pp. 145-156
Author(s):  
Karol Piwoński

The aim of this article is to analyse the position and role of the European Commission in the procedure provided in the regulation on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the European Union’s budget. For this purpose the scheme of this procedure was analysed, by interpreting the relevant regulations using the dogmatic method and considering opinions of the EU institutions and views of the scholars. A comparative method has also been applied. The new position of the Commission in the procedure for protection of the EU budget has been compared with the position it plays in the existing instruments. The analysis made from the point of view of the position of individual institutions in the new procedure, although it does not allow predicting how they will be implemented. The conducted analysis demonstrates that the European Commission – an institution of Community character – has gained wide competences, and in applying them it has been given a wide range of discretion. On the one hand, the introduced regulations exemplify a new paradigm in creating mechanisms for protection of the rule of law. On the other hand, they raise doubts as to their compliance with EU law. However, they undoubtedly constitute a decisive step towards increasing the effectiveness of the EU's instruments for the rule of law protection.


2003 ◽  
Vol 28 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 655-678 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Simons

AbstractMuch attention has been focused on the promulgation of legislation as a bellwether of change in Russia since the beginning of perestroika in the mid-1980s; for a brief period at the beginning of the 1990s, there was even a "war of laws". In the 2000s, legislative activity continues unabated—albeit usually charged with less emotion and devoted to more thorough analyses, if not always wide-ranging discussions, of signifi cant policy issues. The implementation of transition-era legislation is also sharing the limelight in recent years. Dispositions of the USSR Committee of Constitutional Supervision (and, later, of the RF Constitutional Court) are prime examples of a prism through which to view the interpretation and implementation of reform-era legislation in the RF. The outcomes of the controversies resolved by the Court could themselves be a bellwether in ascertaining the degree to which reforms in the Russian legal, political, and economic systems are being anchored in the rule of law. For example, the banning of secret laws from the Russian landscape was the outcome of an early landmark Court case. Yet the hangover of an old policy of only partially disseminating information on the judicial interpretation of Russian legislation still remains. This, in turn, stymies further efforts to cement the pieces of the rule of law puzzle more firmly together. While citizens have been entitled for more than a decade to access the full texts of RF laws, they (or their representatives) can only view a part—albeit one that is far greater than in Soviet times—of the work of the judiciary. This is due to a distinctly narrow view of state acts that, alas, does not encompass the gamut of RF judicial dispositions. So, at the beginning of the 2000s, the RF Constitutional Court still applies a fine-line, technical distinction between its two classes of dispositions: postanovleniia and zakliucheniia , on the one hand (that are subject to mandatory publication), and opredeleniia (that are only selectively published) on the other hand. The use of this approach as a filter, limiting access to judicial information in the RF, is especially remarkable in light of the fact that the use of an analogous practice by the legislative branch has been declared unconstitutional. The Court's approach to accessing judicial information throws, in effect, a mantel of secrecy around a not-insignifi cant category of high-court dispositions. This puts the Court at loggerheads with attempts in other sectors of society to strengthen the evolving rule-of-law regime in Russia. This roadblock notwithstanding, the interpretation and application of reform legislation are not longer hidden from full view owing to a unique compilation of published—as well as unpublished—RF Constitutional Court dispositions from the fi rst decade of its operation. The present postscript outlines the research effort that has produced this compilation; it also argues for the rapid enactment of a full-publication policy at all levels of the RF judicial system.


2011 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 409-430
Author(s):  
David Dyzenhaus

I argue that attention to Austin helps us to appreciate that there are significant continuities between his legal theory and that of contemporary positivists; hence, to the extent that Austin’s theory has defects, these are reproduced in the work of contemporary legal positivism. An historical perspective on contemporary philosophy of law thus permits one to appreciate that the basic divide in legal theory is between a tradition whose basic intuition is that law is answerable to a moral ideal of legality and the positivist tradition that sees law as the transmitter of political judgment. For the former, the rule of law tradition, the basic problem for philosophy of law is to explain the distinction between the rule of law and the arbitrary rule of men. For the latter, the rule by law tradition, the basic problem is to explain how law can effectively transmit the judgments made political elites. The rule by law tradition encounters severe difficulties in making sense of the idea of government according to law, difficulties which reach their height once legal positivists accept, following Hart, that philosophy of law has to understand law as a normative phenomenon, which in turns requires taking seriously the internal point of view of legal officials.


Author(s):  
Reinis Odiņš

In the article, the author looks at the origin of the principle of the private autonomy from the point of view of the basic normal theory, stating that the basic legal and democratic norms of the country are derived from the rule of law. Moreover, the private autonomy also includes, in principle, the right of a person to exercise the right to carry out material legal claims, even in part, if the person so wishes.


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 198
Author(s):  
Ani Triwati ◽  
Subaidah Ratna Juita ◽  
Tri Mulyani

<p>Dengan adanya Putusan MK No. 34/PUU-XI/2013, untuk upaya hukum luar biasa yaitu peninjauan kembali dapat dilakukan lebih dari satu kali. Putusan MK yang memperbolehkan upaya hukum luar biasa peninjauan kembali lebih dari satu kali tersebut, berkaitan dengan kepastian hukum dan keadilan. Apabila peninjauan kembali diperbolehkan lebih dari satu kali tetapi tidak ada pembatasan sampai berapa kali maka perkara tersebut tidak akan ada akhirnya, bahwa adanya asas litis finiri oportet (setiap perkara harus ada akhirnya) tidak akan terpenuhi. Beberapa permasalahan yang perlu dibahas adalah apakah dengan adanya Putusan MK No. 34/PUU-XI/2013 dapat memenuhi nilai keadilan dan kepastian hukum. Selanjutnya bagaimana pengaturan mengenai peninjauan kembali sebagai implementasi Putusan MK No. 34/PUU- XI/2013 agar asas kepastian hukum dan asas litis finiri oportet akan terpenuhi. Putusan MK No. 34/PUU- XI/2013, yang menyatakan bahwa Pasal 268 ayat (3) Undang-Undang Nomor 8 Tahun 1981 tentang Hukum Acara Pidana bertentangan dengan Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia tahun 1945 dan tidak mempunyai kekuatan mengikat, dapat memenuhi kepastian hukum tanpa mengabaikan nilai keadilan. Hal ini dapat dilihat dari pihak kepentingan terpidana yang mana dengan diperbolehkannya peninjauan kembali dalam perkara pidana lebih dari satu kali, memberikan kesempatan untuk memperoleh kebenaran materiil dan keadilan sehingga dapat diperoleh kepastian hukum yang berkeadilan bagi terpidana mengenai perkara yang dihadapi. Untuk memenuhi asas litis finiri oportet, perlu dilakukan pengaturan bahwa untuk upaya hukum peninjauan kembali dalam perkara pidana dapat dilakukan dua kali, hal ini dilakukan untuk mencapai kepastian hukum yang berkeadilan. Di satu pihak peninjauan kembali dapat dilakukan lebih dari satu kali untuk mencari kebenaran materiil dan memenuhi nilai keadilan. Di lain pihak adanya pembatasan permohonan peninjauan kembali yang boleh dilakukan dua kali adalah untuk menjamin kepastian hukum, sehingga nilai kemanfaatan, keadilan dan kepastian hukum dapat terpenuhi.</p><p>With the Constitutional Court No. 34 / PUU-XI / 2013, for an extraordinary legal remedy which reconsideration can be done more than once. Constitutional Court ruling that allows an extraordinary legal remedy reconsideration more than once that, with regard to legal certainty and justice. If allowed to review more than one time but there are no restrictions on how many times it is the case there will be no end, that the principle of litis finiri oportet (every case there should be eventually) will not be met. Some issues that need to be addressed is whether the Constitutional Court No. 34 / PUU-XI / 2013 can satisfy the value of justice and legal certainty. Furthermore, how the arrangements regarding the review of the implementation of the Constitutional Court as No. 34 / PUU-X / 2013 that the principle of legal certainty and the principle of litis finiri oportet will be met. Constitutional Court decision No. 34 / PUU-XI / 2013, which states that Article 268 paragraph (3) of Law No. 8 of 1981 on Criminal Procedure is contrary to the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia in 1945 and has no binding force, can meet the legal certainty without ignoring the value of justice. It can be seen from the interests of the convict which the permissibility of judicial review in criminal cases more than once, providing an opportunity to acquire the material truth and justice so as to obtain legal certainty to convict justice regarding the case at hand. To meet the principle of litis finiri oportet, it is necessary that the arrangements for legal remedy reconsideration in criminal cases can be done twice, this is done to achieve a just rule of law. On the one hand, the review can be performed more than once to search for the material truth and fulfill justice values. On the other hand the restrictions on the reconsideration request should be done twice is to ensure legal certainty, so that the value of expediency, justice and the rule of law can be fulfilled.</p>


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (4.34) ◽  
pp. 245
Author(s):  
Diana Sari ◽  
Yati Mulyati

The development of tax evasion in a country, often the problem solving is done by voluntary disclosure or tax amnesty. Both voluntary disclosure or tax amnesty seem to be a dilemmatic policy between the desire to uphold the rule of law by prosecuting tax smugglers on the one hand by imposing tax amnesty on the other which is viewed from a legal point of view which negates these claims legally. Tax amnesty is a counterproductive action in the tax sanctions system that regulates the waiver of prosecution or reduces or eliminates claims against penalties or fines contained in the provisions of taxation legislation. The positive side of the tax amnesty program is an increase in state revenues from the tax sector. However, an increase in tax revenues is not always followed by an increase in tax ratio.  


Author(s):  
Francesca Asta

Many studies have highlighted a substantial "bureaucracy domination" in procedures relating to migrants’ access to territory. This form of domination is marked by highly discretionary and arbitrary practices, enacted by the administrative authorities of the state. Only minor attention, however, has been devoted to the arbitrariness of judicial decisions and to the judicial role in general in the numerous proceedings that increasingly affect the path of migrants. This path is the main object of this paper. The study focuses on Italian case law in expulsion and detention proceedings of irregular third country national citizens and asylum seekers and presents qualitative empirical research on decisions issued by the competent national authorities. The results have been analysed using a selection of theoretical tools, all referable to the general concept of the rule of law. The judicial decisions on pre-removal detention proceedings in two case studies are examined: the jurisprudence on detention of irregular migrants, in different offices of the Justice of the Peace in Italy; and the case law on detention of asylum seekers in the Ordinary Tribunal of Rome. The assumption underlying the research is that various conceptions of the rule of law may have different explanatory power when it comes to explaining the empirical results. To verify this hypothesis, the study proposes an overview of the main rule of law doctrines in the Western tradition of political and legal thought and applies the method of historical-conceptual analysis. As a result, the explanatory power of six theoretical models of the rule of law was verified against the data with the view to highlight the virtues and vices of the respective explanatory frameworks.      This article reaches a two-fold conclusion. First, as far as the explanatory frameworks are concerned: the results of the two case studies cannot be fully explained by any of the models considered in this study. This fact alone casts doubts on the explanatory power of these theories and calls for further research on judicial decision-making more generally. Secondly, a key finding of the study regarding the notions of discretion and arbitrariness is that the judicial approach which assures the highest protection of rights is also the one that is most easily influenced by arbitrariness. The author argues that this paradox can be easily dissolved by paying attention to the plural dimensions of arbitrariness. If we consider arbitrariness from a legal point of view, i.e. as an illegal decision, it is unsurprising that the authority that most uses its discretionary powers is also the one most at risk of abusing these discretionary powers and hence of exercising arbitrary power. However, if we consider arbitrariness from the point of view of philosophical-political theory, i.e. as a form of domination characterised by the absence of sufficient justification, it is unsurprising that the judicial approach which assures the highest protection of rights is also the one that takes its own role as guarantor of these rights and of the constitutional democratic legal order as such most seriously. This judicial approach thus most often risks exercising its power in criticisable ways, as compared to an authority much more in line with the requirements of law enforcement agencies. Keywords: migration, discretion, justice, arbitrariness, civil rights, Rechtsstaat, expulsion, mixed constitution


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