scholarly journals Manusia Dan Kesempurnaannya (Telaah Psikologi Transendental Mullā Shadrā)

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 133
Author(s):  
Kerwanto Kerwanto
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Major Influence ◽  
Moral Action ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Human Soul ◽  
Theoretical Reason ◽  
Value Of Knowledge ◽  
Mulla Sadra

Abstract : Mullā Ṣadrā is one of the philosophers who had considerable attention to the study of human. His view concerning the human soul and its perfection can be applied as the basis of Islamic principles of psychology. Under the investigation on his philosophical writtings as well as his  Quranic  interpretation,  such  as  Tafsīr  al-Qur’ān,  we  are  invited  to  understand  human nature and its perfection. This article shows Ṣadra’s view about the value of knowledge as the basis of the achievement of happiness in human being. This paper also intended to show that knowledge about the reality of the human soul has a major influence on moral action of an individual.Keywords :  transcendental  psychology,  substantial  motion  (al-harakah  al-jawhariyah), ignorance  (jahl),  theoretical  reason  (nazari),  practical  reason  (‘amali),    intellectual  faculty, animal faculty, lust and anger (amarah). Mullā Shadrā  merupakan salah satu filsuf yang memberikan perhatian yang besar pada kajian tentang  manusia.  Beberapa  pandangannya  tentang  jiwa  manusia  dan  kesempurnaannya bisa dijadikan sebagai basis prinsip-prinsip psikologi Islam. Melalui penelusuran terhadap beberapa karya filsafatnya termasuk juga kitab tafsirnya seperti Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-Karīm, kita diajak untuk memahami hakikat manusia dan kesempurnaannya.Tulisan ini menunjukkan pandangan  Shadrā  tentang  nilai  pengetahuan  sebagai  basis  capaian  kesempurnaan  jiwa dan  puncak  kebahagiaan  manusia.  Tulisan  ini  juga  ditujukan  untuk  menunjukkan  bahwa pengetahuan  tentang  realitas  jiwa  manusia  memiliki  pengaruh  besar  terhadap  tindakan moral seorang individu. Kata-kata kunci :  psikologi  transendental,  gerak  substansi  (al-harakah  al-jawhariyah), kebodohan  (jahl),  akal  teoritis  (nazhari),  akal  praktis  (‘amali),  daya  intelektual,  daya hewaniyah, syahwat dan amarah.

Hylemorphism, rigid designators, and the disembodied ‘Jesus’: a call for clarification

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
JAMES T. TURNER
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Jesus Christ ◽  
Christian Tradition ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Human Soul ◽  
Rigid Designators ◽  
Prime Matter ◽  
Holy Saturday

AbstractMany in the Christian tradition affirm two things: (1) that Jesus Christ descended to Hades/Limbus Patrumon Holy Saturday and (2) that the human nature of Jesus is a hylemorphic compound, the unity of a human soul and prime matter. I argue that (1) and (2) are incompatible; for the name ‘Jesus’, ‘Christ’, and ‘Jesus Christ’ rigidly designates a human being. But, given a certain view of hylemorphism, the human being, Jesus, ceased to exist in the time between his death and resurrection. So, Jesus did not descend to Hades/Limbus Patrum, even if God the Son did.

Practical Reason and the Status of Moral Obligation

2007 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 197-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Audi
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
External World ◽  
Moral Action ◽  
Adequate Account ◽  
Theoretical Reason ◽  
Moral Skepticism ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Status ◽  
Moral Claims

The power of skepticism depends on the apparent possibility of rationally asking, for virtually any kind of proposition commonly thought to be known, how it is known or what justifies believing it. Moral claims are among those commonly subjected to skeptical challenges and doubts, even on the part of some people who are not skeptical about ordinary claims regarding the external world. There may be even more skepticism about the possibility of justifying moral actions, particularly if they are against the agent's self-interest. Both problems-how to justify moral claims and how to justify moral action - come within the scope of the troubling question “Why be moral?” Even a brief response to moral skepticism should consider both kinds of targets of justification, cognitive and behavioural, and should indicate some important relations between the two types of skeptical challenge. I will begin with the cognitive case- with skepticism about the scope of theoretical reason in ethics - proceed to practical skepticism, which concerns the scope of practical reason, and then show how an adequate account of rationality may enable us to respond to moral skepticism.

William of Auvergne on the Various States of Our Nature

Traditio ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 58 ◽  
pp. 201-218 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roland J. Teske
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
The State ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Human Soul ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Human Race ◽  
Philosophical Concept ◽  
Original State ◽  
The Third ◽  
Adam And Eve

Although William of Auvergne, bishop of Paris from 1228 to his death in 1249, criticized Avicenna severely, he also adopted many philosophical positions of Avicenna. In a recently published article, I emphasized William's considerable debt to the philosophy of Avicenna, and in a still-to-be-published article I pointed out how William was indebted to Avicenna for his view of what it is to be a human being, and especially for his view of the spirituality of the human soul. For much of his lengthy work, De anima, William follows Avicenna's philosophy as he found it in the great Islamic thinker's Liber de anima, seu sextus de naturalibus; not, of course, without serious criticism on many points. In chapter 5, however, of his De anima, William rather abruptly introduces a historical concept of human nature, which is closer to that of Augustine than of Avicenna or Aristotle, in place of the philosophical concept of human nature, which he derived largely from Avicenna, whom he often confused with the real Aristotle. In introducing such a historical concept of human nature or of the nature of the human soul, William raises several rather intriguing problems, which I want to discuss in this paper. First, he raises a question about how the various historical states of human nature are to be conceived and how they are to be combined with the philosophical concept of nature that he derives from Avicenna. Second, he raises a question about how he can, while claiming to proceed exclusively by means of philosophical proofs, introduce such topics as the original state in which Adam and Eve were created, the original sin by which they fell and which they passed on to the rest of the human race, and Christian baptism by which the harm stemming from their sin can be undone. Finally, William speaks about the soul's state of natural happiness as opposed to the state of glory, and though his treatment of these states is rather brief, it raises a further question about how William envisaged these states and their relationship to each other. Hence, the paper will have three parts: the first on the present and past states of human nature of which William speaks and on their relationship to the philosophical concept of human nature, the second on how William introduces into what he claimed was strictly philosophical such apparently theological topics, and the third on how William understands the relation between the soul's state of natural happiness and the state of glory.

On Foundation Problems of Normative and Educational Ethics

1998 ◽  
pp. 215-222
Author(s):  
Horst Seidl
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Human Soul ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Moral Goodness ◽  
Deontological Ethics ◽  
Educational Ethics ◽  
The Will ◽  
Natural Inclination

The controversies in our time between teleological and deontological ethics which come down to the problem "from being to ought," referring to human being or nature, can be resolved only by an adequate conception of human nature. Taking up the ancient tradition (Plato, Aristotle, Stoa) again, we can re-examine the teleological conception of human nature as primarily instinctive and selfish, and say that human nature is constituted also by reason and that the instinctive nature is predisposed to be guided by reason or intellect. The constitutive order of the human soul, with the subordination of the instinct under the intellect, involves already some natural goodness, of which the intellect is aware (in the natural moral conscience) and for which the will strives (in a natural inclination). This is the basis for the "moral law" and for normative ethics. Thus, human nature is not selfish in itself. Although moral goodness as humankind’s perfection is an ideal, it has in us already imperfect natural beginnings, a "natural morality." In a certain sense, the moral ought of actions comes from one’s being, from the natural moral goodness of which the intellect is aware in itself, and from its good intentions.

Does Kant Permit Grace?

2020 ◽  
pp. 301-320
Author(s):  
Christopher J. Insole
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Moral Action ◽  
Christian Tradition ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Divine Action ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Traditional Conception ◽  
Divine Grace

This chapter asks whether Kant, in some sense, at least permits us to believe in the possibility of some sort of divine grace, in terms of a supplement to our moral action, or divine assistance. It is established that Kant does permit belief in what could be called a ‘reactive’ divine action, where the human being makes the first moral move in freedom, with God offering some sort of assistance. Kant, though, does not permit belief in proactive divine action, where God would be conceived of as first acting upon us, in a way that helps us to move towards the moral law. This would violate Kant’s demands in relation to freedom. Some commentators have suggested that Kant makes ‘room’ for some sort of concept of divine–human concurrence. This claim is dealt with by showing that, at most, Kant can be said to offer a translation of this concept, into the terms of ‘reactive divine action’, which, from the point of view of the Christian tradition, is tantamount to a denial of concurrence. Kant regards the more traditional conception of concurrence to be an ‘impenetrable mystery’. Kant does allow some space for specific types of mystery, but concurrence, for Kant, is the wrong type of mystery, being useless (and even dangerous) for both theoretical and practical reason.

Geoffrey Sawer and the Art of the Academic Commentator: A Preliminary Biographical Sketch

2014 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 389-420 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Coper
Keyword(s):  
Oral History ◽  
Major Influence ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Biographical Sketch ◽  
Political Landscape ◽  
Law And Politics ◽  
National University ◽  
Oral History Interviews

Geoffrey Sawer was the Foundation Professor of Law at The Australian National University, appointed in 1950 at the age of 39. He was a pioneer in the understanding of law in a broader context, especially at the intersection between law and politics, and his fluid and incisive writing has been a major influence on succeeding generations of academics, practitioners and judges. Drawing on Sawer's writings, oral history interviews and private papers, Michael Coper makes an affectionate biographical sketch of this outstanding scholar and warm and genial human being. In particular, he explores how Sawer's scholarship stands up today, when so much has changed in the legal and political landscape; what is enduring and what is transient in a life's work; and what lessons we can draw when we look at law and life through the lens of biography.

Kant on Judging and the Will

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jill Vance Buroker
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Theoretical Reason ◽  
Critical Philosophy ◽  
Voluntary Activity ◽  
The Will ◽  
Direct Use

Kant’s Critical philosophy depends on the distinction between theoretical and practical reason, which he borrowed from Aristotle. But unlike Aristotle Kant claims that theoretical reason is subordinate to practical reason. This raises the possibility that theoretical judging could be a voluntary activity. This chapter investigates Kant’s view of the relation between theoretical judgments and the will. Based on Andrew Chignell’s recent work, it is argued that Kant recognizes the legitimate direct use of the will only in judgments he labels Belief (Glaube). With respect to Knowledge, his position is identical to Descartes’s position on clear and distinct perception. An analysis of Kant’s voluntarism regarding the activities of theoretical reason provides a model for subordinating theoretical reason to practical reason.

scholarly journals Human Rights and Human Nature

2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 523-534
Author(s):  
Jean Rhéaume
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Historical Context ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Positive Law

At least two important consequences follow from the fact that human rights are based on human nature. First, they exist according to natural law even in cases where positive law does not recognize them. Secondly, they cannot evolve because the nature and purpose of the human being does not change: only their formulation and level of protection in positive law can vary according to the socio-historical context.

The Distinctive Unity of the Human Being in Aquinas

2021 ◽  
pp. 580-595
Author(s):  
Therese Scarpelli Cory
Keyword(s):  
Human Being ◽  
Human Soul ◽  
Rational Animal ◽  
The Core ◽  
Definition Of

This chapter explores the fundamental vision of the human being at the core of Aquinas’ anthropology. Aquinas has typically been construed as defending a fundamentally ‘Aristotelian’ vision of the human being. I show that this label has generated a skewed reading of Aquinas. Accordingly, this chapter does not lay claim to identify what it would take for an anthropology to be authentically ‘Thomistic’. Instead, it makes a proposal concerning what I argue is the ‘guiding vision’ of Aquinas’ anthropology: namely the ‘distinctive unity of the human’. Aquinas prioritizes this notion of distinctive unity in the different areas of his anthropology. I explore how this distinctive unity is expressed (a) in Aquinas’ account of the human soul as the ‘horizon’ of the bodily and spiritual worlds, and (b) in his definition of the human being as ‘rational animal’.

An Unfamiliar and Positive Law: On Kant and Schiller

2013 ◽  
Vol 95 (3) ◽  
pp. 275-297 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reed Winegar
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Friedrich Schiller ◽  
Moral Action ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Positive Law ◽  
The Sublime ◽  
The Relationship

Abstract: A familiar post-Kantian criticism contends that Kant enslaves sensibility under the yoke of practical reason. Friedrich Schiller advanced a version of this criticism to which Kant publicly responded. Recent commentators have emphasized the role that Kant’s reply assigns to the pleasure that accompanies successful moral action. In contrast, I argue that Kant’s reply relies primarily on the sublime feeling that arises when we merely contemplate the moral law. In fact, the pleasures emphasized by other recent commentators depend on this sublime feeling. These facts illuminate Kant’s views regarding the relationship between morality, freedom, and the development of moral feelings.

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