scholarly journals Strategies of Time Appropriation: Authentic and Inauthentic Historicity of Man

2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 419-431
Author(s):  
Ekaterina S. Cherepanova

The article focuses on those paragraphs of the famous text Spiritual Situation of our Time by Karl Jaspers in which he approaches the problem of time from the perspective of philosophical anthropology. This text was published in 1931 and saw multiple editions, including the reprint in 1947, which followed the lecture The Question of Guilt. We surmise from this juxtaposition of texts in the new publication that Jaspers believed in the necessity to revisit the problem of the spiritual situation, but he also regarded his conceptualization of temporality viable in the new context and applicable to analyzing this new situation. We corroborate this hypothesis by close reading of the version of the 1947 text. As there exists a wealth of studies of Jasperss philosophy, we aim to explicate his interpretation of personal historicity and to find a reply to the question why it seems necessary to emphasize the appropriation of time. We demonstrate that the existentialist approach Jaspers offers is a universal model for living in the spiritual situation and for appropriating time. The need to appropriate time is inherent in human nature but the capacity to make sense of it and unravel the potential for authentic existence is not. Human beings are often unaware of their choice of certain time appropriation; moreover, human beings lack consistency in constructing the context of their own historicity. We elaborate in greater detail on the meaning of such concepts as spiritual situation, knowledge of the totality, philosophical life.

2016 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-24
Author(s):  
Grant Farred

Philosophical anthropology is a tradition that is as old as philosophy itself, so much so that it might be said to be indistinguishable from philosophy itself. Philosophical anthropology, extending as it does from Socrates to Sartre, best describes the work of V.Y. Mudimbe. Anthropology, broadly conceived as the science that studies human origins, the material and cultural development of humanity (philosophical anthropology concerns itself with human nature, particularly what it is that distinguishes human beings from other creatures and how philosophy allows human beings to understand themselves), is always Mudimbe’s first line of philosophical inquiry. It is certainly Mudimbe’s interest in anthropology that allows him to conduct his investigations into Africa, its modes of thinking, and colonialism and its continuing effects on the continent. Writing on the latter issue in The Invention of Africa, Mudimbe, with his customary deftness of mind, argues that colonialism and its aftermath cannot by itself account for the continent’s extant condition: “The colonizing structure, even in its most extreme manifestations . . . might not be the only explanation for Africa’s present-day marginality. Perhaps this marginality could, more essentially, be understood from the perspective of wider hypotheses about the classification of beings and societies.”[ Making sense of Africa, in Mudimbe’s terms, must begin with a hypothesization that explicates how “beings and societies” come to be classified, the anthropological undertaking par excellence, which also requires a study of the forces that construct, implement and maintain these classifications.


2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-110
Author(s):  
Antoni Płoszczyniec

The aim of this article is the reconstruction, analysis and presentation of Henryk Elzenberg’s philosophy of the human being, with particular emphasis on his concept of asceticism. Elzenberg’s philosophical anthropology is based on the pessimistic evaluation of reality, which itself is founded on the negative evaluation of human nature. Human nature is corrupt because of the primary will of humanity, which is selfish and self-seeking and which strives only for utilitarian values. The overcoming of pessimism is possible by the transformation of self-seeking will, and asceticism is a remedy which enables human beings to see and realise true, perfectionist values. Asceticism can overcome basic instincts, which pull human nature down to the animal-like state of being. In Elzenberg’s philosophical anthropology, asceticism creates culture and culture grants humanity to humans, which is a trope similar to the ancient conception of paideia.


Author(s):  
Alan L. Mittleman

This chapter moves into the political and economic aspects of human nature. Given scarcity and interdependence, what sense has Judaism made of the material well-being necessary for human flourishing? What are Jewish attitudes toward prosperity, market relations, labor, and leisure? What has Judaism had to say about the political dimensions of human nature? If all humans are made in the image of God, what does that original equality imply for political order, authority, and justice? In what kinds of systems can human beings best flourish? It argues that Jewish tradition shows that we act in conformity with our nature when we elevate, improve, and sanctify it. As co-creators of the world with God, we are not just the sport of our biochemistry. We are persons who can select and choose among the traits that comprise our very own natures, cultivating some and weeding out others.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-100
Author(s):  
Daniel Strassberg

The insight that human beings are prone to deceive themselves is part of our everyday knowledge of human nature. Even so, if deceiving someone means to deliberately misrepresent something to him, it is difficult to understand how it is possible to deceive yourself. This paper tries to address this difficulty by means of a narrative approach. Self-deception is conceived as a change of the narrative context by means of which the same fact appears in a different light. On these grounds, depending on whether the self-deceiver adopts an ironic attitude to his self-deception or not, it is also possible to distinguish between a morally inexcusable self-deception and a morally indifferent one.


Author(s):  
Jon Stewart

This work represents a combination of different genres: cultural history, philosophical anthropology, and textbook. It follows a handful of different but interrelated themes through more than a dozen texts that were written over a period of several millennia. By means of an analysis of these texts, this work presents a theory about the development of Western Civilization from antiquity to the Middle Ages. The main line of argument traces the various self-conceptions of the different cultures as they developed historically. These self-conceptions reflect different views of what it is to be human. The thesis is that in these we can discern the gradual emergence of what we today call inwardness, subjectivity and individual freedom. As human civilization took its first tenuous steps, it had a very limited conception of the individual. Instead, the dominant principle was that of the wider group: the family, clan or people. Only in the course of history did the idea of what we know as individuality begin to emerge. It took millennia for this idea to be fully recognized and developed. The conception of human beings as having a sphere of inwardness and subjectivity subsequently had a sweeping impact on all aspects of culture, such as philosophy, religion, law, and art. Indeed, this conception largely constitutes what is today referred to as modernity. It is easy to lose sight of the fact that this modern conception of human subjectivity was not simply something given but rather the result of a long process of historical and cultural development.


2015 ◽  
Vol 22 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 45-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew F. March

This essay discusses an important feature of much modern Islamic writing on law, politics and morality. The feature in question is the claim that Islamic law and human nature (fiṭra) are in perfect harmony, that Islam is the “natural religion” (dīn al-fiṭra), and thus that the demands of Islamic law are easy and painless for ordinary human moral capacities. My discussion proceeds through a close reading of the Moroccan independence leader and religious scholar ʿAllāl al-Fāsī (d. 1974). I discuss the ambiguities within Fāsī’s theory and suggest that the natural religion doctrine might be better understood less as a reduction of Islamic law to “natural law” and more as an apologetic effort to defend the realism and feasibility of Islamic law. In the hands of reformers like Fāsī, this project is beset with unresolved ambiguities around the constraining quality of revealed law in practice and the moral validity of non-Islamic political and ethical systems.



2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-49
Author(s):  
Paul Kucharski

My aim in this essay is to advance the state of scholarly discussion on the harms of genocide. The most obvious harms inflicted by every genocide are readily evident: the physical harm inflicted upon the victims of genocide and the moral harm that the perpetrators of genocide inflict upon themselves. Instead, I will focus on a kind of harm inflicted upon those who are neither victims nor perpetrators, on those who are outside observers, so to speak. My thesis will be that when a whole community or culture is eliminated, or even deeply wounded, the world loses an avenue for insight into the human condition. My argument is as follows. In order to understand human nature, and that which promotes its flourishing, we must certainly study individual human beings. But since human beings as rational and linguistic animals are in part constituted by the communities in which they live, the study of human nature should also involve the study of communities and cultures—both those that are well ordered and those that are not. No one community or culture has expressed all that can be said about the human way of existing and flourishing. And given that the unity and wholeness of human nature can only be glimpsed in a variety of communities and cultures, then part of the harm of genocide consists in the removal of a valuable avenue for human beings to better understand themselves.


Author(s):  
Barry Stroud

Hume takes his “naturalistic” study of human nature to show that certain general “principles of the imagination” can explain how human beings come to think, feel, believe, and act in all the ways they do independently of the truth or reasonableness of those responses. This appears to leave the reflective philosopher with no reason for assenting to what he has discovered he cannot help believing anyway. Relief from this unacceptably extreme skepticism is found in acknowledging and acquiescing in those forces of “nature” that inevitably overcome the apparent dictates of “reason” and return the philosopher to the responses and beliefs of everyday life. Living in full recognition of these forces and limitations is what Hume means by the “mitigated scepticism” he accepts.


1992 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 190-208
Author(s):  
Frank I. Michelman

Prescriptive political and moral theories contain ideas about what human beings are like and about what, correspondingly, is good for them. Conceptions of human “nature” and corresponding human good enter into normative argument by way of support and justification. Of course, it is logically open for the ratiocinative traffic to run the other way. Strongly held convictions about the rightness or wrongness, goodness or badness, of certain social institutions or practices may help condition and shape one's responses to one or another set of propositions about what people are like and what, in consequence, they have reason to value.


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