scholarly journals «HISTORICAL REPRESENTATION» IN F. ANKERSMIT’S PHILOSOPHY

Author(s):  
Глеб Сергеевич Ицкович

В статье рассматривается концепция «исторической репрезентации» в философии Ф. Анкерсмита. Данная концепция является важным компонентом нарративистской философии истории голландского философа. Используя эту концепцию, Анкерсмит стремится решить проблему истинности в историческом познании, поновому взглянув на историописание. Отвергая реализм как познавательную установку, он склоняется к мысли о подтверждаемости атомарных исторических фактов и возможности говорить лишь о большей или меньшей степени достоверности исторических повествований, поскольку они опираются в значительной степени на различные аксиологические установки и предпосылочное знание. Анкерсмит постмодернистски сближает историю и литературу, что ведет к трудностям в различении исторических и художественных текстов. The article is aimed at the analysis of the concept of «historical representation» in F. Ankersmit’s philosophy. This concept is an important component of the Dutch scholar narrativist philosophy of history. Using this concept, Ankersmit seeks to solve the problem of truth in historical knowledge by taking a new look at historical writing. Rejecting realism as a cognitive attitude, he inclines to the idea of the confirmability of atomic historical facts and the possibility of talking about a greater or lesser degree of reliability of historical narratives, since they depend largely on various axiological attitudes and knowledge presuppositions. Ankersmit brings history and literature together in a postmodern way, which leads to difficulties in distinguishing historical and artistic texts.

Author(s):  
Julian Wright

This chapter asks wider questions about the flow of time as it was explored in this historical writing. It focuses on Jaurès’ philosophy of history, initially through a brief discussion of his doctoral thesis and the essay entitled ‘Le bilan social du XIXème siècle’ that he provided at the end of the Histoire socialiste, then through the work of three of his collaborators, Gabriel Deville, Eugène Fournière, and Georges Renard. One of the most important challenges for socialists in the early twentieth century was to understand the damage and division caused by revolution, while not losing the transformative mission of their socialism. With these elements established, the chapter returns to Jaurès, and in particular the long study of nineteenth-century society in chapter 10 of L’Armée nouvelle. Jaurès advanced an original vision of the nineteenth century and its meaning for the socialist present.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
LEIGH K. JENCO ◽  
JONATHAN CHAPPELL

Abstract This article argues for a ‘history from between’ as the best lens through which to understand the construction of historical knowledge between East Asia and Europe. ‘Between’ refers to the space framed by East Asia and Europe, but also to the global circulations of ideas in that space, and to the subjective feeling of embeddedness in larger-than-local contexts that being in such a space makes possible. Our contention is that the outcomes of such entanglements are not merely reactive forms of knowledge, of the kind implied by older studies of translation and reception in global intellectual history. Instead they are themselves ‘co-productions’: they are the shared and mutually interactive inputs to enduring modes of uses of the past, across both East Asian and European traditions. Taking seriously the possibility that interpretations of the past were not transferred, but rather were co-produced between East Asia and Europe, we reconstruct the braided histories of historical narratives that continue to shape constructions of identity throughout Eurasia.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Robert Alexander Hurley

<p>There is a pronounced tendency within contemporary philosophy of history to think of historical knowledge as something apart from the kind of knowledge generated in the sciences. This has given rise to a myriad of epistemological issues. For if historical knowledge is not related to the scientific, then what is it? By what logic does it proceed? How are historical conclusions justified? Although almost the entirety of contemporary philosophy of history has been dedicated to such questions, there has been little real and agreed upon progress. Rather than fire yet another salvo in this rhetorical war, however, this thesis wishes instead to examine what lies beneath the basic presumption of separatism which animates it. Part One examines several paradigmatic examples of twentieth century philosophy of history in order to identify the grounds by which their authors considered history fundamentally different in kind from the sciences. It is concluded that, in each case, the case for separatism fows from the pervasive assumption that any body of knowledge which might rightly be called a science can be recognised by its search for general laws of nature. As history does not seem to share this aim, it is therefore considered to be knowledge of a fundamentally different kind. This thesis terms this the "nomothetic assumption." Part Two argues that such nomothetic assumptions are not an accurate representation of either scientific theory or practice and therefore that any assumption of separatism based upon them is unsound. To do this, examples of acknowledged scientific problems from the biological and geological sciences which do not involve the use of general laws are examined, with the aim of discovering how these historical disciplines are able to do the work of explanation in their absence. They do so, it is concluded, through a mechanism of epistemic (as opposed to literary) narrative. Having thus identified how historical sciences proceed without making direct use of laws, Part Two then generalises this model of scientific narrative and shows how it can be used to model existing practices in human history. This conclusion has far-reaching consequences, for it brings a single definition, method, and logic of confirmation to all studies of the past – whether traditionally acknowledged as scientific or historical. Thus all historical enquiries proceed by a common logic and by a common method. This effectively and definitively places human history among the sciences, without the need for the kind of radical transformation past attempts to do this have required.</p>


2011 ◽  
Vol 18 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hilda Kean

This issue of Public History Review discusses aspects of the distinctive role of public historians that goes beyond an approach simply aimed at bringing in people to exhibitions or making historical knowledge ‘accessible’. As James Gardner argued in the last issue of Public History Review, ‘We are often our own worst enemy, failing to share what we do. If we want the public to value what we do, we need to share the process of history’. Opening up the premises underpinning different forms of historical representation can assist in widening the historical process and facilitate a way of understanding and making meaning.


2013 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-204 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zoltán Boldizsár Simon

Abstract From time to time our tiny intellectual worlds are simultaneously shaken by big ideas – ideas that, however big they are, have their expiration-date. Such is the case with the idea of the impossibility to find life outside language. In this essay, I picture what I think is the current state of the philosophy of history after the so-called linguistic turn and what I think the direction is where the philosophy of history might be headed by taking into account the important job done by linguistic theories. I regard the abandonment of epistemology and the arrival to the realm of aesthetics as a point of no return, and conclude that a new philosophy of history has to have an aesthetic character. However, due to the omnipotence of language I also detect a narrow constructive potential in linguistic theories and argue that a new philosophy of history has to have the dual task of searching for life outside language while remaining in the realm of aesthetics. As a next step, I identify Frank Ankersmit’s notion of an individual historical experience as a move towards the fulfillment of this dual task. Finally, because Ankersmit’s experience remains mute, in the second half of the essay I attempt to present an outline of the possibility of a fruitful cooperation between the philosophy of history and phenomenology. More precisely, I am trying to synchronize Ankersmit’s notion of an individual historical experience with László Tengelyi’s phenomenological experiments with experience and let Tengelyi speak where Ankersmit “stops talking”. As a result, with the help of Tengelyi, an aperture can be found in language through which experience might worm its way. Due to this fissure, experience might be regarded as an invisible driving force behind linguistic expressions, and thus behind historical writing.


1988 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-274 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. G. Ashplant ◽  
Adrian Wilson

In a previous article, we examined Herbert Butterfield's identification of a certain pattern of anachronism in historical writing, in his classic book The whig interpretation of history (1931). In the decades since that book was originally published, Butterfield's designation has been extended far beyond its original domain of political and religious history. The terms ‘whig history’ and ‘whiggish history’ have passed into the common parlance of historians. This very success, however, has masked a failure to define the nature of such anachronistic writing, its causes and remedies. Such definition is all the more necessary since Butterfield's own attempts were clearly inadequate. Building upon and amending certain tentative formulations of Butterfield's, we defined the root of the anachronistic error as present-centredness: that is, that the historian, in seeking to study, reconstruct and write about the past, is constrained by necessarily starting from the perceptual and conceptual categories of the present.


2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 603-609 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOHN BREWER ◽  
SILVIA SEBASTIANI

According to Michel de Certeau, distance is the indispensable prerequisite for historical knowledge and the very characteristic of modern historiography. The historian speaks, in the present, about the absent, the dead, as Certeau labels the past, thus emphasizing the performative dimension of historical writing: “the function of language is to introduce through saying what can no longer be done.” As a consequence, the heterogeneity of two non-communicating temporalities becomes the challenge to be faced: the present of the historian, as a moment du savoir, is radically separated from the past, which exists only as an objet de savoir, the meaning of which can be restored by an operation of distantiation and contextualization. In Evidence de l’histoire: Ce que voient les historiens, François Hartog takes up the question of history writing and what is visible, or more precisely the modalities historians have employed to narrate the past, opening up the way to a reflection on the boundaries between the visible and the invisible: the mechanisms that have contributed to establish these boundaries over time, and the questions that have legitimized the survey of what has been seen or not seen. But, as Mark Phillips points out, it is the very ubiquity of the trope of distance in historical writings that has paradoxically rendered it almost invisible to historians, so that “it has become difficult to distinguish between the concept of historical distance and the idea of history itself.”


1978 ◽  
Vol 83 (3) ◽  
pp. 684
Author(s):  
Robert Anchor ◽  
Peter Munz

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