CONTRIBUTING TO LEARN MECHANISM OF COORDINATION BETWEEN LEGISLATIVE POWER, EXECUTIVE POWER AND JUDICIAL POWER IN STATE MANAGEMENT IN VIETNAM

2021 ◽  
pp. 11-15
Author(s):  
Thi My Hang Vu
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Power ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Legislative Power ◽  
State Management

scholarly journals ANALISA YURIDIS TERHADAP SISTEM KAMERAL MAJELIS PERMUSYAWARATAN RAKYATSESUDAH PERUBAHAN UNDANG-UNDANG DASAR 1945

to-ra ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Fernando Silalahi
Keyword(s):  
John Locke ◽  
The State ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Political Justice ◽  
Legislative Power ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Democratic State ◽  
Distribution Of Power

Abstract In the life of a state that longs for a political justice, surely in the Basic Law or the Constitution in the country the inventor of his ideas and / or its founders have included a power sharing system that seeks to re ect political justice. If it must be connected with the form of the state, in fact this idea remains rooted in political justice. In the distribution of power, which according to John Locke is divided into legislative power, executive power, and judicial power, there must be authority that is balanced with each other and not overlapping. This was stated by John Locke so that power is not centralized within one institution, thereby reducing the risk of abuse and creating a democratic state.   Keywords: political justice; legislative power; judicial power; democratic state.

scholarly journals TRIAS POLITICA DALAM PERSPEKTIF FIKIH SIYASAH

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Wery Gusmansyah
Keyword(s):  
Civil Law ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Legislative Power ◽  
Law Of Nations ◽  
The Law

According to the concept of the trias politica Montesquieu, in every government there are three kinds of powers, namely the legislative power, the executive power, on matters pertaining to the law of nations; and judicial power on matters that depend on civil law ". According to him, these three types of power must be separate from each other, both about the task (function) and the equipment (organ) that organize it. Basically, the concept of trias politica does not conflict with the jurisprudence of siyasah. The implementation of this power-sharing can be seen in the time of the khulafaurrasyidin. At that time the executive power held by a caliph, the legislative power held by the Council of Shura, and the power of the judiciary held by Qadhi or judge. Then, during the second caliphate of Umar bin Khattab, the division of power between the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary was elaborated by law. At this time, Umar bin Khattab made a law that separates the executive and legislative powers, with the aim that the qadhi as the holder of the judicial power in deciding cases can be free from executive influence

SUBJECTS AND OBJECTS OF PUBLIC MARKETING

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (12) ◽  
pp. 260-270
Author(s):  
Yevgeny Victorovich Romat ◽  
Yury Volodimirovich Havrilechko
Keyword(s):  
Public Administration ◽  
Municipal Government ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Marketing Concept ◽  
Public Authorities ◽  
Public Marketing ◽  
The Public ◽  
State Management ◽  
Management Concepts ◽  
The Subject

The article is devoted to research of theoretical problems of the concepts of the subject and object of public marketing. The definitions of these concepts are considered in the article, the evolution of their development is studied. The article provides an analysis of the main approaches to the notion of subjects and objects of public marketing, their relationship and role in the processes of public marketing. The authors proposes concrete approaches to their systematization. These approaches allow us to identify specific types of public marketing and their main characteristics. Relying on the analysis of the concept of “subject of public (state) management”, it is concluded that as bodies of state marketing, most often act as executive bodies of state power. In this case, the following levels of marketing subjects in the system of public administration are allocated: the highest level of executive power; Branch central bodies of executive power; Local government bodies; Separate government agencies. It is noted that the diversity of subjects of public marketing is explained, first of all, by the dependence on the tasks of the state and municipal government, the possibilities of introducing the marketing concept of these subjects and certain characteristics of the said objects of state marketing. It is noted that the concept of “subject of public marketing” is not always the identical notion of “subject of public administration”. First, not all public authorities are subjects of state marketing. In some cases, this is not appropriate, for example, in the activities of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine or the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine. Secondly, state marketing is just one of many alternative management concepts, which is not always the most effective in the public administration system.

scholarly journals Menakar Independensi Hakim Pengadilan Pajak Pasca Putusan MK Nomor 10/PUU-XVIII/2020

2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 879
Author(s):  
Ananthia Ayu Devitasari
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Power ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Deputy Chairman ◽  
Ministry Of Finance ◽  
Tax Court ◽  
Article 5 ◽  
Case Number

AbstrakIndependensi peradilan adalah fondasi utama terwujudnya keadilan dan kepastian hukum. Terkait diskursus independensi kekuasaan kehakiman tersebut, Mahkamah Konstitusi memutus Perkara Nomor 10/PUU-XVIII/2020 yang menguji pasal Pasal 5 ayat (2) dan Pasal 8 ayat (2) Undang-Undang Nomor 14 Tahun 2002 tentang Pengadilan Pajak. Para Pemohon menguji kewenangan pembinaan organisasi, administrasi, dan keuangan bagi Pengadilan Pajak dilakukan oleh Departemen Keuangan, kewenangan Menteri Keuangan untuk mengusulkan ketua dan wakil Ketua Pengadilan Pajak, serta ketiadaan batasan periodesasi jabatan ketua dan wakil ketua. Lebih lanjut, Mahkamah dalam amar putusan a quo menyatakan bahwa ““Ketua dan Wakil Ketua diangkat oleh Presiden yang dipilih dari dan oleh para Hakim yang selanjutnya diusulkan melalui Menteri dengan persetujuan Ketua Mahkamah Agung untuk 1 (satu) kali masa jabatan selama 5 (lima) tahun”. Berangkat dari latar belakang tersebut, kajian ini berusaha menganalisa independensi hakim pengadilan pajak pasca Putusan MK Nomor 10/PUU-XVIII/2020 dengan pendekatan teori independensi peradilan. Kajian ini menunjukkan Putusan Mahkamah tidak hanya mendukung independensi hakim badan peradilan pajak tetapi juga menarik garis demarkasi antara kekuasaan kehakiman dengan kekuasaan eksekutif.AbstractJudicial independence is the main foundation for the of justice and legal certainty. Regarding the discourse on the independence of judicial power, the Constitutional Court decided on Case Number 10 / PUU-XVIII / 2020 which examined Article 5 paragraph (2) and Article 8 paragraph (2) of Law Number 14 of 2002 concerning the Tax Court. The Petitioners challenged the authority of Ministry of Finance to develop the organization, administration and finance for the Tax Court, the authority of the Minister of Finance to propose the chairperson and deputy chairman of the Tax Court. Furthermore, the Court in its ruling states that "the Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson are appointed by the President who is elected from and by the Judges who are subsequently proposed through the Minister with the approval of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for 1 (one) term of office for 5 (five) years". This study examined the independence of the tax court judges after the Constitutional Court Decision Number 10 / PUU-XVIII / 2020 with independent judicial theory approach. This study showed that the Court's decision not only supports the independence of the tax court judges but also draws a demarcation line between judicial power and executive power. 

Part III Themes, Ch.17 Unity

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gummow William
Keyword(s):  
State Legislatures ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
National Unity ◽  
Legislative Power ◽  
The People ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Ordinary Citizens

This chapter considers national unity in Australia. It focuses first upon the absolute freedom of intercourse among the States of which section 92 of the Constitution commands. The chapter then turns to the absence of disability or discrimination required by section 117. Next, it considers the operation of section 109 not only to adjust relations between Commonwealth and State legislatures but to meet the entitlement of ‘the ordinary citizens … to know which of two inconsistent laws he is required to observe’. Here, reference is made to the uniform quality of justice throughout the Commonwealth which these ‘ordinary citizens’ would be entitled to expect. Finally, the chapter discusses the relationship between ‘the people’, the franchise, and citizenship, and what on occasion has been identified as the implied ‘nationhood’ legislative power of the Parliament, or ‘nationhood’ as an attribute of the executive power of the Commonwealth.

Uncertain sovereignty: Ceylon as a Dominion 1948–1972

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 1258-1282
Author(s):  
Rehan Abeyratne
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Minority Communities ◽  
Cautious Approach ◽  
Legislative Power ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject

Abstract This article, a contribution to a symposium on dominion constitutionalism, looks at sovereignty in Ceylon’s Dominion period (1948–1972). While the Ceylon Constitution has been the subject of in-depth historical and sociopolitical study, it has received less attention from legal scholars. This article hopes to fill that gap. It analyzes Ceylon Supreme Court and Privy Council judgments from this era on both rights-based and structural questions of constitutional law. In each area, sovereignty-related concerns influenced the judicial approach and case outcomes. On fundamental rights, both the Supreme Court and the Privy Council adopted a cautious approach, declining to invalidate legislation that had discriminatory effects on minority communities. This reluctance to entrench fundamental rights resulted, at least in part, from judges’ undue deference to the Ceylon Parliament, which was wrongly looked upon like its all-powerful British progenitor. On constitutional structure, the Ceylon Supreme Court deferred to Parliament even when legislation encroached into the judicial realm. The Privy Council, though, was not so passive. It upheld a separate, inviolable judicial power that Parliament could not legislate away. But by asserting itself as a check on legislative power, the Council—as a foreign judicial body intervening in Ceylonese affairs—stoked concerns that Ceylon was less than fully sovereign, which ultimately ended Dominion status.

scholarly journals National Assembly Make Law or Cease The Making Law

2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nguyen Dang Dung ◽  
Nguyen Thuy Duong
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Power ◽  
National Assembly ◽  
Legislative Power ◽  
Doi Moi ◽  
The People ◽  
Legislative Branch ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Right

Although there has not been a reform like executive and judicial power , since the “Doi Moi” reform until now, the National Assembly - the legislative branch of Vietnamese government has achieved certain successes, but to implement 2013 Constitution better, there ‘s still a lot of work to do. First of all, we have to change our awareness: Legislative power is not simply the right to adopt a law, but also the right to suspend law drafting when the laws do not express the will of the people, nor do they reflect objective movement of society. Keywords: National Assembly, legislative power, right to cease the making law.

13. The judiciary

2021 ◽  
pp. 303-326
Author(s):  
Anne Dennett
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Judicial Independence ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
External Influences ◽  
Political Interference ◽  
The Uk

This chapter examines the role of the judiciary in the UK constitution, the critically important concepts of judicial independence and neutrality, accountability of judges, and judicial power. The UK courts administer justice; uphold the rule of law; and act as a check on executive power. Judicial independence requires that judges should be free from external influences in their decision-making, and make decisions without political interference or fear of reprisal. Meanwhile, judicial neutrality means that judges should determine legal disputes impartially, objectively, and solely by applying the law. At first sight, judicial accountability seems inconsistent with being independent, but it is essential that the judiciary adheres to the highest standards in carrying out its functions. In the absence of a codified constitution, the boundaries of judicial power operate within a framework of constitutional principles and conventions, but there is debate over the limits of that power.

A Subjective Jurisprudence

2020 ◽  
pp. 55-92
Author(s):  
Edward A. Jr. Purcell
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
The Political ◽  
Institutional Goals ◽  
Policy Goals ◽  
Power Limit ◽  
Political Right ◽  
The U.S

This chapter examines Justice Antonin Scalia’s jurisprudence dealing with the U.S. Constitution’s two structural axes, separation of powers and federalism. It argues that both constitutional principles are general, largely indeterminate, and easily manipulable and that Scalia construed them in light of his own subjective goals and values. He was determined to use them instrumentally to expand executive power, limit Congress, and severely restrict federal judicial power. The chapter argues that Scalia regarded separation of powers as more critical and important than federalism because it was better suited to serve his political and institutional goals and that, in joining the Rehnquist Court’s “federalism revolution” in the early twentieth century, he contradicted the position he had taken in his Senate confirmation hearing about the propriety of the Court giving special deference to Congress on federalism issues. Finally, the chapter shows that before he went on the Court, Scalia had made it clear that he viewed both separation of powers and federalism as principles that could and should be interpreted to serve the practical policy goals of the political right.

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