Social Distancing as a Public Goods Dilemma: High Economic Cost Reduces Voluntary Compliance
Participation in social distancing can be seen as a contribution to a public good that is influenced by 1) the marginal costs and benefits of those contributions and 2) expectations that other citizens will participate. We test our theory using an official government economic report on job loss as an exogenous, negative information shock. Using Canadian data, we show that this shock increased aggregate-level mobility and reduced self-reported social distancing among respondents surveyed throughout the pandemic (N=17,539), especially for younger respondents – a group that faces higher costs relative to benefits of compliance. We also conduct three survey experiments on nationally representative samples to unpack a possible mediating effect of expectations of others’ participation. Our results reinforce our principal findings, while also showing that 1) information on prospective economic cost reduces expectations of compliance by other citizens; and 2) expectations of compliance by others cause expectations of respondents’ own compliance.