scholarly journals From aliens to invisible limbs: The transitions that never make it into conscious experience

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaan Aru
Keyword(s):  
Virtual Reality ◽  
Motor Cortex ◽  
Neural Activity ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Neural Mechanisms ◽  
Active Inference ◽  
Eye Blinks ◽  
Sensory Cortices ◽  
Sensory Activity ◽  
Inference Theory

Here it is suggested that one interesting but not well-studied property of consciousness is its continuity – the fact that my experience is stable in time despite the myriads of changes in the underlying neural activity. It is proposed that there are specific mechanisms that maintain the continuity of consciousness by preventing certain transitions in the environment from entering conscious experience. These mechanisms are the key reason why we do not perceive the involuntary eye-blinks or why our own moving limbs do not capture our attention. I will describe some studies we have conducted with virtual reality to demonstrate that one mechanism supporting the continuity of consciousness seems to be the withdrawal of attention from the specific predictable sensory activity. It is described how the active inference theory can explain this set of findings. It seems that (for now) the active inference theory is the only theory that can account for the continuity of consciousness. Next, we explore the neural mechanisms of how the motor cortex conveys specific predictions to the sensory cortices and inhibit the predicted sensory consequences of own movement. Although not much is learned from this piece about the mechanisms of continuity, it is concluded that the topic is worth to be explored more thoroughly.

scholarly journals Neural Activity in Human Primary Motor Cortex Areas 4a and 4p Is Modulated Differentially by Attention to Action

2002 ◽  
Vol 88 (1) ◽  
pp. 514-519 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. Binkofski ◽  
G. R. Fink ◽  
S. Geyer ◽  
G. Buccino ◽  
O. Gruber ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Magnetic Resonance Imaging ◽  
Magnetic Resonance ◽  
Motor Cortex ◽  
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging ◽  
Neural Activity ◽  
Primary Motor Cortex ◽  
Direct Evidence ◽  
Neural Mechanisms ◽  
Functional Magnetic Resonance ◽  
Resonance Imaging

The mechanisms underlying attention to action are poorly understood. Although distracted by something else, we often maintain the accuracy of a movement, which suggests that differential neural mechanisms for the control of attended and nonattended action exist. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in normal volunteers and probabilistic cytoarchitectonic maps, we observed that neural activity in subarea 4p (posterior) within the primary motor cortex was modulated by attention to action, while neural activity in subarea 4a (anterior) was not. The data provide the direct evidence for differential neural mechanisms during attended and unattended action in human primary motor cortex.

scholarly journals Consciousness as a Concrete Physical Phenomenon

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jussi Jylkkä ◽  
Henry Railo
Keyword(s):  
Neural Activity ◽  
Biological System ◽  
Causal Power ◽  
Physical Phenomenon ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Neural Mechanisms ◽  
Neural Activation ◽  
Subjective Experiences ◽  
Standard Problem ◽  
Physical Phenomena

AbstractWhy any type of neural activation is associated with subjective, conscious experience is a fundamental unsolved question in neuroscience. To bridge the gap between neural activity and conscious experience, one seemingly must tie together two very different entities. The paradigmatic view in consciousness science is that subjective experiences are private and cannot be scientifically observed or described: science can only discover correlations between subjective experiences and their neural realizers, but never observe or describe the experiences themselves. We present a metatheory of consciousness that explains how subjective experiences are related to empirical observations and models, and why the two appear so different from each other. We argue that consciousness is a concrete physical process that causally interacts with other physical phenomena. This entails that consciousness can be empirically observed and characterized. The reason why subjective experiences and empirical observations and models of them appear so different is explained by what we call the observer-observed distinction. Empirical observations are always distinct from the observer, but a subject and her experiences constitute a single physical-biological system. We argue that once science has completely described 1) the constitutive neural mechanisms that are isomorphic with experiences, 2) the etiological mechanisms that experiences are based on, and 3) their causal power, then science has provided an exhaustive description of phenomenology. Our conclusion is that, if we accept this framework we call Naturalistic Monism, consciousness collapses into a standard problem of science.

scholarly journals Waving goodbye to contrast: Self-generated hand movements attenuate visual sensitivity

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Madis Vasser ◽  
Laurène Vuillaume ◽  
Axel Cleeremans ◽  
Jaan Aru
Keyword(s):  
Virtual Reality ◽  
Visual Sensitivity ◽  
Hand Movements ◽  
Active Inference ◽  
Body Movements ◽  
Apparent Contrast ◽  
First Order ◽  
Metacognitive Judgments ◽  
Sensory Attenuation ◽  
Inference Theory

AbstractIt is well known that the human brain continuously predicts the sensory consequences of its own body movements, which typically results in sensory attenuation. Yet, the extent and exact mechanisms underlying sensory attenuation are still debated. To explore this issue, we asked participants to decide which of two visual stimuli was of higher contrast in a virtual reality situation where one of the stimuli could appear behind the participants’ invisible moving hand or not. Over two experiments, we measured the effects of such “virtual occlusion” on first-order sensitivity and on metacognitive monitoring. Our findings show that self-generated hand movements reduced the apparent contrast of the stimulus. This result can be explained by the active inference theory. Moreover, sensory attenuation seemed to affect only first-order sensitivity and not (second-order) metacognitive judgments of confidence.

Consciousness

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anil K. Seth
Keyword(s):  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Real Problem ◽  
Active Inference ◽  
Biological Mechanisms ◽  
Specific Content ◽  
Brain Responses ◽  
Biomimetic Approach ◽  
Multiple Levels ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
The Brain

Consciousness is perhaps the most familiar aspect of our existence, yet we still do not know its biological basis. This chapter outlines a biomimetic approach to consciousness science, identifying three principles linking properties of conscious experience to potential biological mechanisms. First, conscious experiences generate large quantities of information in virtue of being simultaneously integrated and differentiated. Second, the brain continuously generates predictions about the world and self, which account for the specific content of conscious scenes. Third, the conscious self depends on active inference of self-related signals at multiple levels. Research following these principles helps move from establishing correlations between brain responses and consciousness towards explanations which account for phenomenological properties—addressing what can be called the “real problem” of consciousness. The picture that emerges is one in which consciousness, mind, and life, are tightly bound together—with implications for any possible future “conscious machines.”

scholarly journals The Cognitive-Emotional Design and Study of Architectural Space: A Scoping Review of Neuroarchitecture and Its Precursor Approaches

Sensors ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (6) ◽  
pp. 2193
Author(s):  
Juan Luis Higuera-Trujillo ◽  
Carmen Llinares ◽  
Eduardo Macagno
Keyword(s):  
Virtual Reality ◽  
Built Environment ◽  
Present Article ◽  
Scoping Review ◽  
Neural Activity ◽  
Emotional Design ◽  
Architectural Space ◽  
Future Design

Humans respond cognitively and emotionally to the built environment. The modern possibility of recording the neural activity of subjects during exposure to environmental situations, using neuroscientific techniques and virtual reality, provides a promising framework for future design and studies of the built environment. The discipline derived is termed “neuroarchitecture”. Given neuroarchitecture’s transdisciplinary nature, it progresses needs to be reviewed in a contextualised way, together with its precursor approaches. The present article presents a scoping review, which maps out the broad areas on which the new discipline is based. The limitations, controversies, benefits, impact on the professional sectors involved, and potential of neuroarchitecture and its precursors’ approaches are critically addressed.

scholarly journals Active Inference: Applicability to Different Types of Social Organization Explained through Reference to Industrial Engineering and Quality Management

Entropy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 198
Author(s):  
Stephen Fox
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Quality Management ◽  
Social Organization ◽  
Generative Models ◽  
Industrial Engineering ◽  
Prediction Errors ◽  
Active Inference ◽  
For Profit ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Inference Theory

Active inference is a physics of life process theory of perception, action and learning that is applicable to natural and artificial agents. In this paper, active inference theory is related to different types of practice in social organization. Here, the term social organization is used to clarify that this paper does not encompass organization in biological systems. Rather, the paper addresses active inference in social organization that utilizes industrial engineering, quality management, and artificial intelligence alongside human intelligence. Social organization referred to in this paper can be in private companies, public institutions, other for-profit or not-for-profit organizations, and any combination of them. The relevance of active inference theory is explained in terms of variational free energy, prediction errors, generative models, and Markov blankets. Active inference theory is most relevant to the social organization of work that is highly repetitive. By contrast, there are more challenges involved in applying active inference theory for social organization of less repetitive endeavors such as one-of-a-kind projects. These challenges need to be addressed in order for active inference to provide a unifying framework for different types of social organization employing human and artificial intelligence.

scholarly journals Mice are not automatons; subjective experience in premotor circuits guides behavior

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Drew C. Schreiner ◽  
Christian Cazares ◽  
Rafael Renteria ◽  
Christina M Gremel
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Motor Cortex ◽  
Adaptive Behavior ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Contextual Factors ◽  
Neural Mechanisms ◽  
Neural Representation ◽  
Recent Experience ◽  
Checking Behavior ◽  
Corticostriatal Circuits

Subjective experience is a powerful driver of decision-making and continuously accrues. However, most neurobiological studies constrain analyses to task-related variables and ignore how continuously and individually experienced internal, temporal, and contextual factors influence adaptive behavior during decision-making and the associated neural mechanisms. We show mice rely on learned information about recent and longer-term subjective experience of variables above and beyond prior actions and reward, including checking behavior and the passage of time, to guide self-initiated, self-paced, and self-generated actions. These experiential variables were represented in secondary motor cortex (M2) activity and its projections into dorsal medial striatum (DMS). M2 integrated this information to bias strategy-level decision-making, and DMS projections used specific aspects of this recent experience to plan upcoming actions. This suggests diverse aspects of experience drive decision-making and its neural representation, and shows premotor corticostriatal circuits are crucial for using selective aspects of experiential information to guide adaptive behavior.

scholarly journals Neural correlates of beauty retouching to enhance attractiveness of self-depictions in women

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chisa Ota ◽  
Tamami Nakano
Keyword(s):  
Magnetic Resonance Imaging ◽  
Social Media ◽  
Neural Activity ◽  
Facial Attractiveness ◽  
Neural Correlates ◽  
Neural Mechanisms ◽  
Functional Magnetic Resonance ◽  
Resonance Imaging ◽  
Amygdala Activity ◽  
Increased Activity

AbstractBeauty filters, while often employed for retouching photos to appear more attractive on social media, when used in excess cause images to give a distorted impression. The neural mechanisms underlying this change in facial attractiveness according to beauty retouching level remain unknown. The present study used functional magnetic resonance imaging in women as they viewed photos of their own face or unknown faces that had been retouched at three levels: no, mild, and extreme. The activity in the nucleus accumbens (NA) exhibited a positive correlation with facial attractiveness, whereas amygdala activity showed a negative correlation with attractiveness. Even though the participants rated others’ faces as more attractive than their own, the NA showed increased activity only for their mildly retouched own face and the amygdala exhibited greater activation in the others’ faces condition than the own face condition. Moreover, amygdala activity was greater for extremely retouched faces than for unretouched or mildly retouched faces for both conditions. Frontotemporal and cortical midline areas showed greater activation for one’s own than others’ faces, but such self-related activation was absent when extremely retouched. These results suggest that neural activity dynamically switches between the NA and amygdala according to perceived attractiveness of one’s face.

Auditory–Visual Aversive Stimuli Modulate the Conscious Experience of Fear

2013 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 347-370 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marine Taffou ◽  
Rachid Guerchouche ◽  
George Drettakis ◽  
Isabelle Viaud-Delmon
Keyword(s):  
Virtual Reality ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Visual Presentation ◽  
Visual Channel ◽  
Sensory Pathways ◽  
Aversive Stimuli ◽  
Behavioral Avoidance ◽  
Affective Information ◽  
Multisensory Information ◽  
The Impact

In a natural environment, affective information is perceived via multiple senses, mostly audition and vision. However, the impact of multisensory information on affect remains relatively undiscovered. In this study, we investigated whether the auditory–visual presentation of aversive stimuli influences the experience of fear. We used the advantages of virtual reality to manipulate multisensory presentation and to display potentially fearful dog stimuli embedded in a natural context. We manipulated the affective reactions evoked by the dog stimuli by recruiting two groups of participants: dog-fearful and non-fearful participants. The sensitivity to dog fear was assessed psychometrically by a questionnaire and also at behavioral and subjective levels using a Behavioral Avoidance Test (BAT). Participants navigated in virtual environments, in which they encountered virtual dog stimuli presented through the auditory channel, the visual channel or both. They were asked to report their fear using Subjective Units of Distress. We compared the fear for unimodal (visual or auditory) and bimodal (auditory–visual) dog stimuli. Dog-fearful participants as well as non-fearful participants reported more fear in response to bimodal audiovisual compared to unimodal presentation of dog stimuli. These results suggest that fear is more intense when the affective information is processed via multiple sensory pathways, which might be due to a cross-modal potentiation. Our findings have implications for the field of virtual reality-based therapy of phobias. Therapies could be refined and improved by implicating and manipulating the multisensory presentation of the feared situations.

scholarly journals Exploring the role of expectations and stimulus relevance on stimulus-specific neural representations and conscious report

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik L Meijs ◽  
Pim Mostert ◽  
Heleen A Slagter ◽  
Floris P de Lange ◽  
Simon van Gaal
Keyword(s):  
Attentional Blink ◽  
Neural Activity ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Activity Patterns ◽  
Neural Mechanisms ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Neural Representations ◽  
Dependent Signal ◽  
Task Irrelevant

Abstract Subjective experience can be influenced by top-down factors, such as expectations and stimulus relevance. Recently, it has been shown that expectations can enhance the likelihood that a stimulus is consciously reported, but the neural mechanisms supporting this enhancement are still unclear. We manipulated stimulus expectations within the attentional blink (AB) paradigm using letters and combined visual psychophysics with magnetoencephalographic (MEG) recordings to investigate whether prior expectations may enhance conscious access by sharpening stimulus-specific neural representations. We further explored how stimulus-specific neural activity patterns are affected by the factors expectation, stimulus relevance and conscious report. First, we show that valid expectations about the identity of an upcoming stimulus increase the likelihood that it is consciously reported. Second, using a series of multivariate decoding analyses, we show that the identity of letters presented in and out of the AB can be reliably decoded from MEG data. Third, we show that early sensory stimulus-specific neural representations are similar for reported and missed target letters in the AB task (active report required) and an oddball task in which the letter was clearly presented but its identity was task-irrelevant. However, later sustained and stable stimulus-specific representations were uniquely observed when target letters were consciously reported (decision-dependent signal). Fourth, we show that global pre-stimulus neural activity biased perceptual decisions for a ‘seen’ response. Fifth and last, no evidence was obtained for the sharpening of sensory representations by top-down expectations. We discuss these findings in light of emerging models of perception and conscious report highlighting the role of expectations and stimulus relevance.

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