Being a beast machine: The origins of selfhood in control-oriented interoceptive inference
Throughout his career Andy Clark has shaped how scientists and philosophers think about the role of representation in action, perception, and cognition. In the latest iteration of this debate he has foregrounded the influential perspective of ‘predictive processing’, which sees perception as a process of action-oriented ‘best guessing’ (inference) about the causes of noisy and ambiguous sensory signals, and which involves the brain inducing ‘generative’ models of how hidden causes mediate the effects of actions on sensory signals. Here, I will develop this position in the context of interoception (the sense of the body from within) and physiological regulation. A key idea here, which recalls 20th century cybernetic theory, is that interoceptive inference is targeted towards maintaining physiological homeostasis rather than inducing complete and accurate internal models of an external state-of-affairs. I explore how this perspective helps connect control-oriented interoceptive inference to phenomenological properties of embodied selfhood and subjectivity. The upshot echoes (or perhaps subverts) a classic philosophical trope of the Enlightenment philosopher Julien La Mettrie: to find the origins of our conscious selves in our nature as beast machines.