scholarly journals The ‘new’ League success in the red belt and its post-fascist inheritance: evidence from 2018 National Elections

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Moreno Mancosu ◽  
Riccardo Ladini

In 2018 national elections, the Lega, an Italian xenophobic right-wing party, has dramatically increased its consensus in the ‘red belt’, the central part of the country traditionally ruled by center-left parties. Pundits have argued that this performance can be attributed to the effect of the new leadership of Matteo Salvini, who shifted the ideological location of the party (that now aims at being a national right-wing party), combined with the drop in preferences of Forza Italia, the ally/competitor in the right-wing ideological spectrum. This paper aims at providing new insights in the explanation of these electoral outcomes, by hypothesizing that geographical trajectories of diffusion of the party are correlated with the presence of geographically clustered post-fascist minorities present in the region since the First Republic age. By employing official figures at the municipality level, the paper analyses the relationship between the percentages of votes for the MSI (the most relevant post-fascist force during the First Republic) in 1976 and the Lega Nord in the 2006-2018 period. Consistent with our hypothesis, the post-fascist inheritance is significantly correlated with the local prevalence for the Lega Nord in 2018, after the change in the political discourse and leadership of the party. Empirical analyses provide evidence of our expectations, even when controlling for unemployment rate and percentage of immigrants.

2020 ◽  
pp. 155541202097561
Author(s):  
Alexander Lambrow

This article addresses the political dimensions of Johan Huizinga’s seminal work Homo Ludens: A study of the play element in culture (1938). More than just a foundational text in academic ludology, this text positioned itself as a polemic against the right-wing political discourse going on in contemporaneous Nazi Germany, represented chiefly by Carl Schmitt. Through his concept of play, Huizinga hoped to resolve what he perceived to be the confusion of play and seriousness among a group of reactionary theorists narrowly focused on the Schmittian Ernstfall, the “serious case” of inimical violence. This article analyzes the usage of the concepts of “play” and “seriousness” in Huizinga’s and Schmitt’s respective corpuses and, finally, places their work in dialogue in order to understand the difficulties involved in defining play as unserious and unpolitical.


2015 ◽  
Vol 73 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Wodak

In recent years, we can observe a shift towards the right, in politics and the related political discourse. This paper analyses this development for debates on migration in Austria, while drawing on the concept of "normalisation". The basic assumption is illustrated with an example of Austrian debates following the terrorist attacks in Paris, 7.–9.01.2015. In the quantitative and qualitative analysis of a complete sample of 72 newspaper articles in the period of two weeks in January/February 2015, it becomes obvious that the notion of "unwillingness to integrate" ("Integrationsunwilligkeit"), a completely vague notion (a "floating signifier") which remains undefined and was used only by the right-wing populist party FPÖ in the 1990s, has since moved to the middle of the political spectrum and was suddenly employed by the political mainstream in 2014 and 2015. Moreover, the analysis provides some evidence for the merging of two completely unrelated arguments: an argument about how to deal with non-compliance of adolescent migrant school children with an argument about the prevention of radicalisation in society.


2021 ◽  
pp. 286-305
Author(s):  
A. A. Ivanov

The question of the attitude of the Orthodox Russian clergy to the right-wing political parties at the beginning of the 20th century — the Black Hundreds (the Union of the Russian People, the Russian People’s Union named after Mikhail Archangel, etc.) and Russian nationalists (the All-Russian National Union and related organizations) is considered. The novelty of the research is seen in the introduction into scientific circulation of new sources (materials of the church press), which make it possible to make a number of significant clarifications in the existing ideas about the relationship between the Orthodox Church and right-wing political organizations. Particular attention is paid to the differences in the views of clergymen on the Black Hundred unions and political structures of Russian nationalists. The reasons for the cooperation of conservative Orthodox pastors with the Black Hundred unions and organizations of Russian nationalists and the circumstances that forced the clergy to show concern for the views and activities of right-wing parties are shown. It is argued that the secularization and Westernization of Russian nationalism, which led to the departure of its ideologists and followers from the foundations of the Orthodox doctrine and church worldview, became the main reasons for the wary attitude of church circles towards the political organizations of Russian nationalists.


Author(s):  
Igor' Vladimirovich Antonov

The object of this research is the political history of the Ulus of Jochi as a part of the Great Mongol Empire. The subject of this is the Eastern policy of Mengu-Timur – the 6th ruler of the Ulus of Jochi (1266-1282). The author examines such aspects of the topic as the relationship of Mengu-Timur with the rulers of the uluses of Hulagu – Abaga, Chagatay – Borak, Ugedei – Kaidu, decisions made by the representatives of the uluses of Jochi, Chagatay and Ugedei in Talas Kurultai. Special attention is given to the analysis of relationship between Mengu-Timur and the ruler of the Central Ulus of Kublai, who founded the Yuan Empire. Comparative analysis is conducted on the written sources and scientific works on the topic. The sequence of events is reconstructed in chronological order. The author agrees with his predecessors that Mengu-Timur became the first sovereign ruler of the Ulus of Jochi. The scientific novelty consists in the conclusion that entitlement of Mengu-Timur as independent monarch was not a decision of Talas Kurultai. In Talas Kurultai in 1269 Kaidu was recognized as the leader of the right wing of the Mongol Empire, which included the Ulus of Jochi, Chagatay and Ugedei. The relations with the Great Khan in Kurultai were not settled, and the independence of uluses was not proclaimed. In the early 1370s, Mengu-Timur was named qayan, i.e. the supreme ruler above the khan. In 1277, Kublai's sons Numugan and Kukju were caught by the rebels, who sent them to Mengu-Timur. He did not support the rebels, but kept the son of Kublai. Since that moment, Mengu-Timur did was not subordinate to Kublai or Haidu, did not interfere into the conflict between them, restraining both of them from military clashes. Although Mengu-Timur maintained peaceful relations with other uluses, he was qayan title was not recognized.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Bohdana Kurylo

Abstract IR scholarship has recently seen a burgeoning interest in the right-wing populist politics of security, showing that it tends to align with the international ultraconservative mobilisation against ‘gender ideology’. In contrast, this article investigates how local feminist actors can resist right-wing populist constructions of (in)security by introducing counter-populist discourses and aesthetics of security. I analyse the case of Poland, which presents two competing populist performances of (in)security: the Independence March organised by right-wing groups on Poland's Independence Day and the Women's Strike protests against the near-total ban on abortion. The article draws on Judith Butler's theory of the performative politics of public assembly, which elucidates how the political subject of ‘the people’ can emerge as bodies come together to make security demands through both verbal and non-verbal acts. I argue that the feminist movement used the vehicle of populist performance to subvert the exclusionary constructions of (in)security by right-wing populists. In the process, it introduced a different conception of security in the struggle for a ‘livable life’. The study expands the understanding of the relationship between populism, security and feminism in IR by exploring how the populist politics of security is differently enacted by everyday agents in local contexts.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 27-49
Author(s):  
Jose M Pavia ◽  
Cristina Aybar

The political fragmentation following the 2008 Financial Crisis and its economic, social, political and institutional fall-out have led to a growing left-right polarisation of politics and a weakening of the middle ground. The effective number of parliamentary parties is at an all-time high both inthe Spanish Parliament (Congreso) and in the Valencian Autonomous Parliament (Corts). Voters are spoilt for choice and switch party more often. This paper uses transfer matrices to analyse the shifting voting patterns in the European, General, Regional, and Local elections held during 2019 in The Valencian Country. The most salient result is the ever-shifting pattern at each end of the political spectrum. On the right wing, there is the steady advance of Vox. On the left wing, UP and Compromís draw from virtually the same pool of fickle voters, with UP picking up most votes in national elections and Compromís winning hands-down in regional and local elections.


2006 ◽  
pp. 54-75
Author(s):  
Klaus Peter Friedrich

Facing the decisive struggle between Nazism and Soviet communism for dominance in Europe, in 1942/43 Polish communists sojourning in the USSR espoused anti-German concepts of the political right. Their aim was an ethnic Polish ‘national communism’. Meanwhile, the Polish Workers’ Party in the occupied country advocated a maximum intensification of civilian resistance and partisan struggle. In this context, commentaries on the Nazi judeocide were an important element in their endeavors to influence the prevailing mood in the country: The underground communist press often pointed to the fate of the murdered Jews as a warning in order to make it clear to the Polish population where a deficient lack of resistance could lead. However, an agreed, unconditional Polish and Jewish armed resistance did not come about. At the same time, the communist press constantly expanded its demagogic confrontation with Polish “reactionaries” and accused them of shared responsibility for the Nazi murder of the Jews, while the Polish government (in London) was attacked for its failure. This antagonism was intensified in the fierce dispute between the Polish and Soviet governments after the rift which followed revelations about the Katyn massacre. Now the communist propaganda image of the enemy came to the fore in respect to the government and its representatives in occupied Poland. It viewed the government-in-exile as being allied with the “reactionaries,” indifferent to the murder of the Jews, and thus acting ultimately on behalf of Nazi German policy. The communists denounced the real and supposed antisemitism of their adversaries more and more bluntly. In view of their political isolation, they coupled them together, in an undifferentiated manner, extending from the right-wing radical ONR to the social democrats and the other parties represented in the underground parliament loyal to the London based Polish government. Thereby communist propaganda tried to discredit their opponents and to justify the need for a new start in a post-war Poland whose fate should be shaped by the revolutionary left. They were thus paving the way for the ultimate communist takeover


2019 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 296-311
Author(s):  
Paul Stephan

Abstract Four new publications provide an overview of the relationship between Nietzsche’s philosophical thought and his political commitments. Together they highlight the true complexity of Nietzsche’s politics, since some of his ideas can be adapted to anarchist and right-wing positions as much as, for instance, to Frankfurt School critical theory. At the same time, these contributions underscore the limitations of a strictly positivist, or philological approach, since any assessment of Nietzsche’s politics cannot be detached from the political faultlines of the present.


1962 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 430-439
Author(s):  
José M. Sánchez

Few subjects in recent history have lent themselves to such heated polemical writing and debate as that concerning the Spanish Church and its relationship to the abortive Spanish revolution of 1931–1939. Throughout this tragic era and especially during the Civil War, it was commonplace to find the Church labelled as reactionary, completely and unalterably opposed to progress, and out of touch with the political realities of the twentieth century.1 In the minds of many whose views were colored by the highly partisan reports of events in Spain during the nineteen thirties, the Church has been pictured as an integral member of the Unholy Triumvirate— Bishops, Landlords, and enerals—which has always conspired to impede Spanish progress. Recent historical scholarship has begun to dispel some of the notions about the right-wing groups,2 but there has been little research on the role of the clergy. Even more important, there has been little understanding of the Church's response to the radical revolutionary movements in Spain.


Author(s):  
Boris I. Kolonitskii

The article examines the cultural forms of legitimation / delegitimation of authority of the Provisional Government. Particular attention is paid to the personal authority of Alexander Kerensky, including rhetorical (persuasive) devices and visual images which underlay the tactics of praising or condemning him. As the main source, the article uses the newspapers of A.A. Suvorin, namely Malen'kaya gazeta [Little newspaper], Narodnaya gazeta [People’s newspaper], Rus' [Rus], Novaya Rus' [New Rus]. These newspapers are compared with resolutions, letters and diaries, and with publications in other periodicals. The study clarifies some aspects of political isolation of the Provisional Government in the fall of 1917. By this time, the propaganda attack on Kerensky was conducted not only by the Bolsheviks and other left-wing groups but also by the right-wing and conservative publications. The propaganda of the left- and right-wing opponents was significantly different but they had a point of contact: both of them created the image of the “traitor” who was unworthy to remain in power.


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