scholarly journals DAGESTAN REGION BETWEEN THE TWO REVOLUTIONS OF 1917 (BALANCE OF SOCIO-POLITICAL POWERS)

2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 952-968
Author(s):  
Leyla B. Salihova ◽  
Burkutbay G. Ayagan

 The article discusses the distribution of socio-political powers in Dagestan region during the period of the February and October revolutions of 1917. The aim of the paper is to examine the process of formation of socio-political groups, to consider their opposition. The February events of 1917 in Petrograd led to the victory of the revolution. In this regard, a difficult situation arose in the Dagestan region: the victory led to a deterioration of the political situation, to demarcation within the opposing political forces. The paper highlights the formation of various political groups and government bodies which replaced tsarism. The study shows that the Provisional Regional Executive Committee and its district and local authorities, Councils of Soldiers and Officers (Workers) Deputies, religious communities, organizations belonging to one or another ethnic group, etc. were organized in the region. The authors point out the organization of the Provisional Regional Executive Committee, which became the body of power of the Provisional Government, to the opposition of the members of the committee itself, to the organization of Union of Allied Mountaineers of the North Caucasus and Dagestan, etc. The fact that representatives of socio-political groups took an active part in congresses and meetings held in the North Caucasus, Dagestan is noted. Analysis of the period under study demonstrates that the political situation in Dagestan was tense, however the struggle of opposing parties was carried out within the democratic principles. It mainly manifested itself in the struggle between the socialist group and representatives of N. Gotsinsky. When writing the paper, the works of domestic researchers was used, among which the works of contemporaries of revolutionary events.

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-171
Author(s):  
S. A. Voronin ◽  
E. A. Bakina

In 2005, the so-called Tulip Revolution took place in Kyrgyzstan. In terms of form and content, the events that took place in Kyrgyzstan fully fit into the concept of protest movements (velvet, melon, jasmine and other revolutions) that unfolded at the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st centuries. The start to such “revolutions” aimed at changing the regime was given in 1953, when the Prime Minister of Iran Mossadyk was removed from power during the coup d’etat, which was supervised by the CIA. An analysis of the events in Kyrgyzstan showed that behind the coup that led to the overthrow of President Askar Akayev, there were external forces coordinating their efforts in accordance with the methodological recommendations of the American technologist of political coups Gene Sharpe. However, external actions, for all their significance, did not become the main cause of the Tulip Revolution, but acted only as a catalyst. Over the centuries, in Kyrgyzstan there has been a complex of internal contradictions between various political groups, which became the detonator of a political cataclysm in 2005. One of the most significant internal causes of the political crisis of 2005 was the clan rivalry of the North and South in the struggle for power. The clan hierarchy has been the foundation of the political systems of Central Asia for centuries; Kyrgyzstan was no exception. The article is devoted to the consideration of the mechanism of the clan hierarchy, the analysis of political competition between the North and the South, the role and importance of clans during the 2005 coup.


2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-120
Author(s):  
Sufian Zhemukhov

A nuanced reading of the current situation in the North Caucasus reveals two main trends that articulate in confrontation with Russian nationalism. First, in the eastern part of the region, particularly in Dagestan, Chechnya, and Ingushetia, a shift from nationalism to Islam has taken place, and the ties between religion and political machine are strong and visible. Second, and by contrast, in the western part of the region, including Adygea, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkessia, and North Ossetia, nationalism has increased, and the political elites seldom practice religion publicly.


Author(s):  
Anatoliy Skripkin

For many years causes of the fall of Scythia have been a subject to a great deal of scientific scrutiny. The topic is still debatable. The author has recently published several papers, which justify Sarmatians’ involvement in the fall of Scythia in the late 4th and early 3rd centuries BC based on the written and archaeological evidence. Previously, the concept has also been supported by other researchers. These days, however, there are studies in favor of alternative versions claiming Sarmatians’ innocence in the events leading to the fall of Scythia. The main ideas of the studies boil down to the statement of no evidence of Sarmatians from the 3rd century BC being found not only in the North Pontic region but also to the east from the Don river. In the light of the statement, they implement the idea that Sarmatians’ appearance in the Eastern European steppes dates back to the time not earlier than the 2nd century BC. In the article, the author, given the anthropological and archaeological datasets, confirms the Sarmatians’ continuous presence in the Volga-Urals region without any chronological gaps between the 4th and the 1st century BC. The idea of the stage-by-stage settlement of the eastern nomads in the Volga-Don region and the North Pontic region is suggested. In the first stage, since the middle of the 4th century BC, the political situation underwent some destabilization processes due to the appearance of Sarmatians in the Lower Don region. The second stage is characterized by Sarmatians attacking Scythia in the first half of the 3rd century BC. For most of the 3rd century BC, Sarmatians’ main habitat was located to the east of the Don river. From there they conducted raids on the territory of the Northern part of the Black Sea region to plunder or collect the tribute. This concept is also supported by linguists’ new interpretations of written sources.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 303-311
Author(s):  
Emilia Alaverdov

Aim. The paper analyses the Islamic revival in Russia in the late 20th century and early 21st. This was reflected in the registration of religious communities, the publication of periodicals on Muslim literature, and, in my opinion, most importantly - the construction of mosques and madrassas. It highlights the roles of mosques and madrassas built in the North Caucasus, which later became the theological centers for the spread of Islam and educated youngsters according to their propaganda. Methods. The study mainly uses an analysis method based on the study of historicism, documents and empirical material. The basis of the source are books, scientific articles, research works conducted by Russian and foreign experts. Results. The post-Soviet wars (1994-1996 and 1999-2000) in Chechnya contributed to the politicisation and realisation of Islam in this region. In 1996-1999 there were 26 Sharia courts, numerous Islamic parties, charitable foundations and organisations in the republic and, most importantly, structures of Wahhabi organisations (Akaev, n.d.). The process of politicisation gradually turned into organisational formations in Russia in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Conclusion. The constructive transformation by reinforcing the modernist potentials of Islam has contributed to the real renewal of Russian Muslim societies, which led to the radicalisation of the whole region. The described events have shown that for the last 20 years, the revival of religious Islam was a revival of political organisations and activities, where religion is connected to politics and criminal activities. A small North Caucasian republic immediately turned up at the center of Russia's recent history. Key Words: Islam, politics, revival, radicalization, Russia, North Caucasus


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 1140-1173
Author(s):  
Arsen M. Kambiev

The article examines the little-studied and complex issue of relations between the new Caucasian state entities during the collapse of the Russian Empire and the following Civil War. The Revolution of 1917 led to the appearance on the political map of the Caucasus and Transcaucasia of a number of new state entities that fought for the recognition of their sovereignty. However, the political and military chaos in the region hindered both the internal process of consolidation of the self-proclaimed states, the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic and the Mountainous Republic of the North Caucasus in particular, and their entry into the international community. The civil war in Russia and the confrontation between the Red and the White forces instigated even more contradictions. Transcaucasian countries, primarily Azerbaijan and Georgia, support both the insurrectionary movement in the Terek-Dagestan region and the leaders of the overthrown Mountainous Republic who stayed in their territory. However, any attempts to create stable allied military, political and economic relations, undertaken by the leaders of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic and the Mountainous Republic, were not successful.


Islamovedenie ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 57-70
Author(s):  
Imanutdin Khabibovich Sulaev ◽  

The article examines the revolutionary events of 1917 in Dagestan from the standpoint of legal awareness of Muslim public figures and clergy and their participation in the socio-political life of the region. The events had both common for the entire Russia and specific features due to the level of socio-economic and political development of the region and the role of Islam in its society. The article examines how the turbulent revolutionary time brought authoritative Muslim leaders to the political scene. Later, they aspired to develop their own tactics and strategy in order to influence the course of events in Dagestan after the February Revolution of 1917. Each representative of the secular and spiritual intelligentsia had their own attitude to the political forces that emerged during the struggle for the revolutionary democracy. The author notes such a characteristic feature of the revolutionary democracy of 1917 in Dagestan as the active involvement of the Muslim clergy in the new government institutions, their appeal to Islam and Sharia when clarifying and resolving various issues of socio-political importance. It is shown that the most important and discussed issue was the election of the head of the Caucasian Spiritual Board of Muslims from among muftis or imams by the Muslims of Dagestan and the North Caucasus. The healthy socio-political forces of the region aspired to preserve law and order in the region appealing to Sharia and Islam.


Author(s):  
Annie Elizabeth Pohlman

Genocide and mass atrocities can be seen as the culminative result of extreme social exclusion. Two of the critical steps on the path to genocidal persecution are the isolation and exclusion of a particular group and the mobilisation and incitement of perpetrators. This paper examines the case of the 1965-1966 massacres in Indonesia in light of these two incipient stages of genocide. First, I discuss the Indonesian killings of 1965-1966 by situating them within the conceptual and legal understandings of genocide and argue that those persecuted belonged predominantly to a defined political group, that is, members and associates of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). I argue that the exclusion of political groups from the legal definition of genocide given in the UN Convention on Genocide is unsupportable when examined both within the context that it was created and the greater conceptual understandings of genocide studies. To support this argument, I then outline the political situation in Indonesia prior to the 1 October 1965 coup and explain how the country went through a process of political pillarisation, effectively creating the conditions for the creation and then eradication of the Left in Indonesia. In the final part of the paper, I examine how these killings were incited. I argue that hate propaganda was used against the PKI and its supporters by the main perpetrators of the massacres, the Indonesian military, to incite a popular, genocidal campaign. As a result of this hate-propaganda campaign, Leftists in Indonesia experienced extreme forms of dehumanisation and social death which, in turn, facilitated their eradication.


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