scholarly journals Why to Study the Brain

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-2
Author(s):  
Ruggero Micheletto

The brain is the ultimate computational machine in the universe. Despite what was thought about the brain decades and centuries ago, now it is well understood that the brain is a calculator, a machine that does computational things. In other words the brain is something that takes information in its input, elaborates it and then spit-out some result in form of information or actions. Many centuries ago, the brain was the location of the mind. The mind was considered like a mysterious entity where our thought, our consciousness and our feeling resided. The definition of mind of course is still valid today, in some sense. What has changed is the fact that now we know that the mind is the results of a computational process. A very, complex process, presumably a stochastic one, but as far as we know, something that we can define as a computer “algorithm” is running inside our brains. Data are processes in a way that is not yet completely clear, and the result is our entire behavior, our thoughts our actions and our perception of reality

Author(s):  
David Clarke

Our understanding of the numerous and significant problems of consciousness is inseparable from the often incommensurable disciplinary frameworks through which the topic has been approached. Music may offer a range of perspectives on consciousness, some issuing from interdisciplinary alliances (such as with cognitive psychology and neuroscience), others tapping into what is distinctively musical about music and what music shares with comparable aesthetic formations. Philosophically speaking, music might afford valuable complementary perspectives to approaches within the empirical sciences that see consciousness as essentially a computational process (Pinker, Dennett), or as solely an epiphenomenon of neural activity within the brain. This chapter will look to experiences of music that support views of the mind as extended and embodied, and that see consciousness as ecologically bound up with Being-in-the-world, to adopt notions from Gibson and Heidegger respectively. In this way, music studies can make a contribution to the philosophical study of consciousness from epistemological, phenomenological, and ontological standpoints.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ainhoa Plaza-Zabala ◽  
Virginia Sierra-Torre ◽  
Amanda Sierra

AbstractAutophagy is a complex process that encompasses the enclosure of cytoplasmic debris or dysfunctional organelles in membranous vesicles, the autophagosomes, for their elimination in the lysosomes. A gold-standard method to assess its induction is the analysis of the autophagic flux using as a surrogate the expression of the microtubule-associated light chain protein 3 conjugated to phosphatidylethanolamine (LC3-II) by Western blot, in the presence of lysosomal inhibitors. Therefore, the current definition of autophagy flux actually puts the focus on the degradation stage of autophagy. In contrast, the most important autophagy controlling genes that have been identified in the last few years in fact target early stages of autophagosome formation. From a biological standpoint is therefore conceivable that autophagosome formation and degradation are independently regulated and we argue that both stages need to be systematically analyzed. Here, we propose a simple two-step model to understand changes in autophagosome formation and degradation using data from conventional LC3-II Western blot, and test it using two models of autophagy modulation in cultured microglia, the brain macrophages: rapamycin and the ULK1/2 inhibitor, MRT68921. Our model provides a comprehensive understanding of the autophagy process and will help to unravel the effect of genetic, pharmacological, and environmental manipulations on both the formation and degradation of autophagosomes.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  

The definition of the psychological concept of attitude is still a controversial problem, and the scholars have not yet reached a consensus on this important issue. The attitude is defined in various ways, as a mental and emotional “construct” not directly detectable, or as a “psychological tendency expressed by evaluating a particular entity”. However, as attitude is an achievement of the mind during the exploration of reality, it is naturally to approach first of all the nature of mind and the relation with the cognition processes from the informational perspective. Therefore, in this paper it is investigated the concept of attitude from a completely new point of view, starting from the informational nature of consciousness. It is shown that the informational structure of consciousness can be fully described by the activity of seven distinct cognitive centers and the attitude can be defined actually as an informational reactive output with respect to an object/objective either perceived or mentally proposed. The attitude is thus the result of a decisional info-processing of an input internal or external information, expressible by the specific informational center managed by the brain associated with this activity, defined suggestively as I want. It is shown that attitude is consequently a function of all other six centers, which intervene in the decisional process as decisional criteria or as priority contributing components, and these centers can become dominant or inactive. In agreement with some previous studies and with the neuro-connections of specific regions of the brain, it is shown that emotions contribute to attitude, but also the personal state, the inherited predispositions, the social interactions, the life experience and the trust in the objective, if this is a proposed project. Associated with the attitude, behavior is different, depending on all cognitive centers.


2018 ◽  
pp. 269-314
Author(s):  
Georg Northoff

How can we account for the existence and reality of consciousness and mental features in general? The present chapter complements the previous one by shifting the focus from the ontological determination of the brain to consciousness. I characterized the brain’s existence and reality by world-brain relation for which I presupposed relation and structure as basic units of existence and reality. This entails structural realism, that is, ontic structural realism (OSR). I now apply the definition of the brain by world-brain relation and OSR to consciousness. The main point is that I extend the spatiotemporal definition of world-brain relation to consciousness, that is, its phenomenal features as distinguished from neuronal (and physical) features (while leaving out other features of consciousness like cognitive features; chapter 7). Specifically, I argue that the world-brain relation provides the necessary non-sufficient ontological condition of possible consciousness, the “ontological predisposition of consciousness” (OPC) as I say. The world-brain relation is characterized by spatiotemporal structure with relational time and space which makes possible “upward spatiotemporal entailment” of consciousness. Accordingly, consciousness is entailed spatiotemporally by world-brain relation; this, in turn, makes possible necessary (rather than contingent) a posteriori ontological connection between brain and consciousness on the basis of their commonly underlying and shared world-brain relation. Importantly, this makes superfluous the introduction of the concept of mind to account for necessary connection of mental features to their underlying ontological basis. Therefore, I suggest replacing the concept of mind by the one of world-brain relation. This entails that the mind-body problem becomes superfluous and can be replaced by what I describe as “world-brain problem”.


Author(s):  
Frederick L. Coolidge

This chapter emphasizes that human brains are the most complicated animate or inanimate system in the universe. It begins with a discussion of the definition of life and consciousness and the transition from life to consciousness. It is proposed that consciousness began with the ability to learn associatively (classical and operant conditioning) during the Cambrian period. There is a discussion of the four cell-building principles of the brain: cell proliferation, cell differentiation, cell migration, and programmed cell death. The multiple naming systems for the brain are presented: (1) Brodmann’s areas, (2) presumed function, (3) people’s names (4) regional location, (5) location and nature of the structure, and (6) gross anatomical name. The chapter reviews the four major brain lobes and their functions. It covers major structures of the limbic system and emphasizes the functional role of the brain’s fasciculi, the major connections for neural transmission, which reflects the concerted evolution of various brain regions.


2019 ◽  
pp. 4-11
Author(s):  
Alan J. McComas

This chapter is concerned with definition and the monism–dualism debate. It first deals with two major issues—a definition of consciousness and the mind–brain problem. The former is simply stated as “consciousness is an organism’s awareness of itself.” After arriving at a clear working definition, the chapter turns to the mind–brain problem. It pays particular attention to the monism–dualism debate, the former of which argues that there is only one unifying reality. From here, the chapter jump-starts a discussion on consciousness as an epiphenomenon of brain activity, ultimately with a conclusion in favor of epiphenomenalism, in the sense that the mind is a product of the working of the brain.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans-Johann Glock

This article compares situated cognition to contemporary Neo-Aristotelian approaches to the mind. The article distinguishes two components in this paradigm: an Aristotelian essentialism which is alien to situated cognition and a Wittgensteinian “capacity approach” to the mind which is not just congenial to it but provides important conceptual and argumentative resources in defending social cognition against orthodox cognitive (neuro-)science. It focuses on a central tenet of that orthodoxy. According to what I call “encephalocentrism,” cognition is primarily or even exclusively a computational process occurring inside the brain. Neo-Aristotelians accuse this claim of committing a “homuncular” (Kenny) or “mereological fallacy” (Bennett and Hacker). The article explains why the label “fallacy” is misleading, reconstructs the argument to the effect that encephalocentric applications of psychological predicates to the brain and its parts amount to a category mistake, and defends this argument against objections by Dennett, Searle, and Figdor. At the same time it criticizes the Neo-Aristotelian denial that the brain is the organ of cognition. It ends by suggesting ways in which the capacity approach and situated cognition might be combined to provide a realistic and ecologically sound picture of cognition as a suite of powers that flesh-and-blood animals exercise within their physical and social environments.


Arts ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur Still ◽  
Mark d’Inverno

To speak comfortably of the machine artist (as outlined in the call for papers for this Special Issue) makes key assumptions about what it is to be an artist. It assumes, for instance, that the experience of living as an artist, which includes the socialisation, hard work, single-mindedness, and focused energy of creative activity, is incidental rather than essential since these aspects are not comfortably applicable to machines. Instead, it supposes that what is essential is the artistic product, and it is the similarity of human and machine products that makes it possible to speak of machine artists. This definition of art in terms of products is supported by modern psychological theories of creativity, defined as the generation of novel ideas which give rise to valuable products. These ideas take place in the mind or brain, regarded as a closed system within whose workings the secret of creativity will eventually be revealed. This is the framework of what is widely referred to as “cognitivism”. This definition in terms of novel ideas and valuable products has been widely assumed by artificial intelligence (AI) and computational creativity (CC), and this has been backed up through a particular version of the Turing Test. In this, a machine can be said to be a creative artist if its products cannot be distinguished from human art. However, there is another psychological view of creativity, that of John Dewey, in which a lived experience of inquiry and focus is essential to being creative. In this theory, creativity is a function of the whole person interacting with the world, rather than originating in the brain. This makes creativity a Process rather than a Cognitivist framework. Of course, the brain is crucial in a Process theory, but as part of an open system which includes both body and environment. Developments in “machine art” have been seen as spectacular and are widely publicised. But there may be a danger that these will distract from what we take to be the most exciting prospect of all. This is the contribution of computer technology to stimulate, challenge, and provoke artistic practice of all forms.


Author(s):  
J. D. Hutchison

When the transmission electron microscope was commercially introduced a few years ago, it was heralded as one of the most significant aids to medical research of the century. It continues to occupy that niche; however, the scanning electron microscope is gaining rapidly in relative importance as it fills the gap between conventional optical microscopy and transmission electron microscopy.IBM Boulder is conducting three major programs in cooperation with the Colorado School of Medicine. These are the study of the mechanism of failure of the prosthetic heart valve, the study of the ultrastructure of lung tissue, and the definition of the function of the cilia of the ventricular ependyma of the brain.


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