scholarly journals TINDAK PIDANA KORUPSI DIREKSI PERSEROAN BUMN YANG MENIMBULKAN KERUGIAN KEUANGAN NEGARA

to-ra ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 30
Author(s):  
Henry Donald Lumban Toruan

Determination of Directors of state-owned company as perpetrators of corruption that cause financial loss to the state being debated. Actions in the framework of the management of the company's Board of Directors conduct business relationships with other companies is intended pursuit for profit purposes set forth in the articles of association of the company. If the state-owned company suffered losses in the business relationship, then it becomes a loss to the state even after careful and responsible as set out in the Company Law. Unfortunately the state losses at state- owned company made an unlawful act of corruption in the Corruption Eradication Act (Act PTPK). Establishes the Board of Directors as a subject perpetrators of corruption in PTPK Law, caused the expansion of the formulation of the notion of public servants, not just civil servants who are subject to the Civil Service Act but also includes those who receive salaries and wages of state finance or state facilities. In terms of state-owned company is a legal entity which has the property that is separate from its shareholders. When capital from state financial aid is included in the state-owned company in the form of capital stock, the capital instantly become the company's wealth. If any damage occurs as a result of the company's business relationships, then it becomes a loss company. Shareholders are only responsible for the loss of shares owned by the company.   Kata kunci: Kerugian perseroan BUMN bukan kerugian keuangan Negara

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 192-203
Author(s):  
Nur Rohim Yunus ◽  
Latipah Nasution

Abstract, State assets in the form of shares of business entities are not state assets, but have been transformed into business entity assets. Likewise, government officials who become Directors/Commissioners and other shareholders have an equal position with private shareholders. The Board of Directors in carrying out their duties and authorities has the authority and protection in every business decision making, but this does not escape supervision through the BJR (Business Judgment Rule) principle, as contained in the Limited Liability Company Law. This study uses a qualitative research method with a statutory approach. The purpose of this study is to understand the criteria for state finances in SOEs and the legal consequences of financial losses and supervision of SOEs. The results of the study stated that the implementation of BJR on the Board of Directors of SOEs could be carried out after fulfilling the terms and conditions of the enactment of BJR. BJR can be implemented because a legal entity is actually subject to the Limited Liability Company law. Keywords: Supervision of SOEs ion; Business Judgment Rules; State Finance   Intisari: Kekayaan negara yang berbentuk saham dari badan usaha bukan merupakan kekayaan negara, tetapi telah bertransformasi menjadi kekayaan badan usaha. Demikian terhadap pejabat pemerintah yang menjadi Direksi/Komisaris dan pemegang saham lainnya memiliki kedudukan yang setara dengan pemegang saham swasta. Direksi dalam menjalankan tugas dan wewenang memiliki kewenangan dan perlindungan dalam setiap pengambilan keputusan bisnis, namun ini tak luput dari pengawasan melalui prinsip BJR (Business Judgment Rule), sebagaimana termuat dalam Undang-Undang Perseroan Terbatas. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode penelitian kualitatif dengan pendekatan perundang-undangan. Tujuan penelitian untuk dapat memahami kriteria keuangan negara pada BUMN dan akibat hukum kerugian keuangan dan pengawasan pada BUMN. Hasil penelitian menyatakan bahwa implementasi BJR terhadap Direksi BUMN dapat dilakukan setelah memenuhi syarat dan ketentuan berlakunya BJR. BJR dapat diimplementasikan karena badan usaha berbadan hukum sejatinya tunduk pada undang-undang Perseroan Terbatas. Kata Kunci: Pengawasan BUMN; Business Judgment Rule; Kuangan Negara


Author(s):  
Handoyo Prasetyo ◽  

As mentioned in the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia of 1945, everyone has the right to live and the right to defend his life. All citizens are equally in the law and must uphold the law without exception. These rights and obligations also apply to workers who after devoting their lives for decades to the state through the company in which they work, entering retirement age and subsequently starting a new life as a retiree. There is a belief that State-Owned Enterprises (it is called as BUMN) is unlikely to go bankrupt because it is owned by the State, becomes the main choice of retirees to entrust the management of their pension funds to PT Asuransi Jiwasraya (Persero). The problem arises when Jiwasraya plans a restructuring program of all Jiwasraya insurance policy, including an annuity policies owned by millions of retirees as a result of the losses suffered by Jiwasraya due to mismanagement and corruptive behavior of former The Board of Directors of Jiwasraya. Pensioners strongly object to the restructuring plan because it has the effect of reducing monthly pensioner benefits by up to 40% (forty percent), a very large amount that means for retirees who rely heavily on monthly money from pension funds, especially during the Covid-19 pandemic health and life costs are also increasing. This study will analyze whether the actions of The Board of Directors of Jiwasraya who restructure insurance policies fall into the category of ultra vires (actions outside the the board of directors authority), which to answer it researchers will use normative juridical research methods. From the results of this study, it was concluded that the insurance policy restructuring program is an ultra vires action, therefore it must be null and void.


Author(s):  
David K. Jones

The fight over an exchange had a very different dynamic in New Mexico because there were no loud voices on the right calling for the state to reject control. Republican Governor Susanna Martinez supported retaining control, but strongly preferred a governance model that allowed insurers to serve on the board of directors and limited the degree of oversight by the board on the types of plans that could be sold on the exchange. Governor Martinez vetoed legislation in 2011 that would have set up a different model of an exchange. Institutional quirks meant the legislature did not have the opportunity to weigh in again for two years, until 2013. By this point it was too late and the state had to rely on the federal website despite passing legislation to run its own exchange.


2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Bella Mutiara Wahab

AbstractProgressive law must place the law in a very close position with the law's community or stakeholders. This position is called responsive, progressive law and is always associated with stakeholders' reality and needs to create justice and happiness as law aspired itself. Also, progressive law emphasizes social integration to overcome public moral insularity.Starting from the viewpoint of progressive law, the author looks at the laws and regulations that discuss the return of interim dividends as stated in the Limited Liability Company Law No. 40 of 2007, article 72, article 72 states that companies allow rules related to dividend distribution in a temporary (interim) way. The article is then interpreted as that if the company has positive profits, the company is allowed to distribute dividends before the company closes the book at the end of the year, provided that the board of directors officially announces the distribution with the approval of the GMS that the positive profits obtained by the company before closing the book will come as dividends interim. As a result, the company competes to distribute interim dividends to increase and show its credibility to investors. It was recorded on the Indonesian stock exchange (IDX) that in September 2020, 73 companies distributed interim dividends.However, article 72 paragraph 5 of the Limited Liability Company Law No. 40 of 2007 explains that if after the company distributes interim dividends to shareholders and at the end of the closing of the annual book the company suffers a loss, the shareholders must return the dividends they have received. If the shareholder does not return it, the directors and commissioners are jointly responsible for covering the company's losses.This viewpoint is the basis for finding the location of the value and form of legal progressivity regarding the mechanism of interim share dividends in limited liability companies as stated in UUPT No.40 of 2007 Article 72 using a normative research method with a conceptual approach. 


Obiter ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Maleka Femida Cassim

Effective shareholder control over the board of directors is patently in the interests of good corporate governance, accountability and transparency. In recognition of this modern reality, the policy focus in company law has shifted to encouraging shareholder participation and shareholder engagement in corporate affairs. Bearing in mind that very few shareholders of large public companies attend meetings in person, proxy voting is of vital importance to corporate democracy. This article discusses enhanced rights conferred by the Companies Act 71 of 2008 in relation to shareholder proxies who attend, speak and vote at shareholders’ meetings. It also considers the pressing practical question whether companies may impose a cut-off time for the lodgement of shareholder proxies.


Author(s):  
Leslie Kosmin ◽  
Catherine Roberts

The two key organs of a company are the board of directors and the members of the company exercising their constitutional rights in a general meeting. Company law attaches great significance to the due convening of general meetings of shareholders. The general meeting is the forum for considering many of the essential matters relating to the company’s affairs including increasing or reducing the share capital of the company, changes to the memorandum or articles of association, alterations to the composition of the board of directors, considering the content of the company’s financial statements and approving dividends.


1985 ◽  
Vol 32 (7) ◽  
pp. 33

Montana position paper on computer use. A position paper on the use of the computer in the mathematics classroom has been developed by a committee of the Montana Council of Teachers of Mathematics. The paper addresses five major issues identified by the committee and states the position of the council on each of these issues. The board of directors of the Montana council and the council-at-large adopted the position paper at their statewide conference in October 1984, and it is being distributed throughout the state. Copies of the position paper can be obtained from Richard Billstein, Mathematics Department, University of Montana, Missoula, MT 59801 (406/243–2603).


1998 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-178
Author(s):  
Omi Morgenstern Leissner

Israel Women's Network v. The Government of Israel (1994) 48(v) P.D. 501The petitioner, the Israel Women's Network, petitioned the Supreme Court of Justice against the appointment of a new member to the Ports and Railways Council and against the appointment of two new directors on behalf of the State to the board of directors of the State-controlled Oil Refinery. All three of the new appointees were men, such that neither of the two councils included a single woman in their composition. The petitioner disputed the constitutionality of these appointments arguing that in the particular circumstances and in line with sec. 18A of the Government Companies Law, the appointees ought to have been women. By a majority decision the Supreme Court held that the respondent did not fulfill the duty of affirmative action required by sec. 18A of the Law, and that the cancellation of the appointments made was justified.


Author(s):  
Padriadi Wiharjokusumo ◽  
Novita Romauli Saragih

Article 97 paragraph (1) of the Company Law requires each member of the Board of Directors to be required in good faith and full responsibility to undertake the supervision of the company for the interests and business of the company. This implies the Board of Directors is liablefor each management and representation of the company in the company’s framework in pursuing its purposes and objectives.This  researchexaminesthe responsibilities of the board of Directors in the bankruptcy of the Limited Liability Company based on Law No. 40 of 2007. This research was conducted through a normative juridical approach.The  data  source  of  this  research  was  gained from the library study. Then  it  was  analyzed  using the qualitative  analysis  which depicts and dissects the significant information.The conclusion  of  this  research is  thatthe responsibilities of the Board of Directors in Bankruptcy Limited Liability Company based on Law No. 40 of 2007 comprises 2 (two) aspects, in particular; civil liability and criminal liability.


Author(s):  
Dr Lee Roach

Company Law provides an introduction to this topic. The text guides the reader through the intricacies of the subject with expert analysis of the application of principles to real-life cases. The chapters provide comprehensive coverage of all core aspects of company law. The relationship between company law and corporate governance is explored, ensuring that readers have a full picture of how and why companies are created and regulated. Topics include: the formation and nature of the company; the board of directors; membership of the company; and corporate rescue, restructuring, and insolvency.


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