scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of Responding to the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism

Energies ◽  
2022 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 427
Author(s):  
Tao Huang ◽  
Zhixin Liu ◽  
Tian Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Policy Design ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Sensitivity Analyses ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Eu Countries ◽  
Adjustment Mechanism ◽  
The Government ◽  
Border Adjustment

The European Union (EU) views the carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) as a measure to tackle carbon leakage, which will have a profound impact on non-EU countries’ exports. Policymakers are faced with the question of how to deal with the CBAM. In contrast to previous studies, we explore the effects of the CBAM on non-EU countries from a dynamic game perspective. This study analyzed the potential effects of the CBAM on China and found that the government and export companies are the two main stakeholders. We found that they can both choose whether to respond actively or passively. Based on their interactive relationship, we adopted an evolutionary game to model the nexus between the government and export companies. We analyzed the evolutionary stable state of each stakeholder and the whole game with the replicator dynamic equation system. To make the system evolve to the optimal state where the government reacts actively and export companies implement low-carbon production, we provide a policy mechanism for how to set key parameters’ values. We used numerical simulation to verify the policy design and to conduct sensitivity analyses of the key parameters. Our results show that, when two stakeholders positively react to the CBAM, it is necessary to increase their profits and to reduce their costs. Therefore, some suggestions are proposed, including optimizing the trade structure, strengthening cooperation with the EU, improving the current carbon market, and adopting carbon tax.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game of Government Subsidy Strategy for Prefabricated Buildings Based on Prospect Theory

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Yu Liu ◽  
Dong Cai ◽  
Chunxiang Guo ◽  
Haizhen Huang
Keyword(s):  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Environmental Benefits ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Long Run ◽  
The Government ◽  
Prefabricated Building

Based on the prospect theory, this paper establishes an evolutionary game model of government and construction units for the problem of poor subsidy construction of government-subsidized construction units and uses the replication dynamic equation to analyse the strategic choice of evolutionary games. The research shows that the evolutionary game system of the construction unit and the government cannot meet the government incentives, and the construction unit also adopts the stable state of the prefabricated building. In the long run, the government subsidy cannot determine whether or not the construction unit will adopt the prefabricated building, and it is the construction cost of the prefabricated building that determines. Therefore, the government's work should shift from subsidies to targeted incentives forconstruction units to reduce the cost of construction of prefabricated buildings. The unit levies an environmental tax and appropriately restricts the income from the traditional cast-in-place construction units, and, on the other hand, it increases the popularization of low-carbon and environmental protection of the fabricated buildings, so that more consumers can recognize the environmental benefits brought by the assembled buildings. It provides a reference for the government to promote the development of prefabricated buildings.

Government expenditure and economic growth in the European Union countries

2018 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 372-386 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gitana Dudzevičiūtė ◽  
Agnė Šimelytė ◽  
Aušra Liučvaitienė
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
European Union ◽  
Government Spending ◽  
Government Expenditure ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Eu Countries ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to provide more reliable estimates of the relationship between government spending and economic growth in the European Union (EU) during the period of 1995-2015. Design/methodology/approach The methodology consisted of several different stages. In the first stage for an assessment of dynamics of government spending and economic growth indicators over two decades, descriptive statistics analysis was employed. Correlation analysis helped to identify the relationships between government expenditures (GEs) and economic growth. In the third stage, for modeling the relationship and the estimation of causality between GE and economic growth, Granger causality testing was applied. Findings The research indicated that eight EU countries have a significant relationship between government spending and economic growth. Research limitations/implications This study has been bounded by general GE and economic growth only. The breakdowns of general GE on the basis of the activities they support have not been considered in this paper, which is the main limitation of the research. Despite the limitation, it might be maintained that the research highlights key relationships in the EU countries. Originality/value These insights might be useful for policy makers. In countries with unidirectional causality running from GE to economic growth, the government can employ expenditure as a factor for growth. The governments should ensure that resources are properly managed and efficiently allocated to accelerate economic growth in the countries with unidirectional causality from GDP to GE.

scholarly journals Profit Distribution and Stability Analysis of Joint Distribution Alliance Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game Theory Under the Background of Green and Low-Carbon

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Renbin Han ◽  
Mengke Yang
Keyword(s):  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Joint Distribution ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Environmental Benefit ◽  
Logistics Industry ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Profit Distribution ◽  
The Government

Abstract Joint distribution is an advanced logistics organization model for improving the quality and efficiency of express logistics industry and achieve high-quality development of logistics, but the distribution of common profit has always been a key obstacle to the effective development of joint distribution. Based on the background of green and low-carbon, this paper explores a fairer and more reasonable profit distribution scheme. The profit game between the government and the two types of member enterprises is analyzed. By focusing on how the government plays a role in inducing the joint distribution alliance to bring the green and low-carbon requirements into the profit distribution, the strategy evolution process of the three parties, the factors affecting the profit distribution and the stability of alliance are discussed through the establishment of "government-member enterprise A-member enterprise B" tripartite evolutionary game model. Finally, the evolutionary game model is numerically simulated based on system dynamics. It is found that: (1) It is necessary for the government to guide and motivate the alliance to create internal incentives and constraints. The effect of government subsidies and rewards to member enterprises is greater than the penalties for member enterprises. (2) The member enterprises are likely to conspire together to defraud government subsidies and rewards, carry out "free riding" and other speculative activities, which makes it necessary for the government and the alliance to establish supervision mechanism, information disclosure mechanism, and property rights protection system. (3) The willingness of member enterprise to positively cooperate will increase with the increase of the additional benefit coefficient, the proportion of profit distribution and the importance of environmental benefit factor; and will decrease with the increase of the cost of promoting green distribution operations.

Implementation of the Paris Agreement on Global Climate: European Carbon Blackmail of Russia and Possibilities of Countering It

2021 ◽  
pp. 77-93
Author(s):  
Sergey Anatolyevich Roginko ◽  
Sergey Nikolaevich Silvestrov
Keyword(s):  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Global Climate ◽  
Paris Agreement ◽  
Eu Countries ◽  
Adjustment Mechanism ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Carbon Taxation ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Border Adjustment

The subject of the analysis is the EU initiative to introduce the so-called Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism developed within the framework of the «European Green Deal» adopted in 2019 and its possible impact on the Russian exporting industries. The author examines in detail the genesis of European initiatives in the field of border carbon tax, draws a parallel between the Border Carbon Correction Mechanism and the early EU initiatives on carbon taxation of flights of foreign airlines operating in airports of EU countries. Recommendations are given on possible measures to hedge risks associated with this EU initiative, including the possibility of blocking the EU initiative in the international arena, including the positions of the leading world powers on this issue, is analyzed. The tactics of interaction on this issue with such large global exporters as China, India, Brazil and others are proposed.

Game Behavior Analysis of Social Proportion on Low Carbon Energy Technology Innovation Risk

2013 ◽  
Vol 807-809 ◽  
pp. 892-896 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shi Zhao ◽  
Ke Fan Xie
Keyword(s):  
Technological Innovation ◽  
Global Economy ◽  
Technology Innovation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Decisive Role ◽  
Social Risk ◽  
Energy Technology ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
The Government ◽  
Low Carbon Energy

With the prominence of energy crisis and environmental pollution problem, low carbon energy technology innovation is becoming the key of global economy sustainable development. But, for the particularity of technology, the low carbon energy technology innovation has enormous risk. Therefore proportion of low carbon energy technology innovation risk through social channels slowly becomes the crux to promoting the development of low carbon energy technology innovation. As the core subjects in risk proportion of technological innovation, enterprises and social risk-sharing organizations all start to select and adjust their strategy in exploration and trial and error and to seek equilibrium point of interest, thus form a dynamic game process. In this paper, the premise of bounded rationality assumptions of evolutionary game theory has been used as an analytical tool to construct evolutionary game model of social proportion of technological innovation risk, and thus to the stability analysis for both the main strategy of evolution. Results of the evolutionary game analysis show that the participation of a third promoting force play a decisive role in the operation and development of social proportion system of technological innovation risk, thus this paper raised conceptions and recommendations for the government that they should take part in the risk prevention system of low carbon energy technology innovation as a conductor and coordinator.

Low-Carbon Selection Decision for Logistics Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game under the Supervision of Government

2011 ◽  
Vol 219-220 ◽  
pp. 736-741
Author(s):  
Ye Zhou ◽  
Hui He ◽  
Yan Feng Wang
Keyword(s):  
Global Climate ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Global Climate Warming ◽  
Logistics Enterprises ◽  
Selection Decision ◽  
The Government ◽  
Supervision Strategies ◽  
Emission Of Greenhouse Gases

The emission of greenhouse gases leading to global climate warming has caused widespread concern on the part of governments worldwide. As one of the main sources of carbon emissions, modern logistics occupies a unique position for energy saving. But as economic entities, logistics enterprises have no real incentive to implement low-carbon logistics operations, which needs government to stimulate logistics enterprises to implement low-carbon strategy through regulations. Constructed an Evolutionary Game Model for logistics enterprises to implement low-carbon selection decision under the supervision of the government, analyzed the effcts of different regulative parameters on the implementation of low-carbon strategy in logistics business. The results show that government's regulation and strategies play a crucial role in carrying out the low-carbon strategy. Finally, according to different evolution conditions and conclusions, it proposes appropriate supervision strategies for government to promote logistics enterprises to put the low-carbon strategy into effect.

scholarly journals The Evolutionary Game Analysis of Multiple Stakeholders in the Low-Carbon Agricultural Innovation Diffusion

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lixia Liu ◽  
Yuchao Zhu ◽  
Shubing Guo
Keyword(s):  
Innovation Diffusion ◽  
Agricultural Development ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Process ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Taxes ◽  
Agricultural Innovation ◽  
Agricultural Enterprises ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

Encouraging the adoption and diffusion of low-carbon agricultural technology innovation is an important measure to cope with climate change, reduce environmental pollution, and achieve sustainable agricultural development. Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper establishes a game model among agricultural enterprises, government, and farmers and analyzes the dynamic evolutionary process and evolutionary stable strategies of the major stakeholders. The impact of innovation subsidies, carbon taxes, and adoption subsidies on low-carbon agricultural innovation diffusion is simulated using Matlab software. The results show that the government’s reasonable subsidies and carbon taxes for agricultural enterprises and farmers can increase the enthusiasm of agricultural enterprises and farmers to participate in low-carbon agriculture. This study can be used as a basis for the government to formulate more targeted policies to promote the diffusion of low-carbon agricultural innovation.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Models on Multiagent Collaborative Mechanism in Responsible Innovation

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Kun Yang ◽  
Wan Wang ◽  
Bin Hu
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Responsible Innovation ◽  
Behavioral Strategies ◽  
Dynamics Modeling ◽  
Exogenous Variables ◽  
The Public ◽  
Behavior Strategy ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
The Government

Innovation is a game process; in particular, the behavior among multiple agents in responsible innovation is susceptible to the influence of benefits, risks, responsibilities, and other factors, resulting in unstable collaborative relationships. Therefore, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model including the government, enterprises, and the public, combined with system dynamics modeling to simulate and analyze the tripartite behavior strategy and sensitivity to relevant exogenous variables. The study shows that the tripartite game eventually converges to a stable state of the government active supervision, enterprises making responsible innovation, and the public’s positive participation. The positive participation of the public drives rapidly the game to a steady state, while the behavioral strategies of enterprises are more susceptible to the behavior of the government. Supervision cost, penalty amount, and value compensation are the most critical factors influencing the change of the corresponding agents’ behavior strategy, and the final strategic stability of tripartite is affected by multiple exogenous variables.

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