scholarly journals Repeated Game Analysis of a CSMA/CA Network under a Backoff Attack

Sensors ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (24) ◽  
pp. 5393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Parras ◽  
Santiago Zazo
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Distributed Algorithm ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Repeated Game ◽  
Folk Theorem ◽  
Medium Access ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Static Game ◽  
Carrier Sense ◽  
Correlated Equilibria

We study a CSMA/CA (Carrier Sense Medium Access with Collision Avoidance) wireless network where some stations deviate from the defined contention mechanism. By using Bianchi’s model, we study how this deviation impacts the network throughput and show that the fairness of the network is seriously affected, as the stations that deviate achieve a larger share of the resources than the rest of stations. Previously, we modeled this situation using a static game and now, we use repeated games, which, by means of the Folk theorem, allow all players to have better outcomes. We provide analytical solutions to this game for the two player case using subgame perfect and correlated equilibria concepts. We also propose a distributed algorithm based on communicating candidate equilibrium points for learning the equilibria of this game for an arbitrary number of players. We validate approach using numerical simulations, which allows comparing the solutions we propose and discussing the advantages of using each of the methods we propose.

scholarly journals A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games

2020 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 1129-1142
Author(s):  
Ghislain-Herman Demeze-Jouatsa
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Repeated Game ◽  
Complete Characterization ◽  
Folk Theorem ◽  
Equilibrium Payoff ◽  
Perfect Monitoring ◽  
Special Case

AbstractThis paper analyzes the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of any finitely repeated game with complete information and perfect monitoring. The main result is a complete characterization of the limit set, as the time horizon increases, of the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game. This model includes the special case of observable mixed strategies.

FSO-Based Analysis of LTE-A MAC Protocols to Achieve Improved QoS

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Prabhjot Kaur ◽  
Hardeep Singh Saini
Keyword(s):  
Data Transmission ◽  
Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing ◽  
Optical Signal ◽  
Transmission Efficiency ◽  
Mac Protocols ◽  
Wireless Access Networks ◽  
Free Space Optical ◽  
Medium Access ◽  
Carrier Sense ◽  
Efficient Data

AbstractFiber wireless (Fi-Wi) communication network is the amalgamation of optical and wireless access networks, which provides better bandwidth for achieving efficient data transmission. Medium access control (MAC) protocols are used in the wireless network for controlling the data flow from the transmitter to the receiver end. The delay produced by these protocols tells about the system efficiency. This paper shows a Fi-Wi system in the long-term evaluation-advanced (LTE-A) environment, which incorporates the dependency of delay generated by the specific MAC protocols during the transmission process. This paper aimed to scrutinize the effects of Carrier Sense Multiplexing Access with Collision Detection (CSMA/CD), Carrier Sense Multiplexing Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) and Slotted ALOHA on the performance of the Fi-Wi system. Free space optical (FSO) channel is incorporated to forward the data to user end. In such system, the optical signal is multiplexed using the Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) technique and finally the data are fetched at the receiver end and different criterions such eye-height, Q-factor and bit error rate are evaluated. Simulation results are performed using MATLAB software. The comparative analysis is also performed in terms of data transmission efficiency, delay and throughput of MAC protocols. This shows the effective results of the proposed system according to the delay produced by MAC protocols.

The Analysis of Willingness to Cooperate for Farmers to Participate in Water Management Based on Game Theory

2013 ◽  
Vol 448-453 ◽  
pp. 1002-1010
Author(s):  
Cong Liu
Keyword(s):  
Water Management ◽  
Game Theory ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Collective Rationality ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Static Game ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Evolution Analysis ◽  
Prisoners Dilemma ◽  
Willingness To Cooperate

To analyze the willingness to cooperate of farmers to participate in water management, we base on game theory and first carry on single static game analysis of willingness to cooperate for farmers to participate in water management, and find that farmers are into a Prisoners Dilemma in a single game, individual rationality comes into conflict with collective rationality, at this time farmers have a tendency to "free riders", so it is difficult to achieve cooperation between the farmers. Then trying to break the prisoners' dilemma, we carry on the farmers repeated dynamic game, the analysis is carried on in the context of incomplete information and limited rationality, we carry on game evolution analysis for willingness to cooperate for farmers to participate in water management. In order to guarantee the rationality of the study, we conduct a survey of willingness to cooperate of farmers to participate in water management in province of Zhejiang and finally confirm that the study is reasonable. And through the analysis of the full text, we conclude six important conclusions.

WLC10-5: Performance Analysis of Slotted Carrier Sense IEEE 802.15.4 Medium Access Layer

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sofie Pollin ◽  
Mustafa Ergen ◽  
Sinem Coleri Ergen ◽  
Bruno Bougard ◽  
Liesbet Van Der Perre ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Performance Analysis ◽  
Ieee 802.15.4 ◽  
Medium Access ◽  
Carrier Sense

Cooperative Homo economicus

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Bowles ◽  
Herbert Gintis
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Public Information ◽  
Folk Theorem ◽  
The Self ◽  
Correlated Equilibrium ◽  
Homo Economicus ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Game Theoretic

This chapter examines whether recent advances in the theory of repeated games, as exemplified by the so-called folk theorem and related models, address the shortcomings of the self-interest based models in explaining human cooperation. It first provides an overview of folk theorems and their account of evolutionary dynamics before discussing the folk theorem with either imperfect public information or private information. It then considers evolutionarily irrelevant equilibrium as well as the link between social norms and the notion of correlated equilibrium. While the insight that repeated interactions provide opportunities for cooperative individuals to discipline defectors is correct, the chapter argues that none of the game-theoretic models mentioned above is successful. Except under implausible conditions, the cooperative outcomes identified by these models are neither accessible nor persistent, and are thus labeled evolutionarily irrelevant Nash equilibria.

A Game Analysis between GM Food Production Enterprises and Regulators in Information Asymmetry

2011 ◽  
Vol 403-408 ◽  
pp. 1960-1963
Author(s):  
Lin Ma ◽  
Hai Ying Gu
Keyword(s):  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Food Production ◽  
Market Equilibrium ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Static Game ◽  
Gm Food

Information asymmetry exists in a game relation between GM food Production enterprises and Regulators. Thus the market equilibrium depends on the strategy of GM food Production enterprises and Regulators.This paper argues that the probability of GM food Production enterprises paying attention to the propaganda and labeling GM food Consciously increase along with the probability of Regulation whether in Dynamic Game or Static Game. For the sake of Consumers,the Regulation of GM food is Essential.

Kitcher on Natural Morality

2012 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ken Binmore
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Repeated Game ◽  
Folk Theorem ◽  
Selection Problem ◽  
Social Contracts ◽  
Evolution Of Morality ◽  
Fairness Norms ◽  
Repeated Game Theory ◽  
Ethical Project

AbstractThis commentary on Philip Kitcher’s Ethical Project compares his theory of the evolution of morality with my less ambitious theory of the evolution of fairness norms that seeks to flesh out John Mackie’s insight that one should use game theory as a framework within which to assess anthropological data. It lays particular stress on the importance of the folk theorem of repeated game theory, which provides a template for the set of stable social contracts that were available to ancestral hunter-gatherer communities. It continues by drawing attention to the relevance of Harsanyi’s theory of empathetic preferences in structuring the fairness criteria that evolved as one response to the equilibrium selection problem that the folk theorem demonstrates is endemic in our species.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document