scholarly journals Can a Dynamic Reward–Penalty Mechanism Help the Implementation of Renewable Portfolio Standards under Information Asymmetry?

Symmetry ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 670
Author(s):  
Xing Xin
Keyword(s):  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
National Development ◽  
Power Industry ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Regulation Mechanism ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Renewable Portfolio Standards ◽  
Private Power

To further promote the low-carbon and sustainable development of China’s power industry, the Chinese government is vigorously introducing competition into power sales market. Simultaneously, On November 15, 2018, the National Development and Reform Commission issued the “Notice on Implementing the Renewable Portfolio Standards (Draft)” to propose the implementation of power sales side Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), which cannot be realized without an effective government regulation mechanism. However, information asymmetry and the limited rationality of the regulatory agencies and private power sales companies in the regulation process make the regulatory effect uncertain to the detriment of a sustainable regulation of the power industry. Thus, it is necessary to optimize the regulation mechanism of the RPS policy in China. We considered the competitive relationship between integrated power sales companies and independent power sales companies, and established an evolutionary game model based on a limited rationality. We also analyzed the implementation effects of the static reward penalty mechanism and dynamic reward penalty mechanism, respectively. The system dynamics (SD) simulation results showed that under the static reward penalty mechanism, there is no evolutionary stable equilibrium solution, and there will be volatility that exists in the evolution process. However, the dynamic reward penalty mechanism can effectively solve these problems. What is more, our results implied that governments should formulate appropriate RPS quotas, improve the green certificate trading mechanism, and take into account the market size of power sales while implementing RPS policy.

Impact of government regulation of RPS on China’s power market under carbon abatement constraints

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 2947-2975
Author(s):  
Bo Shang ◽  
Taozhen Huang ◽  
Xingyu Du
Keyword(s):  
Renewable Energy ◽  
Thermal Power ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Energy Generation ◽  
Power Industry ◽  
Evolutionary Strategy ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Positive Role ◽  
Renewable Energy Generation

In a significant period of Chinese energy reformation to the point of expediting revolution in energy production and consumption, and promoting green low-carbon upgrading transformation of energy electricity, Chinese government has to implement the obligatory policy of renewable portfolio standards (RPS) with specific institutional provisions sternly. The renewable energy quotas in thermal power industry with carbon emission abatement constraints particularly have a latent impact on the behavior of thermal electricity producers, which is ineluctably involved in electricity connection of grid companies. To make clear the positive role in boosting investment in renewable energy generation in thermal power industry under mandatory quotas requirements, we will utilize evolutionary game based on system dynamics (SD) to tackle with the sophisticated nexus among the government, thermal power producers and grid companies. We begin analysis of general evolutionary strategy stability in scenario ll by dynamically adjusting values of external variables of SD model to uncover pivotal variables affecting evolutionary strategy stability. Then in scenario I, the dynamic punishment structure consisting of cost elements to spark off the emulation of optimal manoeuvre selections of tripartite game agents is amended based on the simulation of vital variables affecting evolutionary strategy stability in scenario II. The significant conclusions provide decision-making support and management enlightenment for Chinese government to edge renewable energy generation capacity of thermal power producers and constrained degree of dynamic penalty for grid companies.

scholarly journals Analysis of Multi-Stakeholders’ Behavioral Strategies Considering Public Participation under Carbon Taxes and Subsidies: An Evolutionary Game Approach

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 1023 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wanting Chen ◽  
Zhi-Hua Hu
Keyword(s):  
Public Participation ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Behavioral Strategies ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Taxes ◽  
The Public ◽  
Carbon Production ◽  
Label System

Considering public participation in environmental management, we developed a tripartite game model among governments, manufacturers and publics under carbon taxes and subsidies to investigate whether the mutual relationship between governments and the public can urge manufacturers to adopt low-carbon technology by examining the interaction effect among the multi-stakeholders. In this study, we focus on manufactured products without significant low-carbon peculiarity. For these products, consumers have no way to identify which are from low-carbon production and which are not. The results show that governments and the public have a complementary and coordinating relationship indeed. The regulation cost of governments, the supervision reward for the public and the supervision cost of the public can all influence the behavioral strategies among the multi-stakeholders, including governments, manufacturers and the public. With the regulation cost strengthens dramatically, governments can consider increasing the supervision reward to support the public to participate in the management of manufacturers’ behaviors. Publics should also actively improve their management ability, and the low cost of public participation in supervision is an effective reflection to make up for the lack of government regulation. The implementation of carbon taxes is more advantageous in urging low-carbon manufacturing than government subsidies for low-carbon production. A complete carbon label system can reflect the low-carbon preferences of consumers to help manufacturers integrate low-carbon behavior into their operational decisions.

Considering Public Policy about Low-Carbon Economy

2011 ◽  
Vol 268-270 ◽  
pp. 1721-1725
Author(s):  
Ying Nan Nie ◽  
Yuan Yuan Peng
Keyword(s):  
Policy Development ◽  
National Development ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Economic Policies ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Policy ◽  
Policy System ◽  
Low Carbon Economy ◽  
Quantitative Development ◽  
Carbon Economy

In the context of globalization and low-carbon economy, the Chinese government has drawn up a number of policies and policy experiments to carry out low-carbon economy. But these policies are not perfect, there are still some problems in the formulation process to adapt to the phenomenon of the low level of the national development, the high degree of the “input level”, the policy pilot of the promotion. In response to these phenomena, this paper proposes innovative mechanisms to promote the policy system. The establishment of low-carbon-based government to improve public participation in policy development, the strategies that track the pilot survey of policy, the use of a combination of scientific method such as qualitative and quantitative development of low carbon policy, the low-carbon cycle mechanisms and publicly available information system will be conducive to low-carbon economic policies favorable operating in China.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Research on the Impact of Environmental Regulation on Overcapacity in Coal Industry

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Bo Fan ◽  
Tingting Guo ◽  
Ruzhi Xu ◽  
Wenquan Dong
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Regulation ◽  
Technological Innovation ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Power Industry ◽  
Coal Industry ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Clean Production ◽  
Regulatory Policies ◽  
The Impact

Currently, the world is facing two significant challenges: low-carbon development and overcapacity. Government departments must reexamine their development strategy of energy industry. Implementing environmental regulatory policies and technological innovation can help alleviate coal industry’s overcapacity, while sustainable development requires joint actions of governments, enterprises, and the market. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of local government, power industry, and coal enterprise. Under the premise of bounded rationality, the evolution path of each player in the game under the market incentive environmental regulation is analyzed, and the influence of the change of parameters of each player on the result is numerically simulated. The study found that strengthening environmental regulation by local governments is an inevitable choice to promote the transformation and upgrading of coal industry and power industry. In addition, reducing law enforcement costs and technological innovation costs are the fundamental point of the coordinated development of the three parties. Technological innovation in the power industry will reduce the probability of coal companies’ choosing clean production strategies, while seeking low-cost clean production technology and financial support is the key to coal companies’ optimization of production capacity.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Games of Low-Carbon Behaviors of Construction Stakeholders under Carbon Taxes

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 508
Author(s):  
Qiang Du ◽  
Yunqing Yan ◽  
Youdan Huang ◽  
Chanchan Hao ◽  
Jiao Wu
Keyword(s):  
Construction Industry ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Taxes ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
The Real

The development of low-carbon buildings (LCBs) in China has not reached its expected status, although the Chinese government has formulated many relevant regulations. The real estate developers and consumers are essential participants in the development of LCBs. This paper explores whether the government’s implementation of the carbon tax will change their choices of LCBs. Evolutionary game models between developers and consumers are established under static and dynamic carbon taxes. Their evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) are deduced in different situations. According to the real scenarios in China, numerical simulations are further conducted to show that carbon tax influences the low-carbon behaviors of stakeholders in the construction industry. Under a static carbon tax, the two players cannot reach an equilibrium state, while the game system is stable under a dynamic tax. The probability of the developers constructing LCBs is positively related to the carbon tax, while its degree is gradually weakened as the tax rate increases. Therefore, an appropriate tax should be set to promote the development of LCBs effectively. Finally, policy implications are put forwarded to guide the participants’ low-carbon behaviors and reduce the carbon emissions in the Chinese construction industry.

scholarly journals Research on Safety Regulation of Chemical Enterprise under Third-Party Mechanism: An Evolutionary Approach

Symmetry ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (8) ◽  
pp. 1057
Author(s):  
Xin
Keyword(s):  
Chemical Industry ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Market Access ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Dynamics Simulation ◽  
Regulation Mechanism ◽  
Service Needs ◽  
Safety Regulation ◽  
The Government

In recent years, China’s chemical industry has incurred frequent safety accidents which seriously impact the social environment and public safety. Traditional approaches have reached a bottleneck due to a lack of relevant professionals in the government regulation of chemical enterprise safety production. Thus, a new safety regulation mechanism should be conducted. In this paper, we constructed an evolutionary game model of chemical industry safety regulation based on limited rationality, and the influence of main parameters on the equilibrium evolution process is studied by system dynamics simulation. The results show that government regulation authorities play a leading role in the process of chemical industry safety regulation and increasing punishment will help to achieve an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). What is more, the feasibility and effectiveness of the third-party regulation service mechanism are verified, and the market access threshold of third-party regulation service needs to be improved to stop the occurrence of rent-seeking activities in the regulatory process. In summary, the introduction of third-party regulation service entities to the chemical industry safety regulation process has far-reaching implications for promoting the healthy development of China’s chemical industry.

scholarly journals Government Regulation, Executive Overconfidence, and Carbon Information Disclosure: Evidence From China

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ren He ◽  
Yanduo Cheng ◽  
Mingdian Zhou ◽  
Jing Liu ◽  
Qing Yang
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Psychological Factors ◽  
Carbon Dioxide Emissions ◽  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Low Carbon

Climate change has put countries around the world under great pressure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Chinese government has proposed that China will strive to peak carbon dioxide emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060. A low-carbon lifestyle is becoming a new trend in China. Therefore, the products of firms that actively respond to climate change are more popular for consumers in China. In the Internet era, the carbon information disclosed by firms has become an important way for consumers to understand the behavior of firms in responding to climate change. In the existing literature on the influencing factors of carbon information disclosure, the psychological factors of executives are seldom investigated. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms in low-carbon pilot provinces and cities during the period of 2015–2019, this study explores the influence of government regulation and executive overconfidence on the quality of carbon information disclosure. The results show that government regulation has a significantly positive impact on the quality of carbon information disclosure. The results also reveal that executive overconfidence negatively affects the quality of carbon information disclosure. Moreover, executive overconfidence negatively moderates the relationship between government regulation and the quality of carbon information disclosure. Our findings make a significant contribution to the role of executive’s psychological factors in firm’s behaviors and provide new insights and policy implications for government, firms, consumers, and other stakeholders.

scholarly journals Optimized Solution for Increasing Electricity Access with Mini-Grid Technology in Nigeria

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 156
Author(s):  
Chukwuma Leonard Azimoh ◽  
Charles Mbohwa
Keyword(s):  
National Development ◽  
Solar Irradiation ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Renewable Energy Resources ◽  
Grid Systems ◽  
The North ◽  
Vision 2030 ◽  
The Government ◽  
Electricity Access ◽  
Installed Capacity

Electricity challenge in Nigeria is such that only a dramatic increase in both generation and distribution capacity could leapfrog it out of the situation. Reports show that about 61% of the population have access to electricity, and those that do have are currently grappling with epileptic supply. The power network has installed capacity of about 12.5GW whereas the distribution network has capacity for about 6 GW, and often only about 4.5 GW is available to the consumers. Shortfalls are often met with private generations using diesel generators, resulting in noise and environmental pollution with the attendant health consequences. Frightfully so, the challenge is further exacerbated by the burgeoning population. Nevertheless, the government have set an ambitious target for increasing electricity access in VISION 2030 national development plan. A major milestone of this policy is the audacious ambition to increase the existing grid capacity to 30 GW, with 30% of the mix coming from low carbon technology sources. This study explores the use of available renewable energy resources at eleven locations in different regions of the country for optimal generation of energy in contribution to the Nigerian energy matrix. The study was conducted using HOMER™ and Power BI models. Four energy sources were investigated comprising of solar, wind, hydro and diesel. Our findings show that most places in the southern and middle belt parts of the country support mini-grid systems but are more receptive to grid extension, while a majority of the locations in the north are more environmentally friendly to the implementation of mini-grids. In addition, most places investigated in the south, solar technology contributes more than 80% to the energy mix, meanwhile, most northern locations despite having higher solar irradiation are better suited for wind technology with above 60% contribution to the fold.

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