scholarly journals Analysis of Multi-Stakeholders’ Behavioral Strategies Considering Public Participation under Carbon Taxes and Subsidies: An Evolutionary Game Approach

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 1023 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wanting Chen ◽  
Zhi-Hua Hu
Keyword(s):  
Public Participation ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Behavioral Strategies ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Taxes ◽  
The Public ◽  
Carbon Production ◽  
Label System

Considering public participation in environmental management, we developed a tripartite game model among governments, manufacturers and publics under carbon taxes and subsidies to investigate whether the mutual relationship between governments and the public can urge manufacturers to adopt low-carbon technology by examining the interaction effect among the multi-stakeholders. In this study, we focus on manufactured products without significant low-carbon peculiarity. For these products, consumers have no way to identify which are from low-carbon production and which are not. The results show that governments and the public have a complementary and coordinating relationship indeed. The regulation cost of governments, the supervision reward for the public and the supervision cost of the public can all influence the behavioral strategies among the multi-stakeholders, including governments, manufacturers and the public. With the regulation cost strengthens dramatically, governments can consider increasing the supervision reward to support the public to participate in the management of manufacturers’ behaviors. Publics should also actively improve their management ability, and the low cost of public participation in supervision is an effective reflection to make up for the lack of government regulation. The implementation of carbon taxes is more advantageous in urging low-carbon manufacturing than government subsidies for low-carbon production. A complete carbon label system can reflect the low-carbon preferences of consumers to help manufacturers integrate low-carbon behavior into their operational decisions.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of Three-Player for Low-Carbon Production Capacity Sharing

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (11) ◽  
pp. 2996 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daozhi Zhao ◽  
Jiaqin Hao ◽  
Cejun Cao ◽  
Hongshuai Han
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Dynamic System ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Production Capacity ◽  
Evolutionary Stability ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Manufacturing Enterprises ◽  
Carbon Production ◽  
Capacity Sharing

In the era of the sharing economy, the rise of production capacity sharing has changed traditional manufacturing modes and broken the balance of original production systems. In addition to that environmental-friendly manufacturing enterprises are of great significance with regard to production capacity sharing and sustainable development of the ecology environment. To investigate the decision-making behaviors of the participants involved in low-carbon production capacity sharing, an evolutionary game model taking into account the platforms, manufacturing enterprises with idle production capacity, and those with demanding production capacity is constructed. Then, both evolutionary game theory and Lyapunov stability theorem are used to analyze the asymptotic stability of the equilibrium and evolutionary stability strategies of the system. Besides, the economic and managerial significance of the evolutionary stability strategy is given. Finally, the influence of low-carbon production capacity of enterprises on the stability of the dynamic system is discussed, such as the cost effect of low-carbon production capacity, the effect of transaction cost, and so on. Results indicate that they can provide theoretical reference for decision-making with respect to the platforms, manufacturing enterprises, and sustainable development of the dynamic system.

scholarly journals The Evolutionary Game Analysis of Multiple Stakeholders in the Low-Carbon Agricultural Innovation Diffusion

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lixia Liu ◽  
Yuchao Zhu ◽  
Shubing Guo
Keyword(s):  
Innovation Diffusion ◽  
Agricultural Development ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Process ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Taxes ◽  
Agricultural Innovation ◽  
Agricultural Enterprises ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

Encouraging the adoption and diffusion of low-carbon agricultural technology innovation is an important measure to cope with climate change, reduce environmental pollution, and achieve sustainable agricultural development. Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper establishes a game model among agricultural enterprises, government, and farmers and analyzes the dynamic evolutionary process and evolutionary stable strategies of the major stakeholders. The impact of innovation subsidies, carbon taxes, and adoption subsidies on low-carbon agricultural innovation diffusion is simulated using Matlab software. The results show that the government’s reasonable subsidies and carbon taxes for agricultural enterprises and farmers can increase the enthusiasm of agricultural enterprises and farmers to participate in low-carbon agriculture. This study can be used as a basis for the government to formulate more targeted policies to promote the diffusion of low-carbon agricultural innovation.

scholarly journals Can a Dynamic Reward–Penalty Mechanism Help the Implementation of Renewable Portfolio Standards under Information Asymmetry?

Symmetry ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 670
Author(s):  
Xing Xin
Keyword(s):  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
National Development ◽  
Power Industry ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Regulation Mechanism ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Renewable Portfolio Standards ◽  
Private Power

To further promote the low-carbon and sustainable development of China’s power industry, the Chinese government is vigorously introducing competition into power sales market. Simultaneously, On November 15, 2018, the National Development and Reform Commission issued the “Notice on Implementing the Renewable Portfolio Standards (Draft)” to propose the implementation of power sales side Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), which cannot be realized without an effective government regulation mechanism. However, information asymmetry and the limited rationality of the regulatory agencies and private power sales companies in the regulation process make the regulatory effect uncertain to the detriment of a sustainable regulation of the power industry. Thus, it is necessary to optimize the regulation mechanism of the RPS policy in China. We considered the competitive relationship between integrated power sales companies and independent power sales companies, and established an evolutionary game model based on a limited rationality. We also analyzed the implementation effects of the static reward penalty mechanism and dynamic reward penalty mechanism, respectively. The system dynamics (SD) simulation results showed that under the static reward penalty mechanism, there is no evolutionary stable equilibrium solution, and there will be volatility that exists in the evolution process. However, the dynamic reward penalty mechanism can effectively solve these problems. What is more, our results implied that governments should formulate appropriate RPS quotas, improve the green certificate trading mechanism, and take into account the market size of power sales while implementing RPS policy.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Models on Multiagent Collaborative Mechanism in Responsible Innovation

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Kun Yang ◽  
Wan Wang ◽  
Bin Hu
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Responsible Innovation ◽  
Behavioral Strategies ◽  
Dynamics Modeling ◽  
Exogenous Variables ◽  
The Public ◽  
Behavior Strategy ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
The Government

Innovation is a game process; in particular, the behavior among multiple agents in responsible innovation is susceptible to the influence of benefits, risks, responsibilities, and other factors, resulting in unstable collaborative relationships. Therefore, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model including the government, enterprises, and the public, combined with system dynamics modeling to simulate and analyze the tripartite behavior strategy and sensitivity to relevant exogenous variables. The study shows that the tripartite game eventually converges to a stable state of the government active supervision, enterprises making responsible innovation, and the public’s positive participation. The positive participation of the public drives rapidly the game to a steady state, while the behavioral strategies of enterprises are more susceptible to the behavior of the government. Supervision cost, penalty amount, and value compensation are the most critical factors influencing the change of the corresponding agents’ behavior strategy, and the final strategic stability of tripartite is affected by multiple exogenous variables.

scholarly journals The Evolutionary Game of Stakeholders’ Coordination Mechanism of New Energy Power Construction PPP Project: A China Case

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 1045 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Gao ◽  
Zhen-Yu Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Public Participation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Process ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
The Public ◽  
Power Construction ◽  
New Energy ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

The government, investors, and the public have formed a dynamic multi-game relationship on the Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) project, but few studies include them in a system to study their win–win solutions. Firstly, we constructed a tripartite game model of the government, investors, and the public based on evolutionary game theory. Secondly, the evolutionary process of tripartite strategy behaviors was studied with the system dynamics (SD) model. Finally, the impact of changes in key factors on behavior strategies was studied through sensitivity analysis. The results show the following: (1) In the outsourcing of new energy and power construction PPP projects, the three parties will eventually reach the equilibrium state of {government supervision, public participation, investors effort}, the three parties achieve a win–win situation and the project benefits are the highest at this time, and the public participation will play an important role in promoting the smooth outsourcing of PPP projects. (2) The strategic choices of the government, investors, and the public are sensitive to changes in the corresponding exogenous variables. (3) The security factor plays a crucial role in the choice of public strategy. The public’s choice is not only affected by its own income and cost, but also by the amount of compensation promised by the government and the estimated damage caused by the investor.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Games of Low-Carbon Behaviors of Construction Stakeholders under Carbon Taxes

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 508
Author(s):  
Qiang Du ◽  
Yunqing Yan ◽  
Youdan Huang ◽  
Chanchan Hao ◽  
Jiao Wu
Keyword(s):  
Construction Industry ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Taxes ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
The Real

The development of low-carbon buildings (LCBs) in China has not reached its expected status, although the Chinese government has formulated many relevant regulations. The real estate developers and consumers are essential participants in the development of LCBs. This paper explores whether the government’s implementation of the carbon tax will change their choices of LCBs. Evolutionary game models between developers and consumers are established under static and dynamic carbon taxes. Their evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) are deduced in different situations. According to the real scenarios in China, numerical simulations are further conducted to show that carbon tax influences the low-carbon behaviors of stakeholders in the construction industry. Under a static carbon tax, the two players cannot reach an equilibrium state, while the game system is stable under a dynamic tax. The probability of the developers constructing LCBs is positively related to the carbon tax, while its degree is gradually weakened as the tax rate increases. Therefore, an appropriate tax should be set to promote the development of LCBs effectively. Finally, policy implications are put forwarded to guide the participants’ low-carbon behaviors and reduce the carbon emissions in the Chinese construction industry.

scholarly journals Evolutionary game analysis of environmental pollution control under the government regulation

2022 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kui Zhou ◽  
Qi Wang ◽  
Junnan Tang
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Pollution ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Incentive Strategies ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Reward And Punishment

AbstractThis paper studied a tripartite evolutionary game of stakeholders in environmental pollution control. Most previous studies on this issue are limited to a focus on system dynamics with two-party game problems and lack a spatial analysis of strategy evolution. The parameters adopted are too few, and the influencing factors considered are too simple. The purpose of the paper is to introduce more parameters to study, which will have an important impact on the strategy choices of participants and the evolution path of the strategy over time. We construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of sewage enterprises, governments and the public. We establish a payment matrix and replicator equations as our method, and we also implement parameter simulations in MATLAB. In summary, we found that the reward and punishment mechanism plays an important role in environmental pollution control. Specifically: intensifying rewards and penalties will help encourage sewage enterprises to meet the discharge standard and the public to participate in pollution control action. However, increased rewards will reduce government's willingness to adopt incentive strategies; Government's reward for public's participation in the action must be greater than the increased cost of participation; Reducing the cost of sewage enterprise can also encourage them to implement standard emissions. The research presented in this paper further improves standard emissions and designs reasonable reward and punishment mechanism.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis on Behavioral Strategies of Government and Residents in Municipal Household Waste Separation

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (20) ◽  
pp. 11421
Author(s):  
Xueping Wu ◽  
Liping Zhang ◽  
Jianhua Huang ◽  
Wei Li ◽  
Yanhua Chen ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Influencing Factors ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Household Waste ◽  
Separation Mechanism ◽  
Behavioral Strategies ◽  
Recycling Economy ◽  
Decision Making Behavior

Municipal household waste (MHW) separation is a fundamental way to achieve waste reduction and a recycling economy. This study takes the positions of government and residents in MHW separation as the research object, and aims to explore the change process and influencing factors of their decision-making behavior, which is of great significance to attract residents to participate in MHW separation and establish an effective MHW separation mechanism to solve MHW pollution. This paper firstly establishes an evolutionary game model between government and residents in MHW separation; secondly, the payoff matrix of the system is determined, and the replication dynamic equations under different constraints are calculated to obtain the evolutionary stability strategy of the system, and the stability conditions are analyzed; Finally, through numerical simulation, the decision-making behavior of MHW separation and its influencing factors are studied, and the rationality of the model is verified. The results show that: (1) In the process of MHW separation, residents often choose not to separate without government regulation; (2) Environmental fee rates and government effort have great impacts on residents’ decision-making behavior; (3) The increase of penalty intensity can significantly drive residents to separate MHW; (4) The sensitivity of residents’ behavior decision to subsidy coefficient is the lowest among all the variables, and the incentive effect of increasing subsidy coefficient is not obvious. The research results can not only provide theoretical guidance for policy makers to develop waste management policies, but also provide valuable insights for local communities to guide residents’ MHW separation behavior.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Supervision Behavior for Public-Private Partnership Projects with Public Participation

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Congdong Li ◽  
Xiaoli Li ◽  
Yu Wang
Keyword(s):  
Private Sector ◽  
Public Participation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
The Public ◽  
Private Behavior ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Participation Level ◽  
The Government

The public can directly or indirectly participate in the PPP (public-private partnership) projects and then has an impact on the project profit and public or private behavior. To explore the influence of the public participation of the PPP projects supervision behavior, this paper analyzes the mutual evolutionary regularity of the private sector and government supervision department and the influence of public participation level on public and private behavior based on evolutionary game theory. The results show that the supervision strategy is not chosen when the supervision cost of government supervision department is greater than the supervision benefit; it can make private sector consciously provide the high-quality public products/services with the improvement of public participation level. Therefore, the government should reduce the cost of public participation and improve the public participation level and influence through the application of the Internet, big data, and other advanced technologies, in order to restrain the behavior of the private sector and improve the supervision efficiency.

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