scholarly journals Research on Safety Regulation of Chemical Enterprise under Third-Party Mechanism: An Evolutionary Approach

Symmetry ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (8) ◽  
pp. 1057
Author(s):  
Xin
Keyword(s):  
Chemical Industry ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Market Access ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Dynamics Simulation ◽  
Regulation Mechanism ◽  
Service Needs ◽  
Safety Regulation ◽  
The Government

In recent years, China’s chemical industry has incurred frequent safety accidents which seriously impact the social environment and public safety. Traditional approaches have reached a bottleneck due to a lack of relevant professionals in the government regulation of chemical enterprise safety production. Thus, a new safety regulation mechanism should be conducted. In this paper, we constructed an evolutionary game model of chemical industry safety regulation based on limited rationality, and the influence of main parameters on the equilibrium evolution process is studied by system dynamics simulation. The results show that government regulation authorities play a leading role in the process of chemical industry safety regulation and increasing punishment will help to achieve an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). What is more, the feasibility and effectiveness of the third-party regulation service mechanism are verified, and the market access threshold of third-party regulation service needs to be improved to stop the occurrence of rent-seeking activities in the regulatory process. In summary, the introduction of third-party regulation service entities to the chemical industry safety regulation process has far-reaching implications for promoting the healthy development of China’s chemical industry.

scholarly journals Research on the Transformation Path of the Green Intelligent Port: Outlining the Perspective of the Evolutionary Game “Government–Port–Third-Party Organization”

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (19) ◽  
pp. 8072
Author(s):  
Bin Meng ◽  
Haibo Kuang ◽  
Erxuan Niu ◽  
Jing Li ◽  
Zhenhui Li
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Global Ocean ◽  
Party Organization ◽  
Party Organizations ◽  
Stability Point ◽  
The Government ◽  
And Control

While promoting the global economy and trade, ports impose serious pollution on the global ocean and atmosphere. Therefore, the development of ports is restrained by the policies and measures of governments and international organizations used to cope with climate change and environmental protection. With the development of information technology, the operation and expansion of ports is facing forms of green and intelligent reform. This research aims to link the development of green intelligent ports, government policies, and third-party organizations to find the most suitable evolutionary path for the development of green intelligent ports. This paper assumes that governments will push ports to transform into green intelligent ports from the perspective of benefiting long-term interests, that the goal of ports is to maximize their profits, and that third-party organizations will actively promote the development of green intelligent ports. Based on these assumptions, this paper has established an evolutionary game theory model of “government–port–third-party organization” regarding the development of green intelligent ports. The Jacobian matrix of the game theory system was constructed by using the replicator dynamic equation, and local stability analysis was performed to obtain the equilibrium stability point of the entire system. This research reveals the limitations of the development of green intelligent ports without government involvement and explores the ability of third-party organizations to promote the implementation of policies, confirming the role of government regulation and control in promoting the development of green intelligent ports. This paper may be helpful for the development of green intelligent ports in the future. The results show that: (1) The main factors affecting the choice of port strategy are the benefits of building a green intelligent port, the intensity of government regulation, and the quantitative influence of third-party evaluation results on the port strategy selection. (2) Government decision-making plays an important role in port transformation. If the relevant government chooses the wrong strategy, then the transformation of the port will be delayed. (3) Government regulation and control need to change with the change of the evolution stage. (4) Compared with the macro-control policies of the government, the influence of the third-party organization on the port is significantly smaller.

scholarly journals Game Analysis on the Evolution of Decision-Making of Vaccine Manufacturing Enterprises under the Government Regulation Model

Vaccines ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 267
Author(s):  
Na Zhang ◽  
Yingjie Yang ◽  
Xiaodong Wang ◽  
Xinfeng Wang
Keyword(s):  
Success Rate ◽  
Manufacturing Process ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Early Stage ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Manufacturing Enterprises ◽  
Regulatory Authorities ◽  
The Government ◽  
Regulation Model

The harm caused by defective vaccines to human health and social stability is immeasurable. Aiming at the government’s supervision of the vaccine market, an evolutionary game model is constructed to analyze the quality of supervision and the key factors in the dynamic interaction between government departments and vaccine manufacturers under different supervision modes in the vaccine manufacturing process. The results show that: (1) Severe punishment by government regulatory authorities, and increased costs of rectification after investigation and handling of involuntary behaviors of vaccine enterprises can effectively prevent involuntary behaviors of vaccine enterprises. (2) In the early stage of the game, the success rate of the government’s efficient supervision will make the vaccine enterprises continuously self-disciplined; when the vaccine market is relatively stable, the government’s supervision departments tend to be more conducive to passive supervision. (3) The success rate of government regulatory departments and the probability of a third-party reporting to play a great role in promoting the self-discipline of enterprises. (4) The power of government and regulation are conducive to promoting the active supervision of the government regulatory authorities but corruption of government and awareness of people are different. Once the phenomenon of vaccine enterprises’ non-discipline increases, the government regulation must change from passive regulation to active regulation. Therefore, the government should implement different measures according to the characteristics of each period in the manufacturing process to effectively prevent problematic vaccines. The conclusions and policy recommendations are significant for addressing the issue of insufficient self-discipline of vaccine manufacturers.

scholarly journals Multi-Evolutionary Game Research on Heavy Metal Pollution Control in Soil: Based on a Third-Party Perspective

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (13) ◽  
pp. 5306
Author(s):  
Songtao Xu ◽  
Zhifang Zhou ◽  
Ke Liu
Keyword(s):  
Heavy Metal ◽  
Metal Pollution ◽  
Heavy Metal Pollution ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Strategy Choice ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Soil Heavy Metal ◽  
Pollution Treatment ◽  
The Government

The introduction of third-party governance models for the treatment of soil heavy metal pollution has promoted the marketization, professionalization, and efficiency of pollution treatment, but also can result in distortions of relevant stakeholder relationships and conflicts of interest. The game relationship among the government, soil-polluting companies, and third-party governance companies may solve the practical dilemma of comprehensive management of soil heavy metal pollution and establish a good cooperative mechanism. We constructed a three-party evolutionary game model to analyze the interaction mechanism of each agent’s strategy choice as well as the evolution of each agent’s strategy choice under different parameter trends and simulation analyses. The research showed that the amount of fines and supervision costs, rent-seeking costs and governance costs, and government subsidies and rent-seeking benefits were key factors affecting the evolution and stability strategies of government departments, soil-polluting companies, and third-party governance companies. By cooperating with third-party governance companies, the government can effectively suppress the improper behavior of soil-polluting companies. The conclusions of the study are helpful to broaden the research boundary of soil heavy metal pollution treatment and provide theoretical guidance for the treatment of soil heavy metal pollution in China.

scholarly journals The Decision-Making Analysis on End-of-Life Vehicle Recycling and Remanufacturing under Extended Producer Responsibility Policy

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (20) ◽  
pp. 11215
Author(s):  
Syed Abdul Rehman Khan ◽  
Danish Iqbal Godil ◽  
George Thomas ◽  
Muhammad Tanveer ◽  
Hafiz Muhammad Zia-ul-haq ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Expected Profit ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Game Model ◽  
The Third ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategies ◽  
Dual Cycle ◽  
The Government

This research develops a dual-cycle ELV recycling and remanufacturing system to better understand and improve the efficiency of the ELV recycling and remanufacturing businesses. For the flawless operation of this system, the researchers employed evolutionary game theory to establish a game model between original vehicle manufacturers (OVMs) and third-party recyclers with the government involved. This research presents evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) that could promote an ELV recycling and remanufacturing system. Results show that OVMs’ expected profit difference between choosing and not choosing authorization is crucial in their ESS. The licensing fee plays a part of OVMs’ expected profit difference. Based on the results, optimal ESS could be achieved when the OVMs’ expected profit difference between choosing authorization and not choosing authorization and the third-party recyclers’ profit when paying the licensing fee are both positive. Then, the two groups’ involvement in dual-cycle ELV recycling and the remanufacturing system can be ensured. This research implicates the government to devise appropriate reward and punishment strategy to encourage OVMs and third-party recyclers to collaborate for efficient recycling and remanufacturing systems. Particularly, the government is suggested to impose strict restrictions on OVMs to carry ELV recycling and provide support to promote recycling quantity standards. Hence, the ELV recycling and remanufacturing system would be strengthened, thus improving waste management which is crucial for both environmental and resource efficiency.

scholarly journals Research on Green Collaborative Innovation Mechanism of Cloud Manufacturing Enterprises under Government Supervision

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Jiaqi Zhai ◽  
Xinliang Xu ◽  
Jianzhong Xu ◽  
Xichen Lyu
Keyword(s):  
Government Regulation ◽  
Load Capacity ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Cloud Manufacturing ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Selection Strategy ◽  
Manufacturing Enterprises ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
The Government

With the rapid development of information technology, the sharing economy based on “Internet plus” cloud platforms has become a new collaborative innovation mode and a hot topic in recent years. Considering that government regulation restricts green innovation cooperation among cloud manufacturing enterprises, an evolutionary game model involving the government and cloud manufacturing enterprises A and B with potential differences in their technology knowledge is established using evolutionary game theory. A replication dynamic equation is established, the evolutionarily stable equilibrium strategy of the three parties is analysed, and the key factors affecting the cooperative selection strategy of the government and cloud manufacturing enterprises are discussed through a MATLAB-based numerical simulation. This research shows that when governmental incentives and punishments, the platform load capacity, the trust between enterprises, the technology loss coefficient, and the informatization degree are increased, the government will tend to choose supervision, and cloud manufacturing enterprises A and B will tend to choose the “collaborative innovation” strategy. These results provide a scientific basis suggesting that the government should not only formulate rules and regulations for cloud manufacturing enterprises but also promote green collaborative innovation among such enterprises and enhance their core competitiveness.

scholarly journals The Political Economy of Salt Imports in Indonesia

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-46
Author(s):  
Beltahmamero Simamora ◽  
Marlina Deliana ◽  
Syafruddin Ritonga
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Chemical Industry ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Industrial Sector ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Government ◽  
Industrial Needs

The use of salt is wide, including in the chemical industry, various foods and beverages, pharmaceuticals and cosmetics. The decision to import salt is aimed at protecting the sustainability of production in the national industrial sector. Government Regulation Number 9 of 2018 was issued without involving the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (KKP). The PP for Salt Imports removes the authority of the KKP in providing recommendations for importing industrial salt. The salt import made by the government has received legitimacy from the Ministry of Industry because it is seen as being able to increase investment and welfare for the community. However, the import of salt do not have to get recommendations from the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries are a blunder for the government. Because it is very contrary to the constitution. The concepts presented by Thomas Oatley, namely interests, political institutions and Helen V. Milner, namely Interest, Institutions, and Information, are used to analyze salt import policies. 100 percent of industrial salt is still imported, because Indonesia unable to produce salt for industrial needs. Thus, in terms of the political economy of salt business, it can be concluded that the recurring issue of salt scarcity has been caused by serious errors in the political economy of the salt business in Indonesia. This mistake, objectively, can be traced from the behavior of salt business players and the government to reform for a better Indonesian salt business. 100 percent of industrial salt is still imported, because Indonesia unable to produce salt for industrial needs. Thus, in terms of the political economy of salt business, it can be concluded that the recurring issue of salt scarcity has been caused by serious errors in the political economy of the salt business in Indonesia. This mistake, objectively, can be traced from the behavior of salt business players and the government to reform for a better Indonesian salt business. 100 percent of industrial salt is still imported, because Indonesia unable to produce salt for industrial needs. Thus, in terms of the political economy of salt business, it can be concluded that the recurring issue of salt scarcity has been caused by serious errors in the political economy of the salt business in Indonesia. This mistake, objectively, can be traced from the behavior of salt business players and the government to reform for a better Indonesian salt business.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of Coal Enterprise Resource Integration Under Government Regulation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ziyuan Sun ◽  
Wei Wang ◽  
Weixing Zhu ◽  
Lin Ma ◽  
Yuting Dong ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Government Regulation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Resource Integration ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Government Regulations ◽  
Coal Enterprise ◽  
The Government ◽  
Coal Enterprises ◽  
The Impact

Abstract Based on the perspective of government regulation, this paper discusses how to guide and restrict coal enterprises to conduct resource integration behavior, and whether the government supervises this behavior. First, through empirical research, government regulations of coal enterprises are given practical policy implications. Second, using evolutionary game and simulation technology, from the perspective of government regulation, we explore the complex behavioral interaction mechanism between the dominant and inferior coal enterprises, the mechanism between the government and coal enterprises, and analyze the impact of key factors on the dynamic evolution process. Finally, the sensitivity analysis of the selected parameters is discussed in details, which provides useful decision-making suggestions for the government and enterprises. Results demonstrate that:(1) when the power gap between enterprises is great, government regulations are not effective for inferior enterprises;(2) the combination of government regulation can help to improve the efficiency of coal enterprise strategy selection;(3) excessive government regulations make the strategic choices of the government and coal enterprise tend to swing, failing to achieve effectively resource integration and government supervision.

scholarly journals Can a Dynamic Reward–Penalty Mechanism Help the Implementation of Renewable Portfolio Standards under Information Asymmetry?

Symmetry ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 670
Author(s):  
Xing Xin
Keyword(s):  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
National Development ◽  
Power Industry ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Regulation Mechanism ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Renewable Portfolio Standards ◽  
Private Power

To further promote the low-carbon and sustainable development of China’s power industry, the Chinese government is vigorously introducing competition into power sales market. Simultaneously, On November 15, 2018, the National Development and Reform Commission issued the “Notice on Implementing the Renewable Portfolio Standards (Draft)” to propose the implementation of power sales side Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), which cannot be realized without an effective government regulation mechanism. However, information asymmetry and the limited rationality of the regulatory agencies and private power sales companies in the regulation process make the regulatory effect uncertain to the detriment of a sustainable regulation of the power industry. Thus, it is necessary to optimize the regulation mechanism of the RPS policy in China. We considered the competitive relationship between integrated power sales companies and independent power sales companies, and established an evolutionary game model based on a limited rationality. We also analyzed the implementation effects of the static reward penalty mechanism and dynamic reward penalty mechanism, respectively. The system dynamics (SD) simulation results showed that under the static reward penalty mechanism, there is no evolutionary stable equilibrium solution, and there will be volatility that exists in the evolution process. However, the dynamic reward penalty mechanism can effectively solve these problems. What is more, our results implied that governments should formulate appropriate RPS quotas, improve the green certificate trading mechanism, and take into account the market size of power sales while implementing RPS policy.

scholarly journals Does Massive Placement of Bicycles Win the Market for the Bicycle-Sharing Company in China?

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (13) ◽  
pp. 5279
Author(s):  
Jialing Zhao ◽  
Hongwei Wang ◽  
Yuxin Huang ◽  
Yuan Meng
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Dominant Role ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
The Sustainable Development ◽  
Market Expansion ◽  
Government Enterprise ◽  
The Government ◽  
Decision Making Behavior ◽  
Strategic Balance

The rise of bicycle-sharing stimulated companies’ investment in a large number of bicycles in the market. However, it is important to balance the massive placement of bicycles in the market and the company’s sustainable development. This paper is motivated to identify a strategic balance between market expansion and the sustainable development of the company. Based on the information asymmetry and evolutionary game theory, a tripartite game model was established for the government, enterprise, and consumer. This study identified five evolutionary stability strategies (ESSs) of these three parties under specific conditions by analyzing their decision-making behavior. The results indicated that the number of bicycles in the market placed by a bicycle-sharing enterprise was not directly proportional to its profit. The quantity of bicycles needed on the market was influenced by the government and consumers. It also found that government regulation plays a dominant role in the development of the bicycle-sharing company regarding the number of bicycles needed in the market.

scholarly journals Reformasi Birokrasi Pelayanan Publik di Kecamatan Tanimbar Selatan Kabupaten Kepulauan Tanimbar

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Telly Muriany ◽  
Victor Ruhunlela
Keyword(s):  
Government Regulation ◽  
Public Services ◽  
Service Needs ◽  
Regional Government ◽  
Technology Support ◽  
Descriptive Research ◽  
Information And Communication ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Government ◽  
Bureaucratic Reform

Bureaucratic reform in public services in the Tanimbar Islands District seems very urgent at this time. The facts show that the Tanimbar Islands Regency is still faced with various obstacles in public services, especially those closely related to public service needs in the fields of education, health and licensing, especially at the District level as the spearhead of the Tanimbar Islands Regency government in providing public services. The research method used is descriptive research with a qualitative approach. The use and approach of qualitative research is deemed appropriate because it is in accordance with the qualitative characteristics of the phenomena being studied, to verify the issue of reform has been and can be carried out in accordance with what is expected or in accordance with the character of the archipelago. The results showed that the institutional reform in Tanimbar Selatan District, Southeast Maluku Regency was not effective because of several problems faced related to the efforts of the sub-district government to carry out bureaucratic reform, namely the decentralization of authority was not effective because the decentralization of authority granted was not fully implemented as expected. . From the aspect of organizational structure, it has implemented the principles stipulated in the Government Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia Number 18 of 2016 concerning Regional Apparatus, but it is hoped that it will prioritize aspects of the interests and needs as well as the availability of Regional Government budgets, the function of authority is often not adjusted to the capacity and competence of the apparatus. it is more dominant based on the likes and dislikes. Supporting facilities are still lacking, especially information and communication technology support, which is still an obstacle to providing effective and efficient services. Key Word: Bureaucracy, Institutions, Islands, Reform  

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