scholarly journals Scientific Realism Again

Author(s):  
James Ladyman

The present paper concerns how scientific realism is formulated and defended. It is argued that van Fraassen is fundamentally right that scientific realism requires metaphysics in general, and modality in particular. This is because of several relationships that raise problems for the ontology of scientific realism, namely those between: scientific realism and common sense realism; past and current theories; the sciences of different scales; and the ontologies of the special sciences and fundamental physics. These problems are related. It is argued that ontic structural realism, in the form of the real-patterns account of ontology, offers a unified solution to them all (or at least that it is required to do so, if it is to make good on the promise of naturalised metaphysics).

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-166
Author(s):  
Alex B Pablos

This essay tries to make a tangential cut between the debate that seeks the most adequate definition of scientific progress (involving authors such as K. Popper, T Kuhn, A Bird or J Saatsi) and the debate on the viability of structural realism to be considered the best epistemological approach to the understanding of nature (B van Fraassen, J Ladyman, J Worrall, S Psillos...). Thus, we will first connect both debates by showing that they shared a common problem before their progressive distancing. Finally, we will outline a formulation of scientific progress inferred from the structural realism approach; in particular, our definition will be based on J. Ladyman’s proposal in Every Thing Must Go as we will emphasize that it also provides an answer to the aforementioned original problem. Our conclusion is that this formulation of scientific progress differs from the three main ones, namely, truthlikeness, problem-solving, and accumulation of knowledge. This fourth form is necessarily linked to a speculative approximation of reality. Moreover, we want to suggest that this fourth conception is articulated under the shadow of the ideas of CS Peirce. Keywords: structural realism, scientific progress, J Ladyman, speculative realism


2020 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 323-337
Author(s):  
Travis Dumsday ◽  

Structural realism has re-emerged as part of the debate between scientific realism and antirealism. Since then it has branched into several different versions, notably epistemic structural realism and ontic structural realism. The latter theory (which itself has now divided into competing formulations) is still an important perspective in the realism/antirealism dialectic; however, its significance has expanded well beyond that debate. Today ontic structural realism is also an important player in the metaphysics of science literature, engaging with a variety of ontological questions. One of these pertains to the basic categories of ontology, with the proponents of ontic structural realism typically advocating a radical rethinking of how to view substance and relation while calling into question the (allegedly) traditional privileging of the former over and against the latter. In this paper I assess ontic structural realism from the perspective of two major systems: Thomism and Scotism. I argue that the basic commitments of Thomism allow for some surprising convergences with ontic structural realism, while Scotism does not.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-89
Author(s):  
Adam InTae Gerard

The goal of this paper is to preserve realism in both ontology and truth for the philosophy of mathematics and science. It begins by arguing that scientific realism can only be attained given mathematical realism due to the indispensable nature of the latter to the prior. Ultimately, the paper argues for a position combining both Ontic Structural Realism and Ante Rem Structuralism, or what the author refers to as Strong Ontic Structural Realism, which has the potential to reconcile realism for both science and mathematics. The paper goes on to claims that this theory does not succumb to the same traditional epistemological problems, which have damaged the credibility of its predecessors.


Author(s):  
Bruce L. Gordon

There is an argument for the existence of God from the incompleteness of nature that is vaguely present in Plantinga’s recent work. This argument, which rests on the metaphysical implications of quantum physics and the philosophical deficiency of necessitarian conceptions of physical law, deserves to be given a clear formulation. The goal is to demonstrate, via a suitably articulated principle of sufficient reason, that divine action in an occasionalist mode is needed (and hence God’s existence is required) to bring causal closure to nature and render it ontologically functional. The best explanation for quantum phenomena and the most adequate understanding of general providence turns out to rest on an ontic structural realism in physics that is grounded in the immaterialist metaphysics of theistic idealism.


2019 ◽  
Vol 53 ◽  
pp. 295-307
Author(s):  
Will McNeill ◽  

Heidegger’s 1936 essay “The Origin of the Work of Art” is notoriously dense and difficult. In part this is because it appears to come almost from nowhere, given that Heidegger has relatively little to say about art in his earlier work. Yet the essay can only be adequately understood, I would argue, in concert with Heidegger’s essay on Hölderlin from the same year, “Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetizing.” Without the Hölderlin essay, for instance, the central claim of “The Origin of the Work of Art” to the effect that all art is in essence poetizing, Dichtung, can hardly be appreciated in its philosophical significance without the discussions of both essence and poetizing that appear in the Hölderlin essay. This is true of other concepts also. The central concept of the rift (Riß)—the fissure or tear—that appears in “The Origin of the Work of Art” might readily be assumed to be adopted from Albrecht Dürer, whose use of the term Heidegger cites at a key point in the 1936 essay. Here, however, I argue that the real source of the concept for Heidegger is Hölderlin, and that the Riß is, moreover—quite literally—an inscription of originary, ekstatic temporality; that is, of temporality as the “origin” of Being and as the poetic or poetizing essence of art. I do so, first, by briefly considering Heidegger’s references to Dürer in “The Origin of the Work of Art” and other texts from the period, as well as his understanding of the Riß and of the tearing of the Riß in that essay and in its two earlier versions. I then turn to Heidegger’s 1936 Rome lecture “Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetizing,” in order to show the Hölderlinian origins of this concept for Heidegger.


Author(s):  
Howard Sankey

This note poses a dilemma for scientific realism which stems from the apparent conflict between science and common sense. On the one hand, we may accept scientific realism and agree that there is a conflict between science and common sense. If we do this, we remove the evidential basis for science and have no reason to accept science in the first place. On the other hand, we may accept scientific realism and endorse common sense. If we do this, we must reject the conflict between science and common sense. The dilemma is to be resolved by distinguishing between basic common sense and widely held beliefs. Basic common sense survives the advance of science and may serve as the evidential basis for science.


2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-38
Author(s):  
Jasmina Jeknic-Dugic

A quantum mechanical analysis of the decomposability of quantum systems into subsystems provides support for the so-called "attenuated Eliminative Ontic Structural Realism" within Categorical Structuralism studies in physics. Quantum subsystems are recognized as non-individual, relationally defined objects that deflate or relax some standard objections against Eliminative Ontic Structural Realism. Our considerations assume the universally valid quantum theory without tackling interpretational issues.


Retos ◽  
2015 ◽  
pp. 67-69
Author(s):  
José Antonio Pérez Turpin ◽  
Juan Manuel Cortell Tormo ◽  
Juan José Chinchilla Mira ◽  
Roberto Cejuela Anta ◽  
Concepción Suárez Llorca

Para conocer los componentes actuales del rendimiento en vóley playa, es preciso conocer la estructura temporal de la competición. Por ello, el objetivo del presente estudio fue conocer la distribución del tiempo de juego real y absoluto durante el partido, los sets y los puntos en jugadores de vóley playa profesionales. Para esto, se realizaron video grabaciones de 10 jugadores durante cuatro encuentros disputados en el Campeonato de Europa de vóley playa (Valencia 2005). Se cuantificó la duración total de los partidos, sets y puntos al tiempo que se diferenció del tiempo real de juego. Como resultado se observó que la media de tiempo absoluto por partido fue de 37min 17,4s±11min 16,2s mientras que el tiempo real fue de 8min 12s±2min 24s. La duración media del total del tiempo de duración de los sets fue de16min 19,8s±2min 27s. y la real de 3min 25,8s±43,20s. La media de tiempo invertida en la realización del punto fue de 6±0,95s. El conocimiento mejorado del tiempo absoluto y real de juego en los jugadores puede aportar una valiosa información que permita establecer patrones de entrenamiento específicos para el vóley playa.Abstract: In order to identify the real components of beach volleyball performance, we need to know the time structure of the competition. This study was designed to identify the distribution of time in real and absolute play during the matches, sets and points played by professional beach volleyball players. To do so, we made video recordings of 10 players playing four matches at the European Beach Volleyball Championships (Valencia 2005). We measured the total length of the matches, sets and points while differentiating real playing time. We observed that the absolute time per match was 37min 17.4sec±11min 16.2sec, while real playing time was 8min 12sec±2min 24sec. The average length of the total duration of the sets was 16min 19.8sec±2min 27sec and real playing time was 3min 25.8sec±43.20sec. The average time taken to play a point was 6±0.95sec. An improved understanding of absolute and real playing time provides valuable information that allows us to create specific training patterns for beach volleyball.


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 59-74
Author(s):  
Nikita V. Golovko

The paper aims to make a satisfactory realistic interpretation of the solution of the truth-making problem within the framework of D. Dennett’s real patterns conception in order to show that D. Dennett’s ontology can be interpreted in a realistic sense not only within the framework of J. Ladyman’s structural realism. As a starting point, the solution of the truth-making problem within the concept of “serious essentialism” by E. J. Lowe is considered. Our thesis is that the expansion of the D. Dennett’s conception with E. J. Lowe’s “serious essentialism” leads us to the conclusion that D. Dennett’s ontology not only receives a satisfactory realistic interpretation of the solution of the truth-making problem, but also provides an opportunity to answer properly to the definition of scientific realism given by M. Devitt.


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