Knowledge, tacit

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
C.F. Delaney
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Tacit Knowledge ◽  
Implicit Knowledge ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Thomas Kuhn ◽  
Michael Polanyi ◽  
Adequate Account ◽  
Tacit Knowing ◽  
Theoretical Linguistics

Tacit knowledge is a form of implicit knowledge we rely on for both learning and acting. The term derives from the work of Michael Polanyi (1891–1976) whose critique of positivistic philosophy of science grew into a fully developed theory of knowledge. Polanyi believed that the ‘scientific’ account of knowledge as a fully explicit formalizable body of statements did not allow for an adequate account of discovery and growth. In his account of tacit knowledge, knowledge has an ineliminable subjective dimension: we know much more than we can tell. This notion of tacit knowing in science has been developed by Thomas Kuhn, has figured prominently in theoretical linguistics and has also been studied in psychology.

Tacit Knowledge in Management

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sumat Jain ◽  
Jayant Dubey
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge Management ◽  
Tacit Knowledge ◽  
Management Education ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Michael Polanyi ◽  
Tacit Knowing ◽  
Skilled Performance ◽  
New Knowledge ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Tacit Knowledge Management

The concept of tacit knowing comes from scientist and philosopher Michael Polanyi. It is important to understand that he wrote about a process (hence tacit knowing) and not a form of knowledge. However, his phrase has been taken up to name a form of knowledge that is apparently wholly or partly inexplicable. Tacit knowledge cannot be “captured”, “translated”, or “converted” but only displayed and manifested, in what we do. New knowledge comes about not when the tacit becomes explicit, but when our skilled performance is punctuated in new ways through social interaction. tacit knowledge - Knowledge that enters into the production of behaviours and/or the constitution of mental states but is not ordinarily accessible to consciousness. See also cognize, knowledge, implicit memory, Background, rules. This paper presents the overview of the term Tacit Management, in which we are going to present the different types of tacit knowledge, definitions, and properties of it. How is it useful in applicability of management education? The benefits from it, failure due to lack of tacit knowledge, the paradox of it and at last the conclusion related to the terminology Tacit Knowledge Management (TKM).

The Modern Aristotle: Michael Polanyi’s Search for Truth against Nihilism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald Hoinski ◽  
Ronald Polansky
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Modern Science ◽  
Michael Polanyi ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
The Face ◽  
Human Desire ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Theoretical Science

David Hoinski and Ronald Polansky’s “The Modern Aristotle: Michael Polanyi’s Search for Truth against Nihilism” shows how the general tendencies of contemporary philosophy of science disclose a return to the Aristotelian emphasis on both the formation of dispositions to know and the role of the mind in theoretical science. Focusing on a comparison of Michael Polanyi and Aristotle, Hoinski and Polansky investigate to what degree Aristotelian thought retains its purchase on reality in the face of the changes wrought by modern science. Polanyi’s approach relies on several Aristotelian assumptions, including the naturalness of the human desire to know, the institutional and personal basis for the accumulation of knowledge, and the endorsement of realism against objectivism. Hoinski and Polansky emphasize the promise of Polanyi’s neo-Aristotelian framework, which argues that science is won through reflection on reality.

Beyond Logical Empiricism

Dialogue ◽  
1971 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
William R. Shea
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Theoretical Language ◽  
Scientific Discourse ◽  
Logical Empiricism ◽  
Logical Positivism ◽  
Thomas Kuhn ◽  
Logical Positivist ◽  
Suitable Alternative ◽  
Logical Empiricist ◽  
Paul Feyerabend

The mainstream of the philosophy of science in the second quarter of this century—the so-called “logical empiricist” or “logical positivist” movement—assumed that theoretical language in science is parasitic upon observation language and can be eliminated from scientific discourse by disinterpretation and formalization, or by explicit definition in or reduction to observational language. But several fashionable views now place the onus on believers in an observation language to show how such a language is meaningful in the absence of a theory.In the present paper, I propose to show why logical positivism failed to do justice to the basic empirical and logical problems of philosophy of science. I also wish to consider why the drastic reaction, typified by Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, fails t o provide a suitable alternative, and to suggest that the radical approaches of recent writers such as Mary Hesse and Dudley Shapere hold out a genuine promise of dealing effectively with the central tasks that face the philosopher of science today.

Education at the Crossroads

2000 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 269-281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allan Janik
Keyword(s):  
Continuing Education ◽  
Tacit Knowledge ◽  
Professional Education ◽  
Professional Knowledge ◽  
Michael Polanyi ◽  
Life Long Learning

Drastic changes in professional education have led to a need to emphasize that education must be a matter of life-long learning. About this there can be no doubt: the question is how should we conceive life-long learning. I argue on the basis of recent research in Sweden that professional knowledge is in its most crucial dimension what Michael Polanyi called ‘tacit knowledge’ and as a result that the humanities are indispensable to any concept of continuing education worth taking seriously.

Reasons of the Heart: A Polanyian Reflection

1978 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-157 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerry H. Gill
Keyword(s):  
Tacit Knowledge ◽  
Main Concern ◽  
Michael Polanyi

Reasoning about religion would seem to involve both explicit and tacit factors. These latter are what Pascal had in mind when he spoke of the ‘reasons of the heart which the reason knows not of’. Moreover, these reasons of the heart are the more interesting by virtue of being at least the more difficult and perhaps the more crucial. In these pages I want to examine the notion of reasons of the heart from the angle provided by the insights of Michael Polanyi. Space will not permit a review of the major features of Polanyi's crucial concept of tacit knowledge.1 I shall simply introduce and explore certain of these features as they seem relevant to the main concern of the paper. I trust this can be done in such a way as to be both meaningful to the reader and fair to Polanyi.

Max Scheler’s Pluralistic Conception of Knowledge

2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (9999) ◽  
pp. 83-94
Author(s):  
Stanisław Czerniak ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Historical Context ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Scientific Communities ◽  
Late Work ◽  
Types Of Knowledge ◽  
Knowledge Types ◽  
The Status ◽  
Philosophy Of Knowledge

This article aims to reconstruct Max Scheler’s conception of three types of knowledge, outlined in his late work Philosophical Perspectives (1928). Scheler distinguished three kinds of knowledge: empirical, used to exercise control over nature, eidetic (essential) and metaphysical. The author reviews the epistemological criteria that underlie this distinction, and its functionalistic assumptions. In the article’s polemic part he accuses Scheler of a) crypto-dualism in his theory of knowledge, which draws insufficient distinctions between metaphysical and eidetic knowledge; b) totally omitting the status of the humanities in his classification of knowledge types; c) consistently developing a philosophy of knowledge without resort to the research tools offered by the philosophy of science, which takes such analyses out of their social and historical context (i.e. how knowledge is created in today’s scientific communities).

scholarly journals Consideraciones sobre una semiología de la ciencia

1985 ◽  
Vol 17 (51) ◽  
pp. 71-96
Author(s):  
Javier Echeverría
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Vienna Circle ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Physical Sciences ◽  
Analytical Philosophy ◽  
Theory Of Science ◽  
Logical Atomism

One of the main deficiencies of the twentieth century philosophy of science, in spite of evident achievements in the logical analysis and reconstruction of scientific theories, is the separation between formal sciences and those sciences with empirical contents. This distinction derives from Carnap and it was generally admitted by the Vienna Circle since the publication of “Formalwissenschaft und Realwissenschaft” in Erkenntnis in 1935. Later philosophy of science, in spite of other criticism of the neopositivist programme, has maintained this separation. It can be claimed that Realwissenschaften, physics in particular, have determined the development of later philosophy of science. Analyses of scientific theories most of the time refer to physical theories, and occasionally to biological ones. There is still a lot to be done in the field of mathematics and logic, in order to analyse and reconstruct their theories. But even if this task is undertaken, and some progress has been done lately, there is still a lot of work to do before a general theory of science can be proposed which transcends such a division between formal and empirical sciences, let alone the human or social sciences. This paper is intended as a contribution to supersede the first dichotomy between formal and physical sciences. One of the main problems in order to make some progress along these lines is that since its origins logical positivism had a deficient theory of knowledge, and the same happened with analytical philosophy developed immediately afterwards. This paper thus criticises examples of such a type of theory of knowledge, as expressed in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, and Russell’s Philosophy of Logical Atomism. The core argument is as follows: these theorizations are inadequate for scientific knowledge; this type of knowledge, particularly the notion of ‘sign’ cannot be adapted to the simple scheme proposed in those works. The criticism here undertaken is developed from a rationalist point of view, in a sense which is closer to Leibniz and Saussure, than to recent philosophers fascinated with the word ‘reason’. Some new proposals are put forward, necessarily provisional, which justify the term, which in turn could be perfectly substituted by another, of Semiology of Science.

The Tacit Dimension

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Tacit Knowledge ◽  
Design Process ◽  
Situated Knowledge ◽  
Michael Polanyi ◽  
Conceptual Structures ◽  
Cultural Design ◽  
The World ◽  
Tacit Dimension ◽  
The Many ◽  
Spatial Imagination

In architecture, tacit knowledge plays a substantial role in both the design process and its reception. The essays in this book explore the tacit dimension of architecture in its aesthetic, material, cultural, design-based, and reflexive understanding of what we build. Tacit knowledge, described in 1966 by Michael Polanyi as what we ‘can know but cannot tell’, often denotes knowledge that escapes quantifiable dimensions of research. Much of architecture’s knowledge resides beneath the surface, in nonverbal instruments such as drawings and models that articulate the spatial imagination of the design process. Awareness of the tacit dimension helps to understand the many facets of the spaces we inhabit, from the ideas of the architect to the more hidden assumptions of our cultures. Beginning in the studio, where students are guided into becoming architects, the book follows a path through the tacit knowledge present in materials, conceptual structures, and the design process, revealing how the tacit dimension leads to craftsmanship and the situated knowledge of architecture-in-the-world.

Tacit Knowing: What it is and Why it Matters

Episteme ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Abida Malik
Keyword(s):  
20Th Century ◽  
Michael Polanyi ◽  
Tacit Knowing

Abstract Tacit knowing as a concept and legitimate topic of scholarship came up in philosophical research in the second half of the 20th century in the form of some influential works by Michael Polanyi (although similar concepts had been discussed before). Systematic epistemological studies on the topic are still scarce, however. In this article, I support the thesis that tacit knowing pervades all our common major divisions of knowledge and that it therefore must not be neglected in epistemological research. By this approach I am simultaneously giving a systematic back-up for Polanyi's claim that the tacit component is found in all knowledge.

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