scholarly journals Restating Copyright Law’s Originality Requirement

2021 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Hughes

In 2015, the American Law Institute (ALI) launched a project to create a Restatement of the Law, Copyright.  Concern, objection, and disagreement about the ALI’s Restatement projects is not new, but the Restatement of Copyright project seems to be particularly controversial among industries dependent on copyright protection.  The drafting group has now worked through several versions of some proposed sections; a handful of these have been approved by the ALI Council and are ready to go before the ALI general membership. So now is a good time for close analysis of the chunks of the projects that have crystallized. This Article reviews the 2020 draft Restatement’s presentation of American copyright law’s threshold requirement for protection: that copyright protects only “original works of authorship,” and how that “originality” requirement should be understood in light of the Supreme Court’s 1991 decision in Feist v. Rural Telephone.  Copyright’s originality requirement is a challenging subject for a Restatement because what is unquestionably agreed is that black letter law is  limited, formulaic, and opaque.  Not surprisingly, the Restatement’s handling of this topic hews close to the words of the Supreme Court’s modern pronouncement on the issue, sometimes to the detriment of a richer, potentially more enlightening discussion. The discussion here is based principally on “Tentative Draft No. 1” of the Restatement, released on April 8, 2020,3 but the discussion will also include consideration of the earlier “Council Drafts”4 that led to the 2020 proposal. Part I of the Article briefly describes the controversial beginnings of this Restatement project—and, as of 2021, the continuing animosity of copyright stakeholders to the project. Part II lays out the 2020 draft Restatement’s core provisions on copyright originality, the modest evolution of these provisions since the 2017 draft, and some concerns with what these sections, Comments, and Reporters’ Notes say. In broad strokes, the draft Restatement’s take on copyright originality is faithful to the Supreme Court’s 1991 Feist v. Rural Telephone decision, perhaps too much so. Part II.A explores the draft Restatement’s presentation of Feist’s “modicum of creativity” requirement, raising some issues both with what the Reporters have said so far and equally with what the draft Restatement seems unwilling to say about minimal creativity.  Part II.B discusses the draft Restatement’s presentation of Feist’s “independent creation” requirement; here the concern is that the draft may conflate independent creation with minimal creativity in a way that does not contribute to coherence in copyright law.

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Lemley

Virtually all the courts to consider non-literal infringement of softwarecopyrights have lined up with the “narrow constructionists,” engaging in“analytic dissection” of computer programs in order to determine whetherany copyrightable expression has actually been copied. Most commonly, thisanalytic dissection has taken the form of the“abstraction-filtration-comparison” test set forth in Computer Associatesv. Altai. While there are still a few courts in which the “total conceptand feel” approach remains the law, the approach is moribund: since Altaiwas decided, no court has endorsed the broader “total concept and feel”approach.Rather than ending, the debate over software copyright law appears to beshifting its focus. Having finally resolved the debate that has beenplaguing software copyright law since its inception, courts are discoveringto their chagrin, that deciding what test to apply actually tells you verylittle about how to apply that test. Despite the convergence of courts onAltai's filtration approach, courts remain fundamentally conflicted indeciding how broadly to protect software copyright. Further, there remainsa good deal of misunderstanding about what exactly it means to “abstract”and “filter” a computer program.I suggest a unified approach to evaluating non-literal infringement insoftware copyright cases. This approach focuses on exactly what is allegedto have been copied. It also acknowledges the increasing role of patent lawin protecting computer software, and the role of other copyright concernssuch as compatibility and fair use. The result of this unified approach isto provide relatively narrow copyright protection for computer programs inmost cases of non-literal infringement.


Author(s):  
Ольга Улітіна

Nowadays the process of cooking is becoming more creative, it acquires certain features of art. Cooking is developing not only at the level of the restaurant business because of the special creative contribution of the chefs, but also in the kitchens of ordinary people who are trying to add diversity to their dishes. Today, food should be not only delicious, butalso aesthetically pleasing. «Instagram dishes», «Instagram plating» are especially popular, because of their attractiveness and unusual look.The article is devoted to the study of the copyright protection of culinary products.The copyright legislation of Ukraine and some foreign countries, which in one or another way can be used for protection of the intellectual property rights to culinary products are analyzed. The article also considers the question of whether culinary products can be recognized as derivative works. It is determined whether the recipe can be protected by copyright and established how the concepts of culinary product and recipe relate.Author states that a culinary product as a category consists of four components: 1) idea (recipe/technological process of production), 2) name, 3) the process of cooking itself, and 4) platting (presentation of the dish). The concept of «recipe» is absent at the legislative level in Ukraine.According to the Ukrainian and foreign scientific sources the recipe can be protected by copyright as a literary work. However, in this case only the form in which the recipe is expressed (fixing in tangible medium of expression) is protected. The idea, the essence of the recipe will not be protected under the copyright protection. Therefore, the protection offered by the copyright law in this case cannot be used to protectthe rights to a culinary product made by the recipe. The finished dish is the final product of the recipe, the result of being fixed in a tangible medium, similar to the architectural projects and buildings in which the projects are «fixed».The author claims that some culinary products can be recognized as a derivative works which relates to the original works of fine art. A specific category of Ukrainian legislation – branded food can be protected by the norms of Ukrainian copyright law.


2021 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric J. Schwartz

As the Ninth Circuit succinctly observed, when deciphering copyright law, “[w]e begin, as always, with the text of the statute.”  An examination of any aspect of copyright law commences with the text of Title 17 of the United States Code (the “statute”), and then turns to case law for adjudications and interpretations of the relevant statutory text, or as the primary source of law in the gaps in the statute.  Everything else is secondary and not, of course, a substitute for the law, whether it is legislative history, Copyright Office (and other government agency) studies, treatises, or other commentary. If copyright law consists predominantly of federal statute, how, if at all, will the American Law Institute (“ALI”) project to prepare a Restatement of the Law of Copyright (the “Restatement”) provide a useful or necessary resource for attorneys and the courts?  In the face of the primacy of the enacted statutory text, why undertake a project to recast and rephrase the law?  What, if any, use might it yield to practitioners and courts, and equally importantly, will consequential harms result? From the inception of the Restatement project, the creative community has collectively viewed the project with skepticism about its necessity and fears about its purpose and biases, and the resultant impact on the livelihoods of creators.  This Response focuses on the practical uses, if any, of the Restatement for attorneys and courts grappling with copyright issues.  The Response also examines, from a practitioner’s point of view, the Restatement’s potential to harm the ecosystem of the copyright creative community, and the likelihood that the harm will outweigh any value the Restatement might bring to clarifying the law.


2021 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Shyamkrishna Balganesh ◽  
Jane C. Ginsburg

It is now six years since the American Law Institute (ALI) began work on its first ever Restatement of an area dominated by a federal statute: copyright law. To say that the Restatement of the Law, Copyright (hereinafter “Restatement”) has been controversial would be a gross understatement. Even in its inception, the ALI identified the project as an outlier, noting that it was likely to be seen as an “odd project” since copyright “is governed by a detailed federal statute.”1 Neither the oddity nor the novelty of the project, however, caused the ALI to slow its efforts to push the project forward, and despite the persistence of serious objections from within the membership of the project (including many of the project’s Advisers), the first draft of the Restatement is scheduled to go to a vote seeking adoption by the organization’s full membership in the middle of 2021.


Author(s):  
William E. Nelson

This volume begins where volumes 2 and 3 ended. The main theme of the four-volume project is that the law of America’s thirteen colonies differed profoundly when they first were founded, but had developed into a common American law by the time of the Revolution. This fourth volume focuses on what was common to the law of Britain’s thirteen North American colonies in the mid-eighteenth century, although it also takes important differences into account. The first five chapters examine procedural and substantive law in colonies and conclude that, except in North Carolina and northern New York, the legal system functioned effectively in the interests both of Great Britain and of colonial localities. The next three chapters examine changes in law and the constitution beginning with the Zenger case in 1735—changes that ultimately culminated in independence. These chapters show how lawyers became leading figures in what gradually became a revolutionary movement. It also shows how lawyers used legal and constitutional ideology in the interests, sometimes of an economic character, of their clients. The book thereby engages prior scholarship, especially that of Bernard Bailyn and John Phillip Reid, to show how ideas and constitutional values possessed independent causal significance in leading up to the Revolution but also served to protect institutional structures and socioeconomic interests that likewise possessed causal significance.


2007 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chaim Saiman

These are heady times in America's law and religion conversation. On the campaign trail in 1999, then-candidate George W. Bush declared Jesus to be his favorite political philosopher. Since his election in 2001, legal commentators have criticized both President Bush and the Supreme Court for improperly basing their decisions on their sectarian Christian convictions. Though we pledge to be one nation under God, a recent characterization of the law and religion discourse sees America as two sub-nations divided by God. Moreover, debate concerning the intersection between law, politics and religion has moved from the law reviews to the New York Times Sunday Magazine, which has published over twenty feature-length articles on these issues since President Bush took office in 2001. Today, more than anytime in the past century, the ideas of an itinerant first-century preacher from Bethlehem are relevant to American law.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Koray Güven

Abstract The recent Cofemel judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union extended the European Union’s (EU) originality criterion (i.e. the author’s own intellectual creation) to the realm of works of applied art. The Court excluded ‘aesthetically significant visual effect’ as a condition of copyright protection. It was condemned as subjective and incompatible with the EU originality criterion. The decision may signal a shift in several national copyright laws, under which requirements relating to ‘aesthetics’ are laid down as a condition to acquire protection. This article will demonstrate that the ‘aesthetics criterion’, as it emerged historically and has been employed in national copyright laws, is associated with a different meaning than it conveys at first glance. The aesthetics criterion designates the elbow room remaining to the author after functional constraints have been taken into account, and thus represents a form of the functionality doctrine in the domain of copyright law. However, to some extent it also excludes – though not uniformly – commonplace designs from the scope of copyright protection. Against this background, this article suggests that the aesthetics criterion can arguably be reconciled with the EU originality criterion. The aesthetics criterion represents a balance struck between the need for copyright protection in the field of applied arts, on the one hand, and competition, on the other. In order not to upset this careful balance, a robust application of the EU originality criterion is advocated, precluding protection not only to functionality, but also to commonplace creations.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-154
Author(s):  
Edi Tuahta Putra Saragih ◽  
Muhammad Citra Ramadhan ◽  
Isnaini Isnaini

This research aimed to: (a) obtain the forms of copyright infringement of songs and/or music (with or without lyrics); (b) understand the role of the police, in this case the Police Precinct, in the law enforcement; (c) identify the factors that influenced the law enforcement. The research method used the normative-empirical legal research, with the initial stages of specifying norms in order to get the proper picture, and then specifying empirical events in order to get the real picture. The research results showed several matters: 1) The forms of copyright infringement of songs and/or music (with or without lyrics) found included: the distribution of the works or the copies, the performances of the works, and the announcements of the works; 2) Police Precinct did notultimately carry out their role as a law enforcer for the copyright infringement of songs and/or music (with or without lyrics); and 3) The factors that influenced the law enforcement on the copyright infringement of songs and/or music (with or without lyrics), namely: legislation factor, in the matter of complaint offenses; law enforcement factor, in terms of the capacity of members; less supportive factor of facilities and infrastructure; legal awareness factor, in the problem of the lack of legal counseling; and cultural factor, related to the differences in norms in the copyright law between those in society and those in regulations. 


2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-46
Author(s):  
Florian Mächtel

In its § 142(1) theAmerican Restatement of the Law of Restitutionprovides that “[t]he right of a person to restitution from another because of a benefit received is terminated or diminished if, after the receipt of the benefit, circumstances have so changed that it would be inequitable to require the other to make full restitution.” The notion that the recipient of an unjustified benefit must in principle return not more than the enrichment that has actually “survived” in his hands, is not only fundamental to the American law of restitution, but can also be found in English and German law.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document