scholarly journals The Past, Present, and Future of the Restatement of Copyright

2021 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Shyamkrishna Balganesh ◽  
Jane C. Ginsburg

It is now six years since the American Law Institute (ALI) began work on its first ever Restatement of an area dominated by a federal statute: copyright law. To say that the Restatement of the Law, Copyright (hereinafter “Restatement”) has been controversial would be a gross understatement. Even in its inception, the ALI identified the project as an outlier, noting that it was likely to be seen as an “odd project” since copyright “is governed by a detailed federal statute.”1 Neither the oddity nor the novelty of the project, however, caused the ALI to slow its efforts to push the project forward, and despite the persistence of serious objections from within the membership of the project (including many of the project’s Advisers), the first draft of the Restatement is scheduled to go to a vote seeking adoption by the organization’s full membership in the middle of 2021.

2021 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric J. Schwartz

As the Ninth Circuit succinctly observed, when deciphering copyright law, “[w]e begin, as always, with the text of the statute.”  An examination of any aspect of copyright law commences with the text of Title 17 of the United States Code (the “statute”), and then turns to case law for adjudications and interpretations of the relevant statutory text, or as the primary source of law in the gaps in the statute.  Everything else is secondary and not, of course, a substitute for the law, whether it is legislative history, Copyright Office (and other government agency) studies, treatises, or other commentary. If copyright law consists predominantly of federal statute, how, if at all, will the American Law Institute (“ALI”) project to prepare a Restatement of the Law of Copyright (the “Restatement”) provide a useful or necessary resource for attorneys and the courts?  In the face of the primacy of the enacted statutory text, why undertake a project to recast and rephrase the law?  What, if any, use might it yield to practitioners and courts, and equally importantly, will consequential harms result? From the inception of the Restatement project, the creative community has collectively viewed the project with skepticism about its necessity and fears about its purpose and biases, and the resultant impact on the livelihoods of creators.  This Response focuses on the practical uses, if any, of the Restatement for attorneys and courts grappling with copyright issues.  The Response also examines, from a practitioner’s point of view, the Restatement’s potential to harm the ecosystem of the copyright creative community, and the likelihood that the harm will outweigh any value the Restatement might bring to clarifying the law.


2021 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Shyamkrishna Balganesh ◽  
Peter S. Menell

For nearly a century, the American Law Institute’s (ALI) Restatements of the Law have played an important role in the American legal system. And in all of this time, they refrained from restating areas of law dominated by a uniform statute despite the proliferation and growing importance of such statutes, especially at the federal level. This omission was deliberate and in recognition of the fundamentally different nature of the judicial role and of lawmaking in areas governed by detailed statutes compared to areas governed by the common law. Then in 2015, without much deliberation, the ALI embarked on the task of restating U.S. copyright law, an area dominated by a detailed federal statute. In so doing, the ALI ignored not just calls to revisit the form and method of its traditional Restatements projects but also the extensive history of the deep mismatch between the Restatements and statutory domains that has informed the working of the enterprise over the course of the last century. This Article explores the analytical and historical foundations of that mismatch and shows how the Restatement of Copyright reinforces the need to tailor a methodological template and perspective that is sensitive to the nature of statutory interpretation. It explains why perfunctory extension of the common law Restatement model to copyright law produces incoherent, misleading, and seemingly biased results that risk undermining the legitimacy of the eventual product. Finally, the Article explains how the mismatch between the two is capable of being remedied by a series of modest—yet significant—changes, which could allow the project to serve as a template for future statutory Restatements. These include: emphasizing the centrality of the statutory text and relevant interpretive sources, adopting crucial perspectival differences between incremental lawmaking and statutory interpretation, and highlighting the unique legislative process through which the statute was developed.


2021 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Hughes

In 2015, the American Law Institute (ALI) launched a project to create a Restatement of the Law, Copyright.  Concern, objection, and disagreement about the ALI’s Restatement projects is not new, but the Restatement of Copyright project seems to be particularly controversial among industries dependent on copyright protection.  The drafting group has now worked through several versions of some proposed sections; a handful of these have been approved by the ALI Council and are ready to go before the ALI general membership. So now is a good time for close analysis of the chunks of the projects that have crystallized. This Article reviews the 2020 draft Restatement’s presentation of American copyright law’s threshold requirement for protection: that copyright protects only “original works of authorship,” and how that “originality” requirement should be understood in light of the Supreme Court’s 1991 decision in Feist v. Rural Telephone.  Copyright’s originality requirement is a challenging subject for a Restatement because what is unquestionably agreed is that black letter law is  limited, formulaic, and opaque.  Not surprisingly, the Restatement’s handling of this topic hews close to the words of the Supreme Court’s modern pronouncement on the issue, sometimes to the detriment of a richer, potentially more enlightening discussion. The discussion here is based principally on “Tentative Draft No. 1” of the Restatement, released on April 8, 2020,3 but the discussion will also include consideration of the earlier “Council Drafts”4 that led to the 2020 proposal. Part I of the Article briefly describes the controversial beginnings of this Restatement project—and, as of 2021, the continuing animosity of copyright stakeholders to the project. Part II lays out the 2020 draft Restatement’s core provisions on copyright originality, the modest evolution of these provisions since the 2017 draft, and some concerns with what these sections, Comments, and Reporters’ Notes say. In broad strokes, the draft Restatement’s take on copyright originality is faithful to the Supreme Court’s 1991 Feist v. Rural Telephone decision, perhaps too much so. Part II.A explores the draft Restatement’s presentation of Feist’s “modicum of creativity” requirement, raising some issues both with what the Reporters have said so far and equally with what the draft Restatement seems unwilling to say about minimal creativity.  Part II.B discusses the draft Restatement’s presentation of Feist’s “independent creation” requirement; here the concern is that the draft may conflate independent creation with minimal creativity in a way that does not contribute to coherence in copyright law.


2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 449-479
Author(s):  
Sridevi Thambapillay

The Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 (LRA) which was passed in 1976 and came into force on 1st March 1982, standardized the laws concerning non-Muslim family matters. Many family issues concerning non-Muslim have emerged ever since, the most important being the effects of unilateral conversion to Islam by one of the parties to the marriage. There has been a lot of public hue and cry for amendments to be made to the LRA. After much deliberation, the Malaysian Parliament finally passed the amendments to the LRA in October 2017, which came into force in December 2018. Although the amendments have addressed selected family law issues, the most important amendment on child custody in a unilateral conversion to Islam was dropped from the Bill at the last minute. Howsoever, at the end of the day, the real question that needs to be addressed is whether the amendments have resolved the major issues that have arisen over the past four decades? Hence, the purpose of this article is as follows: first, to examine the brief background to the passing of the LRA, secondly, to analyse the 2017 amendments, thirdly, to identify the weaknesses that still exist in the LRA, and finally, to suggest recommendations to overcome these weaknesses by comparing the Malaysian position with the Singaporean position. In conclusion, it is submitted that despite the recent amendments to the LRA, much needs to be done to overcome all the remaining issues that have still not been addressed.


Author(s):  
William E. Nelson

This volume begins where volumes 2 and 3 ended. The main theme of the four-volume project is that the law of America’s thirteen colonies differed profoundly when they first were founded, but had developed into a common American law by the time of the Revolution. This fourth volume focuses on what was common to the law of Britain’s thirteen North American colonies in the mid-eighteenth century, although it also takes important differences into account. The first five chapters examine procedural and substantive law in colonies and conclude that, except in North Carolina and northern New York, the legal system functioned effectively in the interests both of Great Britain and of colonial localities. The next three chapters examine changes in law and the constitution beginning with the Zenger case in 1735—changes that ultimately culminated in independence. These chapters show how lawyers became leading figures in what gradually became a revolutionary movement. It also shows how lawyers used legal and constitutional ideology in the interests, sometimes of an economic character, of their clients. The book thereby engages prior scholarship, especially that of Bernard Bailyn and John Phillip Reid, to show how ideas and constitutional values possessed independent causal significance in leading up to the Revolution but also served to protect institutional structures and socioeconomic interests that likewise possessed causal significance.


Author(s):  
Marie-Sophie de Clippele

AbstractCultural heritage can offer tangible and intangible traces of the past. A past that shapes cultural identity, but also a past from which one sometimes wishes to detach oneself and which nevertheless needs to be remembered, even commemorated. These themes of memory, history and oblivion are examined by the philosopher Paul Ricoeur in his work La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli (2000). Inspired by these ideas, this paper analyses how they are closely linked to cultural heritage. Heritage serves as a support for memory, even if it can be mishandled, which in turn can affect heritage policies. Memory and heritage can be abused as a result of wounds from the past or for reasons of ideological manipulation or because of a political will to force people to remember. Furthermore, heritage, as a vehicule of memory, contributes to historical knowledge, but can remain marked by a certain form of subjectivism during the heritage and conservation operation, for which heritage professionals (representatives of the public authority or other experts) are responsible. Yet, the responsibility for conserving cultural heritage also implies the need to avoid any loss of heritage, and to fight against oblivion. Nonetheless, this struggle cannot become totalitarian, nor can it deprive the community of a sometimes salutary oblivion to its own identity construction. These theoretical and philosophical concepts shall be examined in the light of legal discourse, and in particular in Belgian legislation regarding cultural heritage. It is clear that the shift from monument to heritage broadens the legal scope and consequently raises the question of who gets to decide what is considered heritage according to the law, and whether there is something such as a collective human right to cultural heritage. Nonetheless, this broadening of the legislation extends the State intervention into cultural heritage, which in turn entails certain risks, as will be analysed with Belgium’s colonial heritage.


Popular Music ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ubonrat Siriyuvasak

Since Thailand's Copyright Act became law in 1979 an indigenous music industry has emerged. In the past, the small recording business was concentrated on two aspects: the sale of imported records and the manufacture of popular, mainly Lukkroong music, and classical records. However, the organisation of the Association of Music Traders – an immediate reaction to the enforcement of the Copyright law – coupled with the advent of cassette technology, has transformed the faltering gramophone trade. Today, middle-class youngsters appreciate Thai popular music in contrast to the previous generation who grew up with western pop and rock. Young people in the countryside have begun to acquire a taste for the same music as well as enjoy a wider range of Pleng Luktoong, the country music with which they identify. How did this change which has resulted in the creation of a new pleasure industry come about? And what are some of the consequences of this transformation.


2007 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chaim Saiman

These are heady times in America's law and religion conversation. On the campaign trail in 1999, then-candidate George W. Bush declared Jesus to be his favorite political philosopher. Since his election in 2001, legal commentators have criticized both President Bush and the Supreme Court for improperly basing their decisions on their sectarian Christian convictions. Though we pledge to be one nation under God, a recent characterization of the law and religion discourse sees America as two sub-nations divided by God. Moreover, debate concerning the intersection between law, politics and religion has moved from the law reviews to the New York Times Sunday Magazine, which has published over twenty feature-length articles on these issues since President Bush took office in 2001. Today, more than anytime in the past century, the ideas of an itinerant first-century preacher from Bethlehem are relevant to American law.


1992 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas H. Scheike

We construct a risk process, where the law of the next jump time or jump size can depend on the past through earlier jump times and jump sizes. Some distributional properties of this process are established. The compensator is found and some martingale properties are discussed.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-154
Author(s):  
Edi Tuahta Putra Saragih ◽  
Muhammad Citra Ramadhan ◽  
Isnaini Isnaini

This research aimed to: (a) obtain the forms of copyright infringement of songs and/or music (with or without lyrics); (b) understand the role of the police, in this case the Police Precinct, in the law enforcement; (c) identify the factors that influenced the law enforcement. The research method used the normative-empirical legal research, with the initial stages of specifying norms in order to get the proper picture, and then specifying empirical events in order to get the real picture. The research results showed several matters: 1) The forms of copyright infringement of songs and/or music (with or without lyrics) found included: the distribution of the works or the copies, the performances of the works, and the announcements of the works; 2) Police Precinct did notultimately carry out their role as a law enforcer for the copyright infringement of songs and/or music (with or without lyrics); and 3) The factors that influenced the law enforcement on the copyright infringement of songs and/or music (with or without lyrics), namely: legislation factor, in the matter of complaint offenses; law enforcement factor, in terms of the capacity of members; less supportive factor of facilities and infrastructure; legal awareness factor, in the problem of the lack of legal counseling; and cultural factor, related to the differences in norms in the copyright law between those in society and those in regulations. 


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