To Perform the Layered Body

Janus Head ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 349-383
Author(s):  
Helena De Preester ◽  

The aim of this article is to focus on the body as instrument or means in performance-art. Since the body is no monolithic given, the body is approached in terms of its constitutive layers, and this may enable us to conceive of the mechanisms that make performances possible and operational, i.e. those bodily mechanisms that are implicitly or explicitly controlled or manipulated in performance. Of course, the exploitation of these bodily layers is not solely responsible for the generation of meaning in performance. Yet, it is that what fundamentally /enables/ the generation of sense and signification in performance-art. To approach the body in terms of its layers, from body image and body schema to in-depth body, may partly answer the complexity at work in art performances, since these concepts enable us to consider, on a theoretical level, the body as represented object, as subject, as motor means for being-in-the-world, as origin of subjectivity and emotions, as hidden but most intimate place of impersonal life processes, as possibly distant image, as sensitive, fragile and plastic entity, as something we own and are owned by, as our most personal and yet extremely strange body.

2021 ◽  
pp. 33-51
Author(s):  
Jan Halák

This chapter presents an account of Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of the body schema as an operative intentionality that is not only opposed to, but also complexly intermingled with, the representation-like grasp of the world and one’s own body, or the body image. The chapter reconstructs Merleau-Ponty’s position primarily based on his preparatory notes for his 1953 lecture ‘The Sensible World and the World of Expression’. Here, Merleau-Ponty elaborates his earlier efforts to show that the body schema is a perceptual ground against which the perceived world stands out as a complex of perceptual figures. The chapter clarifies how Merleau-Ponty’s renewed interpretation of the figure-ground structure makes it possible for him to describe the relationship between body schema and perceptual (body) image as a strictly systematic phenomenon. Subsequently, the chapter shows how Merleau-Ponty understands apraxia, sleep, and perceptual orientation as examples of dedifferentiation and subtler differentiation of the body-schematic system. The last section clarifies how such body-schematic differentiating processes give rise to relatively independent superstructures of vision and symbolic cognition which constitute our body image. It, moreover, explains how, according to Merleau-Ponty, the cognitive superstructures always need to be supported by praxic operative intentionality to maintain their full sense, even though, in some cases, they have the power to compensate for praxic deficiencies.


2021 ◽  
pp. 18-32
Author(s):  
David Morris

This chapter contributes to conceptual debates about the body schema and body image by studying the body schema’s role in shaping our sense of lived space. Contra ‘body-in-brain’ or representational views of the body schema as a centralized controller, the chapter supports ‘body-in-world’ views by showing how the body schema is itself of space, founded and actualized in schematizing movements of a body in the world. This suggests that capacities for, and divergences between, a body schema versus a body image emerge when body-schematizing activity runs into resistances or demands from environmental supports, including other perceiving bodies and the social sphere, over various timescales, e.g., of evolution, development, skill, and habit acquisition, as well as cultural formations. The chapter draws on phenomenological and psychological results concerning our sense of space in cases of directly touching and moving with things, but also in cases where movements coupled with surroundings through light (via our eyes or technological devices) yield a sense of distal things. These are complemented by conceptual insights from recent evolutionary-comparative approaches to the philosophy of mind and body, which give a new perspective on just where movement control arises in bodies.


Perception ◽  
10.1068/p5853 ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 36 (10) ◽  
pp. 1547-1554 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Pavani ◽  
Massimiliano Zampini

When a hand (either real or fake) is stimulated in synchrony with our own hand concealed from view, the felt position of our own hand can be biased toward the location of the seen hand. This intriguing phenomenon relies on the brain's ability to detect statistical correlations in the multisensory inputs (ie visual, tactile, and proprioceptive), but it is also modulated by the pre-existing representation of one's own body. Nonetheless, researchers appear to have accepted the assumption that the size of the seen hand does not matter for this illusion to occur. Here we used a real-time video image of the participant's own hand to elicit the illusion, but we varied the hand size in the video image so that the seen hand was either reduced, veridical, or enlarged in comparison to the participant's own hand. The results showed that visible-hand size modulated the illusion, which was present for veridical and enlarged images of the hand, but absent when the visible hand was reduced. These findings indicate that very specific aspects of our own body image (ie hand size) can constrain the multisensory modulation of the body schema highlighted by the fake-hand illusion paradigm. In addition, they suggest an asymmetric tendency to acknowledge enlarged (but not reduced) images of body parts within our body representation.


Body schema refers to the system of sensory-motor functions that enables control of the position of body parts in space, without conscious awareness of those parts. Body image refers to a conscious representation of the way the body appears—a set of conscious perceptions, affective attitudes, and beliefs pertaining to one’s own bodily image. In 2005, Shaun Gallagher published an influential book entitled ‘How the Body Shapes the Mind’. This book not only defined both body schema (BS) and body image (BI), but also explored the complicated relationship between the two. The book also established the idea that there is a double dissociation, whereby body schema and body image refer to two different, but closely related, systems. Given that many kinds of pathological cases can be described in terms of body schema and body image (phantom limbs, asomatognosia, apraxia, schizophrenia, anorexia, depersonalization, and body dysmorphic disorder, among others), we might expect to find a growing consensus about these concepts and the relevant neural activities connected to these systems. Instead, an examination of the scientific literature reveals continued ambiguity and disagreement. This volume brings together leading experts from the fields of philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, and psychiatry in a lively and productive dialogue. It explores fundamental questions about the relationship between body schema and body image, and addresses ongoing debates about the role of the brain and the role of social and cultural factors in our understanding of embodiment.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1356336X2110562
Author(s):  
Gustavo González-Calvo ◽  
Vanesa Gallego-Lema ◽  
Göran Gerdin ◽  
Daniel Bores-García

Visual culture affects the way people understand the world and themselves, contributing to the creation of certain roles and stereotypes, some of which are related to body image. This study focused on interrogating future physical education teachers’ beliefs about the body and physical activity to understand the construction of bodily subjectivities and their perceptions of how these are influenced by visual (physical) culture. Data were collected through the use of visual methods consisting of photo-elicitation and individual interviews with 23 students from a Primary Education Degree with a specialization in physical education at a Spanish university. Data were analyzed using thematic content analysis. The results of the study show that these future physical education teachers are aware of both the great influence of gender stereotypes and the values of consumerism in the field of physical activity stemming largely from the media, which inevitably will shape their future professional practice. However, the results also highlight how these future physical education teachers consider and position the subject of physical education as an important space where they could help students problematize and challenge these beliefs. We suggest that a focus on visual (physical) literacy is needed for future physical education teachers (and their students) to understand the world from a socially critical perspective and transform it in the interest of equity and social justice.


2021 ◽  
pp. 229-243
Author(s):  
Jonathan Cole

In neurological illnesses, the body may present itself to perception in ways which allows insights into the concepts of body image and body schema. Three such conditions are explored. From those who live with spinal cord injury, paralysed and insentient from the neck down, aspects of the importance of the body in one’s sense of self are revealed. Some also describe a coming to terms with their altered bodies. When considering the body image, its adaptability and this reconciliation to a new normal should be considered. Studies on acquired severe sensory loss explore how conscious control, at the body image level, may partially replace the deafferented body schema. There is little evidence, however, for these subjects extending access to previously non-conscious motor schema. Lastly, some narratives from those with congenital absence of movement of facial muscles describe reduced emotional experience and felt embodiment as children. These can be developed as young adults, through shared social interactions. The importance of the social in elaboration of the body image is further implicit in a consideration of the stigma associated with facial disfigurement. Others’ responses to one’s body are crucial in developing our body image and sense of self.


Author(s):  
Mirella Misi ◽  
Ludmila Pimental

Based on the studies of Don Ihde on the “embodiment relations” between the body and technological artifacts, Gretchen Schiller’s concept of “kinesfield,” and revisiting Merleau-Ponty’s (1945) concepts of “body schema” and “flesh of the world,” this chapter examines the forms of relation that are established in the bodily experience of mediadance, promoting new sensorial and perceptive experiences for dancers and for the public/participant/user, such as innovative forms of body re-presentations and new ways for the public to experience dance. Examples include intermedia performances that allow the performer to make changes to sound and light on the stage or in videos that, through cameras and software, translates movements into sound, light, or graphical patterns. Interactive user-computer software, like Wii and the Sony motion controller, allow the capture (by video) of the movement of the user transmitting it to a virtual body and environment. And dance telematics creates virtual encounters between remote dancers.


CNS Spectrums ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 11 (6) ◽  
pp. 419-422 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan J. Stein ◽  
Paul D. Carey ◽  
James Warwick

ABSTRACTBody dysmorphic disorder (BDD) is characterized by preoccupation with a defect in appearance. Concepts of beauty play a particularly crucial role in humans' mental and social life, and may have specific psychobiologic and evolutionary underpinnings. In particular, there is a growing literature on the neurocircuitry underpinning the body schema, body image and facial expression processing, and aesthetic and symmetry judgments. Speculatively, disruptions in cognitive-affective processes relevant to judgments about physical beauty lead to BDD.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aubrieann Schettler ◽  
Ian Holstead ◽  
John Turri ◽  
Michael Barnett-Cowan

AbstractWe assessed how self-motion affects the visual representation of the self. We constructed a novel virtual reality experiment that systematically varied an avatar’s motion and also biological sex. Participants were presented with pairs of avatars that visually represented the participant (“self avatar”), or another person (“opposite avatar”). Avatar motion either corresponded with the participant’s motion, or was decoupled from the participant’s motion. The results show that participants identified with i) “self avatars” over “opposite avatars”, ii) avatars moving congruently with self-motion over incongruent motion, and importantly iii) identification with the “opposite avatar” over the “self avatar” when the opposite avatar’s motion was congruent with self-motion. Our results suggest that both self-motion and biological sex are relevant to the body schema and body image and that congruent bottom-up visual feedback of self-motion is particularly important for the sense of self and capable of overriding top-down self-identification factors such as biological sex.


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