The Semiotic and Hermeneutic Aspects of Translation

2018 ◽  
pp. 101-117
Author(s):  
Lothar Černý

Translation Studies needs a foundation beyond linguistics. Semiotics and hermeneutics provide insights into the mental processes of translation. This article analyses the possibilities of a bridge between hermeneutics and semiotics in the writings of Peirce and Schleiermacher. For both offer meta-cognitive insights into how the mind deals with difference. Schleiermacher’s lastly claims that language is the reason why a final certainty of knowledge is not possible. Peirce’s view of the sign function at first betrays a hermeneutic deficit, which he appears to overcome by pointing to the “dynamical object” of the sign, providing space for further interpretants. His ontological categories, especially the predicates of thirdness, point to a hermeneutic level of semiosis. However, a basic difference between Peirce’s semiotic theory and Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics remains. Peirce attempts to construct an objective model of signification, while hermeneutics focuses on the interpreting activity towards a given text-sign.

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 50
Author(s):  
Gholam-Reza Parvizi

The question of image in literary studies and in recent years in Translation Studies is one of the most problematic innature. In the present study an attempt was made to define the nature of translating linguistic constructions – evokingimages in the mind of reader – in English novels and their rendered versions in Persian translations. In this studyseven types of images (visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, kinesthetic and organic) in two English novelsand their rendered versions in Persian were analyzed based on two theoretical frameworks, the first one is Jiang’sImage-Based Model to Literary Translation (2008) by which the nature of translation of images were examined andthe other is Chesterman’s translation strategies (1997) which help to systematize translation strategies adopted bytranslators in rewriting the images in English novels. The results have shown that in most of the cases the images thatare intended by original author have been changed in the translations, and the aesthetic experience of the ST reader isdifferent from that of the TT reader.


Author(s):  
Frank Jackson

We know that the brain is intimately connected with mental activity. Indeed, doctors now define death in terms of the cessation of the relevant brain activity. The identity theory of mind holds that the intimate connection is identity: the mind is the brain, or, more precisely, mental states are states of the brain. The theory goes directly against a long tradition according to which mental and material belong to quite distinct ontological categories – the mental being essentially conscious, the material essentially unconscious. This tradition has been bedevilled by the problem of how essentially immaterial states could be caused by the material world, as would happen when we see a tree, and how they could cause material states, as would happen when we decide to make an omelette. A great merit of the identity theory is that it avoids this problem: interaction between mental and material becomes simply interaction between one subset of material states, namely certain states of a sophisticated central nervous system, and other material states. The theory also brings the mind within the scope of modern science. More and more phenomena are turning out to be explicable in the physical terms of modern science: phenomena once explained in terms of spells, possession by devils, Thor’s thunderbolts, and so on, are now explained in more mundane, physical terms. If the identity theory is right, the same goes for the mind. Neuroscience will in time reveal the secrets of the mind in the same general way that the theory of electricity reveals the secrets of lightning. This possibility has received enormous support from advances in computing. We now have at least the glimmerings of an idea of how a purely material or physical system could do some of the things minds can do. Nevertheless, there are many questions to be asked of the identity theory. How could states that seem so different turn out to be one and the same? Would neurophysiologists actually see my thoughts and feelings if they looked at my brain? When we report on our mental states what are we reporting on – our brains?


1993 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 100-103
Author(s):  
Bankole Akindeinde Johnson

“I am superior in many ways but would gladly give it up to be human.”Lieutenant-Commander Data – on android and serving officer on the Starship Enterprise Circa the 25th century at Encounter Farpoint. (See Fig. 1).Striking advances in artificial intelligence (AI) have brought to life philosophical debates about the concept of the mind, and of consciousness. Strong advocates of AI suggest the symbiosis of man and computers is the next step in our evolution, and to control this process, we need to address the “Big Question”: what is the meaning of life, and specifically, what are we? Understanding what we are is of great interest to us all; for psychiatrists, philosophers, and psychologists it is their life's work. In this paper, I shall introduce some of the main ideas about AI under the following headings. Can computers have a mind, improve our understanding of, or be integrated with our mental processes?


Author(s):  
Erly S. Parungao Callueng ◽  
Jennie V. Jocson

This paper presents an analysis of Isolde Amante’s Eve, a 21st century Philippine fiction to reveal a contemporary worldview of motherhood. Despite the success of feminist movements in society, motherhood remains fraught with romantic ideals that stem from the essentialist notions of gender and sex. This results in ‘othering’--oppressing and alienating women in the 21st century. The paper argued that the entire notion of motherhood has entered a postmodern framing—one that challenges traditional notions of motherhood and mothering. To characterize this worldview, the paper used the theories of cognitive stylistics, such as conceptual metaphor theory, to describe the mind style of the text’s focalizer, the narrator in Eve. This theory granted access to the intricate mental processes which helped explain why a character behaves a certain why, what dispositions s/he hold in life, as well as what motivations form his/her thoughts, language and action. Further, the mind style is drawn from the communicative force that make up the ‘maternal discourse’ in the text, using Searle’s Speech Act theory. The result is an unorthodox but liberating view of motherhood and mothering. The study argues the need to mainstream mind style analysis in 21st century fiction literary analysis to discover evolving and liberating ideals related to the constructions of gender, and in particular, motherhood.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Morris

Much of high-level cognition appears inaccessible to consciousness. Countless studies have revealed mental processes -- like those underlying our choices, beliefs, judgments, intuitions, etc. -- which people do not notice or report, and these findings have had a widespread influence on the theory and application of psychological science. However, the interpretation of these findings is uncertain. Making an analogy to perceptual consciousness research, I argue that much of the unconsciousness of high-level cognition is plausibly due to internal inattentional blindness: missing an otherwise consciously-accessible internal event because your attention was elsewhere. In other words, rather than being structurally unconscious, many higher mental processes might instead be "preconscious", and would become conscious if a person attended to them. I synthesize existing indirect evidence for this claim, argue that it is a foundational and largely untested assumption in many applied interventions (such as therapy and mindfulness practices), and suggest that, with careful experimentation, it could form the basis for a long-sought-after science of introspection training.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-211
Author(s):  
Fida Pangesti ◽  
Arti Prihatini

Tip of the tongue (ToT) is experienced by BIPA students when speaking Indonesian due to delayed lexical access. This study aims to describe two focuses, namely: (1) the characteristics of the target vocabulary and the ToT vocabulary and (2) the mental processes when the ToT occurs. The theory used in this research is lexical retrieval in morphosemantics. This research method is descriptive qualitative. Data collection was carried out by observation and interview techniques during the learning process of BIPA Muhammadiyah Malang University. The results showed that ToT occurred in nouns (42%), verbs (24%), adjectives (21%), conjunctions (8%), and numeralia (5%). Tip of the tongue is accompanied by a lot of silence as a fallacy effect that appears in the speech. Gestur becomes a description of the meaning features of the target vocabulary. The mental process of ToT occurs in several events, namely (1) the speaker has a picture of the object in his mind, (2) the activation of the semantic set when the active vocabulary has a relation with the meaning of the target vocabulary, (3) activation of the meaning field when the speaker describes it, (4) activation of the phonological set when the similar sound vocabulary appears in the mind, and (5) the appearance of the first language and / or intermediate language.


1912 ◽  
Vol 58 (242) ◽  
pp. 465-475 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivy Mackenzie

In bringing forward some evidence which would point to the biological course followed by some forms of nervous disease to be considered, I would first of all accept as a working hypothesis two generalisations which apply to all forms of disease. The first of these generalisations is that there is essentially no difference in kind between a physiological and a pathological process. The distinction is an arbitrary one; the course of disease is distinguished from that of health only in so far as it tends to compromise the continuation of a more or less perfect adaptation between the organism and its surroundings. There is no tendency in Nature either to kill or to cure; she is absolutely impartial as to the result of a conflict between organisms and a host; and it is a matter of complete indifference to her as to whether toxins are eliminated or not. In the same way diseases of the mind are the manifestation of a perfectly natural relation of the organism, such as it is, to the environment. If the mental processes are abnormal, it goes without saying that the brain must be acting abnormally whether the stimuli to abnormal action originate in the brain itself or in some other part of the body. For example, if a child with pneumonia be suffering from delirium and hallucinations, as is not infrequently the case, this must be considered a perfectly natural outcome of the relation of the brain to its environmental stimuli outside and inside the organism. The actual stimuli may originate in the intestine from masses of undigested food and the stimuli may play on the brain rendered hypersensitive by the toxins from the lungs; the process and its manifestations, as well as the final outcome, are matters in which nature plays an impartial part. It cannot be admitted that there is any form of nervous disease which does not come under this generalisation. It has been argued by some authorities that because insidious forms of insanity are marked only by the slightest variation from the normal course of mental life, and that because the mental abnormalities are only modifications, and often easily explainable modifications, of normal mental processes, that the so-called insanity originates in these processes, and not in the material substratum of the organism. The fallacy of such an interpretation is obvious; it is tantamount to saying that slight albuminuria is the cause underlying early disease of the kidneys, or that a slight ódema may have something to do with the origin of circulatory disease. It is only natural that in the milder forms of mental disease the abnormal manifestations of brain activity should resemble normal mental processes; and even in the most advanced forms of mental disease there must be a close resemblance between abnormal ideation and conduct and perfectly normal ideation and behaviour. Even in advanced cases of Bright's disease the urinary elimination is more normal than abnormal; the abnormal constituents do not differ so much in kind as in degree from those of urine from healthy kidneys. It is not to be expected that in kidney disease bile or some other substance foreign to the organ would be the chief constituent of the eliminated fluid. The signs of insanity in any given case are the natural products of normal brain action mingled with the products of abnormal action. This does not, of course, preclude the possibility that under certain circumstances these abnormal products, such as delusions, hallucinations and perverted conduct, may not themselves be the direct stimuli to further abnormalities. The suicidal character of pathological processes is well seen in other organs of the body. A diseased heart, for example, is its own worst enemy; it not only fails to supply sufficient nutrition to the rest of the organism, but it starves itself by its inability to contract and expand properly, thereby increasing its own weakness. In the same way, certain phenomena of abnormal brain processes are in all probability due to the recoil on the brain of its own abnormal products in the matter of ideation and conduct.


Author(s):  
Pascual F. Martínez-Freire

The mind is a collection of various classes of processes that can be studied empirically. To limit the field of mental processes we must follow the criteria of folk psychology. There are three kinds of mind: human, animal and mechanical. But the human mind is the paradigm or model of mind. The existence of mechanical minds is a serious challenge to the materialism or the mind-brain identity theory. Based on this existence we can put forward the antimaterialist argument of machines. Intelligence is a class of mental processes such that the mind is the genus and the intelligence is a species of this genus. The capacity to solve problems is a clear and definite criterion of intelligence. Again, like in the mind, the human intelligence is the paradigm of the intelligence. There are also three kinds of intelligence: human, animal and mechanical. Searle’s Chinese room argument is misleading because Searle believes that it is possible to maintain a sharp distinction between syntax and semantics. The reasonable dualism in the brain-mind problem defends the existence of brain-mental processes, physical-mental processes, and nonphysical-mental (spiritual) processes. Constitution of the personal project of life, self-consciousness and free volitions are examples of spiritual processes. Usually the intelligence has been considered the most important quality of human beings, but freedom, or the world of free volitions, is a more specific quality of human beings.


1881 ◽  
Vol 27 (118) ◽  
pp. 166-177
Author(s):  
Charles Mercier

When the doctrine of Insanity emerged from its primitive condition of a belief in demoniacal possession, a belief highly spiritualistic in form, and highly materialistic in fact, it became re-moulded in the current forms of thought, and assumed a shape much like that which now obtains among the uninstructed. The concept of mind having attained to but a low degree of differentiation, and the boundaries between mental and material processes being but vaguely defined, alienism in its early stages could not but reflect the imperfections of the knowledge upon which it was compelled to rest. The alienist, observing that his own actions were preceded or accompanied by mental processes, that the more pronounced his actions the more vivid the feeling which accompanied them, that from each action he could trace backward the line of thought which prompted it; and being generally impressed with the close interconnection between his mental states and his conduct; looked at them as in the relation of cause and effect, and shared the then prevailing doctrine that the Mind, by means of that portion or faculty called the Will, directly produced the bodily actions, much as the force stored in the mainspring of a watch produces the movements of the hands.


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