scholarly journals Delimitación de la protección civil del derecho al honor, a la intimidad y a la propia imagen

Author(s):  
Sonia Calaza López

El proceso civil de tutela del derecho al honor, a la intimidad y a la imagen encuentra su fundamento en la protección de estos derechos fundamentales de naturaleza sustantiva garantizados en el artículo 18 de la Constitución Española (CE) y regulados por la LO 1/1982, de 5 de mayo, de protección civil del derecho al honor, a la intimidad personal y familiar y a la propia imagen (LOPH). Ahora bien, esta LOPH no acomete distinción alguna entre cada uno de estos derechos, de dónde podría inferirse que la tutela del derecho al honor comporta, al propio tiempo, la de la intimidad y la propia imagen. La realidad histórica nos muestra múltiples casos en los que, en efecto, se produce, en unidad o sucesión de actos, una quiebra conjunta de los tres derechos fundamentales mencionados, pero ello no resulta óbice para reconocer que, en otras ocasiones, la lesión del derecho individual o concretamente vulnerado incide, de manera directa y exclusiva, en el honor, en la intimidad o en la imagen, sin interferencia o, si se prefiere, injerencia recíproca alguna. En este estudio tratamos de acometer, sin ánimo exhaustivo, un estudio sobre cual sea el bien o interés jurídico específicamente protegido por cada uno de estos derechos.The civil process of guardianship of the right to the honor, to the intimacy and to the image finds his foundation in the protection of these fundamental rights of substantive nature guaranteed in the article 18 of the Spanish Constitution (CE) and regulated by her 1/1982, of May 5, of civil protection of the right to the honor, to the personal and familiar intimacy and to the own image (LOPH). Now then, this LOPH does not attack any distinction between each of these rights, wherefrom there might be inferred that the guardianship of the right to the honor endures, to the own time, that of the intimacy and the own image. The historical reality shows us multiple cases in which, in effect, it takes place, in unit or succession of acts, a bankruptcy combines of three fundamental mentioned rights, but it does not turn out to be an obstacle to recognize that, in other occasions, the injury of the individual right or concretely damaged it affects, in a direct and exclusive way, in the honor, in the intimacy or in the image, without interference or, if it is preferred, reciprocal some interference. In this study we try to attack, without exhaustive spirit, a study on which it is the good or juridical interest specifically protected by each of these rights.


Author(s):  
David Enrique Pérez González ◽  

Article 10 of the Spanish Constitution of 1978 recognizes the dignity of the individual, the inviolable rights inherent in it, the free development of personality, respect for the law and the rights of others as the basis of political order and social peace. The rules relating to fundamental rights and freedoms recognized by the Constitution shall be interpreted in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the international treaties and agreements on the same subjects ratified by Spain. Hence, this value of dignity serves as a basis in its analysis for framing a dignified death. On this premise, several doubts are raised regarding the combination of several of the precepts of the Magna Carta, which, in their application to the field of health, can generate discrepancies. We refer, on the one hand, to Article 15, which calls for the proclamation of both the right to life and the right not to be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment. And on the other hand, we see that this same article 15 confronts the precepts that the Constitution dedicates to the right to personal freedom in its various variants.



2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 72-82
Author(s):  
Jorge Castellanos Claramunt ◽  
María Dolores Montero Caro

Artificial Intelligence has an undeniable effect on today’s society, so its study regarding its legal effects becomes necessary. And consequently, how fundamental rights are affected is of particular importance. Hence, the present paper studies the influence of algorithms in determining judicial decisions, especially from the point of view of how this issue would affect the right to effective judicial protection, recognized as a fundamental right in article 24 of the Spanish Constitution.



2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. del Carmen Llasat ◽  
F. Siccardi

Abstract. The right of a person to be protected from natural hazards is a characteristic of the social and economical development of the society. This paper is a contribution to the reflection about the role of Civil Protection organizations in a modern society. The paper is based in the inaugural conference made by the authors on the 9th Plinius Conference on Mediterranean Storms. Two major issues are considered. The first one is sociological; the Civil Protection organizations and the responsible administration of the land use planning should be perceived as reliable as possible, in order to get consensus on the restrictions they pose, temporary or definitely, on the individual free use of the territory as well as in the entire warning system. The second one is technological: in order to be reliable they have to issue timely alert and warning to the population at large, but such alarms should be as "true" as possible. With this aim, the paper summarizes the historical evolution of the risk assessment, starting from the original concept of "hazard", introducing the concepts of "scenario of event" and "scenario of risk" and ending with a discussion about the uncertainties and limits of the most advanced and efficient tools to predict, to forecast and to observe the ground effects affecting people and their properties. The discussion is centred in the case of heavy rains and flood events in the North-West of Mediterranean Region.



Author(s):  
Hillary Briffa ◽  
Alessandra Baldacchino

Abstract This chapter assesses the social protection policies enacted by the Maltese government to support Maltese citizens living abroad. First, the current status of the Maltese diaspora and their engagement with the homeland is contextualized, and key infrastructure and policies outlined. In the Maltese legal system, there is no domestic law granting the right to consular or diplomatic protection, however this is offered as a matter of practice based on respect for the fundamental rights of the individual. The strength of historic ties with the destination countries of Maltese emigrants is mainly reflected in the number of Reciprocal Agreements signed between Malta and partner countries. An overview of these formal treaties and their assured benefits is provided. Thereafter, five areas of concern for the social security needs of Maltese diaspora are addressed: unemployment, healthcare, pensions, family-related benefits, and economic hardship. The chapter concludes by acknowledging the communication initiatives between the Maltese government and its citizens abroad; however, it recognises that there is still a long way to go in terms of ensuring democratic participation of citizens in elections. Throughout, the evidence has been compiled primarily as a result of consultation with primary source material, as well as interviews with a range of experts within relevant Maltese governmental bodies.



2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 338-356
Author(s):  
Pieter van Reenen

Abstract The Asylum Procedures Directive stipulates that asylum applications are examined ‘impartially’ by the national authorities. This paper explores the meaning of the term impartiality in administrative settings in EU asylum law focussing on three levels: the Common European Asylum System, the administrative organisational level and the level of the individual immigration officer. CEAS does not provide for a definition of impartiality. The article connects impartiality to the right to good administration as in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. It includes jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights as well as the approach of the EU Ombudsman and EASO in its scope. These sources provide more concrete aspects of impartiality. The article is finalized with recommendations for a code of conduct.



2000 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 360-389 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew S. Butler

The right of individuals to have recourse to international human rights bodies has been regarded as one of the most significant developments in securing respect for and the promotion of universal fundamental rights and freedoms.1 First, it ensures that individuals subjected to human rights violations have an alternative forum should the domestic judicial forums not be persuaded of the existence of rights violations, for whatever reason. Secondly, the availability of an individual's right of recourse affirms the fact that the individual is an actor cognisable by international law, and is not dependent on the intervention of other States for the safeguarding of his or her rights.2 This is particularly important, as many States are slow to engage complaint mechanisms against another State for fear of reprisal (be it in the form of economic or political sanctions, or the instigation of a complaint under the same mechanism by the other state), lack of interest, or otherwise.3 Thirdly, the existence of such fora, and the right of individual complaint from a variety of countries, are useful in developing a common universal standard of human rights observance.4 The combined result of these is that implementation of the goals set out in the international human rights instruments is facilitated because the means for their enforcement are not dependent upon international politics but rather are put in the hands of the rights holders. In turn, such machinery should improve State compliance.5



2016 ◽  
Vol 64 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Abbt

AbstractThe notion of ‘forgetting’ has assumed a new dimension in the digital age. Here I will examine a particular kind of forgetting as reflected in a ruling of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). What the ruling of the ECJ of May 13, 2014 (C-131/12) formulates and invokes as a “right to be forgotten” encompasses the right to co-determine whether certain personal data in the Web should immediately show up or not when a first name and surname is entered as part of a search. When a user has invoked the “right to be forgotten”, and it is determined that it applies, information is, however, not made irretrievable. It continues to remain possible to find this information in a roundabout way, i.e., by means of more precise search queries, although the information should not immediately become visible the moment a person’s full name is typed into a search engine. I will argue that this ruling can be seen as corroborating the fundamental rights of the individual. The idea of the “right to be forgotten” is to give a person a second chance in society. Not all forms of forgetting and remembering can be subsumed under this idea. As will be expounded, this court decision offers a useful normative fundament for the distinction between (1) legitimate attempts at reintegration, (2) legitimate attempts at rehabilitation and (3) unjustified recourse to a right to be forgotten.



Author(s):  
George Sarmento ◽  
Lean Antônio Ferreira de Araújo

A VULNERABILIDADE DO DIREITO À INTIMIDADE NO ESPAÇO DAS FERRAMENTAS TECNOLÓGICAS: MANDADOS CONSTITUCIONAIS DE PROTEÇÃO DO DIREITO FUNDAMENTAL À INTIMIDADE POR INTERMÉDIO DO DIREITO PENAL  THE VULNERABILITY OF THE RIGHT TO INTIMACY IN THE SPACE OF TECHNOLOGICAL INSTRUMENTS: CONSTITUCIONAL WARRANTS FOR PROTECTION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO INTIMACY THROUGH CRIMINAL LAW  George Sarmento*Lean Araújo**  RESUMO: O direito à intimidade integra o catálogo dos direitos fundamentais de proteção descrito no art. 5º, X, da Carta Constitucional, cuja essência é limitar a ação invasiva do Estado e dos demais indivíduos. No processo evolutivo do Estado é de se destacar a contribuição de Hobbes na formulação do Estado como ente responsável pela preservação dos indivíduos. Este momento instituiu a ruptura do indivíduo como ser que se realiza no outro para o ser empreendedor de seu próprio plano de vida, mas submetidas as ações as regras de condutas. A partir desta concepção absolutista evoluiu-se para a formulação de um Estado com delimitação de tarefas por intermédio de Órgãos autônomos e independentes visando à concretude de direitos de proteção ou defesa, direitos prestacionais e direitos de participação. A existência desse Estado Democrático de Direito e Social, constituído a partir da vontade dos seus indivíduos, exige a proteção dos direitos instituídos, dentre eles, à intimidade, e, para tanto, a própria ordem constitucional fixa mandados constitucionais de criminalização, para excepcionalmente coibir os abusos operados no espaço físico e no espaço das ferramentas tecnológicas, em razão da vulnerabilidade existente. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Direito à Intimidade. Ferramentas Tecnológicas. Vulnerabilidade. Proteção pelo Direito Penal. ABSTRACT: The right to intimacy integrates the catalog of privacy fundamental rights depicted in article 5 section X of the constitutional charter. Its essence is to limit the invasive action of the State and other individuals. Hobbes had an important role in State evolutionary process concerning the formulation of the State as responsible for individuals preservation. This moment established the rupture of the individual as a being that realizes itself on another, to an entrepreneur of its own life plan, but submitted to actions and rules of conduct. This absolutistic conception evolved to the formulation of a State with tasks bounded by autonomous and independent agencies aiming to concretize the protection or defense rights, benefit rights and social participation. The existence of this Democratic State and social rights established by the will of the individuals, demands the protection of the established rights, such as intimacy, and therefore the constitutional order itself provides criminal warrants to exceptionally restrain misconducts operated in the physical and technological  space, due to existing vulnerability. KEYWORDS: Right to Intimacy. Technological Tools. Vulnerability. Protection through Criminal Law. SUMÁRIO: Introdução 1 A Evolução do Estado no Pensamento Político. 2 A Unidade da Constituição. 3 A Classificação dos Direitos Fundamentais. 3.1 Os Direitos Fundamentais de Proteção. 3.2 Os Direitos Fundamentais Prestacionais. 3.3 Os Direitos Fundamentais de Participação. 4 O Agir Moral em Contexto. 5 O Espaço das Ferramentas Tecnológicas como meio de Ofensa ao Direito à Intimidade. 6 Mandados Constitucionais de Criminalização. 7 Alterações da Legislação Penal. Considerações Finais. Referências.* Pós-doutor pela Université Daix-Marseille, França. Doutor em Direito pela Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE). Professor do Mestrado do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Direito da Universidade Federal de Alagoas (PPGD/UFAL). Promotor de Justiça.** Acadêmico de Direito da Universidade Federal de Mato Grosso (UFMT). Pesquisador bolsista de Iniciação Científica da Universidade Federal do Mato Grosso do Sul (UFMT) e do Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPQ).



Author(s):  
Adoración Galera Victoria

El presente estudio pretende ofrecer un análisis de las cuestiones constitucionales que se han planteado con ocasión de las recientes resoluciones del Tribunal Supremo sobre las demandas de filiación presentadas frente a Don Juan Carlos I de Borbón. El foco de atención jurídico-constitucional se dirige sobre estas decisiones por cuanto la dimensión del asunto afecta a derechos fundamentales constitucionalmente consagrados y pone de relieve la concepción de la posición jurídica del titular de la Jefatura del Estado en asuntos concernientes a su ámbito privado o familiar. Se trata pues de examinar y valorar de forma crítica las últimas resoluciones del Tribunal supremo en materia de filiación con el fin de analizar desde un punto de vista constitucional su alcance sobre la institución de la inviolabilidad regia y los derechos y fines constitucionales directamente implicados, esto es, la investigación de la paternidad (artículo 39.2 CE) el principio y derecho fundamental de igualdad (artículos 9.2 y 14 CE), y el derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva en su vertiente de acceso a la jurisdicción (artículo 24 CE).This paper aims to provide an analysis of constitutional issues raised during the recent Supreme Court decisions on a paternity action versus Don Juan Carlos I of Borbon. The focus of legal and constitutional attention is focused on these decisions because the case concerns fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. It also emphasizes the concept of the legal position of the owner of the Head of State in matters concerning their private or family. It is therefore to examine and critically evaluate this recent Supreme Court decisions in order to analyze the scope of the institution of the inviolability and constitutional rights directly involved. In particular, they will be analyzed the determination of paternity (Article 39.2 of Spanish Constitution) the principle and fundamental right of equality (Articles 9.2 and 14 of Spanish Constitution), and the right to an effective judicial protection in regard to access to jurisdiction (Article 24 of Spanish Constitution).



2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (103) ◽  
pp. 381
Author(s):  
Kayamba Tshitshi Ndouba

Resumen:El presente artículo aborda algunos problemas entre política y derecho que genera la decisión parlamentaria en la concesión o denegación de los suplicatorios. Por ello, analiza la praxis de los suplicatorios tramitados por el Congreso de los diputados y el Senado hasta la fecha, poniendo énfasis en la doctrina emanada de las decisiones adoptadas por las comisiones parlamentarias competentes. Para profundizar en la interacción entre suplicatorio, política y derecho, el artículo indaga en los pasos cualitativos y saltos prominentes de la evolución de la jurisprudencia constitucional sobre los límites de la facultad de las Cámaras para conceder o denegar el suplicatorio. Recaba y sistematiza el tratamiento académico de los puntos clave del debate emanado de estos sucesivos pronunciamientos del TC: las implicaciones de esta jurisprudencia en relación a los postulados constitucionales de independencia y ordenación de los poderes del Estado, las definiciones de criterios jurídicos que han de inspirar y guiar a las Cámaras para autorizar o denegar el suplicatorio, la concreción del modelo y la estructura de ponderación aplicables en los casos de colisión de dos derechos fundamentales (en este caso, los arts. 23 y 24 de la Constitución española [CE]). Summary:I. Praxis of the Parliamentary Procedure for the Waiver of Immunity. II. The Request to Waive the Parliamentary Immunity Before the Constitutional Court. Issues With Undeniable Constitutional Significance. III. The Constitutional Court and the Judicial Review of the Requests to Waive the Parliamentary Immunity. 1. Interna corporis acta and fundamental rights. 2. «Trial of opportunity» and the formal «requirement of a statement of reasons». 3. The degree of providing an adequate statement of reasons in the denial court’s decision. 4. The question of weighing up different values against one another: fundamental rights and the Parliament members’ prerogatives. IV. The Doctrinal Debate on the Constitutional Court’s Jurisprudence. 1. Emptying the parliamentarian immunity and the issue of «checks and balance» of State’s constitutional powers.2. Opposing the parliamentary immunity and the right of judicial action: the issue of preferential treatment. Concluding: Judicial Review or Political Review? Abstract:This article addresses the existing problems generated by the parliamentary decision in the granting or denial of requests made by the Supreme Court to the Parliament, in order to remove an MP’s parliamentary immunity, so that (s)he can be prosecuted. Such problems are studied both from the perspective of law and of political science. To this end, this paper analyzes and updates the research done to date about the parliamentary praxis on this issue, highlighting the doctrine which emanates from the decisions adopted by the competent parliamentary committees. In order to understand well the interaction between the praxis, politics and law, this paper also examines the most prominent changes and milestones in the evolution of the constitutional case law on the limits of the Parliament’s capacity to grant or to deny the Supreme Court request asking Parliament to remove an MP’s parliamentary immunity so that (s)he can be prosecuted. For this purpose, the paper systematizes the key points of the academic debate concerning the successive decisions of the Constitutional court: the repercussions of this jurisprudence vis-à-vis the constitutional postulates of separation and independence of State powers, the legal criteria that such postulates must inspire and in order to guide the Parliament in its decision to grant or deny the petition, the concretization of the model and the balance needed in cases of collision of two fundamental rights (in this case, articles 23 and 24 of the Spanish Constitution).



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