scholarly journals Souveraineté et fédéralisme

2005 ◽  
Vol 20 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 237-246
Author(s):  
Gil Rémillard

The notion of sovereignty is the most fundamental concept of public law. At the same time, it is one of the main difficulties federalism has to face. Where does sovereignty reside in a federal state ? While this question is not an easy one to answer, knowledge of the manner in which it has been answered in Canadian constitutional law is essential to an understanding of the present constitutional crisis. The most appropriate definition of sovereignty is « jurisdiction to define jurisdictions ». This definition implies the concept of an ultimate authority and its application to a federal system is of great difficulty. Two main theories confront each other. The first one develops the concept that sovereignty should be shared between the federal government and the federated states. The second sees sovereignty as belonging exclusively to the federal government, regional governments merely enjoying some form of autonomy. This paper studies the implications of both theories in Canadian federalism.

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 27
Author(s):  
Kurdistan Salim Saeed

  The federal system in Iraq was constitutionally adopted in 2004 in Article 4 of the Transitional Administrative Law of the State. It was subsequently adopted in the 2005 Constitution of Iraq. Article 1 states that "Iraq is a single, sovereign and independent federal state, (Article 117) in the Kurdistan Region and its existing authorities, a federal territory and defined the terms of reference of both the federal government and the terms of reference of the regions in the fourth and fifth of it. The constitutional organization contained in the Iraqi constitution has defined the terms of reference of the federal government exclusively, and gave broad powers to the governments of the regions, with the definition of some common competencies, and accordingly the Kurdistan Regional Government is the general jurisdiction and the federal government with exceptional jurisdiction, which supports the authority of the Kurdistan Region constitutionally Independence and internal sovereignty, But the process of application of these materials accompanied by different problems generated multiple political and economic problems between the parties, which led to shortcomings in the federal democratic experiment in Iraq The study dealt with this issue through two sections, the first deals with the terms of reference of the federal government and regional governments according to the Constitution of 2005. The second addresses Problems of the exercise of the functions of the federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government.


2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (10) ◽  
pp. 1297-1318 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Gamper

Innumerable attempts have been made to explore the theoretical nature of federalism. Due to the long history, worldwide existence and interdisciplinary character of federalism, a plethora of literature has been written on the topic. Yet, these endeavours have not even resulted in a clear and commonly used definition of the term. Surely, it is one of the great dilemmas of this field of research that despite so much discussion, there is no settled common denominator of ‘federalism'. Whereas practical studies and exchange of experience between the various federal systems offer a more conventional research arena, comparative theoretical approaches are much more seldom. This is not the least because of the tremendous semantic challenges of a comparative theoretical approach. At first glance, it is sometimes difficult to understand the terminology of federalism, the meaning of which differs according to the perspectives of constitutional law, political science or economics. Even more difficulty arises when the substance of federal theories is discussed. Again, differences between theories may be due to different academic approaches, particularly between understanding federalism as an overall principle or as a more concrete concept of a federal state and, in particular, whether the constituent units of a federal state are states, and, if states, whether they are sovereign.


2020 ◽  
Vol V (III) ◽  
pp. 96-104
Author(s):  
Muhammad Imran ◽  
Mughees Ahmad ◽  
Zab Un Nisa

Federations can be different at the level of centralism and in practices of governance. Due to such idiosyncratic features, states can be considered as centralized on the basis of the powerful federal government at the centre or decentralized because of the implementation of the theory of devolution of power and majoritarian federations due to the influential position of majority ethnic groups of the society. Certain federal states can apply a multi-dimensional system of governance, power and authority, while some other states can ascent more centralized and powerful governance. Some scholars alleged that the capability of the Federal state to meet the issue of ethnic diversity diverges transversely to its commitments and different structures. The aforementioned is further claimed that “a formal federal system functions in practice as a unitary system; the system's capacity is not according to the needs to accommodate ethnic and national cleavages” (Kohli, 2004). On the basis of such suggestions, this research paper endeavors to examine federalism as a tool to manage ethnic diversities in Pakistan. This paper argues that a more effective paradigm of the power sharing mechanism can be fruitful to enable federalism in Pakistan to manage ethnic diversities more exclusively.


Author(s):  
Edward McWhinney

The succeeding discussion looks at some of the concrete record of governmental practice (whether provincial or federal) in Canada, under the impact of the “Quiet Revolution” in Quebec, in important areas of foreign affairs and trans-national cultural, social, and commercial relations generally. Its thesis will be, first, that at the level of constitutional law-in-action important changes and modifications are occurring in Canada which largely render out-of-date certain traditional a priori concepts and attitudes as to inter-governmental relations within a federal system; second, that these de facto changes, which are already ripening through sustained practice and observance into conventional constitutional law, tend to present the Privy Council’s work on the Canadian constitution and its interpretation in a new and rather more favourable light (in comparison perhaps with the record of the Canadian Supreme Court); and, third, that the constitutional changes that have, in fact, occurred in this area make good sense in pragmatic, experiential terms, having regard to the inner dynamics of Canadian federalism today and to the aspirations of the main contending power groups, the new positive law of the constitution thus coming very close to being also community “living law” in Canada.


Federalism-E ◽  
1969 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 46-53
Author(s):  
Darcy Drury

The problem with Lord Acton’s state-ment is that it leaves out the third essential ingredient to a federal system of government: a supreme court. In Canada, like most federa-tions, the Supreme Court (SC) is responsible for articulating the constitution and serving as an independent mediator in intergovernmen-tal relations. Each decision made by the SC in regards to government jurisdiction changes the dynamics of Canadian federalism, and some critics fear it can be used as a centraliz-ing device by the federal government. This paper will discuss the nature of the SC by demonstrating its necessity, purpose, and the importance of its independence by examining its crucial role in Canadian federalism. Next, there will be a historical breakdown of the impact of2 the SC on the federal balance of powers through an examination of three es-sential eras: Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (decentralizing), Laskin (centralizing), and Charter (mixed), with analysis involving the attitudinal and legal theorist models of decision making in SC decisions. Finally, the SC’s impartiality towards provincial and feder-al preferences will be evaluated to show that justices have remained immune to direct po-litical pressures [...]


Author(s):  
Cyr Hugo ◽  
Mestral Armand de

This chapter discusses the difficult questions surrounding treaties in Canadian constitutional law. The first part examines treaty-making powers, in particular, the lack of explicit constitutional provisions which outline how, and who, may enter into treaties under Canadian federalism. Under the current Canadian modus vivendi the federal government is the entity which exercises foreign relations, including treaty-making. However, Canadian foreign relations are rich and complex, and all provinces engage in some way in foreign relations—with Ottawa’s explicit or tacit consent—particularly through the use of administrative agreements. The second part of this chapter examines treaty implementation in Canada, which must occur according to the usual division of powers under the Constitution Act, 1867 following the Labour Conventions Reference. Moreover, under current law there are at least 13 forms of implementation—meaning that “legislative implementation” will not always be necessary for a treaty to be considered “implemented” under Canadian law.


Federalism-E ◽  
1969 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-35
Author(s):  
Jenna Herdman

Quebec’s desire for recognition as “pas comme les autres” has defined fifty years of Canadian politics. In Canada, citizens have multiple layers of identity, including their dual allegiance to the federal nation and provincial culture. In the case of Quebec, these two identities often come into conflict with each other. Quebec nationalist sentiment which manifests itself through threats of sovereignty and demands for constitutional recognition, through negotiation with the federal government, has characterized the nature of Canadian federalism. Quebec has already been greatly accommodated and is privileged in the federal system in comparison to the other provinces. Moreover, the failure of the Liberal governments to create a pan-Canadian identity that Quebec accepts, as well as the Conservatives’ failed attempts to modify the constitution, demonstrate the inability for constitutional reform to recognize Quebec as distinct throughout the past fifty years of Canadian federal relations [...]


Federalism-E ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 80-89
Author(s):  
Heather Ibbetson

This paper discusses how asymmetrical Canadian federalism contributes to neo-colonialism and therefore, also the social inequalities faced by Indigenous nations. Asymmetrical federalism has been heralded as a system that maintains a balance of power among the diverse nations that constitute Canada. However, many fail to recognize that Canadian federalism contributes to neo-colonialism, as it validates solely colonizers through the power division in the Constitution Act of 1982. Further, this power imbalance places Indigenous nations under the jurisdiction of the federal government. This greatly limits the ability of Indigenous nations to self-govern and be heard within the Canadian system of government. Through furthering neo-colonial power divisions, the Canadian federal system significantly contributes to social inequalities, such as poor healthcare coverage, faced by Indigenous nations.


KPGT_dlutz_1 ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 506
Author(s):  
Leonam Baesso da Silva Liziero

Perspectivas do federalismo: contrastes entre o formalismo e a abordagem sociopolítica Resumo: Este artigo tem como objetivo apresentar o contraste entre a perspectiva jurídica do federalismo, essencialmente formalista, e perspectivas não-formalistas, como a sociológica e a política, aqui tratadas no mesmo conjunto. Deste modo, serão apresentadas, na perspectiva jurídica, considerações sobre as abordagens realizadas por Jellinek e Kelsen. Sob este ponto de vista, o federalismo é uma questão do direito constitucional de cada federação. Posteriormente, são apresentadas considerações teóricas desenvolvidas por Sidgwick e Riker, para os quais a questão do federalismo é política, bem como a de Livingston, para quem a abordagem sobre o federalismo deve ser antes de mais nada sociológica. Palavras-chave: Estado federal. Federalismo. Formalismo. Jellinek. Kelsen. Livingston. Federalism perspectives: contrasts between formalism and the socio-political approach Abstract: This article aims to present the contrast between the juridical perspective of federalism, essentially formalist, and non-formalist perspectives, such as a sociological and a political one, treated here in the same set. In this way, we present, from a legal perspective, considerations on the approaches taken by Jellinek and Kelsen. From this point of view, federalism is a question of the constitutional law of each federation. Subsequently, theoretical considerations developed by Sidgwick and Riker, for which they are questionable by the federal government, as well as by Livingston, for whom an approach on federalism is first and foremost sociological. Keywords: Federal State. Federalism. Formalism. Jellinek. Kelsen. Livingston.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-53
Author(s):  
Shafi’u Abubakar Kurfi ◽  
Moh’d Lawal Danrimi

Nigeria operates a federal system of government and power is allocated to federal, state and local governments. A collaborative effort was encouraged to promote socio-economic development. Unfortunately, lack of diversification of the economy and over concentration on crude oil, it now operates a monolithic economy. Federal government on monthly basis share the proceed to the three levels of government but ironically, nothing significant is shown for the huge allocations due to uncontrollable embezzlement and reckless spending by public servants more specifically local authorities due to the extreme closeness to citizenry. Documentary data were obtained from published books, reputable journals, government publications, magazines, newspaper publications, internet sources and personal observations in carrying out this study. The paper observed that embezzlement and reckless spending is on the increase in some Nigerian local governments and is manifested through the state joint local government account, embezzlements and reckless spending by local chairmen, fake projects, collusion in the transaction of government businesses, ghost workers, denial of statutory functions. The paper concludes that local government is at the verge of total collapse if adequate measures were not taken to savage the situation. The paper recommends that states joint accounts should be scrap for local governments have a sustainable development.


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