How Shared Economic Beliefs Shape Loan Size, Conditionality, and Enforcement Decisions
This chapter examines how the economic beliefs held by the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) decision makers and the beliefs of the officials at the helm of the borrowing governments shape loan size, conditionality, and enforcement decisions. It first considers two theoretically and empirically informed observations about the IMF-borrower relationship. First, key decisions in the conditional lending process are necessarily informed by the subjective judgments of the staff and management. Second, those judgments are often made in the presence of uncertainty. The chapter then introduces a set of mechanisms that link shared economic beliefs to the measurable outputs of the decisions about each element of the conditional lending process (access, conditionality, and enforcement). It also discusses the rise of neoliberal policymakers in developing countries and why such policymakers get less demanding (and more generous) programs from the IMF.