International Ozone Negotiations and the Green Spiral

Scholarship examining the highly successful ozone negotiations is rare today, as lessons derived from them do not seem to have produced comparable success in climate negotiations. This article argues that there is a “missing piece” critical to understanding ozone negotiation success. I draw on path dependency and feedback literature as well as detailed historical research into the ozone negotiation process to propose a coherent feedback mechanism I refer to as the “green spiral.” In a green spiral, an iterative interaction between negotiation outcomes and changes to the sticky, internal material interests of industry works to make more stringent regulation feasible in subsequent negotiating rounds. Such dynamics offer a consistent explanation for the overall success of the ozone negotiations as well as the timing and nature of individual countries’ shifts in negotiating position and regulatory behavior over time. Understanding environmental negotiation through this lens offers insight into how outcomes of climate and other environmental negotiations might be improved.

How do people plan to negotiate?

Planning is critical for negotiation success as it facilitates obtaining superior outcomes. However, little empirically is known about what people do to plan. We offer an initial exploration of the topic, with the aim of inspiring greater research attention to the topic. We approach the question from an individual differences perspective, since planning phase places greater emphasis on individual action. We explored how the Big Five personality factors and gender predict preference and search for information that facilitates efforts to claim value, create value, and manage relationships. In Study 1, we used a survey method to elicit preferences. Extraversion and conscientiousness predicted preference for information that would help to claim value, and agreeableness predicted preference for information that would help to manage relationships. Women preferred value creating information. In Studies 2, 3, and 4, we examined search behavior using the Mouselab paradigm (Johnson, Payne, Bettman, & Schkade, 1989). A different pattern of relationships emerged. When the search task was complex, agreeableness predicted how extensively people searched for information. When tasks were more constrained, we detected fewer relationships between individual differences and search behavior.

Improving negotiation success in B2B sales organizations: is structured negotiation management a success factor?

Researchers and practitioners alike recognize the necessity to manage salespeople before, during, and after negotiations. Literature identifies four approaches that companies use to manage salespeople in and around negotiations. However, it has never been researched which of these approaches help companies implement negotiation management successfully. The present study examines which management approach or combination of approaches lead to a consistently high level of negotiation success. The authors use a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis to identify the conditions explaining negotiation success. The findings indicate that any effort to actively manage negotiations as a corporate capability supports sales in achieving a higher level of negotiation success. While the study was not able to identify any necessary conditions, the sufficient solution formula to reach a high level of negotiation success comprises two paths in its most parsimonious form. Following this solution formula, companies should either enable salespeople to solve complex situations autonomously and provide guidance along the negotiation process or define clear objectives, manage salespeople against deviations from the objectives, and monitor them closely throughout the negotiation process. This suggests, that successful negotiation management either empowers salespeople to act autonomously or focuses on a control management style. The latter should comprise both aspects of outcome and behavior control.

Persuading the Giant? Explaining Eastern Partnership States’ (Unexpected) Negotiation Success in Relations with the European Union

In bilateral relations and negotiations with the European Union (EU), smaller and economically weaker states are often unable to express their national preferences. Despite their limited bargaining power, however, some Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries obtained significant concessions from the EU. This article analyzes the factors that explain EaP states’ unexpected negotiation success in the context of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with Ukraine, the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with Armenia, and enhanced economic partnership with Belarus. We identify negotiation strategies that are crucial to understanding of the puzzle.

Negotiation for Time Optimization in Construction Projects with Competitive and Social Welfare Preferences

Construction time optimization is affected greatly by the negotiation between owners and contractors, whose progress is dictated by their desire to maximize system revenues. This paper builds an agent-based model and designs an experimental scenario in which the contractor has competitive and social welfare preferences relevant to the Chinese context; we subdivide competitive preference into greed and jealousy components and subdivide social welfare preference into generosity and sympathy components. We analyze the impacts of these different contractor preferences on the revenue-sharing coefficient, negotiation success rate, and negotiation time when negotiation reaches agreement. The results show that the jealousy component of competitive preference has an important influence on improving the income of the subject, while the greed component does not significantly enhance the revenue-sharing coefficient. The sympathy component of social welfare preference does not have an influence on the revenue-sharing coefficient no matter the strength of the generosity component. Increasing the greed component of competitive preference will lead to the extension of negotiation time and, to a certain extent, to the reduction of the negotiation success rate; the sympathy component of social welfare preference does not have an influence on negotiation time no matter the strength of the generosity preference.