Implicit in the reasons given in Chapter 1 for development being ignored until recently as a potential causal factor in evolutionary theory is the general concept of reductionism. It is a strictly reductionistic approach either to believe that phenotypic variation is equivalent to genetic variation, or to act as though this were the case until disproven. Thus, to take but a single example, we find Stebbins (1974), who is avowedly a “strict reductionist,” stating that “in the future all general theories about evolution will have to be based chiefly upon established facts of population and molecular genetics.” Reduction is, of course, a powerful tool, but it is one with which biologists have in general had difficulty, and which in recent years has come under strong attack and defense (see Williams, 1986). The basic reductionist statement with which we are all comfortable is ontological, namely that the processes underlying all living phenomena are reducible to the operation of mechanical causes: there is no irreducible vitalist essence. Reductionism in this sense is unexceptionable and universal in science. The more difficult sort of reductionism to deal with is theory reduction. A simple expression of this would be the statement that the laws of chemistry are all explicable in terms of the laws of physics, or the laws of biology in the laws of chemistry. Nagel (1961) shows that such theory reduction requires that, for example, the laws of chemistry must be deducible from the laws of physics and that the terms and concepts of both sets of laws be “connected” (see, for example, Newton-Smith, 1982; Beckner, 1974). Another way of putting it is that the laws of physics must be of wider scope than the laws of chemistry, which then constitute a series of special cases of the former, under particular boundary conditions. Talking about theory reduction within the biological sciences, where general theories of broad scope are lacking (except the general theory of evolution that all organisms are related by descent), is somewhat pretentious. In the biological sciences we are forced to work more modestly with rules and probabilities rather than grand laws.