scholarly journals Understanding Color Risk Appropriateness: Influence of Color on a User’s Decision to Comply with the IT Security Policy—Evidence from the U.S. and India

Author(s):  
Mario Silic ◽  
Mato Njavro ◽  
Goran Oblakovic
Keyword(s):  
2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 36-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Stocker

Nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs) were an important development in the history of nuclear nonproliferation efforts. From 1957 through 1968, when the Treaty of Tlatelolco was signed, the United States struggled to develop a policy toward NWFZs in response to efforts around the world to create these zones, including in Europe, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. Many within the U.S. government initially rejected the idea of NWFZs, viewing them as a threat to U.S. nuclear strategy. However, over time, a preponderance of officials came to see the zones as advantageous, at least in certain areas of the world, particularly Latin America. Still, U.S. policy pertaining to this issue remained conservative and reactive, reflecting the generally higher priority given to security policy than to nuclear nonproliferation.


1990 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-20
Author(s):  
Larry W. Bowman

Relationships between U.S. government officials and academic specialists working on national security and foreign policy issues with respect to Africa are many and complex. They can be as informal as a phone call or passing conversation or as formalized as a consulting arrangement or research contract. Many contacts exist and there is no doubt that many in both government and the academy value these ties. There have been, however, ongoing controversies about what settings and what topics are appropriate to the government/academic interchange. National security and foreign policy-making in the U.S. is an extremely diffuse process.


Author(s):  
Christopher J. Fuller

This concluding chapter examines the legacy of the CIA's drone war on U.S. counterterrorism, wider U.S. national security policy, and the conduct of America's rivals—both nation-states and terrorist groups. It contemplates the nature of technological progress, judging that innovations always introduce potential threats and opportunities in equal measure. Furthermore, while it is almost inevitable that terrorist groups will exploit drone technology for heinous ends, the technology also offers wider commercial and civilian society opportunities, just as previous transformative technologies, first developed for the purpose of taking lives, eventually came to transform them in positive ways. The use of drones to neutralize terrorists is best understood as the embodiment of America's long-term counterterrorism goal made possible by advancements in both technology and the willingness of the U.S. government to authorize the CIA in undertaking lethal counterterrorist actions.


Author(s):  
E. V. Batueva

The development of ICT and the formation of the global information space changed the agenda of national and international security. Such key characteristics of cyberspace as openness, accessibility, anonymity, and identification complexity determined the rise of actors in cyber space and increased the level of cyber threats. Based on the analyses of the U.S. agencies' approach, the author defines three major groups of threats: use of ICT by states, criminals and terrorists. This concept is shared by the majority of the countries involved in the international dialogue on information security issues and is fundamental for providing cyber security policy on both national and international levels. The United States is developing a complex strategy for cyber space that includes maximization of ICT's advantages in all strategically important fields as well as improvement of national information systems and networks security. On the international level the main task for the American diplomacy is to guarantee the U.S. information dominance. The United States is the only country that takes part practically in all international and regional fora dealing with cyber security issues. However process of the development of a global cyber security regime is not going to be fast due to countries' different approaches to key definitions and lack of joint understanding of cyber security issues as well as due to the position of the countries, among all the United States, that are not interested in any new obligatory international norms and principles. Such American policy aims at saving the possibility of using cyberspace capacity in reaching political and military goals, thus keeping the global leadership.


2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 801-808
Author(s):  
Kenneth Carlberg

Abstract This paper proposes a new direction for U.S. Government cyber policy focusing on stimulus that indirectly incites actions by others to improve cybersecurity protection. To date, the U.S. government has relied on two directions to establish a foundation for cyber security policy: legislative and informative. The former is realized as legislative laws or regulation that provide specific direction to companies or the general public. The latter involves the production and dissemination of information, which is realized in three forms: guidelines, response efforts, and testbeds/pilots. This paper proposes a new “carrot and stick approach” that incorporates both taxes and tax rebates to stimulate solutions that address problems without the government dictating a specific solution.


Author(s):  
Norman Pendegraft ◽  
Mark Rounds

The value of IS security evaluated by simulating interactions between an information system, its users and a population of attackers. Initial results suggest that the marginal value of additional security may be positive or negative as can the time rate of change of system value. This implies that IT security policy makers should be aware of the relative sensitivity of attackers and users to security before setting IT security policy.


Cyber Crime ◽  
2013 ◽  
pp. 214-227
Author(s):  
Norman Pendegraft ◽  
Mark Rounds

The value of IS security evaluated by simulating interactions between an information system, its users and a population of attackers. Initial results suggest that the marginal value of additional security may be positive or negative as can the time rate of change of system value. This implies that IT security policy makers should be aware of the relative sensitivity of attackers and users to security before setting IT security policy.


2021 ◽  
pp. 79-103
Author(s):  
Gregory Falco ◽  
Eric Rosenbach

The question “Who is responsible for cybersecurity?” addresses how cyber risk prevention and resilience is not a one-person show: it takes a village to reduce organizational cyber risk. A case study opens the chapter by examining the immense hack of Equifax and the company’s poor cyber leadership during and after the data breach. It details the importance of strong leadership and educates readers on achieving accountable leadership for cyber risk. Afterward, it teaches readers about an organization’s enterprise information security policy and outlines the components of a cybersecurity culture. Topics include transparency, accountability, appropriate system knowledge, compliance with policy and procedure, and formal communication channels. The chapter guides executives in budgeting and allocating resources to cyber risk management and explains third-party agreements for cyber risk. It also details the importance of cyber talent management. The chapter concludes with Rosenbach’s Embedded Endurance strategy experience with cyber risk leadership at the U.S. Department of Défense.


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