scholarly journals Gender quotas and the selection of local politicians: Evidence from French municipal elections

2020 ◽  
Vol 62 ◽  
pp. 101842 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julie Lassébie
Author(s):  
Juan Antonio Inarejos Muñoz

RESUMENEn este artículo se plantea un análisis comparativo de los mecanismos de representación política y control social implantados en dos sociedades coloniales: las Filipinas españolas y la Indochina francesa. Este tema forma parte de una investigación más amplia centrada en la selección de las élites locales filipinas durante la segunda mitad del siglo XIX y los proyectos de reforma de los sistemas de representación local vietnamita bajo dominio colonial francés. Se trazan en clave comparativa las principales similitudes y diferencias con los mecanismos de representación y control social desplegados en ambos escenarios, aspectos claves a la hora de comprender las razones que determinaron el final de ambas experiencias coloniales en el sudeste asiático.PALABRAS CLAVE: Filipinas, Indochina, colonialismo, elecciones locales, podermunicipal.ABSTRACTThis study presents a comparative analysis of the political representation and socialcontrol implemented in two colonial societies: the Spanish Philippines and French Indochina. This topic is part of a broader study focused on the selection of the native elite in the Spanish Philippines in the nineteenth century and on the projects to reform local representation in French Indochina. The main similarities and differences in the representation and social control mechanisms in both scenarios are described as they are key aspects when it comes to understanding the end of these two colonial experiences in South East Asia. This diverse tool kit included the political use of productive resources, individual conduct reports, the development of clientelist networks, the manipulation of religious beliefs, abuse and repression.KEY WORDS: Philippines, Indochina, colonialism, municipal elections, local power.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-45
Author(s):  
Ashna Arora

This paper evaluates the effects of encouraging the selection of local politicians in India via community consensus, as opposed to a secret ballot election. Using village-level data on candidates, elected politicians, government budgets, and workfare employment, I show that incentives for consensus elections lead to politicians that are more educated but less likely to be drawn from historically marginalized castes, and increase how regressively workfare employment is targeted. These results are supported by qualitative evidence that shows that consensus elections are prone to capture by the local elite, which may reduce the need for clientelistic transfers to the non-elite.


2019 ◽  
pp. 61-74
Author(s):  
John W.P. Veugelers

This chapter examines how the ex-colonials organized, what political influence they achieved, and why their efforts stalled. Anticipating elections, their leaders mounted social and cultural events with support from local politicians. These events maintained collective identity and social networks. They signaled a political potential and tightened bonds with local politicians. Similar models of patron-client arose in other Mediterranean cities (e.g., Aix-en-Provence, Marseille, Nice, Montpellier, Perpignan, and Toulouse). In the 1965 municipal elections, all parties in Toulon wooed the ex-colonials, who backed the moderate right. For the 1965 presidential and 1967 parliamentary elections, they sought to maintain their influence, but lost unity. The patron-client relations and electoral support that joined them to the moderate right would persist until the rise of the National Front in the 1990s.


2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 159-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Drago ◽  
Tommaso Nannicini ◽  
Francesco Sobbrio

This paper uses an original dataset covering the presence of local news in medium-large Italian cities in the period 1993–2010 to evaluate the effects of newspaper entry and exit on electoral participation, political selection, and government efficiency. Exploiting discrete changes in the number of newspapers, we show that newspaper entry increases turnout in municipal elections, the reelection probability of the incumbent mayor, and the efficiency of the municipal government. We do not find any effect on the selection of politicians. Competition plays a relevant role, as the effects are not limited to the first newspaper entry. (JEL D72, L11, L82)


Author(s):  
Francesco Andreoli ◽  
Elena Manzoni ◽  
Margherita Margotti

2019 ◽  
Vol 82 (2) ◽  
pp. 11-48
Author(s):  
Graziana Corica

The 2019 municipal elections in Florence confirm the electoral success of the Democratic Party and the Mayor, Dario Nardella. The center-right candidate, Ubaldo Bocci, an entrepreneur and member of local catholic associations, collected 25% of the votes. The Five Star Movement, with Roberto De Blasi as mayoral candidate, and the left candidate Antonella Bundu got about 7% of the electoral preferences each.In which areas of the city did the PD win? Is it possible establish a causal relation between voting behaviour, the neighbourhood and sociodemographic variables? To answer these questions, the article examines the electoral results through a geographical approach, based on the 72 «elementary areas» of Florence and other variables provided by ISTAT. This analysis identifies four macro-areas, distinguished for the different combinations of the presence of the political parties. Overall, the preferences collected by the PD, more than 50%, make difficult to found a link between the vote and the social background.In order to understand the electoral success of the PD and of local politicians other factors, like political culture or specific contextual features, have to be taken into consideration. Indeed, from a qualitative perspective, this contribution suggests to consider Florence as a «urban regime», composed by several actors who share interests and visions about the growth of the city.


2021 ◽  
pp. 107808742199211
Author(s):  
Katy Hansen ◽  
Shadi Eskaf ◽  
Megan Mullin

Do voters punish incumbent legislators for raising service costs? Concern about electoral punishment is considered a leading obstacle to increasing taxes and fees to fund service provision, but empirical evidence of such backlash is surprisingly sparse. This paper examines whether voters hold local elected officials accountable for raising water service costs. Using 10 years of panel data on municipal elections and water rates in North Carolina, we find rate increases do not reduce incumbent city council members’ vote shares. Local politicians may overestimate their electoral risk from raising taxes and fees to fund public services.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giulia Ferrari ◽  
Valeria Ferraro ◽  
Paola Profeta ◽  
Chiara Pronzato

From business to politics and academia, the economic effects of gender quotas are under scrutiny. We provide new causal evidence based on the introduction of mandatory gender quotas for boards of directors of Italian listed companies. Exploiting staggered board elections, we find that quotas are associated with a new selection of board members, characterized by higher education and lower age, and no significant costs on firm performance or the stock market. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis.


2000 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 549-568 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hannah Stanwick

Case studies of municipal elections hold little appeal for students of local government. Recent scholarship for the most part has focused on gender or the election of councillors, but studies of mayoral contests are virtually non–existent. This is somewhat surprising, considering the constituent size of several large Canadian municipalities where local government leaders are directly elected. If indeed local government is the level closest to the people, a study of municipal electoral behaviour in large cities can provide insights about the relationship between local politicians and the electorate.


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