Russia and the Iraq War: was Putin’s policy a failure?

2004 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 429-459 ◽  
Author(s):  
Galia Golan

Although Russian President Vladimir Putin has been faced with numerous crises since coming to office in 2000, most importantly the war in Chechnya, the Iraq War was the first major international crisis with which his administration was confronted. As in the case of Kosovo for Yeltsin, and the Gulf War for Gorbachev, the Russian President had to deal with conflicting domestic pressures and apparently still more conflicting Russian national and international interests. Indeed, one result of such a situation was a post-war accusation that Putin actually had no policy or at least no consistent policy with regard to the Iraq crisis [Golan, G., 1992. Gorbachev’s difficult time in the Gulf. Political Science Quarterly 107 (2), 213–230]. One may remember similar accusations of Gorbachev’s ‘‘zigzaging’’ in the Gulf War and claims that the Yeltsin government failed to forge a Kasovo policy altogether [Levitin, O., 2000. Inside Moscow’s Kosovo muddle. Survival 42 (1), 130]. Yet, a certain pattern did appear to repeat itself in the Iraqi crisis, namely, pre-war efforts to prevent a military conflict from breaking out, then gradual escalation of rhetoric if not actual involvement, and finally gradual but relatively rapid retreat to conciliatory posture toward the United States (in all three crises). Moreover, Putin was indeed consistent throughout the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods in his opposition to the Americans’ use of force against Iraq and in the need to remain within a United Nations framework. Actually, one might ask (and we shall below) why Putin did not abandon the first part of this policy, in order to maintain the second component, when it became certain that the U.S. was going to attack, with or without UN Security Council approval.

Significance The exercise was described by NATO as a "show of force", while the Dutch foreign minister referred to it as "a warning" to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Multinational military exercises have become more frequent over the past 25 years. The United States participates in dozens of exercises annually and spends billions of dollars to do so. However, there are significant questions over the utility and purpose of such multinational exercises, which serve both a practical function for the militaries involved, as well as a diplomatic signaling effect. Impacts Like BALTOPS, regular exercises will assume greater salience when their regional focus sees new external threats. This could prompt policy changes from adversaries, as they attempt to respond to the exercises. As a result, exercises designed to deter may risk escalating tensions.


2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (1) ◽  
pp. 181-188

In October 2016, Russian President Vladimir Putin suspended the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), a bilateral treaty between Russia and the United States governing the disposal of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. A Russian Foreign Ministry director explained that the decision was prompted by a “dramatic change in the situation . . . brought about by the unfriendly steps taken by the United States.” He also cited “the United States’ obvious inability and unwillingness to honour its obligations . . . on time and in full.” The United States expressed disappointment at the suspension, arguing that continued implementation was in both states’ interests.


Author(s):  
Jussi M. Hanhimäki

There has not been a World War III, so has the United Nations been successful? Alternatively, no day has gone by since 1945 without a military conflict somewhere around the world, so has the UN been unsuccessful? ‘Facing wars, confronting threats: the UN Security Council in action’ considers whether the existence and proliferation of nuclear weapons has acted as a deterrent against a direct military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Security Council is not irrelevant, but it can only be effective when the five permanent members (China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States) are in agreement. Despite this, the UN has been remarkably successful and active.


Author(s):  
Spencer D. Bakich

The Persian Gulf War of 1990–1991 was something of a paradox. From the American perspective, the war had the hallmarks of a resounding victory. Responding to a flagrant case of interstate aggression by Iraq against Kuwait, the George H. W. Bush administration assembled a substantial international coalition to deter further Iraqi attacks against its neighbors in the Gulf and to compel Saddam Hussein into quitting Kuwait, to avoid war. When the latter proved infeasible, the United States led that coalition in forcibly ousting Iraq’s military from Kuwait, substantially degrading Iraqi combat power in the process. The war’s outcome resulted from an auspiciously altered geopolitical landscape at the end of the Cold War, the overwhelming superiority of American power vis-à-vis Iraq, and a US decision-making process that tightly knitted military and diplomatic objectives into a coherent—and coherently executed—wartime strategy. However, America’s historically lopsided victory in the Persian Gulf War proved fleeting. Iraq’s surviving military forces retained the capacity to crush domestic challenges to the Ba’athist regime and to threaten its Gulf neighbors. President Bush’s vision of a post-war new world order notwithstanding, Gulf security depended heavily on continuing military missions years after the Persian Gulf War ended. Despite wartime tactical and strategic successes, grand strategic success eluded the United States in the years after the war.


Author(s):  
A.V. Lepkov

The article examines the level of awareness of US officials regarding the Iraqi program for the production of chemical weapons as well as its use before 1988. Both in Russian and foreign historiography, the issue of Iraq's chemical weapons and the United States relationship with the government of Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war is either considered superficially or becomes only an aspect of more general and extensive research topics. The period of 1980-1988 was marked by active USA-Iraqi cooperation in order to exert pressure on Iran. It is proved that during this period, Washington was fully aware of the development and use of chemical weapons by Iraq from the first incidents, even before the issue was brought to the level of the UN Security Council. It was not profitable for the United States to promote the dissemination of information discrediting an ally in the fight against Iran. World`s attention to the use of chemical weapons was drawn only after the end of the Iran-Iraq war.


2020 ◽  
pp. 49-56
Author(s):  
Vasiliy Ryazhenov ◽  
Victoriya Andreyeva ◽  
Elena Zakharochkina

Russian President Vladimir Putin defined increase in life expectancy from 72.7 to 78 years by 2024 as a national aim in the Decree № 204 of May 7, 2018. Achievement of this aim depends on drug provision system among other factors. Strategy of drug provision for the population of the Russian Federation for the period until 2025 sets the goal of increasing availability of high quality, effective and safe medicines to meet needs of the population and the health system based on the formation of a rational and balanced system of drug provision for the population of the country with available resources. The health care system should expand the possibilities of using modern and effective mechanisms to ensure the financing of drug provision for the population.


Author(s):  
Nataliia Kosaniak

Vasyl Bezkorovayny (1880–1966) was a talented artist, an active figure in the musical life of Galicia and a representative of post-war Ukrainian emigrants in the United States of America. He wrote more than 350 works of various genres. Among them are compositions for symphony orchestra; vocal works — for chorus, ensembles or solo singing; chamber and instrumental music — for piano, violin, zither, cello; music for dramatic performances. The article deals with the archival and musicological analysis of expressive and stylistic features of V. Bezkorovayny’s vocal works, based on the materials of Stefanyk Lviv National Library of Ukraine. Attention is paid to the place of the composer’s vocal masterpieces in the context of Ukrainian vocal music of the first half of the XX century. The most important achievements of the composer related to the genres of choral and chamber vocal music. In style, the composer’s works combine the influences of M. Lysenko, composers of the «Peremyshl school» and Western European romantic and post-romantic models. The original secular choral music of V. Bezkorovayny covers genres of songs, plays, and large-form choirs. In his solo songs the influences of romantic western European music and Ukrainian folk songs affected the formation and approval of the composer’s style. Keywords: vocal music, chorus, solos, melodic-intonation means, harmony, rhythm.


Author(s):  
V. I. Denysenko

The failure to sign the Association Agreement with the EU in autumn 2013 has been investigated. The role of the Russian factor, which became decisive in the foreign policy reversal of the Yanukovych regime, has been revealed. The importance of Viktor Yanukovych’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on October 27, 2013, in the dramatic change of Ukraine’s international vector has been emphasized. On the basis of diplomats’ memoirs, the assumption about intimidation of the Ukrainian President by the Russian side has been substantiated. The timeline of the preparation of the 2013 Vilnius Summit, the position of EU structures and the attempts of the fourth President of Ukraine to win time to trade with the Russians have been reproduced. The thesis about the Donetsk clan’s attempts to prepare public opinion for a 180 degree turn in late October - early November 2013 has been presented. For this purpose, demonstration meetings were organized with representatives of Ukrainian business and trade unions, who called for revision of plans for European integration on their own initiative. The main role in manipulating public opinion rested on the government of Mykola Azarov and the Verkhovna Rada, which had a majority coalition led by the Party of Regions. Instead, Viktor Yanukovych continued his European integration rhetoric and reiterated to Western partners his own willingness to sign the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU. On November 21, the real position of the ruling elite was made available to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. According to it, the process of preparation for the signing of the Association Agreement was suspended, the proposal was made for the trilateral Ukraine-EU-Russia negotiations, and the ministries were tasked with developing measures to maintain economic ties with the CIS countries. The decision was rejected by European partners and led to Yanukovych’s attempts to find other ways to thwart the signing of the Agreement. It has been proved that this role was played by Yanukovych’s requirements for financial assistance from the EU amounting to about 160 billion euros, which aimed to prevent the signing of the Association Agreement. Key words: Viktor Yanukovych, association of Ukraine with the EU, эYulia Tymoshenko, European integration, Pat Cox, Alexander Kwasniewski, Vladimir Putin.


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