scholarly journals EQUAL LIBERTY, NONESTABLISHMENT, AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Legal Theory ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cécile Laborde

Egalitarian theories of religious freedom deny that religion is entitled to special treatment in law above and beyond that granted to comparable beliefs and practices. The most detailed and influential defense of such an approach is Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager's Religious Freedom and the Constitution (2007). In this essay I develop, elucidate, and show the limits of the “reductionist” strategy adopted by Eisgruber and Sager. The strategy requires that religion be analogized with other beliefs and practices according to a robust metric of comparison. I argue that Eisgruber and Sager fail to develop a consistent and coherent metric and I further suggest that this failure is symptomatic of the broader difficulty encountered by liberal theory in fitting the concept of religious freedom into a broadly egalitarian framework.

2020 ◽  
pp. 94-126
Author(s):  
Michael D. McNally

This chapter examines the failure in the courts of Native appeals to religious freedom protections for sacred lands, and it extends the previous chapter's analysis of the reception of Native claims to religion as religion. Where a religious claim conforms to the subjective, interior spirituality that has become naturalized in the United States, it has worked reasonably well in the courts. This is emphatically not the case where claims involve religious relationships with, uses of, and obligations to, land. The chapter explains how courts reason their way out of taking steps to protect Native American religious freedom when sacred places are threatened, a puzzling matter in that courts consistently acknowledge the sincerity of the religious beliefs and practices associated with those sacred places. Along the way the chapter develops a fuller sense of the workings of the discourse of Native American spirituality as it comes to control judicial comprehension of Native religious freedom claims.


Author(s):  
Andrew Koppelman

Proponents of special treatment for religion are increasingly drawn to the implausible claim that (what someone takes to be) divine commands should always supersede human ones. A better account would acknowledge that religion is only one among many profound human concerns. The recognition that there is an enormous variety of deep and valuable commitments undergirds the claims of both gay rights and religious freedom. These can only be protected one at a time, and that is a sufficient reason for singling out religion for special treatment.


Author(s):  
Carolyn Evans ◽  
Timnah Rachel Baker

This chapter examines the ways in which the tensions around proselytization and conversion highlight some of the conceptual difficulties of liberal theory formulations of religious freedom and the way in which different cultures and religious groups are reinterpreting the traditional conception of religious freedom to better fit their own cultural context. Using case-studies from India and Malaysia, the chapter demonstrates the way in which the indeterminate and open-ended language of international conventions on religious freedom can be both a strength (allowing for areas of cultural difference in a flexible way) and a weakness (with no strong determinate boundaries around acceptable behaviour). The language of ‘public order’ in particular, generally included in both international law and in domestic constitutions as a legitimate limitation to religious freedom, is often invoked to legitimize a religious/ethnic majoritarian agenda.


2014 ◽  
Vol 49 (6) ◽  
pp. 1903-1962 ◽  
Author(s):  
EDWARD MILLER

AbstractScholars have portrayed the 1963 ‘Buddhist crisis’ in South Vietnam as a struggle for religious freedom, as a political conspiracy, or as a manifestation of ancient religious beliefs and practices. This paper, in contrast, argues that the crisis emerged from a clash of modernizing visions. The Buddhist-led protests that took place in South Vietnam in 1963 were linked to the Vietnamese Buddhist revival, a nationalist reform movement that began during the early twentieth century. The protests also reflected growing Buddhist anxieties about the Ngo Dinh Diem government's nation-building agenda for South Vietnam. By the time the crisis began, Buddhist leaders had concluded that this agenda (which Diem referred to as the ‘Personalist Revolution’) was incompatible with their plans to realize Vietnam's destiny as a ‘Buddhist nation’. In addition to reinterpreting the origins of the crisis, this paper examines how the course of events was shaped by the personalities and agendas of particular Buddhist and government leaders, and especially by fierce rivalries among members of Diem's family. These internal tensions help to explain the failure of attempts to end the crisis through negotiations, as well as Diem's decision to crush the movement by force in August 1963.


2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 295-317
Author(s):  
Avigail Eisenberg

Abstract This paper examines the shift in how religious freedom is understood from a matter of protecting individual choice to a matter identity. According to the choice approach, the state must protect the individual’s freedom to choose but it cannot be expected to bear the costs of the religious choices citizens make. The identity approach treats the claims individuals and groups make about their religious commitments as non-negotiable facts rather than choices and considers the failure of the state to protect these commitments as unjust because it exposes the individual to disrespect and disadvantage, and stigmatizes and excludes them from full membership in the polity. This paper examines the political context in which the identity approach has emerged in the last 50 years. It then examines three implications of this shift from choice to identity for the protection of religious freedom. Such a shift 1) enhances the capacity of courts to address claims of historical injustice, 2) leads courts to focus on the religious practices of groups rather than individuals, and 3) increases the pressure on courts to assess the authenticity of religious beliefs and practices. These implications lead to significant challenges for public institutions, which are discussed in the final section of the paper.


2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (3) ◽  
pp. 493-503 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. JUDD OWEN

The prevailing view of both the U.S. Supreme Court and liberal theory in America is that liberal principles are neither essentially religious nor essentially secular, but somehow foundationally neutral, or in the words of the Court neutral between “religion and nonreligion.” This essay challenges the cogency of this view through a comparative examination of two strong defenders of religious freedom from the American revolutionary era: Thomas Jefferson and Isaac Backus. Jefferson, the Enlightenment rationalist, and Backus, the Calvinist-Baptist, may initially seem tailor-made for this foundational neutrality, but closer examination reveals that religious freedom for them was not only an extension of their radically opposed views on religion but also an instrument for the promotion of those views throughout society. The ambiguity of America's founding principles is best understood, not through the notion of neutrality, but as the product of a yet unsettled struggle between devout religion and secular Enlightenment.


Author(s):  
Micah Schwartzman

Recent debates about whether the liberal state should give special treatment to religion focus mainly on two issues: (1) whether religious beliefs deserve special exemptions from the law, and (2) whether religious beliefs can serve as a justification for political decision making. Theories of religious freedom can be described in terms of how they respond to each of these issues. A general taxonomy of such theories makes it possible to draw systematic comparisons between them. It also reveals that competing theories face a familiar pattern of objections based on concerns about equality and anarchy. In important ways, these concerns motivate and constrain all liberal theories of religious freedom. Explicating the tension between equality and anarchy helps to clarify the central commitments and limitations of existing and possible theories. By process of elimination, it also suggests an argument for the appeal of political liberalism.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 309
Author(s):  
Mohd Roslan Mohd Nor ◽  
Issa Khan ◽  
Mohammad Elius

This study evaluates the concept of religious freedom and interreligious relationships in Islam. The research engages in textual analysis and historical interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunnah (the Prophetic tradition) regarding the freedom of religious beliefs and practices as well as Muslim relationships with people of other religions. The study shows that Islam plays a unique role in providing every individual with the complete freedom to possess and practiceany religion, culture or ideology. It also shows that as a universal religion,Islam advocates a harmonious relationship among the people of differentreligions, cultures and civilisations for the peaceful coexistence and harmoniousdevelopment of all human beings. The study concludes that Islam as a completeway of life preserves the beliefs and practices of every individual and maintainsa peaceful relationship between the followers of one religion and another. Itconstitutes a viable model for resolving religious hatred and promoting peaceand justice among people of diverse ethnic, religious and cultural backgrounds.


2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-70
Author(s):  
Charles McCrary

AbstractThis article employs the trinary framework to interrogate American religious freedom and religious actors’ interaction with theusstate. It focuses on issues of governance and the classification and management of state subjects and their activities, showing how these lived effects are entwined with more “academic” or intellectual concerns about the categories religion and superstition. The article uses “superstition” in two ways. First, it is a term many Americans, from jurists to popular writers to academics, have used to describe human activities, often with racial assumptions and implications built into the framework. Second, scholars today might use the term, as part of the trinary, as an analytical device. The argument is that because the United States guarantees religious freedom, the state (or, more specifically, a particular state agent) must classify beliefs and practices as religious. This leaves a third category of activities that are clearly not secular but are also not religious, because they are not protected. Thus, we might call this third category “superstition” or “the superstitious.” The article tests this framework with two brief case studies drawn from the early and late twentieth century, respectively.


Author(s):  
Joedson De Souza Delgado ◽  
Gabrielle Jacobi Kölling

The purpose of this study is to analyze religious discrimination in work environments under the aegis of freedom as worthy of protection as opposed to the right to business freedom. With the scope of religious freedom and its limitation parametrized, the article determines in which cases and conditions conduct can be characterized as intolerance or be considered by the employer as reasonable accommodation of religion in the scope of work. To perform this analysis, a qualitative approach was used, with bibliographic and descriptive methodological procedures. It is concluded that, to protect freedom of belief and religion, liberal theory (legal policy) is used for the promotion of individual autonomy and human dignity.


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