Questions about the Nature and Value of Reasoning
This chapter provides a brief and informal introduction to some of the central philosophical questions about reasoning. Among the questions discussed are: What distinguishes reasoning from other mental processes, such as free association or daydreaming? Does reasoning require a recognition that one’s premises support one’s conclusion? Is reasoning something that we do, and as such, something that we can be held responsible for? If so, how should we understand the role that sub-personal information processing plays in much of our ordinary reasoning? How can we characterize the difference between good reasoning and bad, or between correct and incorrect reasoning? Are there rules for correct reasoning? If so, do they go beyond minimal coherence constraints, such as the constraint against believing contradictions? How should we understand reasoning that departs from the paradigm of deductive reasoning? Do the same rules apply to all of us? Can two thinkers reason well from the same premises and yet arrive at incompatible conclusions? This introductory chapter provides a brief overview of how the essays in this collection address these and other questions about reasoning.