Good Reasons?
This chapter attempts to identify discursive commonalities in a critical manner. If categories from practical philosophy are of significance for understanding social norms and how these can be adequately described, then taking a look at the philosophical discourse provides an entry point. Of course, speaking of practical philosophy as such is somewhat limiting in light of the sheer breadth of such discourse, even more so in that philosophical debates are contentious not only in their solutions but in the very definition of problems. However, the chapter makes the attempt nevertheless. Its focus here is driven by the presumption that at least the identification of problems is not too vague an enterprise in contemporary practical philosophy, and that it indeed plays a decisive role for a theory of the normative. Möllers analyzes the deficits of philosophical concepts of normativity, focusing on theories that conceive of norms as reasons for action. He concludes that they fail to offer an adequate description of the social practice of the normative.