Why the Mind Wanders

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caitlin Mills ◽  
Arianne Herrera-Bennett ◽  
Myrthe Faber ◽  
Kalina Christoff
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Mental Content ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Semantic Knowledge ◽  
Default Mode ◽  
Memory Efficiency ◽  
Random Fashion ◽  
Phenomenological Account ◽  
Episodic Memories ◽  
The Mind

This chapter offers a functional account of why the mind—when free from the demands of a task or the constraints of heightened emotions—tends to wander from one topic to another, in a ceaseless and seemingly random fashion. We propose the default variability hypothesis, which builds on William James’s phenomenological account of thought as a form of mental locomotion, as well as on recent advances in cognitive neuroscience and computational modeling. Specifically, the default variability hypothesis proposes that the default mode of mental content production yields the frequent arising of new mental states that have heightened variability of content over time. This heightened variability in the default mode of mental content production may be an adaptive mechanism that (1) enhances episodic memory efficiency through de-correlating individual episodic memories from one another via temporally spaced reactivations, and (2) facilitates semantic knowledge optimization by providing optimal conditions for interleaved learning.

scholarly journals The Default Mode of Human Brain Function Primes the Intentional Stance

2015 ◽  
Vol 27 (6) ◽  
pp. 1116-1124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert P. Spunt ◽  
Meghan L. Meyer ◽  
Matthew D. Lieberman
Keyword(s):  
Human Brain ◽  
Brain Function ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Social World ◽  
Brain Regions ◽  
Social Stimulus ◽  
Intentional Stance ◽  
Default Mode ◽  
Human Tendency ◽  
The Mind

Humans readily adopt an intentional stance to other people, comprehending their behavior as guided by unobservable mental states such as belief, desire, and intention. We used fMRI in healthy adults to test the hypothesis that this stance is primed by the default mode of human brain function present when the mind is at rest. We report three findings that support this hypothesis. First, brain regions activated by actively adopting an intentional rather than nonintentional stance to a social stimulus were anatomically similar to those demonstrating default responses to fixation baseline in the same task. Second, moment-to-moment variation in default activity during fixation in the dorsomedial PFC was related to the ease with which participants applied an intentional—but not nonintentional—stance to a social stimulus presented moments later. Finally, individuals who showed stronger dorsomedial PFC activity at baseline in a separate task were generally more efficient when adopting the intentional stance and reported having greater social skills. These results identify a biological basis for the human tendency to adopt the intentional stance. More broadly, they suggest that the brain's default mode of function may have evolved, in part, as a response to life in a social world.

The Definition of the Human Mind in Its Derivation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ursula Renz
Keyword(s):  
Mental Content ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
The Body ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Finite Minds

This chapter analyzes the passages in which Spinoza develops his definition of the human mind. It begins by reading 2p11 as denying that the mind is something like a bearer of mental states. Next, the chapter argues that, in claiming that the mind is part of the infinite intellect, Spinoza is not referring to the mind’s activity but rather defending holism with respect to mental content. Through an examination of the wording of 2p12, the chapter shows that, contrary to most interpretations, Spinoza does not assume that the human mind perceives any affections of the body. The chapter concludes by showing how, by identifying the mind with the idea of the body, Spinoza solves the problem of the numerical difference between finite minds. Altogether, the chapter shows that, for Spinoza, the human mind is not an idea that God cognizes but the awareness by which we identify our own body.

scholarly journals Activity in the brain’s valuation and mentalizing networks is associated with propagation of online recommendations

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisa C. Baek ◽  
Matthew Brook O’Donnell ◽  
Christin Scholz ◽  
Rui Pei ◽  
Javier O. Garcia ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Word Of Mouth ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Brain Regions ◽  
Prior Work ◽  
Opinion Change ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Mentalizing System

AbstractWord of mouth recommendations influence a wide range of choices and behaviors. What takes place in the mind of recommendation receivers that determines whether they will be successfully influenced? Prior work suggests that brain systems implicated in assessing the value of stimuli (i.e., subjective valuation) and understanding others’ mental states (i.e., mentalizing) play key roles. The current study used neuroimaging and natural language classifiers to extend these findings in a naturalistic context and tested the extent to which the two systems work together or independently in responding to social influence. First, we show that in response to text-based social media recommendations, activity in both the brain’s valuation system and mentalizing system was associated with greater likelihood of opinion change. Second, participants were more likely to update their opinions in response to negative, compared to positive, recommendations, with activity in the mentalizing system scaling with the negativity of the recommendations. Third, decreased functional connectivity between valuation and mentalizing systems was associated with opinion change. Results highlight the role of brain regions involved in mentalizing and positive valuation in recommendation propagation, and further show that mentalizing may be particularly key in processing negative recommendations, whereas the valuation system is relevant in evaluating both positive and negative recommendations.

Attentional Fluctuations Influence the Neural Fidelity and Connectivity of Stimulus Representations

2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (9) ◽  
pp. 1209-1228 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Rothlein ◽  
Joseph DeGutis ◽  
Michael Esterman
Keyword(s):  
Functional Connectivity ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Brain Networks ◽  
Relevant Information ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Attention Task ◽  
Default Mode ◽  
Neural Representations ◽  
Similarity Structure ◽  
Similarity Matrices

Attention is thought to facilitate both the representation of task-relevant features and the communication of these representations across large-scale brain networks. However, attention is not “all or none,” but rather it fluctuates between stable/accurate (in-the-zone) and variable/error-prone (out-of-the-zone) states. Here we ask how different attentional states relate to the neural processing and transmission of task-relevant information. Specifically, during in-the-zone periods: (1) Do neural representations of task stimuli have greater fidelity? (2) Is there increased communication of this stimulus information across large-scale brain networks? Finally, (3) can the influence of performance-contingent reward be differentiated from zone-based fluctuations? To address these questions, we used fMRI and representational similarity analysis during a visual sustained attention task (the gradCPT). Participants ( n = 16) viewed a series of city or mountain scenes, responding to cities (90% of trials) and withholding to mountains (10%). Representational similarity matrices, reflecting the similarity structure of the city exemplars ( n = 10), were computed from visual, attentional, and default mode networks. Representational fidelity (RF) and representational connectivity (RC) were quantified as the interparticipant reliability of representational similarity matrices within (RF) and across (RC) brain networks. We found that being in the zone was characterized by increased RF in visual networks and increasing RC between visual and attentional networks. Conversely, reward only increased the RC between the attentional and default mode networks. These results diverge with analogous analyses using functional connectivity, suggesting that RC and functional connectivity in tandem better characterize how different mental states modulate the flow of information throughout the brain.

Luminosity and the KK Thesis

2019 ◽  
pp. 31-48
Author(s):  
Robert C. Stalnaker
Keyword(s):  
Information Theory ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
The State ◽  
Simplified Model ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Margin Of Error ◽  
The Mind

A mental state is luminous if and only if being in a state of that kind always puts one in a position to know that one is in the state. This chapter is a critique of Timothy Williamson’s margin-of-error argument that no nontrivial states are luminous in this sense. While I agree with Williamson’s rejection of a Cartesian internalist conception of the mind, I argue that an externalist conception (one based on information theory) can be reconciled with the luminosity of intentional mental states such as knowledge. My argument, which uses an artificial and simplified model of knowledge, is not a direct rebuttal to his argument, as applied to a more realistic notion of the knowledge of human beings, but I argue that it shows that a luminosity assumption is compatible with externalism about knowledge, and it suggest an intuitively plausible strategy for resisting his argument.

Postposition-like constructions

2020 ◽  
pp. 677-685
Author(s):  
Gerjan van Schaaik
Keyword(s):  
Mental Content ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Case Marker ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Instrumental Case ◽  
Linguistic Structures ◽  
Predicate Position

There are a relatively small number of linguistic structures that seemingly consists of a noun expanded by a possessive suffix third-person singular and a locative, ablative, or instrumental case marker. They are used as adverbial phrases. The possessive element, however, has no antecedent, and that is why these constructions bear the semblance of postpositions more than that of real nouns. In particular, temporal constructions based on a noun denoting some moment, period, or duration behave like real postpositions in that they allow for indefinite and finite complements. Various postposition-like structures can also be used in predicate position and thus take a person marker. These constructions are typical for the description of mental states and mental content and of instances of intention, decision, and obligation.

Materialism in the philosophy of mind

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Howard Robinson
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Main Difficulty ◽  
Ordinary Sense ◽  
Causal Dependence ◽  
Physical Relation ◽  
The Third ◽  
Almost All ◽  
The Mind

Materialism – which, for almost all purposes, is the same as physicalism – is the theory that everything that exists is material. Natural science shows that most things are intelligible in material terms, but mind presents problems in at least two ways. The first is consciousness, as found in the ‘raw feel’ of subjective experience. The second is the intentionality of thought, which is the property of being about something beyond itself; ‘aboutness’ seems not to be a physical relation in the ordinary sense. There have been three ways of approaching these problems. The hardest is eliminativism, according to which there are no ‘raw feels’, no intentionality and, in general, no mental states: the mind and all its furniture are part of an outdated science that we now see to be false. Next is reductionism, which seeks to give an account of our experience and of intentionality in terms which are acceptable to a physical science: this means, in practice, analysing the mind in terms of its role in producing behaviour. Finally, the materialist may accept the reality and irreducibility of mind, but claim that it depends on matter in such an intimate way – more intimate than mere causal dependence – that materialism is not threatened by the irreducibility of mind. The first two approaches can be called ‘hard materialism’, the third ‘soft materialism’. The problem for eliminativism is that we find it difficult to credit that any belief that we think and feel is a theoretical speculation. Reductionism’s main difficulty is that there seems to be more to consciousness than its contribution to behaviour: a robotic machine could behave as we do without thinking or feeling. The soft materialist has to explain supervenience in a way that makes the mind not epiphenomenal without falling into the problems of interactionism.

Mind, identity theory of

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Jackson
Keyword(s):  
Central Nervous System ◽  
Nervous System ◽  
Identity Theory ◽  
Brain Activity ◽  
Modern Science ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Ontological Categories ◽  
Great Merit ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

We know that the brain is intimately connected with mental activity. Indeed, doctors now define death in terms of the cessation of the relevant brain activity. The identity theory of mind holds that the intimate connection is identity: the mind is the brain, or, more precisely, mental states are states of the brain. The theory goes directly against a long tradition according to which mental and material belong to quite distinct ontological categories – the mental being essentially conscious, the material essentially unconscious. This tradition has been bedevilled by the problem of how essentially immaterial states could be caused by the material world, as would happen when we see a tree, and how they could cause material states, as would happen when we decide to make an omelette. A great merit of the identity theory is that it avoids this problem: interaction between mental and material becomes simply interaction between one subset of material states, namely certain states of a sophisticated central nervous system, and other material states. The theory also brings the mind within the scope of modern science. More and more phenomena are turning out to be explicable in the physical terms of modern science: phenomena once explained in terms of spells, possession by devils, Thor’s thunderbolts, and so on, are now explained in more mundane, physical terms. If the identity theory is right, the same goes for the mind. Neuroscience will in time reveal the secrets of the mind in the same general way that the theory of electricity reveals the secrets of lightning. This possibility has received enormous support from advances in computing. We now have at least the glimmerings of an idea of how a purely material or physical system could do some of the things minds can do. Nevertheless, there are many questions to be asked of the identity theory. How could states that seem so different turn out to be one and the same? Would neurophysiologists actually see my thoughts and feelings if they looked at my brain? When we report on our mental states what are we reporting on – our brains?

Disorders of consciousness, memory, and will

2018 ◽  
pp. 51-86
Author(s):  
Walter Glannon
Keyword(s):  
Psychiatric Disorder ◽  
Mental Content ◽  
Mental States ◽  
External World ◽  
The Body ◽  
Disorders Of Consciousness ◽  
Action Plans ◽  
Flexible Behavior ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Insight Into

This chapter examines major psychiatric disorders as disorders of consciousness, memory, and will. All of these disorders involve disturbances in how the brain processes and integrates information about the body and external world. Distorted mental content in these psychopathologies impairs the capacity to consider different action plans, and to form and execute particular plans in particular actions. Dysfunctional mental states correlating with dysfunctional neural states impair the capacity for flexible behavior and adaptability to the environment. This dysfunction also impairs the capacity for insight into a psychiatric disorder and understanding the need for and motivation to seek treatment.

Complexity is a cue to the mind

2004 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 585-586
Author(s):  
George Kampis
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
General Framework ◽  
Dynamical Behavior ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Target Article ◽  
The Mind

The relevance of chaotic itinerancy and other types of exotic dynamical behavior described by Tsuda (2001) certainly goes beyond the scope of his target article. These concepts of dynamics may offer a general framework for the understanding of complexity, which could help to restructure the analysis and conceptualization of mental states in novel ways, providing insights for the philosophy of mind.

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