European Council Note - 20/21 February: Coming to Terms with Failure

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-35
Author(s):  
Peter Ludlow

The latest Briefng Note documents and seeks to explain a failure. The special European Coun cil of 20-21 February did not just fail to reach an agreement on the EU's Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021-2027. It failed to indicate how one might be reached in the coming weeks or months. MFF negotiations are always diffcult and, in order to fnish the job, the heads of state and government had had to meet at least twice on previous occasions. The breakdown on this occasion was however ominously complete. There are many reasons for this failure. Four nevertheless appear to have been particularly relevant: ˙ The lethal juxtaposition of three irreconcilable factors. Firstly, the emergence over the pre vious fve years of a new, more ambitious EU agenda in the face of climate change and other major challenges, all of which required, and therefore raised expectations of, more rather than less EU expenditure. Secondly, the dependence of a huge clientele in most if not all member states on the maintenance of EU funding for Cohesion and the Common Agricultural Policy. Thirdly, Brexit, which meant that at a time when it needed to spend more, the EU was bound to have revenue at least 10 billion euros per annum less than in the current MFF. ˙ The entrenchment of group think. Caucuses are normal and healthy. Before and at the February European Council, however, the two main caucuses, the Frugal Four, led by Mark Rutte, and the Cohesion Group, led by Antonio Costa, displayed levels of collective intran sigence which made agreement impossible. ˙ The inability of Angela Merkel to take the lead in breaking the impasse. Macron's marginal utility was par for the course as far as French presidents in MFF negotiations are concerned. Merkel, whose position at home had been seriously undermined in the previous fortnight in Thuringia and then in Berlin, could not however step into the breach, even though on the Friday morning she tried to do so. ˙ The failure of Charles Michel, the European Council president, to maintain his grip on a process which, as a result of his own initiative, had become Michelsache as much as if not more than Chefsache . Since 21 February, the MFF negotiations have been overtaken by the Covid-19 crisis. This has at one and the same time made an early resumption of the process improbable and cast doubts on some of the factors which militated against success in February. In a situation of unprec edented gravity, European Council members, both severally and collectively, have been chal lenged 'to think outside the box', particularly about the role of public fnance in facilitating post-crisis recovery. And some at least have begun to do so At the same time, the stock of the intransigents in general and of Mark Rutte in particular has fallen sharply. Thirdly, Michel has been given a fresh lease of life. Whenever therefore the MFF negotiations resume they will do so in a very different environment.

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-55
Author(s):  
Peter Ludlow

The present paper resumes where the previous paper in this series concluded. At its video conference on 23 April the European Council mandated the Commission to draft a Recovery Plan, and on 21 July, at the end of a fve-day meeting, it signed off on a Recovery Fund and a revised MFF.<br/> The size and economic signifcance of the package are illustrated in the text and tables. It is big money which, because it is targeted primarily at the more vulnerable member states, should have a considerable economic impact, particularly in the South. Talk of a crossing of the Rubicon is nonetheless misplaced. Firstly because, though large, it is still much smaller than member states' Covid-related spending. Secondly, more importantly, because the politics of the agreement, which are analysed at some length in the narrative section of the paper, confrm that the leading players in Europe's Union of sovereign states have little or no appetite for the huge systemic changes which would be required to deliver on the federalists' dream.<br/> Four features of the political narrative are of particular importance.<br/> Firstly, the making of the July agreement was a success story which, in the face of widespread scepticism, confrmed that the EU can deliver. As a result, both the self-confdence of the insiders and the standing of the EU with its citizens have been boosted.<br/> Secondly, the story vindicated the Union's European Council centred system of government. Media focus on the 18 May Statement by Merkel and Macron was misleading. The story begins on 23 April and ends on 21 July with the European Council.<br/> Thirdly, individuals and institutions matter too. In institutional terms, the European Commission, the Council's rotating Presidency as well as the European Council itself have been at the heart of the process. In individual terms, Angela Merkel was once again in a league of her own, von der Leyen and Michel performed well, and the leaders of the F4, reinforced for most of the time by the Finnish prime minister, left their mark in a positive still more than a negative sense. As too did Conte and Sanchez. Macron was also important needless to say, but not as important as the French government and the international media suggested.<br/> Fourthly, the story draws attention to the limits as well as the potential of the system. Two closely related episodes since July are cited by way of illustration. In the frst, the negotiations between the German Council Presidency and the European Parliament about the budget, the parliamentary negotiators over-estimated both the powers and the signifcance of the Parliament in the system. In the second, involving the Council, the Parliament and the Hungarian and Polish governments, the latter have, as often before, challenged the shared values on which the EU system is based. On this occasion however their interlocutors have considerable leverage and, rightly in our view, appear determined to stand frm, even if, as is still possible, this puts the MFF/NGEU package at risk.


Author(s):  
V.B. Belov

The article examines the results of the last Bundestag elections. They marked the end of the Angela Merkel era and reflected the continuation of difficult party-political and socio-economic processes in the informal leader of the European Union. The main attention of the research focuses on the peculiarities of the election campaign of the leading parties and of the search for ways of further development of Germany in the face of urgent economic and political challenges. These challenges include the impact of the coronavirus crisis, the impact of the energy and digital transition to a climate-neutral economy, and the complex international situation. Based on original sources, the author analyzes the causes of the SPD victory and the CDU/CSU bloc defeat, the results of the negotiations of the Social Democrats with the Greens and Liberals, the content of the coalition agreement from the point of view of the prospects for the development of domestic and foreign policy and the economy of Russia&apos;s main partner in the west of the Eurasian continent. The conclusion is made about the absence of breakthrough ideas, the consistent continuation of the course started by the previous government for a carbon-free economy and the strengthening of the role of Germany in Europe and the world. For this course, conflicts and problems in achieving the set goals will be immanent due to the compromising nature of the coalition agreements.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (Suppl. 1) ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Denis Horgan ◽  
Walter Ricciardi

In the world of modern health, despite the fact that we've been blessed with amazing advances of late - the advent of personalised medicine is just one example - “change” for most citizens seems slow. There are clear discrepancies in availability of the best care for all, the divisions in access from country to country, wealthy to poor, are large. There are even discrepancies between regions of the larger countries, where access often varies alarmingly. Too many Member States (with their competence for healthcare) appear to be clinging stubbornly to the concept of “one-size-fits-all” in healthcare and often stifle advances possible through personalised medicine. Meanwhile, the legislative arena encompassing health has grown big and unwieldy in many respects. And bigger is not always better. The health advances spoken of above, an increased knowledge on the part of patients, the emergence of Big Data and more, are quickly changing the face of healthcare in Europe. But healthcare thinking across the EU isn't changing fast enough. The new technologies will certainly speak for themselves, but only if allowed to do so. Acknowledging that, this article highlights a positive reform agenda, while explaining that new avenues need to be explored.


Author(s):  
Wolfgang Wessels ◽  
Linda Dieke

The observer´s first impression of the European Council is one of tired European Union (EU) leaders who, after dramatic late-night sessions, try to explain ambiguous compromises on key issues of European policies to their media audiences. From a researcher’s perspective, however, there are still many blank areas—a matter resulting from the various obstacles of analyzing this EU institution. The relevance of the European Council’s decisions has driven research on its agenda formation, decision-making and internal dynamics, its legal status and democratic legitimacy. Yet research on the European Council can be cumbersome and methodologically demanding due to the lack of confirmed empirical evidence: meetings of the European Council are consultations behind closed doors and the dense network of mutual information difficult to access. The conclusions are only a concentrate of the discussions held within. It is furthermore a challenge to explain the causal links between the diplomatic language of the conclusions and the real impact these measures have on EU politics. Nevertheless, the European Council is a vivid object of investigation. Since its creation in 1974, the European Council has undergone structural and formal changes: from the increase to up to 28 heads of state or government, to the establishment of a permanent president and the formal inclusion in the institutional setup of the EU in the Lisbon Treaty. From the first “summits” onwards, the Lisbon Treaty had a crucial role in the development of the EU system and the formulation of the underlying treaties. In crisis, it was often the only constellation able to provide consensual and thus effective proposals. Meanwhile, the scope of its activities has been enlarged toward a state-like agenda. It now covers topics at the very heart of national sovereignty. To these issues dealing with core state powers belong economic governance, migration policy, justice and home affairs, and external action, including security policy. Academic controversies about this cornerstone of the Union derive from intergovernmental or quasi-federalist assessments of the institution or from the powers and limitations of “summits” in general and in relation to other EU institutions. Some argue that the European Council shifts the institutional balance toward intergovernmentalist structures. Others stress the European Council’s role in transferring competences to supranationalist institutions. Further debates focus on whether the European Council has (successfully) overtaken the role of a “crisis manager,” or how its embeddedness in the EU institutional architecture could be enhanced, especially vis-à-vis the Council and toward a constructive and balanced relationship with the EP, in future treaty revisions. Analyses of power and of the role of institutions—especially of a key institution as the European Council—are crucial issues of social sciences. Research projects on this highly interesting EU institution will have to assess which methods are adequate: from studying the treaty provisions, formalized agreements and conclusions, to observing its activities as well as tracing external contexts and the internal constellations of the European Council, to evaluating information considered as “anecdotal evidence” from interviews, biographies, and speeches from the few members of this institution.


1994 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuwa Wong

This article approaches the current global environmental crisis from an evolutionary perspective. It identifies two features in contemporary states' behavior: impotence and intransigence in the face of global crisis. These traits stem from humanity's evolutionary past, in which groups had to maintain their integrity while surviving intergroup competition. Contemporary sovereign states are groups that have survived this process, and they guard their sovereignty vigilantly. They do so by instituting coercive measures on the one hand and cultivating members' loyalty on the other. A belief of common descent must be articulated successfully in order for members to feel group solidarity. Hence, states are intransigent in maintaining that they truly represent the welfare of their members. To the extent that states are successful in inculcating a belief of common descent and identity, they are also constrained in acting altruistically—hence, their impotence in the face of deepening global crisis. To find a way out of this dilemma, strategic alternatives are explored. The emerging role of nongovernment organizations, with certain caveats, is seen as promising.


Author(s):  
Bruce Wilson

In 2013, ANZJES published an article on the significance of European Union (EU) Regional Policy in the process of European integration and its implications for Asia. Over the past decade, EU Regional Policy has evolved considerably. It is still centred on facilitating European integration, but also assumes a much more central role in focusing attention on harnessing resources, intellectual and economic, in order to address major societal missions. Regional Policy, or Cohesion, funds constitute approximately one third of the total European Commission budget and are, therefore, not only an important resource for integration, but also for addressing the wider priorities around the European Green Deal, and indeed, the planet. This is evident in the proposed Multiannual Financial Framework agreed by the European Council for 2021-27, in which Cohesion funding is seen to be a crucial resource for economic and social recovery from the COVID-19 crisis. This article reviews the evolution of this thinking in the last decade and considers its growing international significance. Whilst not necessarily imagined in 2010, when the EU established its European External Action Service (EEAS), a focus on regions and their innovation systems has enabled the EU to strengthen its global influence significantly.


2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 505-522
Author(s):  
Christina Eckes

Counter-terrorist sanctions against private individuals adopted by the EU and by the UN are an exceptionally illustrative example of the executive’s power grasp, where the dangers of counter-terrorist policies and of externalized rulemaking have mutually reinforced each other. This article (re-)considers the role of the judiciary in the face of extreme exercise of externalized executive powers, demonstrates that multilayered governance has extended the powers of courts, shows that the justified exercise of judicial power has led the EU institutions and the Member States into a self-inflicted catch-22, and makes an argument that the extended powers of the executive and of the judiciary should be contained and guided by a principled choice of the constituent power. Constitutional law should require the judiciary to take a substantive approach to multilayered governance that reflects the principle of separation of powers.


Author(s):  
Sara Hagemann

Abstract The 2020 COVID pandemic has posed an unprecedented challenge to Europe’s economies, societies and political institutions. Finding solutions for the immediate and longer-term impact of the pandemic requires collaboration between the European Union’s (EU) member states and leadership from their governments at both national and European levels. The President of the European Council is central to this process, as he leads and facilitates the collaboration between the heads of states and governments. Looking back at the lessons from Donald Tusk’s time as President of the European Council from 2014 to 2019, this article argues that Tusk made an immensely important political contribution to the EU as he set the tone for a liberal and progressive agenda at a time of significant threat from populist and pro-Russian voices in Europe. However, with the recent political and institutional developments in the EU, and based on the insights from Mr Tusk’s successes and challenges, the article also argues that the role of the European Council President today requires strong brokering skills and leadership behind the scenes more than an openly political and public figure.


Author(s):  
Nigar Tahir qizi Sultanova

The European Council represents the supreme level of political cooperation between the EU member-states. Diverse questions pertaining to international politics are discusses on the various levels: summits (in 2019 EU &ndash; League of Arab States summit, EU &ndash;China summit, EU &ndash; Ukraine summit in Kyiv, EU &ndash; Canada summit in Montreal, G7 summit); conferences and informal meetings; council boards on foreign affairs; joint conferences; association councils, etc. A new strategic agenda 2019-2024 adopted by the European Council determines he priority areas that guide the work of the European Special Councils and other EU institutions. Transatlantic relations, crises in Syria, Ukraine and other parts of the world, relations with Russia, Iran nuclear deal, and other question remain on the agenda of the European Council. The article explores the legal framework of the actions of European Council in the area of foreign policy. The overview of foreign policy agenda of the European Council allows analyzing the role of the European Union on the international arena.


2021 ◽  
pp. 115-127
Author(s):  
Nikol Neveceralova

This contribution focus on the revenue side of the EU budget, which consists of own resources, divided into traditional resources, income in the form of a share of value-added tax, and gross national income. On 21 July 2020, the European Council agreed on a multiannual financial framework for the period 2021-2027, and in response to the pandemic situation associated with Covid-19, a temporary recovery instrument for the next generation of the EU was agreed. At the same time, from which it was apparent that it is necessary to find new own resources for the EU, and how the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) could be used to the consequences of the corona crisis. The author will focus mainly on issues on the revenue side of the Union budget and the role of the ESM. Within the ongoing debates when the result was the coronavirus response the question arises of whether it would be appropriate and effective to introduce a common tax for the EU. The main aim of the contribution is to use the descriptive method, the method of analysis and synthesis the revenue side system of the EU budget, and the reform efforts that culminated in the reform of own resources. In the last part of the article, the author using a descriptive method on how the ESM was activated as one of the walls to maintain the stability of the euro area. Including the view of introducing a common European tax as a fiscal instrument to cover the expenditures (debt) incurred related to coronavirus response i.e. recovery instrument Next Generation.


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