CHINA'S OPTIMAL STRATEGY AGAINST THE EUROPEAN UNION AVIATION CARBON TAX SCHEME: A TWO-STAGE GAME MODEL ANALYSIS

The article analyzes the current conditions of professional real estate evaluation in the Russian Federation and draws a conclusion — this sphere is in crisis. The authors noted an appearance of a new type of real estate evaluation related to their "environmentalness" ("green evaluators"). Particular attention is paid to the recent events at the federal level related to the climate agenda and caused by the introduction by the European Union of a border carbon tax. Since real estate objects are one of the main sources of greenhouse emissions, it becomes necessary to take into account the factors of climatic and environmental assessment of real estate, including those for taxation. So, a new direction of economic measurements is being formed — ESG (environmental, social, and governance) evaluation. Taking into account the mistakes made in the evaluation methodology, the authors give the recommendations for the creation of an ESG-evaluation methodology based on the post-neoclassical paradigm and qualimetric methods.

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Marketing Resource Allocation Strategy Optimization Based on Dynamic Game Model

Journal of Mathematics ◽

10.1155/2022/4370298 ◽

2022 ◽

Vol 2022 ◽

pp. 1-9

Author(s):

Yan Long ◽

Hongshan Zhao

Keyword(s):

Nonlinear Dynamics ◽

Network Model ◽

Data Transmission ◽

Dynamic Game ◽

Transmission Model ◽

Game Model ◽

Two Stage ◽

Cooperative Solution ◽

Subgame Consistency ◽

Stage Game

Game theory has become an important tool to study the competition between oligopolistic enterprises. After combing the existing literature, it is found that there is no research combining two-stage game and nonlinear dynamics to analyze the competition between enterprises for advertising. Therefore, this paper establishes a two-stage game model to discuss the effect of the degree of firms’ advertising input on their profits. And the complexity of the system is analyzed using nonlinear dynamics. This paper analyzes and studies the dynamic game for two types of application network models: data transmission model and transportation network model. Under the time-gap ALOHA protocol, the noncooperative behavior of the insiders in the dynamic data transmission stochastic game is examined as well as the cooperative behavior. In this paper, the existence of Nash equilibrium and its solution algorithm are proved in the noncooperative case, and the “subgame consistency” of the cooperative solution (Shapley value) is discussed in the cooperative case, and the cooperative solution satisfying the subgame consistency is obtained by constructing the “allocation compensation procedure.” The cooperative solution is obtained by constructing the “allocation compensation procedure” to satisfy the subgame consistency. In this paper, we propose to classify the packets transmitted by the source nodes, and by changing the strategy of the source nodes at the states with different kinds of packets, we find that the equilibrium payment of the insider increases in the noncooperative game with the addition of the “wait” strategy. In the transportation dynamic network model, the problem of passenger flow distribution and the selection of service parameters of transportation companies are also studied, and a two-stage game theoretical model is proposed to solve the equilibrium price and optimal parameters under Wardrop’s criterion.

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Carbon Taxes Implementation Policies: Global and European Dimensions

Research Papers ◽

10.37075/rp.2021.5.04 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 61 (5) ◽

pp. 93-120

Keyword(s):

Carbon Dioxide ◽

European Union ◽

Carbon Tax ◽

Carbon Dioxide Emission ◽

Basic Research ◽

The European Union ◽

Carbon Taxes ◽

Trading Systems ◽

Available Carbon ◽

Border Adjustment

The objective of the research is to analyze the present framework of available carbon taxes worldwide as one of the contemporary methods for cost engineering of carbon dioxide emission. For the achievement of this objective two basic research tasks have been fulfilled: 1) the essence and framework of and the effects stemming from the application of the basic carbon dioxide pricing approaches (the Emissions Trading Systems, Carbon Taxes, Offset Mechanisms, Results Based Climate Finance and Internal Pricing of the carbon emissions) have been presented; and 2) the European Union dimension of the application of a new carbon tax has been discussed within the context of the Carbon border adjustment mechanism (the carbon border tax) of the European union. The research methods that have been used are comparative analysis, content analysis, elements of the retrospective analysis and generalizations of the ideas of main analytical documents in this field. The results of the research are generalizations and analyses providing solid ground for taking evidence-based decisions regarding future carbon taxes introduction at national and EU level as well as for addressing motivated recommendations towards the application of this type of taxes.

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Constitutional Transparency

The Oxford Handbook of Economic and Institutional Transparency ◽

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199917693.013.0002 ◽

2014 ◽

pp. 32-67

Author(s):

Richard J. Sweeney

Keyword(s):

European Union ◽

Supreme Court ◽

Single Stage ◽

Type I ◽

Type Ii ◽

The European Union ◽

Two Stage ◽

Multistage Processes ◽

Type Ii Errors ◽

Constitutional Changes

For economics, finance, and business purposes, constitutional transparency largely means predictability. Decisions to change a constitution can result in type I errors—accepting changes that do not improve welfare—or type II errors—rejecting a change that would improve welfare. Virtually all written constitutions can change formally through amendments or implicitly through high court interpretations. Evidence shows the two-stage US amendment process is less likely to make type I and type II errors than Supreme Court interpretations. Elites propose European Union (EU) constitutional changes and much the same elites accept them; the procedure appears two-stage but is close to single-stage. Supreme Court, EU, and UK constitutional changes are essentially single-stage procedures, relying on elites. Of the 24 countries and the European Union discussed here, 11 use a two-stage procedure. A wisdom-of-crowds argument supports multistage processes.

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A Novel Two-Stage Game Model for Pricing Cloud/Fog Computing Resource in Blockchain Systems

Asia Pacific Journal of Operational Research ◽

10.1142/s0217595922400012 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Jinmian Chen ◽

Yukun Cheng ◽

Zhiqi Xu

Keyword(s):

Fog Computing ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Stage Ii ◽

Game Model ◽

New Paradigm ◽

Two Stage ◽

Dynamic Interactions ◽

Computing Resource ◽

Game Equilibrium ◽

Stage Game

Cloud/fog computing resource pricing is a new paradigm in the blockchain mining scheme, as the participants would like to purchase the cloud/fog computing resource to speed up their mining processes. In this paper, we propose a novel two-stage game to study the optimal price-based cloud/fog computing resource management, in which the cloud/fog computing resource provider (CFP) is the leader, setting the resource price in Stage I, and the mining pools act as the followers to decide their demands of the resource in Stage II. Since mining pools are bounded rational in practice, we model the dynamic interactions among them by an evolutionary game in Stage II, in which each pool pursues its evolutionary stable demand based on the observed price, through continuous learning and adjustments. Backward induction method is applied to analyze the sub-game equilibrium in each stage. Specifically in Stage II, we first build a general study framework for the evolutionary game model, and then provide a detailed theoretical analysis for a two-pool case to characterize the conditions for the existence of different evolutionary stable solutions. Referring to the real world, we conduct a series of numerical experiments, whose results validate our theoretical findings for the case of two mining pools. Additionally, the impacts from the size of mining block, the unit transaction fee and the price of token on the decision makings of participants are also discussed.

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A Game Research on the Integration between Xi’an and Xian Yang

Advanced Materials Research ◽

10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.368-373.1763 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 368-373 ◽

pp. 1763-1766

Author(s):

Jing Zhu ◽

Pei Zhang ◽

Hai Jun Sun

Keyword(s):

Game Theory ◽

European Union ◽

Prisoner's Dilemma ◽

Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽

Game Model ◽

The European Union ◽

Strategic Option ◽

Two Cities ◽

The Game Theory ◽

Angle Of View

The prisoner’s dilemma is applied to make the new game model between Xi’an and Xian Yang from Game Theory angle of view. In this new model, the profits inequality is taken into account when both sides face the same strategic option, which can make the model to approach more actual situations. The prisoner’s dilemma is the main handicap. Furthermore, the author built the interpretation framework of the two cities’ integration on the basis of the Game Theory and the inspirations of the European Union benefits gained by its members.

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