scholarly journals Unequal votes, unequal violence: Malapportionment and election violence in India

2019 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 156-170 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ursula Daxecker
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
State Level ◽  
Event Data ◽  
Parliamentary Elections ◽  
Electoral Violence ◽  
Voter Preferences ◽  
Electoral Outcomes ◽  
Industrialized Democracies ◽  
The One ◽  
Election Violence

Elections held outside of advanced, industrialized democracies can turn violent because elites use coercion to demobilize political opponents. The literature has established that closely contested elections are associated with more violence. I depart from this emphasis on competitiveness by highlighting how institutional biases in electoral systems, in particular uneven apportionment, affect incentives for violence. Malapportionment refers to a discrepancy between the share of legislative seats and the share of population, violating the ‘one person, one vote’ principle. Drawing on recent work on malapportionment establishing that overrepresented districts are targeted with clientelist strategies, are more homogenous, and are biased in favor of district-level incumbent parties, I argue that overrepresented districts present fewer incentives for using violence. In contrast, elites in well-apportioned or underrepresented districts exert less control over electoral outcomes because such districts have more heterogenous voter preferences, raising incumbent and opposition demands to employ violence. I examine the effects of malapportionment on violence using constituency-level elections data and new, disaggregated, and geocoded event data on the incidence of election violence in India. Results from six parliamentary elections from 1991 to 2009 show that electoral violence is less prevalent in overrepresented constituencies, and that violence increases in equally apportioned and moderately underrepresented districts. The analysis establishes additional observable implications of the argument for district voter homogeneity and incumbent victory, accounts for confounders such as urbanization and state-level partisanship, and validates measures of election violence. The findings illustrate that institutional biases shape incentives for electoral violence.

Contentious Land Narratives and the Nonescalation of Election Violence: Evidence from Kenya’s Coast Region

2017 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 51-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathleen Klaus
Keyword(s):  
Rift Valley ◽  
Regional Variation ◽  
Land Rights ◽  
The Political ◽  
Electoral Violence ◽  
Electoral Outcomes ◽  
Two Factors ◽  
Election Violence ◽  
Coast Region

Abstract:This article examines the puzzle of the nonescalation of electoral violence. Drawing on evidence from Kenya’s Coast and Rift Valley regions, the article argues that land narratives along the coast create few motives for people to participate in electoral violence because residents do not link their land rights with electoral outcomes. Politicians thus have far less power to use land narratives to organize violence. Two factors help account for this regional variation between the Rift Valley and the Coast: the strength of the political patron and the proportion of “outsiders” relative to “insiders.”

The Democratic and Republican Governors Associations and the Nationalization of American Party Politics, 1961–1968

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
Anthony Sparacino
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
State Level ◽  
Partisan Politics ◽  
State Governments ◽  
National Party ◽  
Government Programs ◽  
Party Organizations ◽  
Party Building ◽  
Electoral Outcomes ◽  
American Party

Abstract This article examines the origins and early activities of the Democratic and Republican Governors Associations (DGA and RGA, respectively) from the RGA's initial founding in 1961 through the 1968 national nominating conventions. I argue that the formations of these organizations were key moments in the transition from a decentralized to a more integrated and nationally programmatic party system. The DGA and RGA represent gubernatorial concern for and engagement in the development of national party programs and the national party organizations. Governors formed these groups because of the increasing importance of national government programs on the affairs of state governments and the recognition on the part of governors that national partisan politics was having critical effects on electoral outcomes at the state level, through the reputations of the national parties. To varying extents, the governors used these organizations to promote the national parties and contributed to national party-building efforts and the development of national party brands.

El personal directivo en las leyes autonómicas de desarrollo del EBEP

2011 ◽  
pp. 283-323
Author(s):  
Luis F. MAESO SECO
Keyword(s):  
Basque Country ◽  
State Level ◽  
Political Opportunity ◽  
Public Employment ◽  
Autonomous Communities ◽  
Administrative Culture ◽  
La Mancha ◽  
The One ◽  
Pais Vasco ◽  
Managerial Staff

LABURPENA: Lau urte dira Administrazio Publikoko Langileen Oinarrizko Estatutua indarrean sartu zela, baita horren 13. artikulua ere. Artikulu horretan gobernuei (estatukoa eta autonomia erkidegoetakoak) deia egin zitzaien, nahi izanez gero, zuzendaritzako langileen araubidea ezar zezaten. Arrazoi batzuengatik edo beste batzuengatik (aukera politikoa, administrazioaren erresistentzia, kontrako egoera ekonomikoak, eta abar), dei hori ez du aintzat hartu ez estatuko indar legegileak ez estatuko gobernuak. Zenbait autonomia erkidegotako legegileek eta gobernuek, ordea, kontuan izan dute; horiek Administrazio Publikoko Langileen Oinarrizko Estatutua garatu dute —edo garatzeko izapideak egiten ari dira— eta zuzendaritzako langileen araubidea ezarri dute (Valentzian eta Gaztela-Mantxan, esate baterako, onartu dituzte dagoeneko enplegu publikoaren legeak). Horrez gain, horietako batzuek, hemen G10 deitutako taldea osatzen dutenek hain zuzen ere, berrikuntza asko egin dituzte gai honetan. Funtsezko edukietan, Balear Uharteetako Autonomia Erkidegoa eta Euskal Autonomia Erkidegoa nabarmendu dira gainontzekoen gainetik. Horiei buruz mintzatzen da bereziki, bada, azterlana. RESUMEN: Hace ya más de cuatro años que el EBEP entró en vigor y también su artículo 13. Un artículo en el que se hacía una llamada a los ejecutivos (estatal y autonómicos) para que, sí así lo deseaban, estableciesen un régimen del personal directivo. Pues bien, lo cierto es que, por unas razones u otras (de oportunidad política, de resistencias administrativas, de coyunturas económicas desfavorables, etc.), aquella llamada no ha sido atendida por el legislador o el ejecutivo estatal. Pero sí por los legisladores y ejecutivos de varias Comunidades Autónomas que, no sólo no han dudado en desarrollar el EBEP —o están en trámite de hacerlo— y establecer un régimen de su personal directivo (caso de Valencia o de Castilla-La Mancha, con sus leyes de empleo público ya aprobadas), sino que algunas de ellas (las que integran el aquí llamado G10) han innovado de forma considerable en la materia. Destacando en lo sustantivo y por encima del resto, la Comunidad de las Islas Baleares y el País Vasco. A las cuales está dedicado de manera especial este estudio. ABSTRACT: The Basic Statute for Civil Servants (EBEP in Spanish) came into force more than four years ago, and also its article 13. This article 13 made a call to (state and regional) executives to establish a regime for the managerial staff, if they so wished. Well then the truth is that due to different reasons (political opportunity, administrative culture and others related to economic crisis), that call was not taken into account at the State level. However, Legislators and Executives from different Autonomous Communities have responded to this call. On the one hand, by developing the EBEP (or they are in the process of doing so) and by establishing a regime for managerial staff (the case of Valencia and Castilla-La Mancha, whose public employment acts had already been passed). Also and in addi tion, some of them (those members of the so called G10) have made remarkable innovations on the matter. The Communities of the Balearic Islands and Basque Country stand out above the rest, to which this study is specially devoted.

Pop and the Nation-State: towards a theorisation

Popular Music ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 193-207 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Cloonan
Keyword(s):  
Popular Music ◽  
State Level ◽  
The Other ◽  
Nation State ◽  
Popular Music Studies ◽  
Music Scene ◽  
The One

Recent years have seen two noticeable trends in Popular Music Studies. These have been on the one hand a series of works which have tried to document the ‘local’ music scene and, on the other, accounts of processes of globalisation. While not uninterested in the intermediate Nation-State level, both trends have tended to regard it as an area of increasingly less importance. To state the matter more boldly, both trends have underplayed the continually important role of the Nation-State.

The Activity of the Cluj County Branch of the Romanian National Party in the Spring of 1920 as Reflected in the Newspaper Patria

2021 ◽  
pp. 45-63
Author(s):  
Marin Pop ◽  
Keyword(s):  
The Political ◽  
Political Capital ◽  
National Party ◽  
Old Kingdom ◽  
Parliamentary Elections ◽  
People's Party ◽  
Draft Resolution ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Government ◽  
The One

"This study aims to highlight the activity of the Cluj County Branch of the Romanian National Party (hereafter abbreviated as RNP) in the spring of 1920, covering the events from the fall of the government led by Alexandru Vaida–Voevod until the end of the parliamentary elections of May–June 1920. After the Great Union, the city of Cluj became the political capital of Transylvania, especially after the Ruling Council, which was the provisional executive body of Transylvania, moved its headquarters from Sibiu to Cluj. Iuliu Maniu, the President of the Ruling Council and of the R.N.P, who was elected at the Sibiu Conference of 9–10 August 1919, had settled in Cluj as well. Moreover, at the head of Cluj County Branch of the RNP were personalities with a rich history of struggle for the cause of National Liberation of the Romanians in Transylvania: Iuliu Coroianu, Emil Hațieganu, Aurel Socol, Sever Dan, Alexandru Rusu, Ioan Giurgiu, the Archpriest Ioan Pop of Morlaca, and the Priest‑Martyr Aurel Muntean from Huedin. After the dismissal of the Vaida government, the Central Executive Committee of the RNP convened a party congress for 24 April 1920, in Alba Iulia. Just before the congress, the Cluj County organization had started the election campaign. Meetings were organized in every town and village, aiming to elect representatives for the Congress in Alba Iulia. On 21 April 1920, a large assembly was held in Cluj, during which the deputies of Cluj presented their work in Parliament. Simultaneously, delegates were elected for the Congress of Alba Iulia. The RNP Congress adopted a draft resolution and the governing bodies were elected. Iuliu Maniu was re‑elected as President. Based on the decisions adopted at the Great National Assembly of Alba Iulia on 1 December 1918, he adopted a working program, which was summarized in thirteen chapters. During the electoral campaign of 1920 two major political groups became polar opposites: the one around the People’s Party, which was in power, and the parties that formed the Parliamentary Bloc and had governed before. On the list of candidates of the Cluj County Branch of the RNP we can mostly find the former MPs of the party, as well as those who had filled various leadership positions within the Ruling Council. Following the electoral process, despite all the efforts of the People’s Party, in power at that time – especially those of Octavian Goga – to dispel the propaganda conducted by the RNP, the latter party managed to obtain 27 seats in the House and 14 in the Senate. This placed the RNP in second place among Romania’s political parties. The Cluj County Branch of the RNP was able to win two of the five electoral districts in the Chamber, as well as two in the Senate, out of the three allocated to the county. Another conclusion would be that, starting from these parliamentary elections, more and more parties from the Old Kingdom penetrated into Transylvania and Banat. They would achieve some success with the voters only when they came to hold power in the state and organize elections. Still, the RNP remained the party with the largest grip on the electorate of Transylvania and Banat, and Cluj became the political capital of Transylvania."

Pandemic year in Spain. Political outcome

2021 ◽  
pp. 52
Author(s):  
Alexandra Kurakina-Damir
Keyword(s):  
Political Communication ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Image Point ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
Parliamentary Elections ◽  
The Past ◽  
Political Forces ◽  
The One ◽  
Regional Elections

Despite well-founded doubts about the viability of the coalition (which had insufficient support of the deputies for the adoption of important laws), a well-built strategy of political communication during the pandemic allowed the cabinet of ministers not only to withstand, but also to strengthen its positions. Over the past year, a number of strategically important decisions, both from a political and image point of view, have been adopted. The coronavirus pandemic has had a significant impact on the legislative process. The solution to the Catalan problem faded into the background. In part, this was due to the need for early parliamentary elections in the region and the alleged regrouping of political forces. The revealed facts of possible financial abuse of the honorary king hurt the image of the Crown, but the measures taken today to restore prestige are bearing fruit. Among the electoral trends noted, it is worth highlighting the strengthening of positions of socialists and rightwing populists (especially following the results of early regional elections in Catalonia), as well as a decline in support for left-wing populism. Ciudadanos' position remains unstable: on the one hand, it managed to slightly regain its position in early 2020, but further growth in support stalled, and poor results in the Catalan elections once again raised the question of whether the party has a future. Conservatives, by contrast, have established themselves as the leader of the bloc. Having lost a share of supporters at the beginning of the study period, they tried with all their might to restore the balance, periodically changing the strategy of actions.

Budget oversight in territorial autonomies: A comparative analysis of Hong Kong and Macao

2021 ◽  
pp. 002085232110338
Author(s):  
Brian C.H. Fong
Keyword(s):  
Hong Kong ◽  
Civil Society ◽  
Comparative Studies ◽  
Survey Methodology ◽  
State Level ◽  
Sovereign State ◽  
Systems Model ◽  
One Country Two Systems ◽  
The Media ◽  
The One

Traditionally, comparative budgeting scholars have focused on analysing budget oversight at the sovereign state level. Budget oversight at the territorial autonomy level remains largely under-investigated. Drawing on the Open Budget Survey methodology, this study is a pioneering attempt to compare the budget oversight institutions and practices in Hong Kong and Macao under the ‘one country, two systems’ model. This study finds that the varying practices of budget oversight of Hong Kong and Macao are the consequence of their different bases of opposition politics, including democratic opposition, the media and civil society. This study extends the research focus of existing comparative budgeting literature from sovereign states to territorial autonomies. Thus, it has important implications for budget oversight analysis and policy worldwide. Points for practitioners This article uses comparative studies of Hong Kong and Macao to illustrate how different bases of opposition politics have led to varying practices of budget oversight. For policymakers, the lesson from the comparative studies is that the rise of democratic opposition, the media and civil society will bring about pressures for budget oversight. More policy learning is necessary for policymakers across democracies and semi-democracies to share the experiences of handling the politics of budget oversight.

A Peculiar Interpretation of the Constitutional Principle of “One Person, One Vote” in Poland: Voter (In)equality in the Elections to 1,200 Local Legislatures

2017 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 704-738
Author(s):  
Michał Pierzgalski ◽  
Paweł Stępień
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Study ◽  
Good Practice ◽  
State Level ◽  
Local Elections ◽  
Local Election ◽  
Constitutional Principle ◽  
Venice Commission ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The One ◽  
The Ideal

The adoption of new redistricting plans for the 2014 elections to local legislatures in Poland resulted in significant violations of the “one person, one vote” principle. This article shows the results of the first comparative study measuring within-country variation of voter inequality, using data from the 2014 Polish local elections to 1,200 commune or municipal councils, that is, local legislatures. Voter inequality is usually examined at the country or state level, while studies that take into account within-country variation of malapportionment, using local election data, are neglected by scholars. To put our research in a broader context, we compared levels of malapportionment in Poland with internationally recognized standards (contained, e.g., in the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters issued by the Venice Commission) as to the acceptable levels of deviations from the “ideal” population, and also with empirical findings on the levels of voter inequality in other countries. We argue that the significant vote–value disparities in elections to commune councils in Poland result primarily from the disadvantages of the Polish 2011 Election Code. When it comes to local legislature elections in the vast majority of communes that are not the so-called county-status towns, the legally permitted deviation from the ideal district population ranges from +50 percent to −50 percent. Even considering the standards of redistricting for local elections, the interpretation of the “one person, one vote” principle is rather peculiar in Polish commune elections.

The Ethics of Voting

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Stacey Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Common Good ◽  
Democratic Governance ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
The Third ◽  
Voter Preferences ◽  
Electoral Outcomes ◽  
Political Preferences ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Individual Vote ◽  
The Common

The first question that is often raised in a discussion of the ethics of voting is whether or not there is a duty to vote. The view that there is a duty to vote is supported by two main arguments. The first holds that since the value of democratic governance is high persons should vote to preserve stable democracy. The second is that there is a duty to vote because if nobody voted the effects would be disastrous. The first of these arguments is criticized by Jason Brennan, who holds that since each individual vote will play little to no role in preserving stable democracy nobody has a duty to vote. The second is criticized by Loren Lomasky and Geoffrey Brennan, who argue that it is incomplete unless its supporters can show that democracy needs everyone to vote to continue. The question of whether there is a duty to vote naturally leads to the question of whether it is permissible for persons to vote in their own self-interest. Jason Brennan argues that persons should only (morally) vote for candidates or policies that they are justified in believing would promote the common good. It is unclear, however, what “the common good” consists of. This discussion of the morality of voting in one’s self-interest leads to the question of whether voting for a politician because she has made campaign promises is morally analogous to a voter selling her vote. In discussing this issue it is important to distinguish between the “restricted” defense of markets in votes (that the purchased votes are to be cast in favor of what the buyer is justified in believing is the common good) and the “unrestricted” defense of such a market (that purchased votes can be cast in any way the buyer pleases). Much of this discussion focuses on the morality of unrestricted markets in votes. Christopher Freiman has offered four main arguments in favor of such a market: (1) that it will make both the buyer and the seller better off; (2) that it is required by respect for voter liberty; (3) that it is relevantly similar to other practices that are currently allowed, such as logrolling; and (4) that it would enable electoral outcomes to better express voter preferences. None of these arguments are persuasive. The first is based on illicitly inferring from the claim that persons would voluntarily buy and sell votes if a market were allowed to the claim that they would thereby desire that this market be allowed. The second argument is flawed because if some persons would prefer that a market not be allowed, this could provide a sufficient reason to restrict their liberty by precluding them from selling their votes. The third argument overlooks important disanalogies between votes traded between voters, and votes traded between legislators. The fourth argument is based on the implausible assumption that vote sellers would not misrepresent their political preferences in a market for votes.

Moral Ethnicity and Political Tribalism in Kenya’s “Virtual Democracy”

2001 ◽  
Vol 29 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 8-13
Author(s):  
Stephen Orvis
Keyword(s):  
Ethnic Groups ◽  
Ethnic Politics ◽  
Public Debate ◽  
The State ◽  
Political Liberalization ◽  
Electoral Violence ◽  
The One ◽  
Opposition Parties

Kenyan politics have long been among the most “ethnic” in Africa. From the battles over the constitutional formula for independence to the waning days of the one-party regime in the late 1980s, Kenyan politicians sought support from their ethnic or subethnic groups, and citizens perceived most political battles to be about dividing the “national cake” among the constituent ethnic groups. Political liberalization since 1991 has not fundamentally changed this atmosphere. Most obviously, it has allowed ethnic politics to reemerge into open, public debate. Ruling and opposition parties represent primarily all, some, or coalitions of ethnic groups. Ethnically marked electoral violence, largely instigated by the ruling regime, has come to be expected, though not accepted, as part of the campaign season. Leaders are far more prone to make appeals to the state for resources in openly ethnic terms than they dared to do in the one-party era.

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