scholarly journals The Obama Legacy in the Middle East and the Trump Challenge

2017 ◽  
Vol 73 (2) ◽  
pp. 241-250 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert O. Freedman

During the second term of President Barack Obama, US-Israeli relations sharply deteriorated. After a positive visit by President Obama to Israel in March 2013, major disagreements erupted over the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, over the nuclear deal with Iran and, especially, over the construction of Jewish settlements in the Israeli-occupied West Bank. Making matters worse, personal recriminations crept into the Israeli-American dialogue on the disputes. While the two countries signed a major military assistance agreement in September 2016, Israeli settlement expansion after the election of Donald Trump as the US President in November 2016 led to a further deterioration of relations between the Obama Administration and Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, which was demonstrated by the Obama Administration’s failure to veto a UN Security Council Resolution condemning Israeli settlements.

2017 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 121-159
Author(s):  
Paul Karolyi

This update summarizes bilateral, multilateral, regional, and international events affecting the Palestinians and the future of the peace process. It covers the quarter beginning on 16 November 2016 and ending on 15 February 2017. Neither the Palestinians nor the Israelis made any efforts to resume peace negotiations this quarter. The Palestinians opted to coordinate with outgoing U.S. president Barack Obama on UN Security Council resolution 2334 condemning Israeli settlements, while the Israelis pressed incoming U.S. president Donald Trump for a new regional peace approach. U.S. secretary of state John Kerry presented six principles for a Palestinian-Israeli peace deal, and the French government hosted an international peace conference in Paris. Trump took office in January and began backpedaling on his pledge to move the U.S. embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Meanwhile, Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu continued his efforts to marginalize the Palestinian minority and political opponents in Israel in order to placate the fury of his ruling coalition's ultranationalists over the evacuation of Amona, an illegal settlement outpost. Settler movement leaders used their leverage with Netanyahu to pass a sweeping new bill in the Knesset retroactively legalizing such settlement outposts.


2017 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-26

This section comprises international, Arab, Israeli, and U.S. documents and source materials, as well as an annotated list of recommended reports. Significant developments this quarter: In the international diplomatic arena, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 2334, reaffirming the illegality of Israeli settlements and calling for a return to peace negotiations. Additionally, former U.S. secretary of state John Kerry delivered a final address on the Israel-Palestine conflict, outlining a groundwork for negotiations. Two weeks later, international diplomats met in Paris to establish incentives for Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas to return to the negotiating table. Despite international discussions of peace talks and the impediment settlements pose to a two-state solution, the Israeli Knesset passed the controversial Regulation Law, enabling the government to retroactively legalize settlements and confiscate Palestinian land throughout the West Bank. Meanwhile, U.S. president Donald Trump took office on 20 January 2017, and he wasted no time before inviting Netanyahu to the White House for their first meeting, in February.


Author(s):  
Adekeye Adebajo

Egyptian scholar-diplomat Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s relationship with the UN Security Council was a difficult one, resulting eventually in him earning the unenviable record of being the only Secretary-General to have been denied a second term in office. Boutros-Ghali bluntly condemned the double standards of the powerful Western members of the Council—the Permanent Three (P3) of the US, Britain, and France—in selectively authorizing UN interventions in “rich men’s wars” in Europe while ignoring Africa’s “orphan conflicts.” The Council’s powerful members ignored many of his ambitious ideas, preferring instead to retain tight control of decision-making on UN peacekeeping missions. Boutros-Ghali worked with the Security Council to establish peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, Cambodia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Somalia.


Significance The assassination follows months of political turmoil and rising gang violence and comes just weeks before elections, scheduled for September 26. Interim Prime Minister Claude Joseph, who has taken charge of the country, said yesterday that measures were being taken “to guarantee the continuity of the state and to protect the nation". Impacts Further political assassinations would exacerbate unrest. The Dominican Republic has closed its border, fearing a migrant surge; the situation will bolster public support there for a border wall. The UN Security Council meets today and may authorise emergency action in Haiti; any substantial redeployment, however, would take time.


Author(s):  
Byers Michael

This chapter addresses the US and NATO-led intervention in Afghanistan from 2001 to the present day. It examines the different legal justifications advanced or available for the intervention, namely self-defence, UN Security Council authorization, and intervention by invitation. It explores the complex relationships between these justifications and, particularly, the strategies adopted by states in choosing between them. The chapter concludes by considering the effects of the intervention on the customary international law of self-defence as it concerns non-state actors located in “unaware or unable” states, and anticipatory or pre-emptive responses.


2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 296-316
Author(s):  
Akanksha Singh

The concept of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) took shape to refine the contested concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’. In the initial phase, the concept of R2P did not receive enthusiastic endorsement. Developing countries including India perceived it as a new body with the old spirit and likened it with the concept of humanitarian intervention, and this was reinforced by the US-led war against Iraq in 2003. However, the 2005 World Summit proved to be a watershed in the evolution of R2P, just as it is a landmark to understand an important phase of India’s approach to the idea. It would not be accurate to characterize India as a determined nay-sayer on R2P endorsement, particularly in view of the widely known priority India attached at the World Summit to the question of United Nations (UN) Security Council enlargement. Eventually, by 2009 (with the introduction of ‘three- pillar principles’ of R2P), India became a major proponent for the cautious and legitimate implementation of R2P. However, the experiences gained from Libya made India become a voice of caution in invoking forcible options under the R2P principle in Syria. In this article, the attempt has been made to articulate various permutations and combinations regarding India’s evolving approach to R2P on a case-by-case basis.


Author(s):  
John Karlsrud

The usual suspects of middle power internationalism—small and middle powers such as Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and Sweden—have all contributed to the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali (MINUSMA). This article argues that while these and other Western countries' contributions to MINUSMA may still be characterized as investments into UN peacekeeping reform and a rule-governed world order, the liberal underpinnings of that commitment are withering. Instead, these countries seek to enhance their own status. This is done by gaining appreciation for their contributions, primarily from the US; strengthening their bids for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council; and self-interested contributions to reform UN peacekeeping by efforts to enable it to confront violent extremism and terrorism. Paradoxically, the article concludes, when moving the UN towards counterterrorism and weakening the legitimacy of the organization, Western states undermine a cornerstone of their own security.


2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 335-349
Author(s):  
David Bosco

Less has changed in US diplomacy at the United Nations than many observers expected when the Obama administration took office in January 2009. In the UN Security Council, the United States has pursued a generally steady course that in many respects builds on the accomplishments of the Bush administration. Unexpectedly, the Security Council’s pace of work diminished considerably during the first few years of the new administration. The most significant change is the atmospherics of US diplomacy, not its substance: the Obama administration has participated in processes that the Bush administration shunned and has toned down US criticism of the United Nations’ perceived shortcomings.


Subject Turkish-US relations under a Trump presidency. Significance The election of Donald Trump adds another unprecedented dynamic to the complex US-Turkish relationship. So far, both sides have made cautious overtures to each other in the hope of a ‘reset’, after the relationship greatly deteriorated under Barack Obama. Impacts Erdogan wants a bigger role for Turkey in the Middle East and will be looking for Trump’s support to achieve this. Ankara will work with Washington to counter Tehran’s influence in Iraq. Turkey is unlikely to go along with a broader anti-Iranian effort in the region for fear of damaging its strategic ties with Tehran. If Trump and Erdogan fail to reset the relationship, Ankara may tilt even more towards Moscow.


Significance The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N)’s five-year term ended on May 31. PML-N President Shehbaz Sharif faces a tough fight to become prime minister, with the main challenge set to come from Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and further opposition provided by Bilawal Bhutto Zardari’s Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). Impacts With Khan as prime minister, the military would likely have free rein to pursue an anti-India foreign policy. Khan would step up his criticisms of the war in Afghanistan and likely have a difficult relationship with US President Donald Trump. Pakistan under any government will pursue balanced diplomacy in the Middle East, seeking good ties with both Saudi Arabia and Iran.


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