Descriptive and analytical psychology of Wilhelm Dilthey as theoretical source of phenomenological psychology of Edmund Husserl

2021 ◽  
Vol - (2) ◽  
pp. 131-141
Author(s):  
Vakhtang Kebuladze

The article contains the critical reconstruction of descriptive and analytical psychology of Wilhelm Dilthey and its influence on the phenomenological psychology of Edmund Husserl. Dilthey describes three fundamental features of intrinsic psychic life, which make it different from external physical world: 1. Immediacy — psychic life is directly perceived as intrinsic process; physical world is indirectly perceived as external reality. 2. Connection — psychic life is organic connection of interrelated experiences, physical world is conglomeration of the separate facts. 3. Value — psychic experiences use to have the value to us, physical facts can be irrelevant to us. According to Dilthey descriptive and analytic psychology is possible since the psychic life is directly given as organic connection of experiences, which have a special value. The main method of psychology should be description of the psychic experience. Dilthey sketches out three main direction of this description: 1. Description of the main types of the psychic processes. 2. Description of the main connections of the human experiences. 3. Description of the special parts of the human experiences. On one hand, the phenomenological psychology of Edmund Husserl is grounded on the descriptive and analytic psychology of Wilhelm Dilthey. On another hand, Husserl criticizes some crucial points of Dilthey’s conception. First of all the founder of phenomenology and phenomenological psychology points out the connection of the notions “understanding” and “induction” in the psychological conception of Wilhelm Dilthey. On the contrary, according to Husserl the method of understanding should be based on the concept of intuition, which plays an important role in his phenomenological project.

Author(s):  
Françoise Dastur ◽  
Robert Vallier

This chapter examines the philosophical reflections of Wilhelm Dilthey, Edmund Husserl, and Martin Heidegger regarding the link between phenomenology and history. The philosophies of historicity developed in the climate of relativism that marked the failure of Hegelianism announce a new confrontation with G. W. F. Hegel and a new perspective on the relation of truth and history, which must not be confused with mere anthropocentrism. It is this new perspective on history that we see unfolding in the horizon opened by Husserl's phenomenology and prepared by certain aspects of “life- philosophy.” The chapter first considers Dilthey's concept of “historicity” before discussing the similarities of the Hegelian and Husserlian manners of thinking the subject of history. It also analyzes Heidegger's claim that finitude and historicity are essentially interconnected, with mortality constituting the hidden ground of the historicity of existence.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 19
Author(s):  
Humar Sidik ◽  
Ika Putri Sulistyana

<p>Hermeneutika merupakan sebuah metode interpretasi terhadap sebuah simbol baik berupa teks atau lambang lainnya. Dalam perkembangannya sebagai metode hermeneutika banyak dianut oleh berbagai disiplin ilmu demi mengungkapkan makna yang tersirat dalam sebuah simbol atau teks. Salah satu disiplin ilmu yang menggunakan hermeneutika sebagai metodenya adalah sejarah. Sejarah menggunakan hermeneutika pada bagian interpretasi. Tujuan dari penelitian ini untuk menunjukan pentingnya hermeneutika dalam kajian filsafat sejarah. Metode penelitian yang diterapkan adalah kualitatif deskriptif-analisis. Hasil dari penelitian ini menunjukan beberapa hal, diantaranya yaitu, varian atau jenis-jenis dalam hermeneutika mulai dari hermeneutika romantis milik Friedrich Ernst Daniel Schleiermarcher, hermeneutika metodis karya Wilhelm Dilthey, hermeneutika fenomenologis yang dibangun oleh Edmund Husserl, hermeneutika dialektis dengan eksemplar Martin Herdegger, hermeneutika kritisnya Jurgen Habermas, dan hermeneutika milik Paul Ricouer yang sering digunakan dalam teks sastra serta yang terakhir metode hermeneutika dekonstruksionis hasil pemikiran Jacques Derrida. Selain itu dibahas juga alasan hermeneutika menjadi sebuah metode dalam filsafat sejarah dan bagaimana cara memahami filsafat sejarah dengan hermeneutika. Sehingga penelitian ini berfokus pada hermeneutika sebagai metode penafsiran teks dalam filsafat sejarah dan varian yang sering digunakan dalam hermeneutika pada kajian filsafat sejarah. Hal ini dilakukan demi membatasi terlalu luasnya objek kajian dalam penelitian.</p>


Author(s):  
James Dodd

In phenomenology, ‘lifeworld’ (Lebenswelt) denotes the immediate, everyday, concrete whole of the subjectively experienced world. Its original elaboration in the thought of Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) played a central role in his attempt to ground the rationality of the sciences in the active and passive syntheses of subjective life. Husserl's concept of lifeworld was originally influenced by the work of Richard Avenarius (1843–1896) and Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911), and progressively deepened throughout his philosophical career until it reached its most sophisticated form in the 1930s. Though relevant to a wide variety of analyses of ethical life, perceptual experience and the problem of history, the lifeworld plays its perhaps most important role in Husserl's phenomenological interpretation of scientific rationality. The lifeworld plays a critical role in Husserl’s mature conception of science in two fundamental respects: first, the lifeworld provides the framework for Husserl’s investigation of the origin of basic concepts of logical reasoning (such as negation and states of affairs) in lived experience; second, it anchors his account of rational evidence and truth in the prediscursive dimensions of lived experience. The concept of the lifeworld has proven to be one of Husserl's most important philosophical contributions and has been subsequently developed in a number of post-Husserlian strands of phenomenology and sociology.


Author(s):  
Christopher Thornhill

Historicism, defined as ‘the affirmation that life and reality are history alone’ by Benedetto Croce (1938: 65), is understood to mean various traditions of historiographical thinking which developed in the nineteenth century, predominantly in Germany. Historicism is an insistence on the historicity of all knowledge and cognition, and on the radical segregation of human from natural history. It is intended as a critique of the normative, allegedly anti-historical, epistemologies of Enlightenment thought, expressly that of Kant. The most significant theorists and historians commonly associated with historicism are Leopold von Ranke, Wilhelm Dilthey, J.G. Droysen, Friedrich Meinecke, Croce and R.G. Collingwood. The main antecedents for the development of historicism are to be found in two key bodies of work. J.G. Herder’s Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man (1784) argues against the construction of history as linear progress, stating rather that human history is composed of fundamentally incomparable national cultures or totalities. G.W.F. Hegel’s The Philosophy of History (1826) insists on the historical situatedness of each individual consciousness as a particular moment within the total progression of all history towards a final goal. The shifting fusion of these ideas provides the foundation for both the strengths and the problems of historicism. Historicism follows both Herder, in attempting to do justice to objective history in its discontinuity and uniqueness, and Hegel, in attempting to determine general patterns of historical change. Indeed, historicism can perhaps be best termed a Hegelian philosophy of history without an all-encompassing notion of progress. Rather than constituting a unified intellectual movement, historicism is best known for its elusiveness. Its multifarious quality can be inferred from the variety of critical positions taken up against it. Influential critiques of historicism have been written by Friedrich Nietzsche, Friedrich Rickert, Ernst Troeltsch, Walter Benjamin, Karl Löwith and Karl Popper. Critical engagement with historicism has focused on its alleged relativism, its alleged particularism, its alleged claims to totality, its alleged subjectivism and its alleged objectivism. More positive debates with historicism have significantly influenced the thought of Martin Heidegger, Edmund Husserl and Hans-Georg Gadamer.


2011 ◽  
Vol 2011 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-206
Author(s):  
Ernst Wolfgang Orth ◽  
Ralf Becker ◽  
Detlef Thiel ◽  
Nikola Mirkovic

Wilhelm Dilthey: Briefwechsel Band I 1852–1882; Edmund Husserl: Einleitung in die Ethik. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1920/1924; Emmanuel Alloa: Das durchscheinende Bild. Konturen einer medialen Phänomenologie; Jacob Rogozinski: Le moi et la chair. Introduction á l’ego-analyse


Author(s):  
Jens Zimmermann

The history of hermeneutics is a conversation about knowledge. ‘Hermeneutics: a brief history’ begins with knowledge in the ancient world, where not only mathematics and logic, but also poetry, rhetoric, and philosophy were counted as important sources of objective truth. This view of knowledge changed from the 14th century onwards. The ancients asked how knowledge could enable a virtuous life; moderns focus more on the epistemological question: ‘how we can know that something is true?’ But whose interpretation of truth was the right one? The thinking of René Descartes, Daniel Friedrich Schleiermacher, Wilhelm Dilthey, Edmund Husserl, and Martin Heidegger is explained before considering hermeneutics after Heidegger.


1938 ◽  
Vol 84 (353) ◽  
pp. 1076-1077
Author(s):  
H. von Hattingberg

It is a matter of fact that love represents an indispensable function in the development of the personality. It is true for the peculiar relation arising out of human contact as well as for the critical processes which passion evokes in our psychic life. The importance of this function has increased concomitantly with our constantly growing consciousness. Analytical psychology has occupied itself at various times with the problem of the development of the personality through love—in a certain sense we might say that this is one of its basic ideas. It is therefore all the more remarkable that the literature offers nowhere a clear expression of this idea. In any event the decisive conclusions to be drawn from the assumption of this conception have never been formulated, much less accepted.


2008 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-138
Author(s):  
Tommy Akira Goto

The German philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), founding father of Phenomenology, was one of the most prominent thinkers of the 20th century, who not only influenced the philosophical trends of his time but also the sciences in general. Nevertheless, psychology was the science which strongly had direct influence of phenomenology which, in its turn, provided the possibility of developing a phenomenological psychology. The aim of this thesis is to (re)constitute, from a historical-critical point of view, the conception of phenomenological psychology in Husserl’s last work: The Crisis of European Sciences and the Transcendental Phenomenology (Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenchaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie). At present, psychologists are developing a large number of versions of phenomenological psychology, particularly in Brazil; however, none of them have rigorously been based on Husserl’s concepts. Thus, in order to have an understanding of what constitutes to Husserl a phenomenological psychology, we present, to start with, a brief introduction to the transcendental phenomenology, explaining the variations of the phenomenological method (i. e. phenomenological levels). After that, we point out the most meaningful aspects of Husserl’s last piece of writing, concentrating our efforts on the revelation the philosopher makes concerning a crisis of the sciences and of reason, as well as his phenomenological criticism on epistemology of Psychology. At last, following Husserl’s analyses of phenomenology and psychology, we conclude that the conception of phenomenological psychology will constitute a universal science of human beings whose object of study is the animistic being. This science will have basic functions such as: a) the rebuilding of the scientific psychology and the explanation of the psychological concepts; b) the constitution of a universal science of the psychic; c) the description of the intentional experiences and d) be a propaedeutic discipline for the transcendental phenomenology. For Husserl, the authentic and genuine conception of the phenomenological psychology is important to the psychologists since that it is through the development of this discipline that they will recover the subjectivity as the original source of human life and its correlation with the world-life.


Author(s):  
Paul Silas Peterson

Scheler was a philosopher in the phenomenological school. His mother was Jewish; his father was Protestant. In high school he became a Catholic but abandoned formal religion in 1922. He studied with Wilhelm Dilthey, Georg Simmel, and Rudolf Eucken. His early research was on transcendental philosophy. From 1900 to 1906 he was an outside lecturer (Privatdozent) in Jena and here engaged the work of Edmund Husserl. He was later active in Munich and Gottingen and from 1917 to 1918 at the German Foreign Ministry in Geneva and The Hague. From 1919 onward he was the director of the Institute for Social Sciences in Cologne.


Author(s):  
Michael Barber

This article compares and contrasts Dorion Cairn’s treatment of the relationship between phenomenology and psychology with Embree’s handling of that same topic. Embree, who to a great degree aligns with Schutz, and Cairns converge on the treatment of behaviorism. However, fundamental differences appear in their contrasting approaches to psychology, with Cairns seeking to uphold the distinctiveness of philosophy/phenomenology over against psychology and Embree/Schutz inclining toward a more collaborative engagement with psychology. Their differences reflect their preference for transcendental philosophy or phenomenological psychology, both of which possible preferences were clearly recognized by Edmund Husserl in his “Nachwort zu meinen Ideen”. These preferences in turn have to do with the ultimate philosophical purposes each author is pursuing.Este artículo compara y contrasta el tratamiento de Dorion Cairn de la relación entre fenomenología y psicología con el manejo por parte de Embree del mismo tema. Embree —que en gran medida se alinea con Schutz— y Cairns convergen en el tratamiento del conductismo. Sin embargo, las diferencias fundamentales aparecen en sus enfoques que contrastan con la psicología, con Cairns tratando de mantener el carácter distintivo de la filosofía / fenomenología frente a la psicología y con Embree/Schutz inclinándose hacia un compromiso más colaborativo con la psicología. Sus diferencias reflejan sus preferencias por la filosofía trascendental o por la psicología fenomenológica —ambas preferencias posibles fueron claramente reconocidas por Edmund Husserl en su "Nachwort zu meinen Ideen". Estas preferencias a su vez tienen que ver con los propósitos filosóficos finales que persigue cada autor.


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