scholarly journals Information Elicitation Mechanisms for Statistical Estimation

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (02) ◽  
pp. 2095-2102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuqing Kong ◽  
Grant Schoenebeck ◽  
Biaoshuai Tao ◽  
Fang-Yi Yu
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Impossibility Result ◽  
Statistical Properties ◽  
Truth Telling ◽  
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Discrete Signals ◽  
Private Signals ◽  
Large Populations ◽  
Strategic Agents ◽  
Information Elicitation

We study learning statistical properties from strategic agents with private information. In this problem, agents must be incentivized to truthfully reveal their information even when it cannot be directly verified. Moreover, the information reported by the agents must be aggregated into a statistical estimate. We study two fundamental statistical properties: estimating the mean of an unknown Gaussian, and linear regression with Gaussian error. The information of each agent is one point in a Euclidean space.Our main results are two mechanisms for each of these problems which optimally aggregate the information of agents in the truth-telling equilibrium:• A minimal (non-revelation) mechanism for large populations — agents only need to report one value, but that value need not be their point.• A mechanism for small populations that is non-minimal — agents need to answer more than one question.These mechanisms are “informed truthful” mechanisms where reporting unaltered data (truth-telling) 1) forms a strict Bayesian Nash equilibrium and 2) has strictly higher welfare than any oblivious equilibrium where agents' strategies are independent of their private signals. We also show a minimal revelation mechanism (each agent only reports her signal) for a restricted setting and use an impossibility result to prove the necessity of this restriction.We build upon the peer prediction literature in the single-question setting; however, most previous work in this area focuses on discrete signals, whereas our setting is inherently continuous, and we further simplify the agents' reports.

scholarly journals Cake Cutting: Envy and Truth

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaohui Bei ◽  
Ning Chen ◽  
Guangda Huzhang ◽  
Biaoshuai Tao ◽  
Jiajun Wu
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Private Information ◽  
General Setting ◽  
Impossibility Result ◽  
Market Model ◽  
Truth Telling ◽  
Piecewise Constant ◽  
Cake Cutting ◽  
Strategic Agents ◽  
To Receive

We study envy-free cake cutting with strategic agents, where each agent may manipulate his private information in order to receive a better allocation. We focus on piecewise constant utility functions and consider two scenarios: the general setting without any restriction on the allocations and the restricted setting where each agent has to receive a connected piece. We show that no deterministic truthful envy-free mechanism exists in the connected piece scenario, and the same impossibility result for the general setting with some additional mild assumptions on the allocations. Finally, we study a large market model where the economy is replicated and demonstrate that truth-telling converges to a Nash equilibrium.

scholarly journals Learning from prices: information aggregation and accumulation in an asset market

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michele Berardi
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Dynamic Properties ◽  
Public Information ◽  
Information Aggregation ◽  
Time Varying ◽  
Private Signals ◽  
Private And Public ◽  
Fundamental Value ◽  
Over Time

Abstract Can prices convey information about the fundamental value of an asset? This paper considers this problem in relation to the dynamic properties of the fundamental (whether it is constant or time-varying) and the structure of information available to agents. Risk-averse traders receive two potential signals each period: one exogenous and private and the other, prices, endogenous and public. Prices aggregate private information but include aggregate noise. Information can accumulate over time both through endogenous and exogenous signals. With a constant fundamental, the precision of both private and public cumulative information increases over time but agents put progressively more weight on the endogenous signals, asymptotically disregarding private ones. If the fundamental is time-varying, the use of past private signals complicates the role of prices as a source of information, since it introduces endogenous serial correlation in the price signal and cross-correlation between it and innovations in the fundamental. A modified version of the Kalman filter can still be used to extract information from prices and results show that the precision of the endogenous signals converges to a constant, with both private and public information used at all times.

scholarly journals Relational Contracts with Private Information on the Future Value of the Relationship: The Upside of Implicit Downsizing Costs

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 33-58
Author(s):  
Matthias Fahn ◽  
Nicolas Klein
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Alternative Explanation ◽  
Relational Contracts ◽  
Truth Telling ◽  
Relational Contract ◽  
Bonus Payments ◽  
The Future ◽  
Short Run ◽  
Future Value ◽  
The Relationship

We analyze a relational-contracting problem, in which the principal has private information about the future value of the relationship. In order to reduce bonus payments, the principal is tempted to claim that the value of the future relationship is lower than it actually is. To induce truth-telling, the optimal relational contract may introduce distortions after a bad report. For some levels of the discount factor, output is reduced by more than would be sequentially optimal. This distortion is attenuated over time even if prospects remain bad. Our model thus provides an alternative explanation for indirect short-run costs of downsizing. (JEL D23, D82, D86)

scholarly journals Statistical properties of derived signal systems

Radiotekhnika ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 141-147
Author(s):  
A.A. Zamula ◽  
I.D. Gorbenko ◽  
Ho Tri Luc
Keyword(s):  
Statistical Properties ◽  
Random Sequences ◽  
Signal Systems ◽  
Discrete Signals ◽  
Information Transformation ◽  
Methods Of Synthesis ◽  
Linear Signal ◽  
Correlation Properties ◽  
Derivatives Of ◽  
Structural Ensemble

The search for effective methods of synthesis of discrete signals (sequences) that correspond to the potentially possible limiting characteristics of correlation functions and possess the necessary correlation, structural, ensemble properties remains an urgent problem. The authors have proposed a method for the synthesis of derivatives of signal systems, for which orthogonal signals are used as the initial ones, and nonlinear discrete complex cryptographic signals (CS) are used as generating signals. The synthesis of the latter ones is based on the use of random (pseudo-random) processes, including algorithms for cryptographic information transformation. Derivative signals synthesized in this way have improved (in comparison with linear signal classes) ensemble and correlation properties, while the statistical properties of such signal systems remain unexplored. The paper presents the results of testing derived signal systems using the tests defined in FIPS PUB 140 and NIST 800-22. Analysis of the results obtained allows us to assert that the statistical properties of this class of derived signals satisfy the requirements for pseudo-random sequences: unpredictability, irreversibility, randomness, independence of symbols, etc. In essence, such signals do not differ from random sequences. The use of the proposed class of derived signals will improve the performance of signal reception noise immunity, information security and secrecy of the ICS functioning.

scholarly journals Mechanism Design for Facility Location Problems: A Survey

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hau Chan ◽  
Aris Filos-Ratsikas ◽  
Bo Li ◽  
Minming Li ◽  
Chenhao Wang
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Facility Location ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Practical Importance ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Facility Location Problems ◽  
Social Objective ◽  
Comprehensive Survey ◽  
Strategic Agents ◽  
High Level

The study of approximate mechanism design for facility location has been in the center of research at the intersection of artificial intelligence and economics for the last decade, largely due to its practical importance in various domains, such as social planning and clustering. At a high level, the goal is to select a number of locations on which to build a set of facilities, aiming to optimize some social objective based on the preferences of strategic agents, who might have incentives to misreport their private information. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of the significant progress that has been made since the introduction of the problem, highlighting all the different variants and methodologies, as well as the most interesting directions for future research.

scholarly journals Efficient Multi-Attribute Auctions Considering Supply Disruption

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (03) ◽  
pp. 1950013
Author(s):  
Jie Xiang ◽  
Juliang Zhang ◽  
T. C. E. Cheng ◽  
Jose Maria Sallan ◽  
Guowei Hua
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
Purchase Decisions ◽  
Reverse Auctions ◽  
Reverse Auction ◽  
Truth Telling ◽  
Supply Disruption ◽  
Bidding Strategies ◽  
Numerical Studies ◽  
The Cost

Although supply disruption is ubiquitous because of natural or man-made disasters, many firms still use the price-only reverse auction (only the cost is considered) to make purchase decisions. We first study the suppliers’ equilibrium bidding strategies and the buyer’s expected revenue under the first- and second-price price-only reverse auctions when the suppliers are unreliable and have private information on their costs and disruption probabilities. We show that the two auctions are equivalent and not efficient. Then we propose two easily implementable reverse auctions, namely the first-price and second-price format announced penalty reverse auction (APRA), and show that the “revenue equivalence principle” holds, i.e., the two auctions generate the same ex ante expected profit to the buyer. We further show that the two reverse auctions are efficient and “truth telling” is the suppliers’ dominant strategy in the second-price format APRA. We conduct numerical studies to assess the impacts of some parameters on the bidding strategies, the buyer’s profit and social profit.

Common-Value Public Goods and Informational Social Dilemmas

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 343-369
Author(s):  
Caleb A. Cox ◽  
Brock Stoddard
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Common Value ◽  
Private Signals ◽  
Information And Communication

We experimentally examine private information and communication in a public goods environment with uncertain returns. We consider a common-value public goods game in which the return to contribution is either high or low. Before contributing, three players observe private signals correlated with the return and send cheap talk messages to one another. There are social gains from truthfulness, but a private incentive to exaggerate. We compare treatments with and without cheap talk, finding that communication is largely truthful and increases efficiency. In further treatments, we increase the incentive to exaggerate and find reduced truthfulness and smaller gains from communication. (JEL C72, D82, D83, H41)

scholarly journals Preferences for Truth‐Telling

Econometrica ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 87 (4) ◽  
pp. 1115-1153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johannes Abeler ◽  
Daniele Nosenzo ◽  
Collin Raymond
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Experimental Studies ◽  
Economic Activities ◽  
Combine Data ◽  
Truth Telling ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Do So ◽  
Observed Behavior

Private information is at the heart of many economic activities. For decades, economists have assumed that individuals are willing to misreport private information if this maximizes their material payoff. We combine data from 90 experimental studies in economics, psychology, and sociology, and show that, in fact, people lie surprisingly little. We then formalize a wide range of potential explanations for the observed behavior, identify testable predictions that can distinguish between the models, and conduct new experiments to do so. Our empirical evidence suggests that a preference for being seen as honest and a preference for being honest are the main motivations for truth‐telling.

Strategic Transmission of Correlated Information

2020 ◽  
Vol 130 (631) ◽  
pp. 2175-2206
Author(s):  
Sergio Currarini ◽  
Giovanni Ursino ◽  
A K S Chand
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Selective Exposure ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Discussion ◽  
Truth Telling ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Uniform State ◽  
The World ◽  
Correlated Information ◽  
Multiple Experts

Abstract We consider a situation in which a decision-maker gathers information from imperfectly informed experts, receiving coarse signals about a uniform state of the world. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. We show that with two experts correlation unambiguously tightens the conditions on preferences for a truth-telling equilibrium. However, with multiple experts the effect of correlation on the incentives to report information truthfully can be non-monotonic: while little and large levels of correlation hinder truth-telling, intermediate levels may discipline experts’ equilibrium behaviour and foster truthful communication. We discuss the implications of our results for the political discussion in the presence of ‘selective exposure' to media, where similarity in preferences comes with higher correlation, and a trade-off between truth-telling incentives and informational content arises.

scholarly journals An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory

1997 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Gibbons
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Main Theme ◽  
Sequential Equilibrium ◽  
Solution Concepts ◽  
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Games With Incomplete Information

This paper offers an introduction to game theory for applied economists. The author gives simple definitions and intuitive examples of four kinds of games and their corresponding solution concepts: Nash equilibrium in static games of complete information; subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in dynamic games of complete information; Bayesian Nash equilibrium in static games with incomplete (or 'private') information; and perfect Bayesian (or sequential) equilibrium in dynamic games with incomplete information. The main theme of the paper is that there are important differences among the games but important similarities among the solution concepts.

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