scholarly journals Micro-Fenomenología de la Subjetividad del Psicoterapeuta Sistémico

2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-130
Author(s):  
Ángela Hernández CORDOBA ◽  
Miguel Ángel Villamil PINEDA
Keyword(s):  
Systemic Therapy ◽  
Therapeutic Process ◽  
The Other ◽  
Phenomenological Method ◽  
Relational Context ◽  
Emotion Experience ◽  
Traditional Research ◽  
First Impression ◽  
Third Person ◽  
The One

Systemic psychological therapy takes place in a relational context, where the subjectivities of the consultants and the therapists interact. Traditional research has focused more on the characteristics of the consultants than on the subjectivity of the therapist. Hence, "third person" perspectives have been privileged. The few studies that investigate the subjectivity of the therapist resort to introspective, interpretive and prescriptive methodologies. How to access the subjectivity of the therapist from different perspectives than those offered by "third person" observation and "first person" introspection? The purpose of the article is to explore, through the micro-phenomenological method, how the subjectivity of the therapist is shown in the first impression of a consultant. To do this, interviews were conducted with six therapists. The results show that en-active emotionality appears as an invariant of the therapist's subjectivity; and that this invariant operates as an "intelligent motivation", which enters "into action" in the course of the intersubjective relationship itself and permanently monitors and guides the therapeutic process. The results allow us to consider, on the one hand, that traditional research has undervalued the importance of en-active emotions in the therapeutic process; and, on the other, that the qualitative improvement of therapy implies not only recognizing this invariant, but also cultivating it. Palavras-chave : Subjectivity; Systemic therapy; Micro-phenomenology; En-active emotion; Experience.

scholarly journals Image schemas, mimetic schemas and children's gestures

2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jordan Zlatev
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
First Person ◽  
Natural Interaction ◽  
Image Schemas ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Cognitive Linguistic ◽  
Third Person ◽  
First Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
The One

Abstract Mimetic schemas, unlike the popular cognitive linguistic notion of image schemas, have been characterized in earlier work as explicitly representational, bodily structures arising from imitation of culture-specific practical actions (Zlatev 2005, 2007a, 2007b). We performed an analysis of the gestures of three Swedish and three Thai children at the age of 18, 22 and 26 months in episodes of natural interaction with caregivers and siblings in order to analyze the hypothesis that iconic gestures emerge as mimetic schemas. In accordance with this hypothesis, we predicted that the children's first iconic gestures would be (a) intermediately specific, (b) culture-typical, (c) falling in a set of recurrent types, (d) predominantly enacted from a first-person perspective (1pp) rather than performed from a third-person perspective (3pp), with (e) 3pp gestures being more dependent on direct imitation than 1pp gestures and (f) more often co-occurring with speech. All specific predictions but the last were confirmed, and differences were found between the children's iconic gestures on the one side and their deictic and emblematic gestures on the other. Thus, the study both confirms earlier conjectures that mimetic schemas “ground” both gesture and speech and implies the need to qualify these proposals, limiting the link between mimetic schemas and gestures to the iconic category.

On the Veiling and Unveiling of Experience: A Comparison Between the Micro-Phenomenological Method and the Practice of Meditation

2021 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-77
Author(s):  
Claire Petitmengin
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Phenomenological Method ◽  
External Reality ◽  
Buddhist Meditation ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
The Mind

Abstract Both Buddhist meditation and micro-phenomenology start from the observation that our experience escapes us, we don’t see it as it is. Both offer devices that allow us to become aware of it. But, surprisingly, the two approaches offer few precise descriptions of the processes which veil experience, and of those which make it possible to dissipate these veils. This article is an attempt to put in parentheses declarative writings on the veiling and unveiling processes and their epistemological background and to collect procedural descriptions of this veiling and unveiling processes. From written and oral meditation teachings on the one hand, micro-phenomenological interviews applied to meditative experience and to themselves on the other hand, we identified four types of veiling processes which contribute to screen what is there, and ultimately to generate the naïve belief in the existence of an external reality independent of the mind: attentional, emotional, intentional and cognitive veils. The first part of the article describes these veiling processes and the processes through which they dissipate. It leads to the identification of several “gestures” conducive to this unveiling. The second part describes the devices used by meditation and by micro-phenomenology to elicit these gestures.

Marginality in the Mainstream, Lesbian Love in the Third Person

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emily Van Buskirk
Keyword(s):  
French Literature ◽  
Gender And Sexuality ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Third ◽  
The World ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Philosophical Texts ◽  
And Gender ◽  
The One ◽  
The Third Person

This chapter undertakes a treatment of the rhetoric of personal pronouns in Ginzburg's writings on love and sexuality, drawing on Michael Lucey's study of the first person in twentieth-century French literature about love. It brings together questions of genre and narrative, on the one hand, and gender and sexuality, on the other. The chapter is divided into two sections, treating writings from two different periods on two kinds of love Ginzburg thought typical of intellectuals: in “First Love,” it discusses the unrequited and tragic love depicted in Ginzburg's teenage diaries (1920–23); in “Second Love,” it analyzes the love that is realized but in the end equally tragic, depicted in drafts related to Home and the World (1930s). The chapter examines the models the author sought in literary, psychological, and philosophical texts (Weininger, Kraft-Ebbing, Blok, Shklovsky, Oleinikov, Hemingway, and Proust).

Narrative and Lyric Levels in Catullus

Metalepsis ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 119-146
Author(s):  
Gail Trimble
Keyword(s):  
Speech Acts ◽  
The Other ◽  
Mise En Abyme ◽  
Real Existence ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Lyric Poet ◽  
The One ◽  
Narrative Poem ◽  
Ring Composition

This chapter revisits the challenges of thinking about narrative metalepsis in lyric contexts by considering the diverse corpus of Catullus. Catullus’ most obviously narrative poem—poem 64—offers rich possibilities for metaleptic readings, and the chapter particularly investigates the ways in which the boundary between the poem’s outer narrative and its inset, ostensibly ecphrastic story is navigated by two powerfully subjective presences, the narrator and Ariadne, by such means as apostrophe and mise en abyme. Yet Catullus is typically classified as a lyric poet, and the chapter also examines poems that fuse the narrative and lyric modes, looking at potentially hymnic addresses to divinities across the corpus, and the tension in poem 68 between, on the one hand, the tendency to establish a whole series of nested narrative levels through ring composition and simile, and, on the other, the pull of the lyric mode towards a unified poetic ‘present’. There is a particular emphasis on the interaction among speech acts in the first, second and third person. Catullus himself appears in all three ‘persons’ as a character in the corpus, but is also a Roman author in whose real existence we believe, and the chapter concludes by returning against this background to Genette’s concern that metalepsis prompts us to ask whether we may belong to some narrative—as Catullus indeed does.

An Outsider's View: Alexis de Tocqueville on Aristocratic Society and Politics in 19th Century England

1980 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 122-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Spring
Keyword(s):  
19Th Century ◽  
The Other ◽  
Great Power ◽  
Alexis De Tocqueville ◽  
Economic Power ◽  
First Impression ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Special Quality ◽  
The One ◽  
The 19Th Century

This brief account of Tocqueville's ideas on aristocratic society and government in England is intended to serve as a sort of introduction to the longer papers that follow in this symposium. For some years the subject of English aristocratic power in the 19th century—especially in connection with the First and Second Reform Acts—has been much discussed. The discussion has dwelt on such questions as whether the aristocracy grew or declined in power, whether the Reform Acts made for a growth or loss of power, whether aristocratic leadership knew precisely what it was doing, and so on. So far this discussion has been carried on, so to speak, exclusively from the inside: that is, in terms of contemporary English events and ideas. In Tocqueville, who was both an Anglophile and an informed and penetrating observer of England from the 1830s until his death in 1859, we have a distinguished outsider. His ideas are always interesting for their own sake. For this symposium they have the added merit of touching on some of its central themes. On occasion, his ideas may strike the reader as exaggerated, ambiguous, even inconsistent, certainly without system. But they are usually suggestive, and merit the historian's serious attention.Tocqueville's first impression of the English aristocracy was one of great power—a power rooted in its monopoly of landowner ship. As he saw it, the contrast between the French landowning aristocracy and the English was that between an aristocracy, on the one hand, that was land poor, and an aristocracy, on the other hand, that was richly endowed in land. Tocqueville also saw that if landed property did not always lead to economic power—since agriculture did not pay that well—it had a special quality, as compared to other forms of wealth, which was bound to lead to political power.

scholarly journals Pensamiento crítico versus razón arrogante

2005 ◽  
pp. 11-27
Author(s):  
Carlos Pereda
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
The Other ◽  
First Person ◽  
Critical Thought ◽  
Ethical Implications ◽  
The Third ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Multiple Levels ◽  
The One ◽  
The Third Person

In this article, several levels in which can be proposed/presented the old dilemma of liberty and determinism are discussed and which is the task of critical thought or, particularly, of this critical thought that is philosophy. On the one hand, this dilemma is confronted in its metaphysical side. On the other, its epistemological and ethical implications are considered. Along this multiple levels I particularly consider the crash between the point of view of the first person and the third person.

Personal Identity and the Idea of a Human Being

1991 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 127-142
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Madell
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Natural Kind ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Personal Approach ◽  
Third Person ◽  
The One ◽  
The Mind

The central fact about the problem of personal identity is that it is a problem posed by an apparent dichotomy: the dichotomy between the objective, third-person viewpoint on the one hand and the subjective perspective provided by the first-person viewpoint on the other. Everyone understands that the mind/body problem is precisely the problem of what to do about another apparent dichotomy, the duality comprising states of consciousness on the one hand and physical states of the body on the other. By contrast, contemporary discussions of the problem of personal identity generally display little or no recognition of the divide which to my mind is at the heart of the problem. As a consequence, there has been a relentlessly third-personal approach to the issue, and the consequent proposal of solutions which stand no chance at all of working. I think the idea that the problem is to be clarified by an appeal to the idea of a human being is the latest manifestation of this mistaken approach. I am thinking in particular of the claim that what ought to govern our thinking on this issue is the fact that human beings constitute a natural kind, and that standard members of this kind can be said to have some sort of essence. Related to this is the idea that ‘person’, while not itself a natural kind term, is not a notion which can be framed in entire independence of this natural kind.

scholarly journals Perception and Passivity Can the Passive Pre-Givenness Be Phenomenalized?

Phainomenon ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-35
Author(s):  
Pedro M. S. Alves
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenological Approach ◽  
Phenomenological Analysis ◽  
The Other ◽  
Phenomenological Method ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Passive Synthesis ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Primitive Forms ◽  
The One ◽  
As If

Abstract In what follows, I intend to address an issue which is at the boundaries of the phenomenological method of reflective explication, and that, in this sense, points to some limitations of the phenomenological approach to consciousness and mind. I am referring to an aporetic situation that is at the heart of the phenomenological analysis of passivity. On the one hand, phenomenology shows, at least indirectly, a passive life that is beyond the first steps of the activity of the ego in the receptive, affective life. This is something that is beyond the rising of an ego, and from which a phenomenology of the ego-form of subjective life could be addressed. On the other hand, the analytic and conceptual tools of the phenomenological method have no grips on this basic realm of subjective life. As a result, Husserl’s analysis of passivity starts with the evidence of a pre-affective, pre-egoic realm, from which a phenomenology of the ego could be developed. However, Husserl’s analyses end up with the denegation of this dimension, as if it was invisible for the phenomenological method. As a consequence, the starting point of the analysis is not passivity proper, but rather the primitive forms of receptivity, which is already a first layer of the activity of the ego. Instead of an analysis of the ego-polarization (the “birth” of the ego), the egoic layer of conscious life is simply presupposed. A phenomenology of the ego-form is, thus, at the same time promised and denied. This aporetic situation is visible in the alteration of the concept of a passive pre-givenness in Husserl’s Analysis Concerning Passive Synthesis.

Phänomenologie und Medizin

2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 285-308
Author(s):  
Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Daily Life ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
The Other ◽  
Phenomenological Method ◽  
Life World ◽  
Phenomenological Philosophy ◽  
Anthropological Medicine ◽  
The One

This paper pursues two aims. First, it outlines the main intentions of a recently established research project dealing with problems of subjectivity in the field of medicine. Secondly, it discusses Viktor von Weizsäcker’s Gestaltkreis with a view to what this famous physician considers a phenomenological method appropriate to the special requirements of his field of work. Considering whether his ideas make sense from the point of view of a phenomenological philosophy, we try to explain some basic correspondences of phenomenology and Weizsäcker’s anthropological medicine. Doing this, we focus on two issues, namely objectivity and subjectivity, and theory and practice. Referring to the latter there are two meanings of ‚practice‘ which have to be carefully distinguished: natural experience embedded in our daily life-world activities on the one hand, and applications of (natural-)scientific knowledge on the other hand.

scholarly journals Voice and case in finnish in the light of Zabrocki’s theory of person

2012 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-34
Author(s):  
Robert Bielecki
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Personal Meaning ◽  
Personal Pronouns ◽  
Arts And Sciences ◽  
Personal Meanings ◽  
The Arts ◽  
Third Person ◽  
The One ◽  
High Degree ◽  
Semantic Properties

Abstract Robert Bielecki. Voice and Case in Finnish in the Light of Zabrocki’s Theory of Person. Lingua Posnaniensis, vol. L IV (1)/2012. The Poznań Society for the A dvancement of the Arts and Sciences. PL ISSN 0079-4740, ISBN 978-83-7654-103-7, pp. 21-34. This paper attempts to demonstrate the properties of the categories of voice and case in Finnish in the light of Zabrocki’s theory of Person. The presented morphosyntactic, syntactic and semantic properties of words taking part in diathesis lead us to formulate sentences (theorems) belonging to the sphere of the postulated grammar of person of this language. In Finnish, particular personal meanings undergo both lexicalization (in the form of appropriate personal pronouns) and grammaticalization (in the form of personal endings). Moreover the Finnish language seems to operate with a collective personal meaning, where three particular communicative statuses do not undergo differentiation. This kind of personal meaning seems to be only grammaticalized in Finnish; it lacks a pronoun lexifying such a collective personal meaning. Because of the high degree of syncretism of the nominative and (endingless) accusative on the one hand and the passive and impersonal voice on the other, Finnish contains significant overlapping between passive structures - where the three personal meanings undergo specification - and impersonal structures - where the three personal meanings undergo unification. Notwithstanding, only in sentences of the type Kana on tapettu ‘One has killed the hen’, ‘The hen has been killed’ (and with smaller probability Kana tapetaan ‘One kills (will kill) the hen’, (‘The hen is (will be) killed’)) do we encounter total ambiguity in respect of the personal meaning semified by the predicate (the collective person vs. third person).

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