scholarly journals Bayang-bayang teori keagenan pada produk pembiayaan perbankan syariah

2015 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 251
Author(s):  
Misnen Ardiansyah
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Maximum Level ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Optimum Level ◽  
Islamic Bank ◽  
Sharing Scheme ◽  
Study Find ◽  
Level Of Effort

In Indonesia, the most populer contract used by Islamic bank is murabahah contract, which is very close to the debt based financing. Many researchers argue that, this phenomenon is due to the risk faced by Islamic bank particularly related to the moral hazard by mudarib. This paper aims to explore the lack of musharakah and mudarabah contract in perspective of agency problems theory. The important issue in this paper is whether agency problem also underlies between customer as an agent and Islamic bank as a principal in financing contract. By employing holistic paradigm, namely by combining Islamic value and conventional theory, this study find two conclusion. First, agency problem in the scheme of Islamic banking products is due to the asymmetric information between agent and principal. Strict procedures and higher criteria cause mudarabah amount of financing contract of Islamic bank can not reach it optimum level. Second, agency problems which is happen in Islamic bank can be solve by optimizing the profit sharing ratio aimed to know the customer characters. Optimal sharing ratio can press the moral hazard problem, since the customer should be able to run his business with a maximum level of effort and be able to maximize the revenue generated to match the expectations of the bank and the customer. If the profit-sharing scheme is not optimal, it will lead bank suspicion, thus, banks will increase their control that it will directly have an impact on the rising of cost of monitoring and verification.   Di Indonesia, kontrak yang lumayan tenar yang paling banyak digunakan oleh bank syariah adalah akad murabahah, yang sangat dekat dengan pembiayaan berbasis utang. Banyak peneliti berpendapat bahwa, fenonema ini karena risiko yang dihadapi oleh bank syariah khususnya terkait dengan moral hazard. Tulisan ini bertujuan mengeksplorasi kurangnya musharakah dan mudarabah kontrak dalam perspektif masalah agensi teori. Isu penting dalam tulisan ini adalah apakah masalah keagenan juga mendasari antara pelanggan sebagai agen dan bank syariah sebagai utama dalam kontrak pembiayaan. Dengan menggunakan paradigma holistik, yaitu menggabungkan nilai Islam dan teori konvensional, penelitian ini menemukan dua kesimpulan. Pertama, masalah keagenan dalam skema produk perbankan syariah adalah karena informasi asimetris antara agen dan principal. Prosedur yang ketat dan kriteria yang lebih tinggi menyebabkan jumlah mudarabah kontrak pembiayaan bank syariah tidak dapat mencapai kepada tingkat optimal. Kedua, masalah keagenan yang terjadi di bank syariah dapat terpecahkan dengan mengoptimalkan nisbah bagi hasil yang bertujuan untuk mengetahui karakter pelanggan. Nisbah bagi yang optimal dapat menekan masalah moral hazard, karena pelanggan harus mampu menjalankan bisnisnya dengan tingkat maksimum usaha dan mampu memaksimalkan pendapatan yang dihasilkan sesuai dengan harapan bank dan nasabah. Jika skema bagi hasil tidak optimal, hal itu akan menyebabkan kecurigaan Bank, dengan demikian, bank akan meningkatkan kendali mereka bahwa itu akan langsung berdampak pada meningkatnya biaya monitoring dan verifikasi.

AGENCY PROBLEM DALAM PENERAPAN PEMBIAYAAN AKAD MUDHARABAH PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH

ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Human Resources ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
The Public

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).

scholarly journals The Importance of Good Customer Ethics in Improving The Financing Portion of Mudharabah

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 015
Author(s):  
Khotibul Umam
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Business Ethics ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
Islamic Bank ◽  
Bank Financing

Mudharabah is a partnership contract (reputation agreement) in which one party (shahibul maal) will give his property to another party (mudharib) as productive business capital  with profit sharing between the owner of the funds/capital based on the agreed ratio in advance. In practice, the application of financing mudharabah is not easy to be implemented in Islamic banking because financing mudharabah will make the asymmetric information between the customer and Islamic banking. Mudharabah client have more information than Islamic banking about all of that business.  Asymmetric information sometimes can make the costumer do the moral hazard and adverse selection acts with the result that Islamic banking didn't take that risk and make the distribution of mudharabah financing portion becomes very small when compared to the total number of Islamic bank financing. Mudharabah Customers must have a good business ethics and always have advanced principle of honesty, trustworthy and transparent in managing shahibul maal funds in orther to they can minimize the risk of financing mudharabah and make Islamic banking be confident to grant the decision of financing mudharabah.

scholarly journals UPAYA MEMINIMUMKAN AGENCY PROBLEM DENGAN MENGGUNAKAN KONSEP ISLAM TENTANG PERUSAHAAN

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 73-98
Author(s):  
Moh Khoiruddin
Keyword(s):  
Control System ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Cost Efficiency ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Mutual Trust ◽  
Hazard Control ◽  
Business Contract

Although companies generally have goals, in company management practices, conflicts often arise between shareholders as stakeholders and managers, and / or between shareholders and creditors. Agency problems can be experienced by companies that are operationalized with conventional concepts or those based on sharia. Conventionally, agency problem solutions can only be approached with material or incentive-oriented approaches. From the results of a number of studies, it is concluded that an incentive approach alone does not significantly reduce agency problems in the company. In the sharia concept, the anticipation process for agency problems is carried out from the start of an agreed business contract on the basis of mutual trust and trust. The approach used is not only material but also immaterial, which is oriented towards the afterlife. The moral hazard control system does not only arise from the rules made but also inherently from all parties who agree to the contract. It is possible to achieve higher supervisory cost efficiency in theory with this sharia concept.

All-or-Nothing Monitoring: Comment

2010 ◽  
Vol 100 (1) ◽  
pp. 625-627 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bo Chen
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Optimal Contract ◽  
Incentive Schemes ◽  
Monitoring Result

Zhao (2008) presents an interesting “all-or-nothing monitoring” result for a multitask moral hazard agency problem with partial effort observation. We argue that the optimal contract based on the non-verifiable observation of the agent's effort in Zhao (2008) can be regarded as a limitation on the incentive schemes available to the principal. I then propose some arguably more appropriate approaches for analyzing such agency problems. (D82, D86, M54)

PENERAPAN ASAS KEADILAN PADA TRANSAKSI PENYIMPANAN DANA NASABAH DI BANK SYARIAH BERDASARKAN AKAD MUDHARABAH

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
SITI NUR SHOIMAH
Keyword(s):  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
Business Activity ◽  
Legal Research ◽  
Conceptual Approach ◽  
Islamic Bank ◽  
Principle Of Justice

ABSTRAK This research is motivated by the fact that it does not include clauses related to the risk of the Bank or the Customer in the mudharabah agreements in the customer deposit funds in Islamic Banking (Sharia Banking), if at any time the business of managing a Islamic Bank fund suffers, even though there are also Customer funds in the business, and it’s not balanced, because maybe only one party, the Customer or the Bank, bears the risk of loss. This imbalance then causes injustice, even though justice is a shariah requirement in the distribution of results from a business activity. Research that uses the normative legal research with the statute approach, and conceptual approach, results in the finding that the principle of justice in customer deposit funds in Islamic Banking based on mudharabah agreements is realized in the form of profit sharing system in the form of proportional and balanced benefits and risks.   Keyword: Principle of Justice, Mudharabah Agreements, Customer Deposit Fund, Islamic Banking   ABSTRAK Penelitian ini dilatarbelakangi oleh fakta yang menunjukkan tidak dicantumkannya klausul terkait resiko Bank ataupun Nasabah di dalam akad mudharabah pada transaksi penyimpanan dana Nasabah di Bank Syariah, apabila suatu ketika usaha dari pengelolaan dana Bank Syariah mengalami kerugian, padahal di dalam usaha tersebut juga terdapat dana Nasabah, dan ini tentu tidak seimbang, karena dimungkinkan hanya pihak Nasabah Penyimpan atau Bank Syariah yang menanggung resiko atas kerugian tersebut. Ketidakseimbang inilah yang kemudian menimbulkan adanya ketidakadilan, padahal keadilan merupakan persyaratan syari’ah dalam pembagian hasil dari suatu kegiatan usaha. Penelitian yang menggunakan metode normatif dengan pendekatan perundang-undangan dan pendekatan konseptual ini, menghasilkan temuan bahwa asas keadilan pada transaksi penyimpanan dana Nasabah di Bank Syariah berdasarkan akad mudharabah diwujudkan dalam bentuk sistem bagi hasil berupa keuntungan dan resiko secara proporsionalitas dan seimbang.        Kata Kunci:Asas Keadilan,  Akad Mudharabah, Penyimpanan Dana Nasabah, Bank Syariah  

scholarly journals Of pride and prejudice: agent learning under sticky and persistent stereotype

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 381-410
Author(s):  
Georg D. Blind ◽  
Stefania Lottanti von Mandach
Keyword(s):  
Maximum Likelihood ◽  
Private Equity ◽  
Optimum Level ◽  
Pride And Prejudice ◽  
Anglo Saxon ◽  
Agent Learning ◽  
Economic Interaction ◽  
Level Of Effort ◽  
Group Agents ◽  
A Share

AbstractStereotypes matter for economic interaction if counterparty utility is informed by factors other than price. Stereotyped agents may engage in efforts to counter stereotype by adapting to in-group standards. We present a model informing the optimal extent of these efforts depending on an agent’s (a) share of total transactions between out- and in-group agents; and (b) share of repeated transaction pairings with in-group counterparties. Low values of (a) suppress the effect of adaptation efforts on the stereotype itself (persistence). In turn, low values of (b) mean that out-group agents cannot dissociate from stereotype (stickiness). Significantly, the model implies that the optimum level of effort may require adaptation beyond in-group standards, and that such over-adaptation attains maximum likelihood in cases where stereotype is sticky and persistent at the same time. We test our model with data on private equity buyout investments conducted in Japan between 1998 and 2015 by domestic Japanese and Anglo-Saxon funds. We document that the latter not only adapt, but eventually over-adapt. In addition, we show that their efforts are effective in reducing a premium initially asked by domestic counterparties.

scholarly journals Islamic banks: Profit Sharing Contracts and Agency Theory in the Islamic banks in Lebanon

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (18) ◽  
pp. 137-162
Author(s):  
Racha Ghayad ◽  
◽  
Mohamad Hamdan ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Agency Theory ◽  
Balance Sheet ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
Central Feature ◽  
Islamic Banks ◽  
Islamic Bank ◽  
Contractual Relations ◽  
The Absolute

The central feature characterizing the financial Islamic system is the absolute prohibition of the payment and receipt of fixed interest in any transaction. Theoretically, Islamic Banking operates on the basis of Profit Loss Sharing (Mudaraba and Musharaka). In Lebanon the balance sheet of Islamic banks appear that, the percentage of PLS financing is very weak. The lack of profit and loss sharing (PLS) financing is an important problem affecting Islamic banks in Lebanon. The main objective of this research is to analyze problems faced by Islamic banks in Lebanon to use the PLS contract. The type of PLS contract raises a set of issues concerning the contractual relations between the Islamic bank and the clients. These issues may be addressed from the perspectives of Agency Theory, as we will do in this paper.

scholarly journals PENGARUH PRINSIP BAGI HASIL DAN BUNGA, DAN REPUTASI BANK TERHADAP KEPUTUSAN NASABAH DALAM MEMILIH JASA PERBANKAN: BANK SYARIAH DAN BANK KONVENSIONAL DI KOTA JAMBI

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 38-46
Author(s):  
Eka Julianti Efris Saputri
Keyword(s):  
Discriminant Analysis ◽  
Sample Selection ◽  
Sampling Technique ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Primary Data ◽  
Analysis Method ◽  
Banking Services ◽  
Islamic Bank ◽  
Conventional Banks ◽  
Conventional Bank

This study  was intended  to  examine the effect of  profit  sharing  principle and  interest,  and  bank reputation  against  customer  decision  in  choosing  banking  services,  that  is  between  islamic  bank  and conventional  bank in Jambi  City.  Data in this study  is primary data by using  questionnaire. The sample selection  in  this research  used  nonprobability sampling  technique  with  acidental  sampling technique. The sample obtained in this study were customer of islamic bank and customer of conventional bank in Jambi City. The  analysis  method  used  was  discriminant  analysis  using  IBM  SPSS  Statistic  22.  The  results  of  the discriminant analysis prove that in choosing banking services in Jambi City between islamic banks and conventional banks, customers do not see from the principle of profit sharing and interest, and bank reputation.

scholarly journals Analysis of Low Realization For Mudharabah Financing at Muamalat Indonesia Bank, Banda Aceh

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 215-223
Author(s):  
Arinal Rahmati ◽  
Deni Mulyadi ◽  
Januddin Januddin
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Descriptive Analysis ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Islamic Banks ◽  
Analysis Method ◽  
Income Statement ◽  
Financing Model ◽  
Depth Interviews ◽  
Problem Data ◽  
Banda Aceh

This study aims to determine the causes of low realization of mudharabah financing at Muamalat Indonesia Bank, Banda Aceh Branch. This research is expected to be a framework or model for other Islamic banks that have the same problem. Data for this study are collected through in-depth interviews and documentation studies. This research uses descriptive analysis method and the results of the data obtained are analyzed qualitatively. The results of the study show that the minimum factor of realization of mudharabah financing is caused by the bank's difficulty in obtaining the income statement accurately, transparently and routinely. In addition, mudharabah products are very vulnerable to the occurrence of moral hazard from business actors (mudharib) who tend to maximize profits resulting in reduced returns to the bank as shahibul mall. Then other factors are also influenced by the ineffectiveness of the profit-sharing financing model relating to entrepreneurs and the lack of interest in the scheme of profit sharing in business activities.

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