scholarly journals Solving the AI Race: Addressing the potential pitfalls of competition towards Artificial General Intelligence

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Schmidt
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Early Stage ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Total Loss ◽  
Control Measures ◽  
General Intelligence ◽  
Loss Of Control ◽  
Human Control ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
Strategic Balance

AGI could arise within the next decades, promising a decisive strategic advantage. This paper discusses risks, associated with the development of AGI: destabilizing effects on strategic balance, underestimating risks in the interest of victory in the race, egoistically exploiting the huge benefits by a tiny minority. Further: Developed AGI could be beyond human control. Human goals could not be implemented and an intelligence explosion to superintelligence could take place leading to a total loss of control and power. If competition for AGI is non-transparent, secret, uncontrolled and not regulated, it’s possible that risks could not be managed and would lead to catastrophic consequences. The danger corresponds to that of nuclear weapons. It is crucial that the key actors of a possible AI Race agree at an early stage on the prevention and transparent regulation of a possible AI Race - similar to measures to secure strategic stability, on arms control measures, disarmament, and prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The realization that an uncontrolled AI race can lead to the extinction of humanity - this time even independent of human will – requires analogous measures to contain, prevent, regulate and secure an AI race within the framework of AGI development.

The Nonproliferation Treaty: Its Negotiation and Prospects

1969 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 788-807 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. L. M. Burns
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
Control Measures ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
United Nations General ◽  
General Assembly Resolution ◽  
United Nations General Assembly

The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) devoted its major efforts from the endof July 1965 until April 1968 to negotiating the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, spending little time on other arms control measures in the sessions throughout this period. In May 1968 the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics jointly presented the draft treaty to the First (Political and Security) Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. After lengthy debate and acceptance of several amendments to meet the wishes of nonnuclear states the Treaty reached its final form on May 21, 1968, and was “commended” in General Assembly Resolution 2373 (XXII) of June 12, 1968.

scholarly journals Strategic stability and the possibilities of China's involvement in the strategic arms control negotiations

2020 ◽  
Vol 72 (4) ◽  
pp. 678-708
Author(s):  
Marina Kostic
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Comparative Method ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Main Hypothesis ◽  
Defense Strategies ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Cold War

Th? paper focuses on the research of general possibilities and limitations of the multilateralization of the strategic arms control negotiations and particularly the inclusion of China in these negotiations because, during 2019 and 2020, the US conditioned the extension of the New START Treaty with China?s involvement in the trilateral strategic arms control negotiations. By doing so, the US recognised China as an important factor influencing the maintenance of strategic stability and possibilities for further reduction of strategic arms. The main hypothesis is the claim that the limitations still overcome the possibilities regarding the multilateralization of the strategic arms control negotiation, and that the prospects of involving China in this kind of negotiation remain minimal. This hypothesis was tested through theoretical deliberation based on the notion of strategic stability, and its transformation during the Cold War until today, as well as on four indicators or preconditions of China?s involvement in the strategic arms control, which are: 1) quantitative reduction of the number of nuclear arms of the US and Russia to China?s level; 2) decrease of the role of nuclear weapons in the national security and defense strategies of the great powers; 3) decrease of the role of nuclear weapons as the status symbol of the great power or superpower and 4) conclusion of the multilateral international agreement (not trilateral) on limitations on the use of nuclear weapons. The author uses the methods of content and discourse analysis, as well as the comparative method. The author concludes that the absence of the intention of the US and Russia to further reduce their strategic arms and decrease the role of nuclear weapons in their security and defense strategies, as well as the absence of consent on which parties or actors should be included in the arms control talks and China?s general suspicion about the effectiveness of the arms control agreements, influence China not to take part on any strategic arms control talks at this moment.

scholarly journals Debating the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from Europe: What Germany expects from Russia

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 82-96
Author(s):  
Oliver Meier ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Government Support ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Political Dimension ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
Political Debates ◽  
Recent Debate ◽  
The Government

The recent debate in Germany about nuclear sharing confirmed the broad support among decision-makers for continued involvement in the political dimension of NATO’s sharing arrangements, i. e., participation in the Alliance’s nuclear consultative bodies. At the same time, German decision-makers hold divergent views on continued participation in the operational and technical aspects of nuclear sharing. Russia’s arsenal of approximately 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons is of great concern to Germany and many in Berlin are worried that Russia is systematically expanding its nuclear arsenal. German decision-makers and the government support NATO’s dual-track policy of deterring and engaging Russia. German policy-makers’ arguments on the added military value of forward-deployed US nuclear weapons remain vague and there are few specific ideas about what type of arms control would be best suited to reduce the role and number of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. There are four frameworks in which tactical nuclear weapons could be discussed with Russia, namely the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), other multilateral fora, the Russian — US bilateral dialogue on strategic stability, and the NATO — Russia Council. If Russia is serious about reducing the role and number of nuclear weapons in Europe, it should accept the reciprocity paradigm and drop some worn-out demands and positions that have little relevance for political debates around arms control in Berlin and elsewhere.

scholarly journals Strategic stability at 30+ years: stasis, evolution, or degradation?

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 123-138
Author(s):  
D. V. Stefanovich
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
International Security ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Academic Community ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Control Measures ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
Political Relations

“Strategic stability” as a characteristic of military and political relations with a low possibility of large-scale armed confl ict between great powers remains one of the basic notions of international security, especially in its nuclear missile dimension. At the same time, this notion also sets forth tangible state of strategic forces of two (or potentially more) nations and the framework of risk reduction and arms control measures preventing a nuclear war. The purpose of this study is to identify the main trends in this area and how strategic stability can be maintained and enhanced. To this end, I review the main offi cial doctrinal documents and statements in this area, international arms control treaties, trends in the development of the armed forces, and academic and expert publications. It is concluded that strategic stability can be preserved under increasing infl uence of a growing number of new factors, both political (including degradation of arms control regimes) and technological. Among the latter are modernization and development of means for delivery of nuclear warheads, growth of long-range precision-guided non-nuclear weapons potential, increase of antagonism in new environments. The experts point out the need for active work of the academic community and diplomats to fi nd new solutions ensuring maintenance of strategic stability in the future. Negative scenarios are outlined in the absence of such solutions.

scholarly journals Russia's Nuclear Weapons in a Multipolar World: Guarantors of Sovereignty, Great Power Status & More

Daedalus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 149 (2) ◽  
pp. 37-55
Author(s):  
Anya Loukianova Fink ◽  
Olga Oliker
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
International Security ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Great Power ◽  
Missile Defense ◽  
Security Environment ◽  
Strategic Stability

At a time of technological and political change in the international security environment, Russia continues to view nuclear weapons as guarantors of peace and security among great powers. Nuclear weapons also assure Russia's own great-power status and mitigate uncertainty in an emerging multipolar order. In a world where the United States pursues improved missile defense capabilities and appears to reject mutual vulnerability as a stabilizing factor, Moscow views its modernized nuclear arsenal as essential to deter Washington from a possible attack on Russia or coercive threats against it. Some elites in Russia would like to preserve existing arms control arrangements or negotiate new ones to mitigate a weakening infrastructure of strategic stability. At the same time, however, they seem skeptical that the United States is willing to compromise or deal with Russia as an equal. Meanwhile, multilateral arms control appears to be too complex a proposition for the time being.

scholarly journals Arms control in the new military-political and technological conditions

2020 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Digital Technologies ◽  
Nuclear Nonproliferation ◽  
Dual Use ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
The World ◽  
Dialectical Relationship ◽  
Expert Community ◽  
The Military

The monograph explores past, present and future of the dialectical relationship between arms control and the military-strategic, technological and political trends in the world developments. It examines the methodology of nuclear weapons development and employment, assessment of their impact on strategic stability and the prospects for the treaty-based arms control over emerging technologies. The book analyses innovative military and dual-use digital technologies as well as space weapons and the prospects for their prohibition. It also researches the problems of arms control in Europe and threats to nuclear nonproliferation regimes. The monograph is addressed at Russian and international political and expert community, as well as for the general readers interested in arms control issues.

scholarly journals Outlines of Strategic Stability in Global Multipolar Competition

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-168
Author(s):  
V. Mizin ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
Modern World ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
Theoretical Approaches ◽  
The World ◽  
Global Parameters ◽  
Comprehensive Study

The article is devoted to the problems of ensuring strategic stability and the task of a comprehensive study of the current situation with strategic stability, developing new approaches to it, taking into account modern realities in the context of a crisis in the international situation, especially in relations between Russia and NATO, Russia and the United States. According to President Vladimir Putin, as a result, the system of strategic stability in the world continues to degrade. The main factors of this aggravation are analyzed. The task is to develop new foundations for strategic stability and assess its global parameters. The new concept of strategic stability can no longer be focused solely on the priority of preventing nuclear conflict between major nuclear powers, but must also take into account the totality of factors that determine the security situation in the realities of the modern world order. An analysis of the long-overdue systemic shift in world processes is arguably impossible without a fundamental re-evaluation of the entire perception of international security, and, above all, the concept of strategic stability, which is the theoretical basis of military policy and theoretical approaches to arms control. Academic community needs to develop a fundamentally innovative strategy for arms control in the new environment. Whether this will be a bilateral Russian-American format or a multilateral arrangement is a question that needs to be clarified in the course of diplomatic consultations. The required concept should obviously be both interdisciplinary (covering with various methodological tools a number of sciences such issues as strategic nuclear weapons, non-strategic nuclear systems, missile defense, "prompt global conventional strike", hypersonic, cyberwarfare, space, beam, drones and other "exotic" types of weapons), and multilateral (that is, it should take into account the nuclear forces and nuclear potential of "third" countries, and not just the two traditional rivals – Russia and the United States).Such a concept of strategic stability should thus be much more "holistic" and comprehensive, covering not only the military potential of the leading powers, but also taking into account their political relations and divergences, the imperative of providing restraint and preventing major conflicts in the modern world. As such, it involves a comprehensive study of the crisis realities in the international system, primarily in the Russia–NATO and Russia–US “dyads” interrelationship against the background of the emergence of new nuclear weapons stakeholders. Among other things, these factors in the global balance of power make it impossible to proceed to a nuclear-free world in the foreseeable future. In this regard, the author sets the task for the expert community to formulate certain concrete ways to implement new conceptual frameworks for assessing the global parameters of the world system's evolution, and to develop pragmatic initiatives that can be taken to improve overall stability and interaction between the United States, NATO, Russia, and other emerging global actors.

A Bifurcated Global Nuclear Order

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ramesh Thakur
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Civil Society ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Full Range ◽  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
The World ◽  
The United Nations

The very destructiveness of nuclear weapons makes them unusable for ethical and military reasons. The world has placed growing restrictions on the full range of nuclear programs and activities. But with the five NPT nuclear powers failing to eliminate nuclear arsenals, other countries acquiring the bomb, arms control efforts stalled, nuclear risks climbing, and growing awareness of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear war, the United Nations adopted a new treaty to ban the bomb. Some technical anomalies between the 1968 and 2017 treaties will need to be harmonized and the nuclear-armed states’ rejection of the ban treaty means it will not eliminate any nuclear warheads. However, it will have a significant normative impact in stigmatizing the possession, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and serve as a tool for civil society to mobilize domestic and world public opinion against the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.

scholarly journals Effectiveness of Epidemic Preventive Policies and Hospital Strategies in Combating COVID-19 Outbreak in Taiwan

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (7) ◽  
pp. 3456
Author(s):  
Ting Wan Tan ◽  
Han Ling Tan ◽  
Man Na Chang ◽  
Wen Shu Lin ◽  
Chih Ming Chang
Keyword(s):  
Mortality Rate ◽  
Incidence Rate ◽  
Risk Ratio ◽  
Early Stage ◽  
Control Measures ◽  
Polymerase Chain Reaction Test ◽  
Effective Control ◽  
Nasopharyngeal Swab ◽  
Preventive Strategies ◽  
Epidemic Control

(1) Background: The implementation of effective control measures in a timely fashion is crucial to control the epidemic outbreak of COVID-19. In this study, we aimed to analyze the control measures implemented during the COVID-19 outbreak, as well as evaluating the responses and outcomes at different phases for epidemic control in Taiwan. (2) Methods: This case study reviewed responses to COVID-19 and the effectiveness of a range of control measures implemented for epidemic control in Taiwan and assessed all laboratory-confirmed cases between 11 January until 20 December 2020, inclusive of these dates. The confirmation of COVID-19 infection was defined as the positive result of a reverse-transcriptase–polymerase-chain-reaction test taken from a nasopharyngeal swab. Test results were reported by the Taiwan Centers for Disease Control. The incidence rate, mortality rate, and testing rate were compiled, and the risk ratio was provided to gain insights into the effectiveness of prevention measures. (3) Results and Discussion: This study presents retrospective data on the COVID-19 incidence rate in Taiwan, combined with the vital preventive control measures, in a timeline of the early stage of the epidemic that occurred in Taiwan. The implementation of multiple strategy control measures and the assistance of technologies to control the COVID-19 epidemic in Taiwan led to a relatively slower trend in the outbreak compared to the neighboring countries. In Taiwan, 766 confirmed patients were included, comprised of 88.1% imported cases and 7.2% local transmission cases, within the studied period. The incidence rate of COVID-19 in Taiwan during the studied period was 32 per million people, with a mortality rate of 0.3 per million people. Our analysis showed a significantly raised incidence risk ratio in the countries of interest in comparison to Taiwan during the study period; in the range of 1.9 to 947.5. The outbreak was brought under control through epidemic policies and hospital strategies implemented by the Taiwan Government. (4) Conclusion: Taiwan’s preventive strategies resulted in a drastically lower risk for Taiwan nationals of contracting COVID-19 when new pharmaceutical drug or vaccines were not yet available. The preventive strategies employed by Taiwan could serve as a guide and reference for future epidemic control strategies.

Stepping back from the brink: Why multilateral regulation of autonomy in weapons systems is difficult, yet imperative and feasible

2020 ◽  
Vol 102 (913) ◽  
pp. 235-259
Author(s):  
Frank Sauer
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Human Control ◽  
Conventional Weapons ◽  
United Nations Convention ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
The Military ◽  
Weapons Systems

AbstractThis article explains why regulating autonomy in weapons systems, entailing the codification of a legally binding obligation to retain meaningful human control over the use of force, is such a challenging task within the framework of the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. It is difficult because it requires new diplomatic language, and because the military value of weapon autonomy is hard to forego in the current arms control winter. The article argues that regulation is nevertheless imperative, because the strategic as well as ethical risks outweigh the military benefits of unshackled weapon autonomy. To this end, it offers some thoughts on how the implementation of regulation can be expedited.

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