scholarly journals PERJALANAN SINGKAT PERKEMBANGAN FILSAFAT ILMU

2016 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hermawan Hermawan
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Nature Of Science ◽  
Scientific Method ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
Scientific Methods ◽  
History Of ◽  
Scientific Statement ◽  
Similarities And Differences

Abstract: Philosophy of science is part of the philosophy that answers some questions about the nature of science. This field learn the basics of philosophy, assumptions and implications of science, which includes, among others, natural sciences and social sciences. Here, the philosophy of science is closely related to epistemology and ontology. The philosophy of science seeks to explain issues such as: what and how a concept and can be called as a scientific statement, how the concept was born, how science can explain, predict and utilize nature through technology; how to determine the validity of an information; formulation and use of the scientific method; kinds of reasoning that can be used to obtain a conclusion; and the implications of scientific methods and models to society and to science itself. In this regard, this article will present a brief history of the development of philosophy of science to how the contribution of Islam to establish the philosophy of science. Thus it would be seen clearly similarities and differences in the aspects of epistemological, ontological, and axiological of various schools of philosophy that has developed: rationalism, empiricism, and Islam. Abstrak: Filsafat ilmu adalah bagian dari filsafat yang menjawab beberapa pertanyaan mengenai hakikat ilmu. Bidang ini mempelajari dasar-dasar filsafat, asumsi dan implikasi dari ilmu, yang termasuk di dalamnya antara lain ilmu alam dan ilmu sosial. Di sini, filsafat ilmu sangat berkaitan erat dengan epistemologi dan ontologi. Filsafat ilmu berusaha untuk dapat menjelaskan masalah-masalah seperti: apa dan bagaimana suatu konsep dan pernyataan dapat disebut sebagai ilmiah, bagaimana konsep tersebut dilahirkan, bagaimana ilmu dapat menjelaskan, memperkirakan serta memanfaatkan alam melalui teknologi; cara menentukan validitas dari sebuah informasi; formulasi dan penggunaan metode ilmiah; macam-macam penalaran yang dapat digunakan untuk mendapatkan kesimpulan; serta implikasi metode dan model ilmiah terhadap masyarakat dan terhadap ilmu pengetahuan itu sendiri. Berkaitan dengan ini, artikel ini akan memaparkan sejarah singkat perkembangan filsafat ilmu hingga bagaimana kontribusi Islam dalam membangun filsafat ilmu tersebut. Dengan demikian akan terlihat dengan jelas kesamaan dan perbedaan aspek-aspek epistemologis, ontologis, dan aksiologis dari berbagai macam aliran filsafat yang sudah berkembang: rasionalisme, empirisme, dan Islam. Keywords: filsafat ilmu, rasionalisme, empirisme, al-Quran.

Does Popper Explain Historical Explanation?

1995 ◽  
Vol 39 ◽  
pp. 225-240
Author(s):  
Kenneth Minogue
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
Scientific Method ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Historical Explanation ◽  
The Social ◽  
History Of

It is one of Karl Popper's great distinctions that he has an intense—some would say too intense—awareness of the history of philosophy within which he works. He knows not only its patterns, but also its comedies, and sometimes he plays rhetorically against their grain. He knows, for example, that the drive to consistency tends to turn philosophy into compositions of related doctrines, each seeming to involve the others. Religious belief, for example, tends to go with idealism and free will, religious scepticism with materialism and determinism. Popper does not believe in a religion, was for long some kind of a socialist, and takes his bearings from the philosophy of science. Aha! it seems we have located him. Here is a positivist, a materialist, probably a determinist. But of course he denies he is any of these things. Again, like many modern thinkers, he wants to extend scientific method not only to the social sciences but also to history. So far so familiar, until we discover that he regards nature as no less ‘cloudy’ than human societies.

Science and common sense in the study of international politics

1984 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-39
Author(s):  
Roger D. Spegele
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
International Politics ◽  
Scientific Research ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
Mind And Body ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Humean View

The history of recent efforts to establish a science of international politics may be usefully viewed as elaborate glosses on David Hume's powerful philosophical programme for resolving, reconciling or dissolving a variety of perspicuous dualities: the external and the internal, mind and body, reason and experience. Philosophers and historians of ideas still dispute the extent to which Hume succeeded but if one is to judge by the two leading ‘scientific’ research programmes1 for international politics—inductivism and naive falsificationism —these dualities are as unresolved as ever, with fatal consequences for the thesis of the unity of the sciences. For the failure to reconcile or otherwise dissolve such divisions shows that, on the Humean view, there is at least one difference between the physical (or natural) sciences. and the moral (or social) sciences: namely, that while the latter bear on the internal and external, the former are concerned primarily with the external. How much this difference matters and how the issue is avoided by the proponents of inductivism and naïve falsification is the subject matter of this paper.

scholarly journals DORĘCZENIA PISM PROCESOWYCH (UWAGI NA MARGINESIE CTH. 2,4,1 [A. 318/319] = C. 5,4,20)

2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 149
Author(s):  
Jacek Wiewiorowski
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
Controversial Issue ◽  
Basic Data ◽  
Roman Law ◽  
European Law ◽  
The Status ◽  
History Of ◽  
Universal Nature ◽  
The Way

THE NATURAL SCIENCES IN THE SERVICE OF PLEADINGS IN CASES INVOLVING MINORS: REMARKS ON CTH 2.4.1 [A. 318/319] = C. 5.4.20)SummaryThe subject of this article is the status of juvenile persons in Roman law, as exemplified by one of the constitutions of Constantine the Great, CTh 2.4.1 [a. 318/319] = C. 5.40.2, fragments of which are preserved in Theodosius’ Code of 438, and in an abridged version in Justinian’s Code of 534. In the first part of the article the author analyses the extremely controversial issue of the identity of the constitution’s addressee. In the second part he discusses the content of this constitution and the premises for its issue in the light of the Constantinian legislation on family matters and the way it was later interpreted. The article’s third part is an attempt to apply the natural and social sciences to the question of minors and their personality, and the examination of this issue as regards CTh 2.4.1 [a. 318/319] = C. 5.40.2. The author takes into consideration the basic data on the status of minors in Roman law, in the subsequent history of European law, and in non-European cultures. He concludes by making a series of observations on the potential for the application of the natural sciences in the study of Roman law, which could serve to confirm the timeless and universal nature of some of the solutions it prescribed.

scholarly journals Hayek, las ciencias y la praxeología

2017 ◽  
pp. 129-152
Author(s):  
Luis Luque Santoro
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Formal Theory ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
The Social ◽  
Methodological Principles ◽  
Science Methodology ◽  
Complex Phenomena

This paper includes the main conclusions driven from a thorough com-pilation and interpretation of F.A. Hayek’s most relevant views on the subjects of philosophy of science, epistemology and methodology regarding social scien-ces. The dialogue that Hayek seems to establish between sciences and methods is particularly highlighted. This dialogue might be summarized in two ways: a «bottom-up» connection, by offering an alternative justification for methodologi-cal dualism and the proper methodological principles for the social sciences, from the perspetive of the natural sciences methodological paradigm in which Hayek frames his human mind theory in his work The Sensory Order; and a «top-down» connection, by concluding with respect to the complex phenomena theo-ries of natural sciences that there exist common methodological challenges with the social sciences, which require in both cases to take into account methodolo-gical differences not covered under the orthodox mainstream methodological paradigm. In this sense an interpretation of Hayek’s methodological approxima-tion to economics as an applied or empirical social science is proposed; which intends to offer explanations about concrete reality, as a necessary complement of Mises praxeology which instead only focuses on pure and formal theory. Keywords: Hayek; Philosophy of Science; Methodology; Praxeology; Pure Logic of Choice. JEL Classification: A12, A14, B41, B53. Resumen: En este trabajo se presentan las principales conclusiones de una detenida compilación e interpretación de los planteamientos más importantes de F.A. Hayek sobre temas de filosofía de la ciencia, epistemología y metodo - logía de las ciencias sociales. En particular se resalta el diálogo que Hayek parece plantear entre ciencias y métodos y que se concretaría en dos senti-dos: en una conexión «por abajo», justificando el dualismo metodológico y los principios metodológicos adecuados para las ciencias sociales, desde el paradigma metodológico de las ciencias naturales en el que elabora su teoría sobre la mente humana en El Orden Sensorial; y en una conexión «por arriba» al concluir respecto a las teorías sobre fenómenos complejos de las ciencias naturales la existencia de retos comunes con los que también se enfrentan las ciencias sociales y que requieren dar cabida en ambos casos a diferencias metodológicas no previstas según el criterio ortodoxo dominante. En este último sentido, se propone una interpretación de la aproximación metodoló-gica de Hayek para la economía como una ciencia social aplicada o empí-rica que tiene como objetivo ofrecer explicaciones de la realidad, como el complemento necesario a la praxeología misesiana centrada en la teoría pura formal. Palabras clave: Hayek; Filosofía de la Ciencia; Metodología; Praxeología; Lógica Pura de la Elección. Clasificación JEL: A12 (Relación de la economía con otras disciplinas); A14 (Sociología de la economía); B41 (Metodología económica); B53 (Escuela aus-triaca).

Scientific Change

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anouk Barberousse
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Scientific Method ◽  
Scientific Progress ◽  
Scientific Change ◽  
General Question ◽  
Scientific Enterprise ◽  
History Of ◽  
Dynamics Of Science

How should we think of the dynamics of science? What are the relationships between an earlier theory and the theory that has superseded it? This chapter introduces the heated debates on the nature of scientific change, at the intersection of philosophy of science and history of science, and their bearing on the more general question of the rationality of the scientific enterprise. It focuses on the issue of the continuity or discontinuity of scientific change and the various versions of the incommensurability thesis one may uphold. Historicist views are balanced against nagging questions regarding scientific progress (Is there such a thing? If so, how should it be defined?), the causes of scientific change (Are they to be found within scientific method itself?), and its necessity (Is the history of scientific developments an argument in favor of realism, or could we have had entirely different sciences?).

Scientific realism and social science

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Russell Keat
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Social Science ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
Central Issue ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
The Social ◽  
History Of ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
Realist Conception

A central issue in the philosophy of the social sciences is the possibility of naturalism: whether disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, economics and psychology can be ‘scientific’ in broadly the same sense in which this term is applied to physics, chemistry, biology and so on. In the long history of debates about this issue, both naturalists and anti-naturalists have tended to accept a particular view of the natural sciences – the ‘positivist’ conception of science. But the challenges to this previously dominant position in the philosophy of science from around the 1960s made this shared assumption increasingly problematic. It was no longer clear what would be implied by the naturalist requirement that the social sciences should be modelled on the natural sciences. It also became necessary to reconsider the arguments previously employed by anti-naturalists, to see whether these held only on the assumption of a positivist conception of science. If so, a non-positivist naturalism might be defended: a methodological unity of the social and natural sciences based on some alternative to positivism. That this is possible has been argued by scientific realists in the social sciences, drawing on a particular alternative to positivism: the realist conception of science developed in the 1970s by Harré and others.

Social science, methodology of

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Rosenberg
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Social Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Research Design ◽  
Natural Science ◽  
Physical Science ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
Special Importance ◽  
The Social

Each of the sciences, the physical, biological, social and behavioural, have emerged from philosophy in a process that began in the time of Euclid and Plato. These sciences have left a legacy to philosophy of problems that they have been unable to deal with, either as nascent or as mature disciplines. Some of these problems are common to all sciences, some restricted to one of the four general divisions mentioned above, and some of these philosophical problems bear on only one or another of the special sciences. If the natural sciences have been of concern to philosophers longer than the social sciences, this is simply because the former are older disciplines. It is only in the last century that the social sciences have emerged as distinct subjects in their currently recognizable state. Some of the problems in the philosophy of social science are older than these disciplines, in part because these problems have their origins in nineteenth-century philosophy of history. Of course the full flowering of the philosophy of science dates from the emergence of the logical positivists in the 1920s. Although the logical positivists’ philosophy of science has often been accused of being satisfied with a one-sided diet of physics, in fact their interest in the social sciences was at least as great as their interest in physical science. Indeed, as the pre-eminent arena for the application of prescriptions drawn from the study of physics, social science always held a place of special importance for philosophers of science. Even those who reject the role of prescription from the philosophy of physics, cannot deny the relevance of epistemology and metaphysics for the social sciences. Scientific change may be the result of many factors, only some of them cognitive. However, scientific advance is driven by the interaction of data and theory. Data controls the theories we adopt and the direction in which we refine them. Theory directs and constrains both the sort of experiments that are done to collect data and the apparatus with which they are undertaken: research design is driven by theory, and so is methodological prescription. But what drives research design in disciplines that are only in their infancy, or in which for some other reason, there is a theoretical vacuum? In the absence of theory how does the scientist decide on what the discipline is trying to explain, what its standards of explanatory adequacy are, and what counts as the data that will help decide between theories? In such cases there are only two things scientists have to go on: successful theories and methods in other disciplines which are thought to be relevant to the nascent discipline, and the epistemology and metaphysics which underwrites the relevance of these theories and methods. This makes philosophy of special importance to the social sciences. The role of philosophy in guiding research in a theoretical vacuum makes the most fundamental question of the philosophy of science whether the social sciences can, do, or should employ to a greater or lesser degree the same methods as those of the natural sciences? Note that this question presupposes that we have already accurately identified the methods of natural science. If we have not yet done so, the question becomes largely academic. For many philosophers of social science the question of what the methods of natural science are was long answered by the logical positivist philosophy of physical science. And the increasing adoption of such methods by empirical, mathematical, and experimental social scientists raised a second central question for philosophers: why had these methods so apparently successful in natural science been apparently far less successful when self-consciously adapted to the research agendas of the several social sciences? One traditional answer begins with the assumption that human behaviour or action and its consequences are simply not amenable to scientific study, because they are the results of free will, or less radically, because the significant kinds or categories into which social events must be classed are unique in a way that makes non-trivial general theories about them impossible. These answers immediately raise some of the most difficult problems of metaphysics and epistemology: the nature of the mind, the thesis of determinism, and the analysis of causation. Even less radical explanations for the differences between social and natural sciences raise these fundamental questions of philosophy. Once the consensus on the adequacy of a positivist philosophy of natural science gave way in the late 1960s, these central questions of the philosophy of social science became far more difficult ones to answer. Not only was the benchmark of what counts as science lost, but the measure of progress became so obscure that it was no longer uncontroversial to claim that the social sciences’ rate of progress was any different from that of natural science.

Critical Realism for Ethnography

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Grant Banfield
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Critical Realism ◽  
Social Scientists ◽  
Sociological Practice ◽  
Critical Realist ◽  
The Social ◽  
History Of ◽  
Theoretical Developments ◽  
British Philosopher

While specific applications of critical realism to ethnography are few, theoretical developments are promising and await more widespread development. This is especially the case for progressive and critical forms of ethnography that strive to be, in critical realist terms, an “emancipatory science.” However, the history of ethnography reveals that both the field and its emancipatory potential are limited by methodological tendencies toward “naïve realism” and “relativism.” This is the antimony of ethnography. The conceptual and methodological origins of ethnography are grounded in the historical tensions between anti-naturalist Kantian idealism and hyper-naturalist Humean realism. The resolution of these tensions can be found in the conceptual resources of critical realism. Working from, and building upon, the work of British philosopher Roy Bhaskar, critical realism is a movement in the philosophy of science that transcends the limits of Kantian idealism and Humean realism via an emancipatory anti-positivist naturalism. Critical realism emerged as part of the post-positivist movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s. From its Marxian origins, critical realism insists that all science, including the social sciences, must be emancipatory. At its essence, this requires taking ontology seriously. The call of critical realism to ethnographers, like all social scientists, is that while they must hold to epistemological caution this does not warrant ontological shyness. Furthermore, critical realism’s return to ontology implies that ethnographers must be ethically serious. Ethnography, if it is to hold to its progressive inclinations, must be about something. Critical realism for ethnography pushes the field to see itself as more than a sociological practice. Rather, it is to be understood as a social practice for something: the universalizing of human freedom.

Marx in the Anthropocene: Value, Metabolic Rift, and the Non-Cartesian Dualism

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (1-2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kohei Saito
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
Ecological Crisis ◽  
Capitalist Development ◽  
Cartesian Dualism ◽  
Metabolic Rift ◽  
Second Stage ◽  
Radical Critique ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractCharacteristic to the Anthropocene is global ecological crisis that humans have created without knowing any effective solution. Beyond the division of humanities, social sciences and natural sciences, there thus emerged a series of serious attempts to figure out an adequate theoretical framework for comprehending the formation, development and future of the Anthropocene. Ecological Marxists also actively participate in this discussion to problematize the relationship between the Anthropocene and capitalism, which results in a new debate. While second-stage ecosocialists such as John Bellamy Foster and Paul Burkett are trying to connect the general issues of the Anthropocene to the concept of the ‘metabolic rift’, Jason W. Moore not only replaces the concept of the Anthropocene with the ‘Capitalocene’ and rejects the metabolic rift approach as falling into the ‘Cartesian division’, which cannot aptly theorize the nature of today’s crisis. Critically analyzing Moore’s ‘monist’ understanding of the history of capitalist development, this paper examines why Marx used apparently ‘dualist’ terminologies in his analysis. Moore claims that his post-Cartesian approach is the correct interpretation of Marx’s political economy, but a closer examination of Marx’s method reveals his non-Cartesian dualism, which functions as a basis for a radical critique of today’s ecological crisis. Furthermore, this paper argues that Marx’s theory of metabolism must be understood in relation to his intensive research on natural sciences and non-Western societies to envision possibilities of the revolutionary subjectivity.

scholarly journals PEMIKIRAN METODOLOGIS A. MUKTI ALI TENTANG PENELITIAN AGAMA

2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rahmadi Rahmadi
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Basic Concept ◽  
Scientific Method ◽  
Religious Studies ◽  
Scientific Methods ◽  
Scientific Approach ◽  
Integral Assessment

In Indonesia, it will be said that A.Mukti Ali is a pioneer in introducing religious studies. A.Mukti Ali realized thatreligious studies did not only need the scientific methods but they must also integrate with social approaches. He thoughtreligious studies should be conducted objectively without involving the apologists-polemical element as a basic concept. Infact, the use of the scientific method, social sciences, and objective attitude do not be certainly enough to understandreligious phenomenon, despite religious reflection must be involved and researchers must give their views too. All componentsmust be synthesized in order to produce a holistic and integral assessment of religious phenomenon. The integratedcomponents that needed in studying religious phenomenon is what be called by Mukti Ali as a scientific approach-cumdoctrinaire.This writing will discussed about A.Mukti Alis thoughts in the field of religious studies.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document