scholarly journals Legitimacy of democracy in the works by Max Weber and Сarl Schmitt

Pravovedenie ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 501-517
Author(s):  
Viktor P. Kirilenko ◽  
◽  
Georgij V. Alekseev ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Max Weber ◽  
Legal Culture ◽  
Carl Schmitt ◽  
Political Regime ◽  
The Political ◽  
Modern Democracy ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Political Events ◽  
The Relationship

Identification of political regime’s legality and legitimacy by the German lawyer Carl Schmitt seems to be an attempt to solve the problem of unjust laws which is close to the idea of legitimate domination stated by Max Weber. Popularity of the legitimacy paradigm within the framework of political and legal discourse on its way towards the provision of rational government is often associated with an underestimation of democratic charisma’s role in legitimation when it is compared to the legal bureaucratic justification of government. Noting the fact that rationality is the most important and at the same time the least reasoned part of Max Weber’s social theory, we need to assess the potential of the bureaucracy in securing the ideals of the rule of law with an extreme caution. If Carl Schmitt’s position on the relationship between legality and legitimacy changed along with the development of political events of the 20th century, the ideas of Max Weber were modified during the translations of his works from German and gave to legitimacy deep textbook value. Decrease in chances of unjust law’s application requires certain legal culture that allows not only to question any formal prescription of the law and to test it for legitimacy, but also gives an opportunity to assess the legality of any democratic decision before it is implemented. Understanding the legitimacy of democracy depends largely on the ideology that dominates society, and the legal culture of the person that assesses the political regime. It is obvious in the context of political mistakes made during the first half of the twentieth century that the danger of underestimating the threats to the rule of law, originating both from illegitimate authorities and from unlawful political decisions. Historical experience underscores the need for a broad understanding of the rule of law state (Rechtsstaat) in a modern democracy, which simultaneously protects the formal legality and legitimacy of the political regime.

Part III The Relationship Between the Judiciary and the Political Branches, 7 Super-presidentialism in Angola and the Angolan Judiciary

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomashausen André
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
The Political ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Constitutional State ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Parliamentary Oversight ◽  
Supply Information

This chapter recounts the history of constitutional developments in Angola leading up to the 2010 constitution. It introduces the new Angolan Constitutional Court and discusses the first and thus far only substantive decision of this Court—the Parliamentary Oversight Judgment of 9 October 2013—a serious constitutional conflict between parliament and the president. The Court held that the 2010 constitution had reduced the powers of parliament as compared to the previous text and that parliament lacked the power to question the executive or to summon ministers to hearings before it. Since these are presidential powers, the Court held, parliament may not arrogate them, though it may request the president to supply information or order his ministers before it. Although the conservative leaning of the Court in this dispute disappointed the opposition and many commentators, the judgment strengthened the rule of law and of the constitutional state.

scholarly journals Ewolucja reżimu politycznego w Polsce w okresie funkcjonowania rządu Beaty Szydło

2019 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 21-35
Author(s):  
Maciej Olejnik
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Political Regime ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Elites ◽  
Media Freedom ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Illiberal Democracy ◽  
Types Of Democracy

Evolution of the political regime in Poland during the functioning of Beata Szydło’s government Liberal and illiberal democracies can be defined on the basis of five criteria distinct in both types of democracy: the rule of law, the government’s control, political elites’ integrity, media freedom and minorities’ protection. The article shows that four out of five criteria constituting illiberal democracy were fulfilled in Poland while Beata Szydło’s government was functioning the rule of law, the government’s control, media freedom and minorities’ protection, whereas only one systemic norm forming illiberal democracy minorities’ protection was fulfilled when the previous governments Donald Tusk and Ewa Kopacz’s governments operated. Thus, it can be stated that the transition from liberal to illiberal democracy took place in the period of the functioning of Szydło’s government.

scholarly journals Demokratska vladavina prava

2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-106
Author(s):  
Olivier Jouanjan
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Direct Democracy ◽  
Fundamental Principle ◽  
Carl Schmitt ◽  
Modern Democracy ◽  
Political Will ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Administrative Control ◽  
The People ◽  
Collective Process

In Europe, democracy has a bright future. Not one democratic mechanism, however direct, cannot guarantee direct democracy. Therefore, the theory of populism by theoretician Carl Schmitt is analyzed « thoughts on Schmitt against Schmitt : Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde“. Furthermore, the democratic myth is discussed and its ideology. The state of rule of law of modern democracy and the two faces of modern democracy are analyzed. The need to participate in civil society in administrative control is stressed. The relation of the tension between democracy and rule of law is observed. The need to consider the concept of considering modern democracy in relation to the idea of rule of law, democracies under conditions of modern politics on the basis of which Böckenförde, referring to Hegel, calls the problem „division “are emphasized. It is precisely from this problem that Böckenförde shows that modern democracy can only be representative. Representation is a fundamental principle of the rule of law while representation means a system of formation necessary for expressing the political will of the people. Every formation of the collective process means the introduction of standards of procedure, significant guarantees and formal conditions of this process.

Deficiencies of the Rule of Law and the Legal Culture, and Its relationship to Underdevelopment

2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Francisco Javier Fonseca
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Economic Models ◽  
Legal Culture ◽  
The State ◽  
Formal Expression ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Cultural Aspects ◽  
Actual Fact ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractFor many years research on development has been focused on complex economic models. However, the underdevelopment phenomenon entails important cultural aspects which have been barely explored. One of those aspects is the relationship between legal culture and the rule of law, and its effects on development. The aim of this article is to find evidence of the relationship between the lack of the binomial rule of law/legal culture and underdevelopment. The article states that legal culture and rule of law, as factors for development, are a binomial, meaning that, in the research of development/underdevelopment phenomenon, those factors are to be studied together. Rule of law, in terms of its relationship with development, should not be conceived as a mere formal expression of generalized submission to laws, including on the part of the organs of the State itself, but it should also be observed from a broader perspective. Hence its necessary connection with the legal culture, as the existence of these laws and the actual fact that people, generally, be conscious of them and their conduct be guided by them. The existence of the binomial rule of law/legal culture constitutes, in this way, a framework for the flourishing of development in a given region or country.

The Political and the Basic Law'sSozialstaatPrinciple—Perspectives from Constitutional Law and Theory

2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (11) ◽  
pp. 1887-1900 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Michael Heinig
Keyword(s):  
Welfare State ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Carl Schmitt ◽  
The Political ◽  
Social State ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Welfare State

The welfare state aspect is among the central characteristics of German statehood as established by the constitution. For the Basic Law's drafters, it was so indispensable that they included the mandate of a welfare state in the catalogue of constitutional principles which are to have eternal validity within the constitution and which could only be dispensed with at the cost of breaching the constitution, the cost of revolution (Article 79(3) of the Basic Law (Grundgesetzin German; hereinafter “GG”)). Article 79(3) GG codifies the distinction between constitution and constitutional provision made prominent by Carl Schmitt, whose constitutional doctrine of 1928 asserted that, while the constitutional legislature can amend an individual provision in the constitution, the constitution as a whole is not to be changed short of political action transcending the law, that is, a revolution. Article 79(3) GG takes up this idea, insulating certain features of the constitution from amendment. These features—outside all democratic reach and thus quasi depoliticized—include the inviolability of human dignity (Article 1(1) GG) and the nature of the state as a democracy, a republic, a federal state based on the rule of law, and a “social” state (Article 20(1) GG). On closer scrutiny, the principles underlying the state's structure reveal a significant difference between, on the one hand, the principles of democracy, federalism, the rule of law, and republicanism and, on the other, the principle of the welfare state. The four former features stem from long traditions in constitutional law; modern political philosophy has detailed them precisely and the Basic Law concretizes them in thorough regulations. In contrast, the political history of ideas has failed to produce a “flag-bearing” thinker for the welfare state. The establishment of the welfare state has played no significant role in constitutional history. And, on first glance, even the Basic Law seems to provide hardly any specifics as to what exactly makes up its “social” state or, in particular, what normative consequences follow from this constitutional principle. This raises the question: What actually justifies the principle of the welfare state's illustrious position among those constitutional entities endowed with highest relevance? The following discussion develops the answer: Regardless of its limited historical and theoretical traditions, the principle of theSozialstaatfinds its meaning beyond its doctrinal content in its own distinct, symbolic substance.

scholarly journals Liberalisme dan Rasionalitas sebagai Basis Rule of Law: Perspektif Gerald Turkel

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-200
Author(s):  
Aditya Yuli Sulistyawan
Keyword(s):  
Critical Theory ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Social Action ◽  
Max Weber ◽  
The United States ◽  
Philosophical Study ◽  
Classical Liberalism ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Common Thread ◽  
The Relationship

This paper is intended to discuss Gerald Turkel’s thoughts on liberal society, rationality, and rule of law, as well as the author’s analysis of the paradigms that underlie these thoughts. This article focuses on the scope of social change by analyzing how rule of law has made the change from classical liberalism and competitive capitalism to corporate liberalism and corporate capitalism in the United States. Through the study of literature, the author can conclude that there is a common thread between the relationship between classical liberalism, competitive capitalism and the rule of law ideology, in this case the rule of law is explained based on the typology of legal decision making put forward by Max Weber and his views on rationality and social action. Next, a philosophical study by the author paradigmatically against the thought of Turkel concluded that Turkel’s writings were still in the understanding of the positivism paradigm. However, this paradigmatic study is not the only one because through this writing, the reader is invited to slowly (but surely) enter the “world” paradigm of critical theory et. al. Therefore, among the paradigmatic ranges, Turkel actually rests on the post-positivism paradigm. Abstrak Artikel ini membahas pemikiran Gerald Turkel mengenai masyarakat liberal, rasionalitas, dan rule of law, serta paradigma yang memayungi pemikiran tersebut. Artikel ini difokuskan pada lingkup perubahan sosial dengan menganalisis bagaimana rule of law telah membuat perubahan dari liberalisme klasik dan kapitalisme kompetitif menuju liberalisme korporasi dan kapitalisme korporasi di Amerika Serikat. Melalui studi literatur, artikel ini menyimpulkan bahwa terdapat benang merah hubungan antara liberalisme klasik, kapitalisme kompetitif dan ideologi rule of law, dalam hal ini rule of law yang dijelaskan berdasarkan tipologi pengambilan keputusan hukum yang dikemukakan oleh Max Weber dan pandangannya tentang rasionalitas dan tindakan sosial. Telaah filsafati yang dilakukan secara paradigmatik terhadap pemikiran Turkel menyimpulkan bahwa tulisan Turkel masih berada dalam pemahaman paradigma positivisme. Namun demikian, telaah paradigmatik ini bukanlah satu-satunya, karena melalui tulisan tersebut pembaca diajak untuk secara perlahan-lahan (namun pasti) memasuki “dunia” paradigma critical theory. Oleh karena di antara rentang paradigmatik itu, Turkel sejatinya berpijak pada paradigma post-positivisme.

scholarly journals The Rule of Law, Religious Authority, and Oaths of Office

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 195-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Aroney
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Democratic Politics ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Political Office ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Relationship

The rule of law requires political office holders to exercise their powers in accordance with the law. Most societies, however, rely not only on the moral obligation to obey the law but also require office holders to take a religious oath or solemn affirmation. The divine witness to the oath of office stands in as a guarantor of the political order but also looms above it. As such, the oath represents a paradox. It guarantees the performance of official duties while also subjecting them to external judgement. The oath thus encompasses the large question of the relationship between religious conviction, personal fidelity, moral principle, and political power. It suggests that law and religion are as much intertwined as separated in today’s politics. By tracing the oath of office as a sacrament of power, much light can be shed on the relationship between law and religion in today’s liberal-democratic politics.

Cicero and Milo

1974 ◽  
Vol 64 ◽  
pp. 62-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. W. Lintott
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
The State ◽  
The Political ◽  
New Era ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Political Position ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Political Realignment ◽  
Political Scene

The battle of Bovillae on 18th January, 52 B.C., which led to Clodius' death, was literally treated by Cicero in a letter to Atticus as the beginning of a new era—he dated the letter by it, although over a year had elapsed. It is difficult to exaggerate the relief it afforded him from fear and humiliation for a few precious years before civil war put him once more in jeopardy. At one stroke Cicero lost his chief inimicus and the Republic lost a hostis and pestis. Moreover, the turmoil led to a political realignment for which Cicero had been striving for the last ten years—a reconciliation between the boni and Pompey, as a result of which Pompey was commissioned to put the state to rights. Cicero's behaviour in this context, especially his return to the centre of the political scene, is, one would have thought, of capital importance to the biographer of Cicero. Yet two recent English biographies have but briefly touched on the topic. It is true that, in the background of Cicero's personal drama, Caesar and Pompey were taking up positions which, as events turned out, would lead to the collapse of the Republic. However, Cicero and Milo were not to know this, nor were their opponents; friendly cooperation between the two super-politicians apparently was continuing. Politicians on all sides were still aiming to secure power and honour through the traditional Republican magistracies, and in this pursuit were prepared to use the odd mixture of violence, bribery and insistence on the strict letter of the constitution, which was becoming a popular recipe. In retrospect their obsession with the customary organs of power has a certain irony. Yet it is a testimony to the political atmosphere then. Their manoeuvres are also important because both the instability caused by the violence of Clodius and Milo, and the eventual confidence in the rule of law established under Pompey's protection, helped to determine the political position of the boni associated with Pompey in 49 B.C. Cicero's relationship with Milo is at first sight one of the more puzzling aspects of his career. What had they in common, except that Milo, like most late Republican politicians, was at one time associated with Pompey? Properly interpreted, however, this relationship may not only illuminate Cicero's own attitudes but illustrate the character of the last years of Republican politics.

The Relationship between Constitutions, Socioeconomics, and the Rule of Law: A Quantitative Thermodynamic Approach

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaus Jaffe ◽  
Antonio Canova ◽  
Jose Gregorio Contreras ◽  
Ana Cecilia Soares ◽  
Juan Carlos Correa ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Thermodynamic Approach ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The Relationship
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